1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath |
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, November 6, 1962, 1 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba. Secret. Received at the Department of State at 1:50 a.m. According to the USUN copy of this telegram, it was drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in substance by Stevenson. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)
1642. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy had a three-and-a-half hour meeting with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich today. Following summary based on uncleared memcon./1/
/1/A 19-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place on November 5, from 6 to 9:30 p.m. at the Soviet Mission in New York, is ibid., 1A October/November Meetings.
1. Stevenson and McCloy referred to Kuznetsov's conversation with McCloy yesterday,/2/ in which former expressed misgivings re inclusion IL-28 aircraft in armaments subject to removal. Kuznetsov, frequently drawing upon prepared text, stated following:
/2/November 4, an apparent reference to Document 142.
A. Sov Govt displeased with Stevenson's Nov 2 letter to Mikoyan;/3/
/3/See footnote 3, Document 133.
B. Sovs surprised IL-28 aircraft regarded by US as offensive, because they basically obsolete in view their low ceiling and low speed. These aircraft, which 15 years old, belong to coastal defenses and cannot be used in combat over enemy territory;
C. US demands this respect can be regarded only as attempt delay solution of problem and continue tense relations between US and USSR;
D. USSR conducting present negotiations in good faith and wishes speedy agreement and normalization situation in Caribbean; if US also honest in its pledge re non-invasion, it should not be disturbed by exist-ence IL-28 aircraft in Cuban hands, since they defensive and subsidiary arms;
E. Cuba sovereign state and can determine itself its defensive needs; no offensive weapons exist in Cuba;
F. Negotiations should center on main problem at hand and raising additional questions can only complicate matters.
Stevenson and McCloy stressed question IL-28 aircraft not new, since President's October 22 statement, quarantine proclamation, as well as October 28 letter contained either specific or general reference to offensive weapons other than missiles. Pointed out jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads could hardly be qualified as obsolete. Noted such armaments in hands of man like Castro could create gravest situation, and LA countries deeply concerned by this. Denied Kuznetsov's insinuation US seeking obstruct negotiations by raising this very important question. After prolonged exchange, in course of which Stevenson and McCloy continued press for removal IL-28 aircraft and Kuznetsov reiterated essentially same points as listed above, Kuznetsov contended negotiations must not depart from President-Khrushchev agreement, substance of which he described as follows:
A. US is to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by US or by its Allies, or by any state in Western hemisphere; Kuznetsov commented US trying evade this subject;
B. As evident from Khrushchev's message, USSR will remove missiles which President regards as offensive. He commented there no question that missiles had been subject President-Khrushchev exchange, Security Council debate, and current talks.
In response to direct question whether USSR would include IL-28's in arms to be removed, Kuznetsov replied in negative, stating that they not offensive arms and SovGov would act accordingly. Suggested both sides report problem to their govts.
2. Kuznetsov referred to schedule of removal, saying first Soviet vessel, Labinsk, due to leave November 6, with eight other ships, Bratsk, Leninskiy Komsomol, Kurchatov, Asosov, Divnogorsk, Volgoles, Polzunov, Alapayevsk, to leave November 7. Said he had no information whether this would complete removal operation.
3. Kuznetsov said USSR had decided make Sov vessel Almata available for verification inbound ships by ICRC. Details re signals and identification would have [to] be worked out and appropriate information had been given to member UN Secretariat. This vessel would be stationed north of Cuba and all Sov ships bound for Cuba would use only northern route, although southern route might be used after November 12.
McCloy and Stevenson pointed out no commitment had been made re US willingness accept Soviet ship, and noted neutral, i.e., Swedish, ship could also be used. Kuznetsov professed surprise, claiming US had not objected to Soviet ship. McCloy reiterated he had expressly stated he could not commit US Govt re use of Soviet ship.
4. McCloy then raised subject of removal of warheads, pointing out this very important matter, and wondered how USSR could satisfy US re their removal. Kuznetsov asserted this question of detail; USSR's actions clearly indicate that all equipment related to what US calls offensive missiles will be removed. Thus, there should be no doubt re warheads, if warheads are indeed in Cuba. USSR intends fulfill all these commitments in good faith, but US raising these questions in order postpone final solution of problem. Stevenson and McCloy stressed importance removal warheads, pointing out that with some modification they could also be used on bombers. Suggested verification removal of warheads could perhaps be done on see-and-count basis as Kuznetsov had suggested for missiles. Stevenson noted problem of warheads highlighted importance ground inspection, and wondered what progress Mikoyan had made in Havana. Asked when Mikoyan returning. Kuznetsov replied he did not know. McCloy said President regarded McCloy-Kuznetsov conversation yesterday as useful and indicating progress, to which Kuznetsov replied he gratified hear this and observed such appraisal fully justified, particularly since USSR doing everything necessary to resolve problem ASAP. Reiterated that as to warheads, USSR would remove from Cuba everything related to "so-called" offensive missiles, but noted he could not say anything beyond that.
