Department Seal

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume XI
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

flag
bar

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

126. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 31, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

SUBJECT

Report Number Six of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of late Wednesday afternoon, October 31, 1962.

2. The situation was assessed as one in which the Soviets were seeking to retrieve diplomatically as much as they could from the debacle: re-raising, at levels short of formal diplomacy, the question of Turkish bases and Guantanamo; seeking to protect the Cuban revolution and maintaining some credibility for the value of Soviet support outside the Bloc; seeking, by propaganda, to make the most of Khrushchev's "statesmanship" and to reaffirm Soviet strength and toughness. The Soviets evidently have a problem with Castro; but it was judged likely that they would seek to salvage the Communist revolution in Cuba, with or without Castro; and that Mikoyan's mission was designed, by means of stick and carrot, to achieve a reconciliation of their commitment to remove the missile bases with this longer run objective.

3. It was judged urgent that we resume a posture of pressure unless there was a radical break in the diplomatic situation, including reconnaissance and maintenance of the blockade. On a contingency basis preparations for putting increased pressure on Castro by extending the blockade to POL were judged urgent. Such measures might be introduced in the first instance by increments, through low-level, informal action.

4. Such measures of increased pressure on Castro might be executed with the knowledge and even connivance of the Soviet Union, if it found Castro too difficult to deal with; although we should refuse any substantial price for Soviet collaboration in this exercise.

5. In the light of Soviet tactics, including Kuznetsov's invitation to Stevenson to widen soon the area of discussion, it was felt more important than ever that we separate all other matters from the three central issues; that is, the removal of offensive missiles, the lifting of the blockade, and a form of assurance that we would not invade, consistent with our OAS commitments and the President's September 13 press conference. As counterpoint to UN negotiations, the OAS should be active on several fronts, including the review of latest evidence on Cuban indirect aggression in Latin America. If discussions with Soviet officials were to go beyond Cuban problems, the first issue that ought to be raised is the question of the enforcement of the Laos agreement.

6. The eleven tasks listed under 3 a-j in Report Number Five were reviewed./1/ All are in motion.

/1/Document 109.

7. With respect to task 3 a (probable Soviet military policy), it was noted that among the options open to the Soviet Union was a stepped up missile defense system, the possibilities for which should be included in that task, along with other measures for correcting what Moscow evidently regards as the dangerous Soviet nuclear imbalance. In addition, the CIA representative undertook to generate a speculative paper which would attempt roughly to cost out alternative Soviet methods for correcting the nuclear imbalance. (Action: Mr. Whitman)

8. One of the most likely possibilities was judged to be that the Soviet Union would undertake, as after Stalin's death, a prolonged and serious re-evaluation of its military and foreign policy in the light not merely of their Cuban misadventure but the frustration of many lines of policy which they have been pursuing since, roughly, 1957. The decisions at which they finally arrive in this likely reassessment will depend, in part, on our posture and our policy from the present forward, as they perceive it, just as Stalin's policy was shaped after 1945 by his assessment of our strengths and vulnerabilities, and Khrushchev's after 1957, by his assessment as of that time. The cast of our total military and foreign policy in coming months is thus one critical variable in the making of new Soviet dispositions. The implications of this possible interconnection and recommended courses of action and signals to Moscow, designed to produce new Soviet dispositions most in our interest, is a new task assigned to the group chaired by Mr. Harvey.

127. Summary Record of the 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 31, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Mr. McCone noted that on an open line between Moscow and Havana, Suslov, speaking for Gromyko, had talked to Abramovich, the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, giving urgent instructions.

Secretary Rusk gave a preliminary report on U Thant's failure to persuade Castro to accept UN inspection procedures in Cuba. He said that McCloy in New York had reported Kuznetsov had said that antiaircraft complexes in Cuba were controlled by the Cubans.

The President directed that all government officials talking to the Russian officials should talk only about Cuba and the removal of offensive weapons. The Russians should be told that when the Cuban crisis is settled, we will talk about other matters. Our policy is to listen to whatever the Russians have to say on other matters but make no response until the Cuban situation has been resolved. The President asked that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be so informed.

Secretary McNamara reported that U-2 flights had produced no pictures because of bad weather and that there existed a requirement for low-level flights. Secretary Rusk and General Taylor agreed.

Secretary Rusk said the time had come for us to build up pressure on our side.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the quarantine be reinstituted for dawn tomorrow. U.S. ships will hail all ships entering the quarantine zone. If they reply, giving their name, port of origin, and cargo, they will be allowed to proceed to port. If their reply is unsatisfactory, the U.S. Navy ship will report to Washington. No ship would be boarded without specific authorization by the President, which the Secretary of Defense will obtain after consulting the Secretary of State.

With reference to low-level flights, Secretary McNamara said that he favored ten or twelve sorties, General Taylor favored eighteen, and General LeMay recommended thirty.

The President directed that fourteen low-level sorties be made with no more than one pass over each target. Missile sites and roads were acceptable targets, but no ports are to be included.

Returning to the decision on reinstituting the quarantine, the President said a final decision would be made after Secretary Rusk reported to him later this evening on the U Thant/Castro talks. If the quarantine was reinstituted, we would make a public announcement.

In response to a request by USIA Acting Director Wilson for guidance with respect to official radio broadcasts to Cuba, the President recommended no verbal attacks on Cuba via this media for this week. He asked that emphasis be given to the fact that the OAS decision is the basis for our aerial surveillance of Cuba and that the issue is not U.S. vs. Cuba, but Cuba vs. all the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Wilson read the themes which are being used by USIA on its broadcasts. The President asked Mr. Wilson to get from others, including foreign diplomatic officials in Cuba, their impression of our radio broadcasts.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be informed of the arrest at sea of anti-Castro Cubans heading toward Cuba. (The U.S. ship arresting the Cubans was the PT-109, the ship used in the film of that name.)

The President also asked that McCloy be informed of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] planned sabotage in Venezuela.

The President held for decision tomorrow a proposal which would initiate the next step in the planned U.S./USSR space cooperation program. He asked that the initialed U.S./USSR civil air agreement, which had never been finally signed, be reexamined.

The President commented that we should make known that we are anxious to stop our air surveillance of Cuba if the UN comes up with a satisfactory substitute. However, we must continue surveillance in our own national interests until a satisfactory substitute is found.

Bromley Smith/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

128. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 10:59 p.m.

New York, October 31, 1962, 10 p.m.

1579. For Secretary from McCloy. Department pass White House. Immediately after I received from you President's instructions, Akalovsky at my request informed Kuznetsov along following lines:

1. In absence international inspection personnel, such as ICRC, US prepared make gesture re quarantine. While quarantine in full will start tomorrow, we prepared let ships pass on hail-and-pass basis, as in case Sov tanker Bucharest, i.e., no inspection on board vessels would be involved. We prepared use this procedure for a few days until more solid basis for inspection of ships is developed.

2. Re aerial surveillance, US believes it would be good for everybody if evidence were obtained that dismantling of relevant facilities has started, i.e., if we could show to world pictures attesting to that fact. We hope USSR would do everything to avoid incidents in connection our overflights, because any such incident would create gravest situation and would again put us face to face.

Kuznetsov appreciated information, but with respect to second point stated USSR could not do anything because anti-aircraft defense was in Cuban hands. US was facing Kuznetsov with problem where he could do nothing because problem related to Cuban territory and sovereignty. Akalovsky observed USSR could use its influence with Cuba in order prevent incidents fraught with gravest danger. Kuznetsov replied he could not add anything to what he had already said.

Stevenson

129. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 31, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, October-November Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and concurred in by McCloy.

1581. Subject: Cuba. Dept pass White House. McCloy had one hour mtg with Kuznetsov today./1/ After exchange of pleasantries, McCloy noted U Thant and his entire party leaving Havana 4:30 p.m. today, and according our info there were difficulties with Castro. While we understood Sov reluctance admit inspection on ground before weapons removed, which might reveal secret technology, US would have to continue aerial surveillance starting tomorrow, and until verification by UN arranged. Most dangerous situation would arise if our planes were to be shot at or downed. We prepared to turn aerial surveillance over to UN, but so long as no adequate UN verification existed US would continue its own flights. Our photographs of day before yesterday did not indicate any marked progress in dismantling, indeed indicated some further construction, although we realized not all sites may have received appropriate orders. We hoped photographs after tomorrow would show such progress.

/1/Gilpatric's 2-page handwritten notes on this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba, Gilpatric Notes.

Kuznetsov observed all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy said we had thought sophisticated weapons were in Soviet hands. Kuznetsov repeated all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy reiterated most dangerous situation would arise as result US surveillance planes being shot at or downed.

Kuznetsov then said President and Khrushchev had committed themselves to certain steps and it was his and McCloy's job see that arrangements be made for carrying out those steps. Dismantling of relevant facilities would be finished in couple of days, probably by Nov 2 or 3, although he not familiar with details. McCloy asked what he meant by dismantling. Did this include destruction buildings and emplacements? Kuznetsov said he did not know details. As to time required for removal of what US called offensive weapons, that would depend on number of ships available, which in turn depended on US position re quarantine, because if no Sov ships were able go to Havana, removal would obviously be protracted. McCloy observed he believed Sovs would have no difficulty getting enough ships to Havana for purpose of removal offensive weapons. Kuznetsov continued verification arrangements must be worked out with Castro; as to USSR, it prepared fulfill its obligations.

Kuznetsov then said that number other problems must be discussed so as to create a situation precluding recurrence of what happened this time. Suggested McCloy think about them so as to have discussion those problems at later date. Kuznetsov said under U Thant proposal, USSR had fulfilled its part, i.e., it refrained from sending ships to quarantine area and from sending arms to Cuba. Thus it had also met US desires. On other hand, U Thant's proposal also provided for lifting quarantine, but so far US Govt had agreed to suspend quarantine only for two days. Another problem was that of assurances to Cuba that no invasion would be launched from US or Latin American countries, that no preparations for invasion would take place in territory of US or LA's and that no organization of subversive activities by refugees against Cuba would take place in US or LA's. Important make clear that Cuban people could live in security and peace. President-Khrushchev exchange indicated some assurances should be given to Cuba against subversion and interference in its internal affairs.

McCloy responded he could not tell definitely US attitude on these points; however, Kuznetsov's statement of problems welcome and we would express our views on them at appropriate time. Problem of exiles ticklish, since they anxious make Cuba free so that it could do what it wanted do and be free of pressures by Castro. It would be difficult to control their thoughts. Organizing refugees into units was one thing, but control of their thoughts was a different matter. We could not get into a position of guaranteeing support for Castro, particularly in view Cuba now center of infection of subversive and sabotage activities against Latin American countries as demonstrated by recent events in Venezuela. McCloy then stressed main problem at this time was removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. When this done atmosphere for discussion other problems, including test ban and disarmament, would be much better. Kuznetsov agreed but commented it difficult define defensive and offensive weapons since US called its weapons at foreign bases defensive, although those weapons were same as weapons USSR had placed in Cuba. Suggested however that discussion this subject would serve no useful purpose at this time and that McCloy and he deal with practical matters before them to make arrangements which would preclude recurrence present situation.

McCloy inquired whether USSR thought ICRC would act as agent of UN. Kuznetsov replied definitely yes. Re Kuznetsov's remark USSR had done something under U Thant proposal, McCloy pointed out it had been USSR who had created this situation in first place by introducing offensive weapons Cuba and pointing them at our hearts. It impossible negotiate while gun was on table and therefore removal those weapons was primary problem. As to definition offensive weapons, US had made clear what it meant and Sovs knew it.

Kuznetsov then inquired re US views on what if any UN presence would be required after removal of relevant weapons completed. President's message to Khrushchev contained two points relating to this problem, which needed clarification. McCloy replied he had not given much thought to what would be required after removal completed, but he did not think that any interminable UN presence would be needed. We would give this matter further consideration.

Kuznetsov suggested thought be given to procedure for handling Cuban item in Security Council. Noting USSR had no fixed views on this point as yet, wondered whether might not be possible have a joint US/USSR statement or separate statements by two Govts with Security Council taking note of such statement or statements and appealing to all states to facilitate implementation arrangements. McCloy responded he no UN expert and pointed out Stevenson rather than he US Rep in UN. His own function was merely to coordinate US policy on Cuban problem. Kuznetsov said that his assignment was to assist Acting SYG in resolving Cuban problem as speedily as possible and Zorin was USSR spokesman in UN. McCloy expressed hope Castro would be less recalcitrant and observed US and Sovs might find themselves united vis-a-vis Castro. Kuznetsov smiled.

At one point early in conversation Kuznetsov said Mikoyan arriving NY 2 or 3 p.m. Nov 1 and leaving NY shortly after noon Nov 2. Mikoyan would like meet with McCloy and extended invitation to dinner Nov 1. McCloy said he would of course make himself available for meeting with Mikoyan, but not quite sure whether he had any prior engagement for tomorrow night. Would give definite reply first thing tomorrow morning after checking calendar. Subsequently, after talking with Secretary, McCloy confirmed he would be available for dinner.

Stevenson

130. Summary Record of the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 1, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary of developments in Cuba and brief reports on situations in several other areas./1/ The question of who mans the SAM sites in Cuba is still unanswered, but existing evidence indicates that the Russians control and command these missiles. Mr. McCone added that the Russians may be using Castro's obstructionism to serve Soviet interests in connection with on-site inspection. He said the Soviets, in talks with U.N. and U.S. officials, are forthcoming on questions of on-site inspection.

/1/Based in part on CIA memorandum [document number not declassified], "The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 1 November 1962." (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk said the most important question to be decided is whether we should make low-level flights over Cuba today. He recommended that if we fly and if we lose a reconnaissance plane, we should not retaliate today.

The President noted that we could expect nothing more from Castro until Mikoyan arrives in Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that Mr. Gilpatric and our officials in New York recommend that no reconnaissance flights be flown today in view of U Thant's request that nothing be done to interfere with his discussions with Mikoyan. The Soviets are reported to have told U Thant that the missile sites in Cuba would be bulldozed beginning tomorrow.

Secretary McNamara said personally he thought we ought to fly low-level missions today. The Russians have not so far complied with their agreement to withdraw the missiles and the U.S. public needs to be reassured that we know what is going on in Cuba. He said we need more information on the IL-28 bombers in Cuba. He urged that flights be authorized today because Mikoyan would be arriving in Cuba tomorrow. He doubted that there would be any Soviet or Cuban reaction to our flights.

General Taylor stated that we cannot appear to be stopped by Castro's threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes. He recommended that fourteen flights be authorized over missile sites and Cuban ports. If a reconnaissance plane was shot down, he recommended that we reinstitute the blockade.

The President said he did not favor reinstituting the blockade because we would have to stop Soviet ships. He thought that we could carry out low-level reconnaissance missions because our best guess is that there would be no reaction to such flights. He asked how we could deal with the shooting down of one of our planes if the pictures revealed that the Soviet missiles were being dismantled.

Secretary McNamara recommended that there be two flights of two planes each, one over the airfield where the IL-28 planes are based, and the other over the three MRBM sites. The eastern part of Cuba would be covered only by U-2 flights. The purpose of overflying the IL-28 airfield would be to make clear that we consider these bombers "offensive weapons," to be removed by the Russians.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be told that we are making low-level flights. It should be made clear to the Russians that the Cubans are preventing us from establishing inspection procedures accepted by the Russians, and, therefore, we must continue our aerial surveillance.

The Attorney General suggested that we talk to UN officials and get from them a promise to institute a UN inspection system.

The President wanted the Defense Department to provide him with the proposed flight patterns and the time over target of each flight.

Assistant Secretary Nitze said that the IL-28 bombers had been given to the Cubans, and, therefore, if we overflew the bomber bases, we should expect to be fired upon. He doubted that we would be fired upon if we flew over the SAM sites. He recommended that we not fly low-level over the IL-28 base because we have not made clear yet to the Russians that the IL-28 bombers are included in the deal as "offensive weapons." In addition, he noted that we do not intend to include the SAM sites in our discussion of weapons to be withdrawn from Cuba.

Secretary McNamara restated his view that we should get pictures of the IL-28 base, but that no flights need be flown over the Isle of Pines. He said again that chances of losing one of our planes are very small. In his view it is essential that the IL-28 bombers be included among Soviet weapons to be withdrawn, hence, we should have the latest information as to whether they are being dismantled.

The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the IL-28 base and of several MRBM sites. If a U.S. plane is shot down, no military reprisal will be taken today. The President asked that a full brief be provided to Mr. McCloy in New York in order to reinforce his strong statement to Mikoyan about why we are making low-level flights.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize full photographic coverage of Cuba on Saturday/2/ when the Soviet missiles will supposedly be removed.

/2/November 4.

The President asked for consideration of a longer range surveillance plan. He suggested that we tell the Soviets that if they refuse to take out the IL-28 bombers, we will insist upon on-site inspection.

Secretary Dillon noted that the OAS would support our demand in view of the fact that the Russians have now admitted that their forces are in Cuba. He urged that we make no commitment about not invading Cuba if we do not get satisfactory aerial surveillance and an acceptable inspection system.

The President directed that if one of our planes was hit, we would not announce this fact. We would not announce our intention to make low-level flights, but we would announce the return of our planes after they are back.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

131. Record of Action at the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary covering developments in Cuba, as well as brief reports on situations in other areas. In response to a question, he said the admittedly confused evidence pointed to the conclusion that SAM sites in Cuba are under Russian control.

2. There followed a discussion of whether aerial reconnaissance should be carried out over Cuba today. The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the airbase where the IL-28 planes are stationed and over certain MRBM sites. Weather conditions ruled out U-2 flights today. The major reason for overflying the IL-28 base is to make clear that we consider these planes "offensive weapons" to be removed by the Russians, and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled.

3. The President asked that Mr. McCloy make clear to Mikoyan during a conversation later today that we must carry out aerial reconnaissance over Cuba because the Cubans are preventing the implementation of the Soviet agreement to UN inspection of the removal of the missiles. A message to McCloy was to be drafted./1/

4. Following a discussion of reprisals to be taken if a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot down over Cuba, the President decided that no retaliation would take place today.

5. General Taylor was assured that the full photographic coverage of Cuba planned for a later time--after the reported date of the removal of Soviet missiles from existing sites--would be authorized.

McGeorge Bundy

/1/See Document 132.

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 1, 1962, 3 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963. Confidential; Niact.

1158. Eyes only from Undersecretary Ball. President believes it essential that in conversation with Mikoyan (and Kuznetsov as appropriate) following points be made with utmost emphasis:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding based on assumption that Sovs would and could deliver on Khrushchev commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and through UN verification satisfy U.S. and other OAS countries. This in fact done and does not recur.

2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached that U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.

3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuban agreement. Further instructions on this will come later today.) US also promptly responded SYG request suspend quarantine and recon flights during period his Havana visit. Also as Sovs aware USG has close watch to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

4. On question verification USG has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible UN arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented.

5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence UN verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and LA publics.

6. Thus, although much less satisfactory than UN verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27 is clear in covering "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear acceptance that all of these arms are to be dismantled, crated and returned to Sov Union (or destroyed). You should seek to elicit a clear confirmation that the IL28's are included and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba.

8. In addition, you should point out that if Sov missiles and bombers are being removed, there seems no need for Soviets to leave in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. (Note that SAM's use missile fuel which proscribed under quarantine regulations.) President's undertaking against invasion is adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed.

9. The President particularly desires that there should be no discussion of wider issue from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter.

Rusk

133. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 2, 1962, 1 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/11-262. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of State at 1:52 a.m. A 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, IA October/November Meetings.