5. In summing up conversation Stevenson listed following questions as remaining open: Removal IL-28 aircraft, nationality inspection ship, and verification removal of warheads, although Kuznetsov had given assurances warheads would be removed. Kuznetsov disagreed, saying there no open question from Sov standpoint. Concluded US should consider Soviet deeds and respond in kind.
Stevenson
152. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Washington, November 6, 1962, 9:50 a.m.
Ball reported the Secretary's conversation to Bundy/1/ saying the Secretary suggested the three of them sort this thing out and decide what we want to do. Ball is reluctant because we also have McCone and Bobby. Bundy said that Bobby was away today and the President doesn't get back until the middle of the afternoon. It doesn't seem complicated to him, but he would be glad to sit down with Ball and Bob. Ball said he was concerned as 90% of them might be at sea by tonight. Bundy said we only have to say "We know you are going to sea." Whatever happens, let it happen at sea. They won't cross the Atlantic overnight. All we have to do today is to point out the rapid departure and emphasize the speed in the verification procedure. Ball thought the farther out to sea they get the more difficult it would be for psychological reasons.
/1/In this telephone conversation, November 6, 9:45 a.m., Rusk suggested that since McNamara could not attend a meeting, Ball, Bundy, and McNamara should work out the policy for verification of missiles leaving on Soviet ships that day. (Ibid.)
Bundy thought rather than have the Executive Committee meeting, he would like to have a clear sense that Ball, the Secretary, Bob and Bundy know what we want to do and check it out with the President; then proceed on that basis.
Ball told him that Bob thought we ought to make immediate representation to Kuznetsov; that since they are leaving, it is urgent to get a neutral observer on board. The easiest way to do it is to take a US ship alongside, and if they won't do it, would we take a Soviet ship to do it. We ought to have someone alongside to take a picture. Bundy asked if they were willing to have a US ship alongside and Ball replied they talked like they were prepared to do it. We could also get good photographs of the cargo. These missiles are not crated; they are under tarps, so that it is pretty good from that point of view. Also if we could get the tarp rolled back to make sure they are not duds, and take some pictures. Bundy would be inclined to take up Kuznetsov on his offer yesterday for UN ships alongside and if we can't count through the tarps ask to see under them. Bundy will check this out with Bob and the President and call Ball back./2/ Bundy said he did not get the impression from the conversation that they talked hard about the danger of the MIG business. He suggested that Ball go into that with Ros--he said he meant the MIGs scramble. He will report back to Ball after talking with Bob.
/2/Bundy telephoned Ball at 10 a.m. to report that McNamara agreed
to Ball's suggestion. Bundy could not reach the President, but
he expected that Kennedy would call when he arrived at Hyannisport.
Bundy suggested Ball proceed and promised to call after talking
to the President. (Ibid.) Bundy called Ball at 10:25 a.m. to say
that the President agreed, but "he would like to get a little
neutrality on board if it could work." Bundy thought it would
be too complicated, and Ball agreed it would be "unrealistic"
to try to get neutral observers on board Soviet ships. Both men
concluded that the only plan was to get alongside the Soviet ships,
"haggle from there." The President wanted Gilpatric
to do the haggling in New York. (Ibid.)
153. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
November 6, 1962, 11:30 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball and Johnson were in Washington. Yost also participated in the conversation.
Stevenson--When does Gilpatric get here?
Ball--He is on the other line now. He is in New York, I will find out where he is. He is in New York and calling in on another phone. Alex Johnson is talking to him./1/ He is at the Waldorf Towers.
/1/Ball and Johnson talked to Gilpatric at 11:15 a.m., apparently Johnson stayed on the line while Ball talked to Stevenson. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
Stevenson--All right. We will get him over here as quickly as we can.
Ball--What we should do is to get back to the Russians and this is what Gilpatric is being told to get in touch with you about and since these things are going out of there we want to arrange to get these things photographed at close range and look at them. This is probably the best we can do under the circumstances.
Stevenson--I got a long God damn thing from the Department today./2/
/2/Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., see footnote 2, Document 147.
Ball--Let me put Alex Johnson on because he wrote this long damn thing from the Department today./3/
/3/Captain Elmo Zumwalt and Joseph Sisco drafted the telegram and Johnson cleared it.
Stevenson--There is one ship already sailing. We have to get on to that one I suspect right away. This thing--5--requires a verification at sea and a loading time which we don't have. I think maybe we can start with "D"--inspection from along side./4/ Can we skip everything before that?
/4/Section 5, "Required Verification at Sea," subsection d, "Inspection from Along Side," was considered in this telegram as an acceptable fall-back position. If this was to be the verification mode, then the guidelines in this telegram suggested that all offensive equipment had to be on deck and uncrated.