1604. Eyes only for the Secretary. McCloy, Stevenson and Akalovsky met with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, Dobrynin, Menshikov and Zhukov from 7 to 11 pm Thursday/1/ night. Mikoyan started in aggressive mood, insisting on suspending quarantine now, saying that was U Thant's intention. We repeated that the agreement was embodied in the correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy and left no uncertainty that the hail and pass quarantine could not be suspended until the Red Cross inspection was in effect. This seemed to bother Mikoyan considerably, but after some further discussion he dropped the matter. When asked how far away the nearest Soviet ships were, he replied four or five days. We pointed out that in that event, if Red Cross inspection was established quickly, few if any Soviet ships would have to pass the present quarantine. He said Thant had agreed with him that the US should suspend quarantine during the interval.

/1/November 1.

Mikoyan then asked if we were working now to formalize the agreement between us. We replied there were only three questions: Red Cross inspection, inspection and verification of removal of weapons, and the guarantee to Cuba; and saw only one difficulty in reaching an agreement, namely Castro's rejection of verification. Mikoyan made long speech insisting on linking Castro's five points with Soviet-US agreement and charged US with drawing attention to only "temporary" questions while overlooking "cardinal" questions. He said we obviously did not want to hear about interests of others and were only concerned with our own interests. He went on to suggest certain reports should be made to United Nations and that a formal document or protocol should be executed, and that he wanted negotiations to commence formally on basis of the letters, including Castro's five points,/2/ between the US, Soviet and U Thant. Later he asked if Cuba should not be included in the discussions, repeating again and again that we must discuss Guantanamo and the other points relating to normalizing the situation in the Caribbean with UN presences in Cuba, in the US and in other parts of the area, to see that agreement adhered to. Castro, he said, was Prime Minister of independent state and we can't evade assurances of non-aggression against Cuba, that we were withdrawing from our commitments and must discuss everything, that they must know the US position in order to tell Castro.

/2/Castro's five points were made in a letter to U Thant, October 28. Castro stated that U.S. guarantees against an invasion would be ineffective without: 1) cessation of the economic blockade and commercial and economic pressure against Cuba; 2) cessation of subversive activities; 3) cessation of piratical attacks from U.S. and Puerto Rican bases; 4) cessation of violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters; and 5) U.S. withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its return to Cuba. The text of the letter is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448.

We repeated over and over that we must stick to this problem and this problem only and could consider no other questions. We added that Castro could raise any questions he pleased and that they would be dealt with at the right time and that we were concerned with one question only and that was between the US and Soviet Union. He went back again and again to his insistence that we were by-passing the other side, including lifting the blockade and normalizing the situation, that the whole understanding would have to be formalized in documents registered with the United Nations and approved by the Security Council, and that we can't disregard the demands of Castro. Following our insistence that we can negotiate only one problem and that any discussion of Guantanamo in connection with it was out of the question, he remarked that the Soviet Union had never raised Guantanamo, which was a Cuba-US problem, but that the US should discuss the other four points.

We explained to him that we needed no documents except the declarations of USSR, US and SYG before Security Council after transaction completed. For that purpose Cuba was not a necessary party, especially if it refused any United Nations inspection as Khrushchev had promised.

We then turned to other forms of inspection and verification, by air recon and tables of organization, and suggested he could argue with Castro that a UN presence would be an assurance to Castro against invasion in interim as well as an assurance to US. Mikoyan was at pains to say that this meeting was not a final negotiation, but merely an exploration to see what everyone had in mind. We said that we felt time was of the essence and that we could agree upon modalities of the Red Cross inspection directly or through our deputies almost at once, on basis of Thant's proposals. We added that we could see no necessity for documentary agreement on aerial inspection, but wanted assurances from him that our planes would not be fired on if that was the only form of inspection and verification available to us. They replied they could not guarantee that the guns would not shoot, because Cuba was an independent country over which they had no control, and adverted again to fact that we should consider everything, but that at least this talk had served to expose our differences. (Later in a summary we had feeling we were really very close together and that if Mikoyan would drop his effort to link Castro's five points our differences were few.)

When we tried to get down to details of the Red Cross and aerial inspection Mikoyan said he was not specialist and these were details, that he had brought a General and Colonel to help Kuznetsov, repeating again and again that he could give us no guarantee regarding the security of our over-flights. We reminded him Khrushchev had agreed to UN inspection and that we understood his difficulties if Cuba refused, in view of its independence, and were trying reach accommodation for quick and satisfactory results. He reverted again to argument that if we insisted on UN inspection in Cuba, it had a right to insist on inspection of refugee camps and training activities anywhere. He was assured that there were no such camps any longer and that US was not engaged in such activities. Likewise we tried reassure him about training of Cuban citizens in the army and that US wanted to regularize relations in Caribbean for protection of others as well as Castro, but that this was a separate matter that had nothing to do with this question. Mikoyan quickly asked if we were referring to possible restoration economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba, and we explained regional arrangements in this hemisphere through OAS and that such matters were not excluded from future consideration if other aggravations could be relieved, but that we must get the one question before us promptly resolved.

FYI. With regard to SAM sites, we had clear impression they intended to leave them in Cuba, and they also said they had given these guns to a number of other countries, including Indonesia and UAR.

Meeting became more cordial and friendly as it proceeded and was exclusively dominated by Mikoyan. He said he did not know whether he was coming back through New York on way home, but we had impression he intended to.

Their estimate of time to complete removal was ten to fifteen days, including the IL-28's.

At one point he repeated Khrushchev's statement that what we call offensive weapons had been given to Cuba to deter US aggression, but that if non-aggression was guaranteed they would be withdrawn and that they would ship no more weapons.

In summarizing our conclusions, we reviewed the procedure before the Security Council and they suggested we exchange drafts of declarations, which seemed to us to indicate acceptance of this procedure. On the whole our feeling was that we had left no doubt the five points and weapons transaction could not be linked and that he will meet Castro with a clear impression of our position, and understand we will insist on interim inspection by our means if an agreement for UN presence cannot be reached. It is our intention to proceed as promptly as possible with Kuznetsov and his deputy Morozov to try complete modalities on Red Cross inspection pending Mikoyan's return./3/

/3/The morning of November 2 Stevenson sent Mikoyan a letter stating that during last evening's conversation he and McCloy had neglected to discuss with Mikoyan a list of items that the United States considered offensive weapons. See the Supplement. (Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2; USUN Files: NY FRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Stevenson

134. Summary Record of the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 2, 1963, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) John McCone also prepared an account of this meeting, memorandum for the record, November 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)

The President referred to a newspaper story by Roland Evans/1/ which reported details of Khrushchev's private letter of October 26./2/ The President said the White House had already issued a denial that the U.S. Government believed this letter was written by an agitated or an overwrought man. He directed that all copies of the letter be returned to the State Department. He added that apparently a copy of the letter had gone to an allied embassy in Washington. He reaffirmed an earlier instruction that the only sources of information on the Cuban situation are Mr. Bundy and Mr. Sorensen. He indicated his unhappiness with the amount of information which had been given to the press without authorization. He directed that all aerial reconnaissance information be kept out of the Top Secret CIA Bulletin until after he had seen it. He would then decide what circulation within the government was to be given the reconnaissance information. He restated his view that we must make information available to the press in our own way rather than have it leak out.

/1/In the Herald Tribune, November 2.

/2/See Document 84.

Director McCone then summarized the intelligence memorandum./3/ He said we now have information of a highly sensitive nature which convinces us that Soviet officers control the Cuban air defense system. In conclusion, he reported on the current Soviet test series. So far there have been fifty Soviet tests, including one yesterday of an estimated 1.2 megatons, at an altitude of fifty nautical miles.

/3/[document number not declassified], "The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 2 November 1962"; see the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24)

Under Secretary Ball reported on a dinner meeting held last night in New York between our officials and Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov./4/ He said Mikoyan started with a very hard position, but modified this somewhat later in the evening. He repeatedly attempted to tie Castro's five points/5/ to the agreement between President Kennedy and Khrushchev. He proposed that there be a formal exchange of documents which would conclude the Cuban missile negotiations. We opposed such a proposal and suggested instead that there be a UN Security Council meeting which would be called to hear three unilateral declarations--one by U Thant, another by the Soviets, and a third by the U.S.

/4/See Document 129.

/5/See footnote 1, Document 129.

There was a discussion of some UN presence in the form of a peace commission. The Russians were ambiguous on the status of the SAM sites. One of the Russians said that the Cubans might agree to the dismantlement of the SAM sites in return for our promise to stop overflights. The IL-28 bomber issue was not pinned down in the conversations. The Russians said repeatedly that they could not force Castro to accept on-site inspection. There was no decision on how inspection will be carried out after the missiles have been withdrawn. Mikoyan did not ask us not to overfly, but he did admit that he could not get Castro to accept ground inspection.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric urged that we insist upon UN inspection as promised by Khrushchev. He noted that KOMAR missiles have been given to the Cubans and recommended that we keep our quarantine until a satisfactory substitute was in place.

The President decided that in view of the unsatisfactory discussions with the Cubans and the Russians, he would cancel his planned press conference in order not to be obliged to reply to questions about what guarantees we have that Russian missiles had been withdrawn from Cuba. Under Secretary Ball read a six-point statement which he recommended the President issue in lieu of a press conference.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not call attention to the IL-28 bombers at this point because we may want to retaliate against these planes if one of our reconnaissance planes is shot down.

The President directed that a statement be prepared for issuance by the White House or the State Department. It should include what the Russians have agreed to and what we have agreed to./6/ He asked what had been discussed in New York about the quarantine and about our overflights. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric reported that UN officials have given up on a UN surveillance system because Castro won't accept it.

/6/Apparent reference to the statement released by the White House on November 2; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 451-452.

The President asked how we were going to check on Soviet missiles being withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk said we could ask the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Cuba check on Soviet equipment there, and where it was being moved to in Cuba.

The President noted that inspection of incoming material could be achieved, but we must develop some way of inspecting outgoing Soviet missiles.