Johnson--Yes, skip everything before that and go to "D".
Stevenson--All right. I think--if the United States is limited to inspect from along side the vessel, how the hell can we do that if they loaded from below?
Ball--What we really need is this--what we really need to see are the missiles. The photographs we have indicate that they are in the proc-ess of loading the 26 out of the 42. We have to tell them we have to see all the missiles and if we can pull along side and see the missiles and make sure they are not dummies.
Stevenson--This telegram goes into such minute detail. Should we just disregard this and decide now what we want to do?
Ball--All right. I think we can. First, have a ship pull along side these ships and we will photograph from the ship or helicopter, or something like that, but at close range so that we can count for each missile; and have the tarpaulin pulled back so that we can see there are missiles under there.
Stevenson--We are not going to insist on boarding or uncrating.
Johnson--They are being loaded and covered with tarpaulins. It would be easy to the advantage of everyone if we could go on board and examine them, but if we could come along side and check that there actually is a missile under the tarpaulin that would be OK.
Stevenson--You want to see what is above deck on the associated equipment?
Ball--Yes, but we don't have to account for all of it.
Stevenson--We are going to have a hard time getting that. We will have to move awfully fast on this. I think we ought to see if we can get a loading plan.
Ball--Yes.
Stevenson--What else about this?
Ball--Plus the instructions that the ships--we pull a ship along side and the right to take the picture from a helicopter.
Stevenson--All right.
Ball--Hold on, I will make sure about Gilpatric. Gilpatric will come right over.
Stevenson--All right. You told me about the ship inspection from along side. What about this associated equipment and missiles, do we have to see all of these things?
Ball--No, we just want to make sure that enough of it is going on board. Some will be deck loaded.
Stevenson--That is they are not holding back what they said they have?
Ball--That's right. We are not going to try to take an inventory or count it on a piece-by-piece basis. I think this is what we will have to settle for.
Stevenson--Yes, I think this is what we will have to settle for. They are going to try to short circuit the ground inspection. This thing got so vicious last night/5/--we have got to pull our wits together. If I can't get some instructions pretty soon on the guaranty they are going to clam up. I have been waiting for some instructions for the guaranty for weeks.
/5/See Document 151.
Ball--We are going to have a meeting this afternoon/6/ and we will try to get something out.
/6/See Document 154.
Stevenson--I wish they would talk to me before they send these instructions out.
Ball--I think this thing I have just given you is fairly realistic.
Stevenson--Yes, I think this is all right.
Ball--I don't think we give up on the ground inspection.
Stevenson--You mean on the shipments or verification after the fact?
Ball--Verification after the fact.
Stevenson--Yes. The other thing we are going to have to take up again is this warhead business. What is your position on that? How can you tell if they have warheads?
Ball--One with a Geiger counter, I would think. I think our chances on doing anything on that are very slight. I think we should keep it for conversational purposes.
Stevenson--I don't know. If we don't have anything to say it is not very good conversation.
Ball--Ros is on his way there now. I think you should sit down and talk to him and see what you ought to recommend and get back here and I will see if I can clear it out.
Stevenson--Have we got any great signal forms on the ships?
Ball--Great signal forms on the ships?
Stevenson--Yes.
Johnson--Oh, you mean signaling from our ships to theirs?
Stevenson--Yes.
Johnson--No, I don't think anyone contemplated that it would be used.
Stevenson--Telling them that our ship so and so will come by at a certain time.
Ball--We could furnish them that.
Stevenson--It is going to be rough. Most of the details I don't know about and I would like to know about. I am going to have to proceed in writing or God knows where we will be. I want to know all the details about this particular aspect of it.
Johnson--We will undertake to get those details.
Ball--I think you should talk to Gilpatric about that and he can work it out directly with the Navy people and Defense. We would have to go back through them anyway on this.
Stevenson--On the warheads, you have given up I gather.
Ball--No, I don't think, we are going to get it. We want to be satisfied the warheads are out. What suggestions can they make?
Stevenson--They say they haven't any except their commitment that they would remove from the island anything that is offensive. I gather, by some small modification, you could use a missile warhead on an airplane. We can't go on this way, George, it is intolerable, by having a lot of ambiguous talk. Yesterday they insisted that McCloy had agreed to the Soviet ship on Sunday and bitter accusations of bad faith. I think all McCloy said was he didn't personally care if it was a Soviet ship or not but that he couldn't commit the Government. I think we have to have a much higher degree of realism. They are going to stall on this ground verification because they can't get it.
Ball--Right.
Stevenson--You see what I mean?
Ball--Sure.
Stevenson--They are going to say "No more overflights." We will have to face this one in the course of the negotiations. They were insistent on bringing it up last night and I am sure they are going to say we have a few things you know about.
Ball--Did they get into the overflights last night?
Stevenson--No, but they got into the guarantees. I can ask questions like where will the warheads be and on what missiles and can we work out some scheme of identifying them above deck.