The President asked that instructions to McCloy be prepared which would lay down the line he is to follow for the next three days./7/

/7/Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2, 7 p.m., in which Stevenson and McCloy were told that the President wanted to tie down the Soviets on inclusion of IL-28 bombers as offensive weapons. The President also instructed Stevenson and McCloy to stress that it was the Soviet responsibility to provide acceptable verification, that Soviet cargo ships should not seek to enter the quarantine area until ICRC inspection procedures were in effect unless they were prepared to accept U.S. inspection, and that after removal of weapons, continuing arrangements would be required to assure against reintroduction. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we continue limited but daily overflights. He asked authorization for two flights of two planes each to cover different areas than were photographed yesterday. Targets would include Cuban ports and the IL-28 airfield. He opposed high altitude flights until we are certain that the Soviets do control the SAM sites. In answer to a question, he said we could use a drone for overflights, but the Air Force was opposed because of the possible loss and compromise of the highly classified drone.

In answer to a question, Director McCone said it was conceivable but improbable that missiles fired from SAM sites in Cuba could reach the U.S.

The President authorized the release to the press of the pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday, but not the pictures of the IL-28 bombers. He agreed that the quarantine should be continued until a satisfactory substitute was found.

Secretary McNamara reported on the current shipping situation and recommended that our ships hail all Bloc ships crossing the quarantine line but board none of them. He said Admiral Dennison had asked permission to board a Soviet ship, but had been denied this authority. The President agreed that we should not now board Bloc ships.

The President again called attention to the necessity of inspecting Soviet ships leaving Cuba with Soviet missiles as cargo. This inspection must be carried out either by the International Red Cross or by the U.S.

The President then turned to a discussion of atomic testing. He asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly when our current test series ends and what we should say about our plans for future tests. He asked whether we should announce that we were prepared to halt tests until there was a test ban agreement. He said he opposed any pledge to refrain from testing for an indefinite period.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy stated that our scientists doubt that the "black box" method of detecting nuclear tests is promising. The President asked that he be provided an evaluation of these unmanned seismic stations as a means of monitoring an atomic test ban.

Acting USIA Director Wilson asked the President for guidance for USIA during the next few days. The President instructed that USIA emphasize that Castro was obstructing peace in the Caribbean by blocking UN inspection measures. For the time being, USIA should not use the theme that Castro is a Soviet stooge.

The President asked for a report on the fighting between the Indians and the Communist Chinese, along with an estimate of what we thought would develop in this area./8/

/8/According to a memorandum for the record of this meeting by McCone, November 2, the CIA "was asked to prepare an immediate report on the effectiveness of the blockade" so as "to have some indication of its effect on the Cuban economy, if any." McCone's record indicated that "it was decided that a drone should be flown promptly" over the objections of McNamara and the Air Force. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962)

Bromley Smith/9/

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

135. Record of Action Taken at the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 2, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive.

1. Referring to a newspaper story giving alleged details of Premier Khrushchev's October 26th letter, the President said the White House had issued a denial that the U.S. government believed it was written by an agitated or overwrought man. He instructed that henceforth information obtained from aerial reconnaissance of Cuba should not be released within the Government until after it had been presented to him for decision as to whom it would be made available. He reemphasized the importance of preventing unauthorized release to the press of information about the Cuban situation.

2. Director McCone summarized the intelligence memorandum, emphasizing the sensitive nature of information in our possession which convinces us that Soviet officers control the air defense system established in Cuba. He also reported on the Soviet nuclear test series, including yesterday's test of a 1.2 megaton weapon at 50 nautical miles.

3. There followed a report and a discussion of the meeting last night in New York of U.S. officials with Messrs. Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov. It was decided that, in lieu of a press conference, a White House statement would be prepared for release today summarizing where we are in the Cuban situation.

4. The President authorized two aerial reconnaissance missions consisting of our planes, the first over Cuban ports and the second over the IL-28 airfield. The President authorized the release to the press of pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday. Yesterday's pictures of the IL-28 bombers will not be released.

5. Following a discussion of the current status of the quarantine, the President instructed that until further orders U.S. naval ships should not board Bloc ships, but U.S. ships should continue to hail all vessels entering the quarantine zone.

6. The President asked that draft instructions to Mr. McCloy covering the negotiations for the next few days be prepared for his approval. These instructions would make clear that we want the IL-28s removed, that our quarantine must be maintained until a satisfactory substitute is provided, and that ships coming from the USSR to take the Soviet missiles out of Cuba must be inspected by the U.S. or by the International Red Cross.

7. The President asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly about the ending of our test series and about our policy toward future nuclear tests. He also asked for an evaluation of unmanned seismic stations as a means of inspecting an atomic test agreement.

8. In response to a request for guidance, the President instructed USIA, for the time being, to emphasize Castro's obstruction to UN inspection and to measures necessary to restore peace to the Caribbean rather than to depict Castro as a Soviet puppet.

9. The President asked for a full report on Indian-Chinese fighting and an estimate of future developments.

McGeorge Bundy

136. Summary Record of the 18th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary, emphasizing reports about the construction of a submarine base in Cuba. He called attention to the increasing number of reports of missiles being stored in Cuban caves./1/

/1/McCone prepared an account of this meeting in which he described his presentation in more detail. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported that a peripheral flight of a U-2 about five miles off the west coast of Cuba had been authorized by the President. The weather for reconnaissance was poor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated a requirement for fourteen low-level sorties, covering harbors, roads, storage areas, the IL-28 air base, and Banes, which is suspect as a possible submarine base site. Secretary McNamara said he recommended fewer low-level flights.

Mr. McCone predicted that it would take from two weeks to a month to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President, commenting on the recommended low-level flight over the port of Havana, said he thought this target would be a day off and deferred authorizing this reconnaissance mission.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the presence in Havana of Mikoyan and stated his view that the port of Havana was not a good target for today. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President authorized three low-level sorties of two planes each, one over the IL-28 base, the second over the Banes area, and the third over the San Julian port area.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize a major aerial reconnaissance mission Sunday or Monday/2/ in order to see what had been moved in Cuba. He said we need pictures of the ports in order to know what was being loaded on outgoing ships and pictures of assembly areas where Soviet equipment is being moved prior to being shipped out.

/2/November 4 or 5.

The President said that he wanted by Sunday or Monday a recommendation on the future use of U-2 planes. Secretary Rusk said daily pictures of the IL-28 planes are most important.

Secretary Rusk referred to a preliminary draft of inspection arrangements./3/ Certain measures can be taken if Cuba agrees, but other meas-ures will have to be taken if Cuba refuses to accept inspection arrangements satisfactory to us. He noted that there was no real resist-ance from anywhere except Cuba to the continuance of overflights.

/3/Apparent reference to "Draft Instruction to USUN, Cuba: Inspection Arrangements," for use by the Executive Committee and submitted for consideration at this meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba) Text in the Supplement.

The President said the major issue is the inspection of outgoing Soviet ships which will be returning Soviet missiles to the USSR. He said he believed we would have to work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles in order to be certain that all were removed. He asked that we work out what arrangements we think we must have and what we think the Soviets would accept.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson suggested that the International Red Cross inspectors might look at cargo being loaded on outgoing Soviet ships to be certain that it had been properly identified on the ships' manifests.

Director McCone said we had seen thirty missiles in Cuba and we estimate that forty-eight were brought in. He agreed that we must work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles.

Secretary Rusk said one major problem was how to inspect armaments in Cuba after the strategic missiles had been removed. One way to do this would be to propose an atom-free zone in Latin America. Treaty inspectors could go to Cuba to ensure that no nuclear weapons remained on the island or were introduced.

The President requested a paper stating exactly how we understand the agreement we have reached with the Russians. He wanted for his consideration the instructions to be sent to McCloy to govern McCloy's talk with Kuznetsov. He suggested that we raise with the Russians the question of Cuban caves as an illustration of the need for an inspection procedure which would reassure us that the missiles were removed, even if we did not inspect each missile. He suggested that the New York negotiating group, including Ambassador Stevenson, be asked to come to Washington later today to discuss inspection arrangements with the Executive Committee./4/ He made it clear that we could not live with a Soviet submarine base in Cuba. He wanted to hold Khrushchev to every single one of the points he had agreed to. He felt that we should insist on the general demilitarization of Cuba and he emphasized again the serious situation which would arise if there were an incident involving one of our U-2 planes and the SAM sites in Cuba.

/4/See Document 138.

Secretary Rusk commented that we must have acceptable inspection on the ground in Cuba before we make any commitment about our not invading the island.

Mr. McCone noted that evidence to date indicates the missiles are being dismantled, but apparently everything else is being built up, including communication complexes and possibly even a submarine base.

The President said he wanted to see detailed instructions covering the negotiations on inspection. He thought that we should give the Russians the impression that because the missiles are mobile and can be put back in place, we will have to insist on demilitarization of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that we ask the Russians if they intend to keep a military base in Cuba. We would tell the Russians that this was not negotiable.

At this point the following joined the Executive Committee: AEC Chairman Seaborg; Commissioner Haworth; Dr. Wiesner; and Mr. Kaysen.

A draft announcement of the ending of our current nuclear test series was read and discussed.

In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said that the Commission tests in 1963 would be for the purpose of exploiting the Ripple development. He thought that by May we would be in a position to resume tests above ground. He acknowledged that weapons development would be possible if testing were limited to underground shots.

Secretary Rusk opposed stating in the announcement a time limit on our suspension of testing. He did not want us to tie our hands because at a later time we might have to resume tests in order to keep pressure on the Russians.

The President commented that we had a greater capability than the Russians to conduct useful underground tests. He felt that we would not lose if the Russians did not conduct atmospheric tests and we continued our underground testing.

The draft release was revised and approved, it being understood that underground tests would continue.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

137. Editorial Note

On November 3, 1962, John Scali of the American Broadcasting Corporation met with Alexander S. Fomin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and reputedly head of Soviet intelligence in Washington. Fomin made five points to Scali. First, the United States must be patient with Soviet efforts to moderate Castro; second, the Soviet Union required reciprocal concessions; third, as Castro was adamantly opposed to inspection, the United States and Soviet Union should resolve the issue themselves, by inspection of Soviet ships at sea in international waters; fourth, the Soviet Union could not withdraw its surface-to-air missiles from Cuba for fear of leaving Castro defenseless; and fifth, the Soviet Union planned to leave some technicians in Cuba to train Cubans in the operation of defensive weapons.