Ball--I think that is good.
Stevenson--Let's talk about the IL-28's here. Mikoyan ran into trouble on the IL-28's after he got down there. They now have gotten sticky as hell on this. They may be introducing this as a bargaining point on something else. In all events we have to make up our minds and I think on the removal of the IL-28's and that raises the question of airing nuclear bombs and how to get removal and also whether conventional bombs are going to be removed. I think all of these things I have to have some broad general sort of objective to obtain they are realistic. But I am pretty familiar with the other kind. We might as well forget the thing on conventional bombs. If we could just disregard that and get the record clear then we could concentrate on the thing which we can insist on more legitimately. The IL-28 as an aircraft and any nuclear weapons they carry.
Ball--I think that is fine.
Stevenson--If anyone has any ideas of what we can ask for or how many it should bring in and give us some assurance that you have taken them out . . .
Ball--We have a way of getting that at a high level.
Stevenson--You mean a message to Khrushchev?
Ball--Yes.
Stevenson--I think that is the only way really. I would think if we are going to do anything about this we should move on this promptly.
Ball--What I think would be most helpful for us--Ros is on his way down there now and if you could work something out and put it to us and we could get answers for you and he could interpret back to McNamara the way it looks from New York.
Ball--I think on this one point of these arrangements on these ships that you and Ros should go to work on that right away.
Stevenson--And you will be working on the guarantees. We have to button up on the Red Cross coming in, which is nonsense anyway, we will have to reach an agreement actually within hours as to if it will be a Swedish ship or a Soviet ship. We opened that one up again last night and any remarks that McCloy made about a Soviet ship have been erased. The negotiators are waiting here to see what they are to negotiate about.
Ball--I think the Swedish ship could be made available.
Stevenson--Is that what we want?
Ball--Yes.
Stevenson--All right, we will reject the Soviet ship. We will instruct the UN to charter the Swedish ship.
Ball--Gilpatric knows where the Swedish ship is.
Stevenson--All right. I would make this as simple as possible. I would tie it to the invasion and to the commitments in the inter-American agreement and then let me present it along with a demand for a reciprocal promise from them that they won't reintroduce these weapons into Cuba. We have never let any doubt but that we were not going to make any guaranty at all.
Johnson--Yes. We want some verification of not introducing these then we can make one kind of a guaranty. If it is simple the removal of the missile without any . . . .
Stevenson--When you say guaranty against reintroduction, what do you mean?
Johnson--Some arrangement in Cuba on missiles--something to verify that these weapons are not being reintroduced.
Stevenson--If we are ready for that I think we can get something. That would mean inspection of the United States and on intervening countries.
Ball--In the message we sent up yesterday/7/ we didn't reject . . . .
/7/Apparent reference to Document 147.
Stevenson--I think it would be helpful if we could proceed on the assumption that mutual inspection is something that will have to be worked out over a period of time by the Caribbean Defense Committee. We will guaranty against invasion by the United States in exchange for Soviet guaranty that they will not reintroduce these weapons in Cuba.
Johnson--What would the Cubans do under that?
Stevenson--They wouldn't do anything. Let's get this transaction completed first and then we will sit down and negotiate what we can do and undertake with Cuba on all of these things. Unless we have some very clear line that we ought to pursue right now it is difficult to deal with this. I don't want to go over with a lot of vague alternatives. We can say if you don't give us grounds and verification then we must ask for this. If you do and I don't know what that could be, I don't think they will ever buy it. They will immediately charge us with bad faith. They will say we have introduced new matter and we will have another bad time. I do think that probably we should separate two things--one is the immediate deal with the Russians and the other is future arrangements with Cuba. On the one with the Russians if we settle with a simple guaranty now and then assume we will run our air reconnaissance, this will present a very serious problem. It will be asserted into the Security Council over and over, regardless of what we promised. What we could do is for the future we will have to preserve the line to run reconnaissance flights to assure these weapons will not be reintroduced.
Johnson--Isn't it very difficult for us to give--it seems to me it is very difficult for us to give that guaranty without Cuba in turn having done something.
Stevenson--I think we could ask Cuba to give us a guaranty that she won't introduce these weapons. It is the verification procedure. I don't want to get in a position where they now want to trade off Guantanamo for something more. It is the sort of thing we should get some of your views on as promptly as possible. Somehow we have been able to go through these meetings by saying you will get your guarantees; and then they get into the subject of protocol and a registered agreement.
Johnson--We hope to get to this at the meeting this afternoon, then we will get something to you.
Stevenson--I can hold it off today.
Johnson--They haven't given us ground verification.
Stevenson--That is the one big handle we have got.
Johnson--If we get the IL-28's and ground verification . . . .
Stevenson--That is only one verification for compliance it doesn't take care of the future. McCloy has come to the conclusion that the ground verification is a lot of nonsense and he is against doing it. They are going to be almost impossible to find.