Although original records of certain other Scali-Fomin conversations have been found, none for November 3 has been discovered. Pierre Salinger paraphrases and quotes from Scali's report of this meeting in With Kennedy, pages 279-280. Salinger notes that Scali's reports were regularly transmitted to members of the Executive Committee and that President Kennedy jokingly suggested that Scali should attend the sessions.

138. Summary Record of the 19th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 3, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. According to the President's Appointment Book the meeting lasted until 6:25 p.m. (Ibid.)

Prior to the reading of a summary of the latest intelligence on Cuba by Director McCone, Secretary Rusk said we may be experiencing the greatest deception in our history if the Russians are not removing their strategic missiles from Cuba. (Mr. McCone's summary was apparently a special intelligence estimate prepared by USIB.)/1/

/1/See Document 139 for additional information on McCone's briefing.

The President suggested that the summary be sanitized and given to Mr. McCloy to use in his conversations with Soviet representative Kuznetsov.

The President then read the attached instruction to all officials concerned with the present negotiations with the Russians on Cuba./2/ Ambassador Thompson pointed out that the reference to no Soviet missile base in Cuba is a reinterpretation of what Khrushchev agreed to.

/2/See Document 141.

Ambassador Stevenson read a list of questions which he hoped would be answered./3/ Ambassador Yost of the USUN mission reported on negotiations with the International Red Cross aimed at establishing inspection at sea of Soviet ships leaving Cuba. Red Cross inspectors aboard neutral ships would go alongside the Soviet ships, board them and inspect them. It was hoped that the Russians would accept this sea inspection system.

/3/Not found.

Ambassador Stevenson reported efforts to set up a verification system on the ground in Cuba. The Russians are prepared to have UN inspectors look at the missile sites after the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. We have insisted on inspection in the interim during the time the missiles are being dismantled and the sites destroyed.

Mr. McCloy reported on his talks with Mikoyan and Kuznetsov. The big problem is to get verification which covers all of the island. The Soviets appear to be stringing out the negotiations. Castro may well refuse to accept arrangements agreeable to the Russians. Examination of cargo at sea is very difficult and reading ship manifests in ports is not very helpful. One suggestion is that we ask the Soviets for the list of weapons and missiles they sent to Cuba. We would check outgoing equipment and missiles against this list. If we cannot arrange an inspection system at the docks in Cuba, we will have to work out some kind of inspection system at sea.

Secretary Rusk commented that the Soviets are under an obligation to see that the offer they made to us is implemented.

Ambassador Stevenson said there was little difficulty in seeing the missiles, but seeing the equipment is considerably more difficult. He felt that we should try to get an ex poste facto inspection of all of Cuba. If we cannot get this, we should accept inspection at sea. Our last resort position would be to seek inspection at the home port of the Soviet ships taking the missiles from Cuba.

General Taylor suggested that we should ask the Russians for their withdrawal plan.

The President said we must insist on UN inspection on the ground. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we had no difficulty on this point with the Russians, but the Cubans were being recalcitrant. He believed that we would eventually have to accept an inspection at sea or inspection at the debarkation port.

With reference to our overflights, Ambassador Stevenson said the Russian position was that they could not agree because the Cubans refuse to permit overflights. The Russians say Cuba is an independent country which they cannot force to accept actions which are an invasion of their sovereign air space. It may be necessary for us to drop back to inspection at sea or at debarkation ports.

Mr. McCone noted that the SAM sites appeared to be under Soviet control.

The President asked whether we could obtain a sampling of outgoing cargoes by UN inspectors on docks at each of five ports. However, this procedure does not provide permanent safeguards against reintroduction of strategic missiles.

Ambassador Stevenson suggested that one way to deal with the future would be to support the nuclear-free zone for Latin America. Cuba might accept inspectors enforcing a nuclear-free zone treaty because inspectors would be visiting all Latin American countries.

The President said we should ask for the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson commented that he believed the IL-28s would be removed, possibly by air.

Mr. McCloy raised the question of whether the President should see Mikoyan. A decision is to be made later after McCloy had talked to Mikoyan.

Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Cubans and the Russians would insist on a Security Council meeting. He linked this meeting to actions which we plan to take with the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in no position to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba because no procedures had yet been worked out for the inspection of the withdrawal of the strategic missiles. He felt we should insist upon performance before giving any guarantee.

The President said he wanted any wording of a non-invasion guarantee to be approved by him before being discussed. He preferred that we limit any commitment to that included in our letter to Khrushchev/4/ rather than making a reference to our obligations under the UN charter. He pointed out that our commitment would refer only to invasion and not exclude use of the threat of force. He asked for a paper which would summarize what we expect the Cubans to agree to, what we expect the Russians to agree to, and what we ourselves are prepared to agree to.

/4/See Document 95.

Secretary Rusk referred to reports of sabotage in Venezuela apparently instigated by a pro-Castro group or Cubans. The President said we should be as tough as we can in dealing with such situations.

Secretary McNamara asked that the New York negotiations repeat our insistence that the IL-28 bombers be removed from Cuba. He said he thought we should force the Russians to answer whether they intended to withdraw the bombers. Until the Russians answer on this point, he recommended that we reach no agreement of any kind.

Mr. McCone estimates there are forty IL-28s in Cuba. We have seen nine on the ground and additional planes still in their crates.

The President said he was willing to talk to Mikoyan if Mikoyan's attitude was reasonable in his discussions with McCloy.

The President discussed our public attitude toward the Cuban crisis. He was not certain how much concern we wanted to surface. He felt that our attitude should be one of vigilance and watchful waiting. We should publicly make clear that we were insisting on implementation of all of the deal made by Khrushchev. We could say that we were sticking firmly to the terms of our offer. So far, Khrushchev has not denied the position we have taken in the letter to him. However, he has never said that he specifically accepted our offer. Thus, the deal we have with Khrushchev consists of what we say it is.

The President raised the question of what we should say about the IL-28s. He believed we should say publicly that we considered bombers as part of the deal, i.e. weapons offensive to us which would be withdrawn from Cuba. He agreed that we should delay announcing our public position on the bombers until tomorrow./5/

/5/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action dated November 3 for this meeting. It stated that the President authorized preparation of a sanitized version of McCone's intelligence briefing for McCloy to use in his discussions with Kuznetsov; that the President approved the general instruction containing a restatement of basic U.S. policy; noted that in the negotiations at the UN there should be insistence on on-site on-the-ground inspection of missile sites; and stated that the President insisted that the basis of negotiations must be his October 27 letter to Khrushchev, and that U.S. posture, both publicly and privately, should be one of carrying out the specifics of that letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President revised and approved an announcement to be made tomorrow upon the conclusion of our current nuclear test series.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

139. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 3, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on November 5.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Executive Committee of NSC--Saturday, November 3, 1962--4:30 p.m.

Attended by all members

Also in attendance:

Ambassador Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and several of their staff from the United Nations

The President opened the meeting, stating the purpose was to clearly outline U.S. policy to be sure "all were on the same wave length".

McCone then read a November 3rd memorandum summarizing intelligence information--copy attached./1/ The President requested this memorandum, which he expressed as being very comprehensive, be sanitized for use in further negotiations and discussions with the Soviets./2/

/1/CIA Memorandum, "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600 3 November." The memorandum reported that the whereabouts of missiles and equipment that had been removed was still unknown, and that uncrating and assembling of IL-28 bombers at San Julien was continuing. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24)

/2/The sanitized version of the CIA memorandum of November 3 was sent to Kuznet-sov under cover of a letter from Stevenson, November 3. It reads:

"The analyses of the photographic reconnaissance conducted by us yesterday over Cuban missile sites shows definitive evidence of dismantling of the sites and removal of missiles and related equipment from the area. Destination of the equipment is as yet not apparent.

"On the other hand, there is clear evidence of progressive work on decrating and assembling of the IL-28's." (Telegram 1625 from USUN, November 3; USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Secretary Rusk emphasized the dangers of deception.

The President then read a draft of his instructions to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba, a November 3rd copy of which is attached./3/

/3/See Document 141.

There followed a long discussion of various means of verification, the importance of ground inspection, the dangers of deception and the difficult question of verifying that this operation would not be repeated at some future time. Included in these discussions were the disposition of the IL 28s, the manning and ultimate disposition of the SAM sites, the MIG 21 problem and most particularly the responsibilities to the OAS countries to make suitable arrangements for their protection against continuation of subversion, insurgency, sabotage, etc. stemming out of Cuba.

Preparation for the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting on November 4th/4/--CIA arranged sanitized versions of a number of points covered in the attached memorandum of 3 November. This information was developed over night and on Sunday morning early Mr. Sheldon and others visited Mr. McCloy in Stanford, Connecticut and briefed him thoroughly on all subjects.

/4/See Document 142.

At about 11 o'clock McCone talked with McCloy who expressed appreciation for the briefing and seemed satisfied that he was armed with all necessary information to carry on his talks with Kuznetsov.

In the evening, Rusk called McCone, stating that Kuznetsov had indicated a willingness to have us look at the crates of the large missiles and that there were 42 missiles in Cuba. He asked that CIA study all pertinent data in the interests of verifying this figure. It will be recalled that CIA estimate had run to a probable 48 missiles in Cuba. McCone called Sheldon who agreed to study this matter.

In the discussion with McCloy, McCone was advised that Kuznetsov would agree that we could inspect and photograph a number of crates on board ships as they departed from Havana; the crates would be dock loaded so that they would be readily visual from a ship pulling alongside, or from the air; however we would not be permitted to board the ships. Apparently Kuznetsov did not feel he could arrange on-site inspection within Cuba.

Apparently Kuznetsov confirmed that there were a total of 40 launchers (10 sites) and that 24 launchers were operational at the time the whole matter was surfaced.

McCloy stated that Kuznetsov was non-responsive with respect to the operation of the SAM sites, to the withdrawal of the SAM sites; withdrawal of the IL 28s and the MIGs were not mentioned. Full telegraphic report is due 11:05./5/

/5/Attached to this memorandum for the record was a November 2 memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence Cline to McCone entitled, "Time Factors in Construction of Soviet Missiles Bases in Cuba." It estimated how long it would take to make a MRBM site operational and how soon U.S. reconnaissance could discover them. See the Supplement.

John A. McCone/6/

Director

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

140. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, November 3, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A note on the source text indicates that a copy went to Thompson who "took it w/him." Thompson and Bundy met with the President on November 2, from 6:10 to 6:23 p.m. for an "off the record meeting." (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) The letter could have been drafted then.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of October 30./1/ I am commenting now only on a problem raised in your letter which relates to the Cuban affair.

/1/Document 120.

With respect to the quarantine on shipments to Cuba, I am hopeful that arrangements can be worked out quickly by the United Nations which would permit its removal. We were happy to agree to your suggestion that the International Committee of the Red Cross undertake responsibility for inspection. You are, of course, aware that Premier Castro has announced his opposition to measures of verification on the territory of Cuba. If he maintains this position this would raise very serious problems. So far as incoming shipments are concerned, I understand that efforts are being made to have the International Red Cross carry out the necessary measures at sea and I hope that these will be successful. In the meantime, perhaps the existence of the quarantine can be of assistance to Mr. Mikoyan in his negotiations with Premier Castro. I should also like to point out that in an effort to facilitate matters, I instructed our delegation in New York to inform your representative there, Mr. Kuznetsov, that for the next few days any Soviet ships in the quarantine area would be passed without inspection and only the hailing procedure which was carried out in the case of your vessel, the Bucharest, would be applied.

I am hopeful we can dispose of this pressing matter quickly so that we can go on in a better atmosphere to the broader questions. We both must make our best efforts to this end.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 3, 1962, 8:44 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-362. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy, cleared by Rusk, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.

1189. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. Following is text of an instruction from the President to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba:

"It is time for a review of our basic position in these negotiations and for a clear restatement of our policy and purpose.

We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases. We have no decisive evidence of what they will do with this equipment. The assembly of IL-28's continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification. Our aerial surveillance still proceeds without guarantee of safety.

This crisis is likely to move in one of two major directions in the next few weeks. On the one hand, we may be able to make arrangements which will in fact ensure the verified removal of all Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba and establish reliable safeguards against their reintroduction. This is the object of our policy and it is precisely stated in my letter to Khrushchev of October 27:/1/ `You would agree to remove these weapons systems (previously defined as "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use") from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.' Chairman Khrushchev's message of 28 October/2/ contained an explicit undertaking to dismantle, crate and return to the Soviet Union `the weapons which you describe as "offensive"' under UN verification. It is the position of the United States Government that this is a clear acceptance of my proposal of October 27.

/1/See Document 95.

/2/Document 102.

This requirement means removal of all offensive missiles and supporting equipment, and of all bombers and their equipment. These items and associated equipment are generally described in my statement of September 13 and in my address of October 22; they are clearly defined in my Proclamation of October 23./3/ All Americans should stick firmly to this position. We should add that a submarine base is equally unacceptable--as Chairman Khrushchev has acknowledged by clear inference in his assurances on the fishing facility.

/3/For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674-681, 806-809, and 809-811, respectively.

In blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28.

If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the associated and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: `(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.' We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemisphere countries to get them to take a similar position. The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will give an undertaking not to invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base and ceases to harbor weapons. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba.

There is another major course which events may take. It is one with which all who have negotiated with the Soviet Government in the past are familiar. It is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet Government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up.

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that this is what is now beginning.

This second line of Soviet conduct is unacceptable to the United States. To prevent it we must make it very clear, at every stage, by both word and act, that the United States Government will not accept a mere gentlemen's agreement relating only to visible missiles on identified launch pads. We must have adequate arrangements for verification and inspection to be sure both that offensive weapons are removed and that no more are introduced. Without them, both surveillance and the quarantine must be continued and both may need to be extended. (This condition does not exclude temporary relaxation of either quarantine or surveillance in return for useful steps toward fully effective arrangements. Such a relaxation is foreseen in connection with our plans for ICRC inspection of certain inbound cargoes.) All the offensive weapons systems, including anything related to a submarine base, must be removed, or we shall have to consider further action of our own to remove them.

Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons. The Soviet Government must recognize that the events of the last three weeks have made it impossible for opinion in this Hemisphere to be satisfied with Soviet assurances alone. Verification is essential if the Governments of the Western Hemisphere are to be able to live with this situation without further action.

I repeat that this statement of policy should be taken as binding guidance by all who are engaged in the framing of instructions or the conduct of negotiations on this matter. It is of fundamental importance that we speak as one voice and continue to keep it entirely clear to all Soviet representatives that the agreements of October 27 and 28 must be carried out in full--and that otherwise the United States Government will find it necessary to move again by its own means to insure itself against a repetition of the extraordinary act of deception which initiated this crisis. In this situation the Soviet Government has a clear choice between verified removal of all offensive weapons systems and renewed action by the United States. It has no middle choice, and we believe its own interests should lead it to accept the honest and full execution of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and to see to it that Castro provides the necessary cooperation.

Detailed guidance in support of this general policy has been provided in approved instructions to USUN earlier this week. The basic messages are 1147 of October 31,/4/ as amended, 1159 of November 1,/5/ 1166 of November 1,/6/ and 1177 of November 2./7/ A codification of this guidance is planned. My only addition at present is that I now believe we should not be satisfied, as 1147 suggests, with aerial surveillance and post-removal ground inspection for departing offensive weapons. We must also have some way of verifying the reexport of the missiles, and the best practicable way seems to be to count them on departing ships. This can be done with no violation of Soviet security by reliable and non-technical non-Americans, and we should insist on this or an equally effective verification."

/4/Document 125.

/5/Telegram 1159, November 1, instructed Ball to stress to Soviet negotiators the importance of verification, the consequences of attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes, and the fact that IL-28 bombers were part of the agreement and should be dismantled. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)

/6/Telegram 1166 contained instructions and suggestions on how to get ICRC inspectors into action as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-162)

/7/See footnote 7, Document 134.

Rusk

142. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 4, 1962, 11:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562). Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, it was drafted by McCloy. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002 Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (Top Secret, exdis, etc.))

1630. Eyes only for the Secretary. Meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 4. Kuznetsov came to lunch at McCloy's home at Stamford. En famille, most informal, no other officials or any translator present. After lunch took a long walk during the course of which talk was conducted lasting until about 5:00 PM. McCloy started out with a resume of our aerial surveillance of yesterday of Cuba again expressing great concern over the evidence of the assembly of the IL-28's. The buildup of these planes was in sharp contrast to the dismantling of the sites and largely nullified the good impression we were getting from the rapidity with which the missile sites were being dismantled. K said that this had been something of a new subject to him and had been recently notified of it. He said he had notified Moscow of the importance we placed on it and that he had doubted that these were properly classified as offensive weapons but this was only his opinion. K would report Moscow attitude as soon as he received it.

McCloy told him that the President had refrained from publicly referring to the buildup of the IL-28's as he was sure there would be a sharp reaction if it were made public. McCloy also stated that there could be no doubt of the inclusion of these bombers in the list of offensive weapons and if any documentation were needed it would be easy to provide it. Mc gave him our position on verification following the lines of 1189/1/ stating we had been deceived by assurances given our officials in respect to the weapons introduced in Cuba and it was impossible for us now to act merely on a gentlemen's agreement. McCloy said he was seriously troubled by the problem of verification as it seemed as if the Soviet Union would not be able to make good on their Chairman's commitment for UN observation of dismantling and removal although Mc felt certain that they could get Fidel's compliance if they really set about it. K said this was not by any means certain. Mc repeated we could not be satisfied with our reconnaissance alone (to which incidentally they still continue to object) and we would not be satisfied with the mere inspection of the abandoned missile sites. We had to have evidence of the disposition and the removal of the weapons. Mc referred to the stories about weapons in caves and said such stories were bound to arise if we did not have opportunity for inspection on the ground. We had to have evidence which would convince us as practical men that the commitments to remove these weapons had been carried out. K said they had been giving thought to this matter and the Chairman himself had been preoccupied with it as he was fully aware of his commitments and he wished to negotiate this thing honestly both in what he called the short run and the long run. K referred to a suggestion that Mc had made regarding manifests that they had followed up. He said manifests of what was going out would not be any good unless it was known what had come in, but in order to give us reasonable and practical assurance of their determination to fulfill their commitment and on instructions directly from the Chairman he wanted to submit the figures.

/1/Document 141.

There were as of October 22, 24 completed sites and 16 in incomplete form, or a total of 40, and they had introduced a total of 42 missiles into Cuba. All of these sites had been dismantled and rendered inoperable by November 2. They were prepared to find reasonable means to convince us that these missiles had been removed and their suggestion was as follows: (1) They would give us photographs of the sites in dismantled form. (2) They would give us their schedule of removal to the ports and shipping schedules. He said that we could bring our own vessels along side the Soviet ships which were taking the missiles out in such a way as to enable us to see and count the missiles. They would also give us photographs of 42 missiles on the way out. Mc pointed out that the commitment to remove the missiles would include launching pads, trucks and other paraphernalia that goes with the missile and K said that he would assume this to be so. K said if we did not raise too many questions, insist on looking into every box and otherwise raise objections which would convince them that we were merely trying to find obstacles to the fulfillment of our own guaranties, he was certain we would be able to work out reasonable details involved in this verification process without friction.

Mc asked him whether as an alternative they would permit inspection in Soviet ports of the off-loading. K thought this might involve complications and from all points of view it seemed better to do it at sea where we could be sure the ships had just come from Cuba. He wanted us to know that what they had done and what they were prepared to do was not a result of weakness--simply a desire to do all possible to maintain and consolidate the peace. The balance would remain the same as it was before but he repeated that the Soviet Government wants honestly to negotiate this matter of the removal of the weapons at once. They want to normalize the situation very promptly. They want the quarantine lifted as it is a wartime rather than a peacetime measure. They want to remove the atmosphere of war. K gave Mc a rough translation of a message from the Chairman/2/ to the effect that the Soviet Union seriously and sincerely sought to find a solution and make an effort to solve all the questions quickly on a basis of mutual conciliation and on the conditions which were stated in the letters of the President and the Chairman; and the Soviet Union expected that the United States will cooperate completely and promptly and lift the quarantine. The US should not doubt the full sincerity of the Soviet's statement regarding the dismantling and shipping out of the offensive weapons.