Johnson--That is the problem on it.
Stevenson--I have one other point--this business of the press stories that come from Washington, when we manage to keep this place silent, has caused us grief for two weeks. Every day there is a new story in the newspapers coming from Washington. I must have some knowledge in advance of what they are putting out down there, in the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House.
Ball--I don't think any of it is going out through official channels. The Department is not putting anything out.
Stevenson--Isn't Sylvester and Manning briefing people all the time?
Ball--No.
Yost--What about the Maggie Higgins story this morning about the Kuznetsov-McCloy talks?
Stevenson--It didn't come from here. We maintain total silence here and down there there is a gush of talk. It goes to the Secretary General and we have to unwrap it, it goes to the Russians and we have to clear it up with them.
Ball--It causes me as much pain and anguish as it does you.
Stevenson--Well, the resentment of the press here . . . .
Ball--Yes, I understand. It is a problem.
Stevenson--We are at the point here where no one sees anything but Yost and me and our own Mission doesn't know what is going on. I am a pitiful beggar here to get some kind of coordination.
Ball--This is an old problem and we were able to solve it for a week and we have not been able to solve it since. I don't know where the stuff gets out.
Stevenson--Well this Rowan-Evans stuff got out. I was told that Bundy was telling Alphand what was in the telegram.
Ball--Well a copy of the telegram was given to the Ambassador.
Stevenson--Well that is like publishing it in the New York Times.
Ball--I agree.
Stevenson--I would like for you to take it up with Kennedy or Rusk or some one. Maybe we could do some backgrounding here and leaking of the right stuff to come out. Maybe we could get some of our stories planted and have the right thing come out at the right time. I don't like to do it, but we did it years ago when we didn't have any control. It is time consuming to me and to most of us likewise.
Ball--Let me talk to the President about that this afternoon.
Stevenson--OK, I will talk to Gilpatric.
154. Summary Record of the 21st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 6, 1962, 6:15 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:23 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.
The meeting was opened by the Vice President at the President's request. The President joined the group twenty minutes after the meeting began.
Secretary Rusk summarized a draft reply to Khrushchev (copy attached, as well as a copy of the final outgoing letter)./1/ The letter was revised, approved and later delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here. Secretary Rusk said that Khrushchev had not mentioned IL-28 bombers but referred to a list of weapons which we considered offensive. The Secretary said that the reply contained no ultimatum. The following proposed sentence was deleted: "But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends."
/1/Dated November 5. (Ibid., Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62) See the Supplement. For the letter as sent, see Document 155.
A proposed paragraph on Finland was deleted, which read:
"As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time--while public and private reassurances were being given--there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us."
The following sentence was also deleted: "The same consideration will face the American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted."
At this point the discussion was interrupted and the President brought into the Cabinet Room Mr. Aramburu, the former President of Argentina, and introduced him to those present.
Resuming the discussion, the following concluding sentence was approved: "This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and to give attention to other problems necessary to restore peace."
The President interrupted to call attention to a news report prominently displayed on page one of the Washington Evening Star alleging that Soviet missiles were being hidden in caves in Cuba. Mr. McCone said the source of this story has been interviewed, but is unwilling or unable to say anything more than he told the press. The President suggested that Mr. McCloy talk to Mr. McKelway of the Star and other editors in an effort to persuade responsible editors to check such stories with the government before they print them and to include in the story a statement to the effect that the government has no information to substantiate the report, if such is the case.
The President then began reading the revised draft reply to Khrushchev. In commenting on the reference to a shift in the balance of power, the President said this statement was not persuasive unless the IL-28 bombers were linked to the entire Soviet action. He suggested that the reference in the first paragraph to the IL-28 bombers was not obnoxious. He felt that the letter could be toned down. He argued that the reference to Finland should be left in. Others said that the Finland paragraph should be saved and used, if necessary, in the next letter.
Secretary Rusk said that we did not have a good contract with Khrushchev but we have to get everything out of their language that we possibly can.
The President commented that the situation was capable of becoming dangerous very quickly. He thought reference should be made to Soviet military personnel in Cuba and he again stated his support of the reference to Finland. Both Mr. Nitze and Ambassador Thompson disagreed and the Finland paragraph was finally deleted.
There followed a discussion as to whether the public should be informed of our efforts to induce the Russians to take out the IL-28 bombers. Some felt that our public posture should be calm and not one which would hot things up. Others felt that we should tell the public of the instructions we had sent last Saturday in an effort to get the Russians to agree to remove the bombers. Mr. Bundy thought we should say publicly that we were discussing the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Secretary Rusk recommended that we say nothing about the bombers until all the missiles were out. The President decided that no official comment on the bombers should be made tonight.
The President was informed that Soviet missiles are actually being removed by Soviet ships. He commented that it was more important to get positive proof of the missiles leaving than it was to get the Soviet bombers out now.