/2/Document 145.

K indicated that if Castro gave his consent to an on-site inspection they might be willing to accept verification of the shipment at the docks in Cuba, but he said it was necessary to plan for other eventualities. He repeated that the whole job of dismantling and preparation for removal could be effected by November 10 and presumably the shipping schedule would begin then.

There were other questions in addition to this matter of verification, particularly the one as to the form of the protocol or the declaration giving the United States guaranties. Those guaranties would have to be clearly expressed against invasion by the United States, in accordance with the President's letter or permitting the mounting of an attack from the soil of the United States together with the use of the good offices of the United States to induce other Latin American countries to adopt the same attitude. K said there should also be some guaranties given against subversive activities against Cuba, at which point Mc interposed that this would be very difficult indeed to comply with inasmuch as Cuba was a hotbed of subversion itself and that we would and could do nothing which could be interpreted as support of Castro or his regime.

K also mentioned Guantanamo and Mc told him that it was out of the question that the United States would permit Guantanamo to be in any way related to the solution of the present Cuban problem. K rather pressed for a commitment on the part of the US to be willing to discuss the subject at sometime in the future but Mc told him that no joining of the Guantanamo question with this incident was feasible. As to the form of the US guaranty, K said he was not particularly concerned as to whether it was by protocol or by declaration although Zorin felt very strongly about this. Mc brought up the question of submarines and possible submarine bases and K said that this was something he was familiar with and he felt sure, particularly since the Chairman himself had given assurances on this subject, that the port was presently a fishing port with no intention of making it a submarine port. Mc referred to the presence of submarines in the area and stated that we were quite concerned about this as they seemed to be appearing in conjunction with the whole weapons buildup. Mc said he must realize what we object to is the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba--that defensive weapons can be supplied to the Cubans if they want to but they must be in the hands of Cubans and not Soviet troops or technicians. K said he understood this point of view--and how about Turkey. At this point K made quite an argument about our characterization of weapons in Turkey as defensive that we were calling offensive in Cuba. Mc said that we would be glad to talk to him about our bases abroad at some other time.

Mc also referred to the SAM sites and repeated that we could not give any credit to the statement that this weapons system was manned and operated by Cubans rather than Soviet technicians. Mc stated the evidence was conclusive of Soviet operations and that it was apparent that the whole complex was part and parcel of the buildup of the missile sites. K did not respond to this.

In regard to the President's requirement that there should be some safeguards against the re-introduction of these weapons beyond a mere undertaking by the Soviet Union, he made reference to U Thant's idea of a UN presence in the Caribbean on a reciprocal basis which should include UN observers in some sections of the United States. Mc told him that he thought this was out of the question. What then should be the form of the safeguards against the reintroduction of weapons? Mc told him that he hadn't come to any conclusions in this regard although this might be dealt with in some way by a declaration of nuclear free zones, a thought to which K had previously referred. K again came back to the question of subversion and a guaranty against subversion. Mc again repeated that we could not take any steps which would mean support of Castro or establishment of a safe haven for Castro's subversive activities against the rest of the hemisphere. Mc also told him that his representative, Morozov, in working out the Red Cross deal seemed to be rather sticky in regard to ships from which Red Cross personnel could inspect incoming vessels as well as in some other matters. Mc told him that K should be prepared to induce the Bloc ships to agree to the same procedures that the Soviet ships would agree to. Talk then turned to the type of ship which would be used by the Red Cross personnel. Mc urged him to accept a US ship rather than a neutral ship as a US ship would cost less and could be put into operation more expeditiously. K immediately countered with a Soviet ship stating that one could probably be made available just as rapidly from Havana as any US ship. Mc told him that he could not tell him whether a Soviet ship would be acceptable and argued in favor of a US ship such as a hospital ship or any other US ship utilizing a tender bearing a Red Cross or UN flag which tender would actually serve as the means by which incoming ships were boarded.

K then brought up the hail and pass formula and said that he understood that all the Red Cross would do would be to hail and pass. Mc disabused him of this and said that there would be no sense in having Red Cross personnel if this were all that was to be done. The hail and pass formula had been intended as a temporary measure to permit Soviet ships for a brief interval to enter Cuban ports carrying food or other innocent cargo until the Red Cross operation could be put into effect provided this could be done reasonably promptly. K seemed to accept this.

Finally K registered an objection to our constant reference to the deception that the officials of this country had been exposed. There had been no obligation to tell us of the character of weapons they were introducing into the Island of Cuba. Mc said that this was probably so but there was an obligation among the friendly countries to respond truthfully to an inquiry when so much was at stake.

At the end K asked Mc what his reaction was to his earlier proposal to which Mc replied that it showed evidence of their effort to try to meet the problem of their inability to obtain the on-the-ground inspection to which the Soviet Union had been committed, but he could not say more until after Mc again had consulted his Government.

K said we must take this as the basis for other long range negotiations because it is clear we should not risk the danger involved in another such confrontation. Mc refrained from asking what these long range negotiations might cover for fear of having them complicate the immediate problem, but he agreed as to the necessity of eventual long range discussions and hoped that the constructive solution of the present difficulty would lead to them.

Stevenson

143. Summary Record of the 20th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 5, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary./1/ He then compared our figures on strategic missiles in Cuba with the Russian figures which Kuznetsov gave to McCloy yesterday./2/ Kuznetsov says the Russians sent forty-two missiles to Cuba. We had estimated that there were forty-eight Soviet missiles in Cuba, thirty-three of which we have actually seen.

/1/Based in part on CIA memorandum, "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba," Information as of 6 a.m. November 5, in which the lack of agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba on inspection in Cuba and verification of the removal of Soviet missiles was highlighted. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) McCone's memorandum for the record of this meeting, November 5, indicated that he also summarized other intelligence reports, including the SC 11157/62, a special memorandum on offensive missile strength in Cuba. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

/2/See Document 142.

Secretary McNamara reported on the aerial reconnaissance missions of yesterday. Two U-2 missions aborted yesterday because of mechanical failure. Five more U-2s are flying today.

Secretary Rusk reported on the McCloy/Kuznetsov conversation yesterday. The Russians are prepared to give us an actual missile inventory, including the shipping schedules, so that we can count the missiles on their way out. Secretary Rusk said he continued to believe that we must have inspection arrangements on the ground in Cuba. We need a UN presence in Cuba, plus a Latin American atom-free treaty zone, if Castro will accept such. If not, we must refuse to give a commitment not to invade and we must continue aerial reconnaissance missions and our present intelligence efforts on the ground in Cuba. We are unable to put forward an inspection plan until we know what Mikoyan has proposed to the Cubans and what Castro has agreed to accept.

The President recalled that Zorin wanted a protocol covering the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. He asked that thought be given to how this might be done.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of legislating on Communist subversion in the hemisphere.

The President asked:

1. How we would get a guarantee that no Soviet submarine base would be built in Cuba.

2. How to get out the IL-28 bombers.

3. What was our position if a demand were made that UN observers inspect refugee camps in the U.S. and in other areas where Cuban nationalists might receive military training.

4. How the U.S. or the UN would continue reconnaissance flights.

The President's basic question was how much should we give for a permanent UN presence in Cuba. He believed that we should keep open the question of accepting UN observers in the U.S. until we knew exactly what we would get in return.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that all arrangements arising out of the current situation must focus on Cuba. Comparable actions such as inspection in Cuba in return for the UN investigation of complaints about the U.S. were difficult, not only for the U.S., but for other members of the OAS. As to future assurances, we want a permanent UN presence in Cuba for which we would guarantee that we would not invade. For us, the UN presence would be a guarantee against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. We should think about overflights of Cuba and the U.S. and about a UN presence in Florida as well as in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy said that the UN route to the demilitarization of Cuba would lead to a realignment of our relations with Castro.

Secretary Rusk said we must under all circumstances continue to overfly Cuba. The President asked how we would continue to overfly as long as the SAM sites were operational. Secretary Rusk replied that our overflights would continue by tacit agreement of the Cubans and the Russians.

The President asked whether a group was at work on what to tell McCloy in answer to questions raised by Kuznetsov. He believed that if Mikoyan asks Kuznetsov about our future assurances with respect to Cuba, McCloy should be in a position to respond. Secretary Rusk preferred to delay sending our final position to McCloy until after we knew what took place in Havana.

The President agreed that no release should be made to the press of pictures which reveal Soviet activity yesterday in Cuban ports. He added that we might have the International Red Cross inspect incoming ships and we would look at ships leaving Cuba. He agreed that we could delay reaching a final position on the permanent arrangements, but we should not discuss any arrangements for the time being with Mikoyan./3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. It summarized the decisions and major points of the discussion and noted that a cable would be sent to McCloy which would give answers to the questions posed by Kuznetsov on November 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement. For the cable to McCloy, see Document 147.

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

144. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Robert Kennedy. Copies sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

Washington, November 5, 1962.

Dobrynin asked earlier this morning if I could see him and I made arrangements to have him come to the office at 12 o'clock Noon.

He delivered another letter from Mr. Khrushchev./1/ I read it and found that it concerned our list of offensive weapons that Stevenson had submitted.

/1/Document 145.

I explained to Dobrynin that from the first it had been made clear by the Soviet Union that they would get rid of any weapons which we considered offensive and certainly it was very clear that the bombers, the IL 28's, had to go. Dobrynin replied that he was not familiar with that position and also did not know what was on the list that Khrushchev mentioned in his letter. I told him I would get a copy of it; that it was basically the same list of weapons that had been listed in the President's Quarantine Proclamation. He replied he would obtain a copy from Kuznetsov.

During the middle of the conversation the President called and said that he had just received some preliminary information which indicated that several of our planes over Cuba had been fired upon. In ending my conversation with Dobrynin, therefore, I stressed the fact that any arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba.

145. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, undated.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. According to Problems of Communism the Russian text was transmitted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on November 4. A note on the source text indicates it was received on November 5. Other copies are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, and ibid.: Lot 66 D 204.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have just received information from Mr. V. Kuznetsov, our representative at the negotiations in New York for liquidation of the tense situation around Cuba, that Mr. Stevenson handed him a list of weapons which your side calls offensive./1/ I have studied the list and, I must confess, the approach of the American side to this matter has seriously worried me. In such a move, I will say frankly, I see a wish to complicate the situation, because it is impossible indeed to place into the category of "offensive" weapons such types of weapons which have always been referred to as defensive weapons even by a man uneducated militarily--by a common soldier, not to say of an officer.

/1/See footnote 3, Document 133.

It is hard for us to understand what aim is being pursued by the introduction of that list, by setting forth such a demand--in any case it must be some other aim, but not a desire for a speediest clearing of the atmosphere. And it is being done at a moment when we have already agreed with you on the main questions and when we on our part have already fulfilled what we agreed upon--have dismantled rocket weapons, are loading them now on ships and these weapons will be soon shipped from Cuba. That is why I feel greatly concerned with the advancing of such demand by the American side, concerned with its possible consequences, if necessary reasonableness is not displayed.

The demand which has been set forth is evidently pursuing, as I have already said, some other aims and that--I would wish, Mr. President, that you understand me correctly--can lead not to the betterment of our relations but, on the contrary, to their new aggravation. We should understand the position each side is in and take it into consideration but not overburden, not complicate our relations, especially at such an important moment when measures are being taken to eliminate the acute tension and bring these relations to a normal state.

That is why I would ask you, Mr. President, to meet our anxiety with understanding, to take measures on your side in order not to complicate the situation and to give your representatives a directive to eliminate the existing tension on the basis upon which both of us have agreed by having exchanged public messages. You spoke to the effect that missiles which you called offensive should be removed from Cuba. We agreed to that. You in your turn gave assurances that the so-called "quarantine" would be promptly removed and that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the U.S. but by other countries of the Western hemisphere either.

Let us then bring the achieved understanding to a completion, so that we could consider that each side has fulfilled its pledges and the question has been settled. If, however, additional demands are made, then that means only one thing--the danger that the difficulties on the way to eliminating tension created around Cuba will not be removed. But that may raise then new consequences.

I think that you will understand me correctly. For you and I will evidently have to deal not only with elimination of the remnants of the present tension--there lies ahead for you and me a great, serious talk on other questions. Why then start now complicating the situation by minor things. May be there exist some considerations, but they are beyond our comprehension. As for us, we view the introduction of additional demands as a wish to bring our relations back again into a heated state in which they were but several days ago.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

146. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B10285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Mr. Bundy at 1:45 this date

I commented on Governor Stevenson's report #1630, November 4th, midnight,/1/ summarizing the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting. I stated that we felt that the meeting was constructive, stating McCloy had adhered to policy but pointed out that the examination of missile cases on ships would not necessarily constitute convincing proof that missiles were actually exported; that no arrangement has been agreed on IL 28s, and that no form of verification short of a combination of aerial and on-site inspection would give us final answer. Bundy gave me a copy of draft of President Kennedy's cable to Stevenson and McCloy, November 5, copy attached./2/ I commented as follows:

/1/Document 142.

/2/Not attached, but see Document 147.

I felt that we faced a serious problem in the future of Cuba and read my memo of 5 November (copy attached). In addition I stated that it seemed to me that we were going too far in assuming that we would have to grant reciprocal rights if we insisted on UN on-site inspection, of which my point was that the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement provided for inspection of the dismantling, removal and continuing absence of offensive weapons and this agreement in no way referred to inspection of U.S. territory. Therefore it seems to me that the effect of the negotiation is to set up a situation in which we will have to submit to a situation not anticipated in the agreement if we are going to force the other sides to fulfill their obligations. Secondly, the question of the SAM sites. I advised Bundy that the building of the expensive SAM installation and the large number of operators required were the principal reasons that I suspected installation of offensive missiles. I could not rationalize the Soviet move on any other basis. I was now equally disturbed at the Soviet's insistence that the SAMs remain in being and operational and their obvious deception in claiming they are operated by Cubans and not by Soviet personnel. I explained that I now feel that the SAMs are being left there to shield the reintroduction of missiles at some future time or the emplacement of missiles which are secretly detained on the Island. There can be no other explanation. The SAMs are useless as a defense against our military action as our attacking planes can come up in low undetected and destroy them instantly. Therefore they are targeted against U-2s. By leaving them on the Island the gravest situation faces us. We will be in complete ignorance of their activities and the reintroduction of weapons at a future time is a distinct possibility.

In later conversation with the AG I made both of these points very emphatically. He said he would discuss them personally with the President.

John A. McCone/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/4/

/4/Secret. Prepared by McCone.

PROBLEMS WE FACE IN THE FUTURE IN CUBA

1. Castro will retain power. He will be given Soviet assurances and economic assistance to permit him to "ride through" the recent fiasco. He will hold his political organization together. It will be more violent than it has in the past.

2. Militarily he will be stronger. Undoubtedly vast quantities of armament has been received recently (Note: we should enumerate types and quantities identified from pictures). He therefore has more for his own defense and to pass out to insurgent groups throughout the hemisphere.

3. He will have a maritime capacity against Central America and the northern tier of Latin American by the utilization of 6 Khronstad and 18 Komar vessels.

4. He will have an air strike capability against this same area with IL 28s.

5. By retaining the SAMs, he will provide a shield against aerial inspection and therefore can arrange with the Soviets for the re-introduction of MRBMs and IRBMs with reasonable safety as the SAMs will protect him against our U-2 photography. This was the original purpose of the installation of the SAMs and there can be no question but that their retention is for no other purpose than to provide this same protection for the installation of MRBMs in the future.

6. Sophisticated communication equipment will give him an improved capability to communicate with Moscow and also to broadcast instructions to his agents and operators throughout the Hemisphere.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 5, 1962, 3:20 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and cleared by Ball. A draft of this telegram with Bundy's handwritten revisions is ibid.

1194. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy from President. Your conversation with Kuznetsov/1/ shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

/1/See Document 142.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential.

One serious gap in Kuznetsov's proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since Khrushchev spoke to Knox of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurances on warheads as much as on missiles themselves. Moreover, we need to know about possible warheads for IL28's and even MIG 21's.

This warhead problem highlights the general importance of post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number and not inconsistent with our own reports, but Soviet figures, while genuinely useful, are not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that past Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets had no obligation to tell us exactly what they were doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing. These assurances came from highest levels, and proved absolutely false.

Your insistence on the removal of IL28's, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious Soviet involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently. You are also right to resist guarantees on subversion and to keep Guantanamo out of it.

With respect to U.S. guarantees, we are not yet ready to give you more detailed instructions, but these three general points may be helpful:

(1) No long-term arrangements can be settled until after we have reached clear understanding on verified removal of offensive weapons systems, including IL28's.

(2) OAS-approved right of surveillance will be kept intact and is important to both sides as last week's flights showed. In this connection you should report to Kuznetsov that today one of our low-level flights was harassed by MIG's apparently manned by Soviets. No damage was done, and it is not clear that MIG's fired, but episode provides good basis for you to drive home our view of critical importance of unimpeded surveillance unless and until better arrangements can be made. You should remind Kuznetsov that surveillance must and will continue, and that further interference will be sure to bring prompt reaction including armed action if necessary.

(3) We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection involving Caribbean areas outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sites in this connection./2/

/2/In telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., the Department of State provided Stevenson and McCloy with a long guidance, as a followup to Kuznetsov's suggested procedures and as a guide to the kind of inspection procedures required to check out-going cargoes. These procedures were prepared by an interagency panel. In discussing these procedures, Stevenson and McCloy were to stress that the United States still insisted on UN inspection in Cuba to guard against hidden or reintroduced offensive weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562) See the Supplement.

Rusk

148. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret.

We must operate on the presumption that the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret subterranean base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade. If he thinks there is substantial danger of this what suggestions would he now make?

John F. Kennedy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original. Another note in the same hand reads: "Despatched by receipt #1073--11/15/63--3:30 p.m."

149. Telegram From President Kennedy to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Urgent. This message was ostensibly from Bromley Smith, but it was sent apparently at the instruction of the President. The following times are handwritten on the source text: 3:30 p.m., 4:05, 4:35. It was received in the White House situation room at 5:20 p.m.

CAP 55515-62. Deliver immediately to Executive Secretariat for Ball and Alexis Johnson. Begin message: Your conversation with Kuznetsov/1/ shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

/1/Presumably a reference to the discussion in Document 142.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. End of message.

150. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, November 5, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McNamara's working papers). Top Secret.

As I have communicated to General Wheeler, through General Clifton, the plans for X/1/ seem thin. Considering the size of the problem, the equipment that is involved on the other side, the nationalistic fervor which may be engendered, it seems to me we could end up bogged down.

/1/The reference to "plans for X" was to CINCLANT OPLAN 316, designed to exploit an unforeseen turn of events in Cuba that offered a worthwhile opportunity for exploitation by the United States. The range of circumstances in which this plan would be implemented ranged from support of a widespread rebellion of the Cuban population to military action to divert Castro from military adventure against Guantanamo. The reaction time for the plan was 5 days. The concept called for airborne assault in the vicinity of Havana by two airborne divisions, followed as quickly as possible by an amphibious assault by the 2d Marine Division/Wing Team over beaches to the east of Havana. Depending upon the amount of time for build-up, additional forces would be committed incrementally until approximately five full divisions, with necessary supporting troops, would be engaged. This plan was known as "quick reaction plan." (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange)

I think we should keep constantly in mind the British in Boer War, the Russians in the last war with the Finnish and our own experience with the North Koreans. We are keeping, as I understand it, three divisions in reserve. I think we should plan to use them and call up any guard divisions we have available. This may require us to build additional divisions.

John Kennedy

[end of document]

flag
bar

Department Seal Return to Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. XI.
Return to the Department of State Home Page. This is an official U.S.-Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.