Mr. Ball reported that the Russians are permitting us to take pictures of the departing missile ships from helicopters or from U.S. ships which come along side the Soviet ships.
The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. Minow, joined the group to discuss the use of two 50-watt medium-wave radio stations, one operated by the USIA and the other by the Navy, to broadcast to Cuba. Acting Director Wilson of USIA reported that nine commercial stations have been broadcasting nightly to Cuba. The radio time has been purchased by the U.S. These stations are now anxious to return to their regular programs. Mr. Wilson joined Mr. Minow in recommending that the two government-owned stations begin broadcasting this week end under the umbrella of the existing broadcasting of the commercial stations. Mr. Minow said the standard radio band had never before been used by U.S.-owned stations but there was a compelling need to go ahead as recommended. The President agreed.
There followed a discussion about the feasibility of using airborne television to get through to the Cubans. Mr. Wilson reported that the plane carrying equipment would have to fly within thirty miles from Havana. In about three weeks after the first telecast, the Cubans could jam the programs so that they could not be received. Mr. Wilson recommended that the airborne television be saved for an emergency. The President agreed.
The program for air reconnaissance tomorrow was discussed.
1. Three U-2 flights over Cuban ports were authorized by the President.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended ten low-level missions, four over the Port of Havana, two over the IL-28 bomber bases, two over the Port of Isabella, and two over Guantanamo and Santiago. Secretary McNamara suggested that the President turn down the request for low-level missions over Havana. The President agreed.
General Taylor reported on an abort of a U-2 reconnaissance plane which was half way through its mission when a Soviet radar locked on. Under the existing rule the U-2 broke off. Existing rules call for only one U-2 over the island at a time. It is not possible to obtain good pictures from planes flying outside the territorial limits of Cuba even from a U-2.
The President asked what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down. General Taylor said we would halt further missions and try to find out if the Soviets ordered the shoot-down. If so, we would make an air attack on a SAM site.
Secretary Rusk urged that we do nothing which would upset the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations now under way in Havana. If one of our planes were shot down, we would have to respond. This would be awkward in view of the presence in Havana of Mikoyan.
Secretary McNamara said we really did not need the low-level missions over Havana because we were checking on the ships as they move out of Cuba. All Soviet missiles must go as deck cargo because no missile-carrying ships are available to the Russians as of now.
The President returned to his question as to what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot at or shot down. He asked for recommendations within the next twenty-four hours.
Mr. McNamara reminded the President that we had told the Russians that they were responsible if any of our planes were shot at or shot down.
The President asked the group to remain subject to call and suggested that we try to get the press to act more responsibly by playing down unsubstantiated reports from Cuban refugees about Soviet missiles being hidden in Cuban caves.
Bromley Smith/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
155. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
Washington, November 6, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. No classification marking.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday,/1/ you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. This item is indeed of great importance to us.
/1/Document 145.
The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth./2/ You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second,/3/ in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba"/4/ specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive.
/2/See Documents 95 and 102.
/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-809.
/4/For text, see ibid., pp. 809-811.
Your letter says--and I agree--that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.
I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side we are insisting only on what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.
These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.
I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.
In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger--not only for our two countries but for the whole world.
I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.
I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.
For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles has begun.
Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.
I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.
In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.
Sincerely,/5/
/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
156. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, November 7, 1962, 12:45 a.m.
//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared by Yost. This telegram was incorrectly dated November 6. It was drafted the evening of November 6, but not sent until early the following day.
1660. Subject: Cuba. Eyes only for Secretary. Dept pass White House. Stevenson, Gilpatric and Yost had a five and half hour mtg with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich today. Fol summary based on uncleared memcon./1/
/1/A 38-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 4-9:30 p.m., is ibid., 1A October/November meetings.
1. ICRC inspection. Stevenson informed Sovs US not prepared agree to employment Sov ship and preferred UN chartered neutral ship, i.e., Swedish vessel available in Carribean area. Noted ICRC would verify all Sov flag ships, Sov chartered ships, bloc ships, and bloc chartered ships. Kuznetsov argued at length Sovs could speak only for their own ships and perhaps Sov chartered ships, but could not speak for any other country, since that would be violation sovereignty those countries. Claimed US approach this problem at variance with Pres's Oct 23 message,/2/ which spoke of "your" i.e., Sov ships only. Stevenson explained quarantine against offensive weapons imposed on all shipping to Cuba regardless of nationality and US willing replace quarantine temporarily ICRC verification. Kuznetsov claimed quarantine illegal and USSR could not be expected assist US in making arrangements which would be substitution for it. Discussion this subject concluded with Stevenson saying if Sovs refused apply ICRC verification to all vessels with bloc cargoes, US would have to continue use quarantine with respect all ships other than Sov. Kuznetsov responded USSR agreed to ICRC "observation" Sov Cuba-bound ships and if US wished use quarantine for other ships, that its own business.
/2/See Document 52.
After further exchange re nationality ship to carry ICRC team, Kuznetsov admitted Sov original proposal had been to use either Sov or neutral ship. Finally indicated neutral ship would probably be satisfactory and agreed give USUN final word shortly. (Subsequently phoned to confirm Swedish vessel OK and ask name and location.)
2. Inspection procedure outgoing Sov ships. Stevenson suggested Sovs give US schedule shipment 42 missiles Kuznetsov had told had been or were in Cuba, as well as time and place for rendezvous with US Navy ships for verification purposes. He outlined verification procedure as follows: Depending upon operational conditions, presence of missiles on board Sov ships would be verified either from US vessel or unarmed helicopter through visual observation and photography; one or two missiles should be sufficiently exposed so as to identify them as such but without revealing technical specifications. Photography necessary for purpose of verifying number outgoing missiles. Kuznetsov referred to list outgoing Sov ships he had given Stevenson yesterday/3/ and said his understanding was those ships were carrying what US called offensive arms, including missiles. Had no info re ships and cargoes after Nov 7. Noted prompt action required since one ship already left Havana. Re use of helicopters, observed this new point but said it would be communicated to Sov Govt. Promised prompt reply./4/ Gilpatric and Kuznetsov agreed exchange call signals both Sov ships and US Navy vessels concerned, and masters would arrange between themselves time and place rendezvous.
/3/The list of the ships, given on November 5, is in telegram 1646 from USUN, November 6, 7 p.m. Labinsk would sail on November 6, and Bratsk, Lenin Komsomol, Kurchatov, Anosov, Divnogosk, Volgoles, Polzunov, and Alapaevsk would depart on November 7. Also in this letter Kuznetsov stated that the Soviet Union had "no objections to the setting in motion by Mr. McCloy of the proposal for US ships to observe at closer range removal of the rockets on Soviet vessels." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-662)
/4/In telegram 1681 from USUN, November 7, 10 p.m., the mission reported that Mendelevich approached Akalovsky and, reading from a prepared text, stated that agreement had been reached on U.S. visual observation. Masters of the Soviet ships had been instructed to inform the U.S. ships that came along side of the number of missiles they were carrying. If needed, canvas could be partly removed. If the United States insisted upon using helicopters in case of bad weather, the Soviet Union had no objection. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret; Exdis, etc.))
3. Removal of warheads. Stevenson suggested Sovs furnish number of warheads and schedule their removal, following pattern envisaged for missiles. Said verification procedure for missiles could be applied to warheads as well, with one difference, i.e., Geiger counters should be placed close enough to warhead containers to detect radio active material therein. Gilpatric noted we assumed warheads would be transported in such containers as would not reveal nature of their contents, and we did not ask that they be opened.
Kuznetsov replied he could only repeat what he had said yesterday on subject of warheads, and went on rehashing arguments he had advanced yesterday, stressing that US complicating matters by raising additional questions while USSR honestly conducting negots and intended scrupulously fulfill its obligations with respect removal what Pres called offensive weapons and all equipment related thereto. In response to further pressing by Stevenson and Gilpatric, Kuznetsov said he regretted say Sov and US views on question warheads entirely different. Stevenson and Gilpatric stressed vital importance question removal warheads, which essential element offensive weapons, and need revert to it at first opportunity.
4. Activation of SAM sites. Stevenson said another very serious situation had arisen in connection with activation SAM sites in Cuba this AM. Protested such interference with conduct our aerial surveillance, which we obliged conduct in absence ground verification to monitor removal of weapons. Requested Sovs ensure non-recurrence such interference during completion of agreements. Gilpatric noted this very important matter and if SAM sites continued be deactivated as they had been during past ten days, that would avoid need for US taking other measures to make its aerial surveillance effective.
Kuznetsov agreed this major question, but claimed it merely demonstrated US pursuing policy of gross violation sovereignty other states. Reiterated this and similar arguments which he had used in conversation on this subject with McCloy last week. Suggested US stop over-flights now because "so-called" offensive weapons now removed and would be shipped out in couple of days; thus no need for over-flights existed. Refused accept US statement USSR must take steps to prevent recurrence, on grounds Cuba sovereign state. Suggested best way resolve this question and improve US-Cuban relations was to formalize guarantees to Cuba to be submitted to UN and to include assurances re: (a) non-aggression by US, (b) US steps to prevent its allies in Western Hemisphere from committing aggression against Cuba, (c) non-support by US of refugee attacks against Cuba, and (d) cessation subversive activities from US territory. Also said wishes Cuban people re Guantanamo should be satisfied. Claimed that all this would promote friendly US-Cuban relations and prevent another crisis. Said if such obligations were assumed, UN presence in Carribean, including territory of US, Cuba and other Latin American countries, should be instituted as proposed by U Thant, for purpose of verifying compliance. Stevenson and Gilpatric reverted to question over-flights and emphasized extreme gravity with which US regard any interference over-flights and that we would hold USSR accountable for whatever occurred. Kuznetsov replied USSR could not take any responsibility; US would be responsible.
5. IL-28 aircraft. Stevenson recalled yesterday's conversation this subject and quoted relevant portions Pres's and own statements to prove jet bombers had always been included in category offensive weapons. Stated question IL-28 aircraft was being taken up by Pres with Khrushchev today. Noted all other matters on which Sovs negative would also have to be taken up in Moscow unless they could be resolved here. Kuznetsov denied Pres-Khrushchev correspondence referred to IL-28 aircraft and contended US and USSR had been talking about IRBMs and MRBMs. While US had made certain declarations and submitted lists of items, they were unilateral documents and could not be regarded as part of agreement. Reiterated arguments re obsolescence and non-offensive nature IL-28, and contended only reason why US raising these additional questions was to complicate matters and protract situation of crisis. Appealed US be reasonable and take into account fact steps taken by USSR clearly showed it wished implement agreement. Stevenson and Gilpatric asked Sovs reflect on unresolved problems so that they could be settled; otherwise sharp, profound and grave disagreement would exist which would have to be referred to higher authority. Kuznetsov concluded by stating USSR's most sincere desire was not to sharpen US-USSR relations but to take any possible measures to resolve problems and eliminate tensions. Regretted he had failed convince Stevenson and Gilpatric position correct and expressed hope they would consider Sov views so as to find such solutions as were in interests both sides.
Stevenson
157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 7, 1962, 2:48 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Thompson; cleared by Cleveland, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rusk; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Moscow.
1210. Dobrynin in conversation with Thompson last night repeated arguments advanced by Kuznetsov on IL-28's. He said Soviets considered that agreement between President and Khrushchev concerned only missiles. He said IL-28 was fifteen-year-old model incapable of being sent on long-range mission and would be sitting duck for modern air defense system. He stated Soviets considered quarantine proclamation illegal and therefore could not take into consideration its list of prohibited weapons.
Thompson pointed out we did not agree with their appraisal of offensive capabilities IL-28's and observed that most Latin American countries did not have modern air defenses. He said it was clear on our side that bombers were included in the agreement on Cuba and cited specific mention of them in President's October twenty-second address/1/ as well as language in President's letter to Khrushchev of October twenty-seventh./2/
/1/See footnote 3, Document 155.
/2/See Document 95.
Dobrynin said Soviets had the feeling they were moving promptly to carry out agreement. He understood removal of MRBM's had started November second and was expected to be completed by November tenth. The United States had not only done nothing to carry out agreement but was endeavoring to expand its scope. Dobrynin asked when and in what form non-invasion guarantee would be made.
Thompson drew attention to fact that invasion had not taken place, and that we had facilitated Soviet ships in quarantine area proceeding to Cuba. He said negotiations on guarantee declaration were going on in New York but it appeared to him that difficulty was caused by attitude of Cuban Government. The agreement specifically provided for verification of removal of offensive weapons and Cuban Government appeared to be blocking any UN effort to carry this out. He pointed out that there appeared to be at least two phases to the problem. The first was the dismantling and removal of the weapons and the second was assurances against their reintroduction. Dobrynin asked whether US guarantee would be given at the end of phase one. Thompson replied that the Soviets could be sure that we would not invade but he did not see how any formal action on a guarantee of indefinite duration could be taken until longer-range arrangements could be agreed upon. In this connection, he inquired whether Dobrynin thought some regional arrangement such as an atom-free Latin America or a Caribbean agreement would facilitate Cuban acceptance to verification and control measures, stress-ing that he was speaking personally and had no information on what US policy would be on such matters. Dobrynin replied this possibility had been raised by U Thant when he was in Cuba and he personally thought this was hopeful approach. He inquired whether it would be possible to include Florida or part of Southeastern United States in a Caribbean arrangement. Thompson replied that while this might raise a number of problems, we had nothing to hide and he would not exclude such possibility.
Rusk
158. Summary Record of the 22d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 7, 1962, 5 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
Deputy Director Carter of CIA summarized the current intelligence./1/ Deputy Secretary Gilpatric explained our method of inspecting outgoing missiles. We will have pictures certainly of missiles aboard six outgoing Soviet ships. About 90 percent of the missile erectors have been moved to Cuban ports. Some Soviet troops are leaving. Photographs will be available in Washington tomorrow.
/1/In his record of action of this meeting, November 7, Bundy noted that Carter reported that three ships had loaded 17 Soviet missiles, 11 of which were on the two ships already on the high seas. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24) See the Supplement.
The President asked whether we should say something tonight about the outgoing missiles. Mr. Salinger said he thought something had to be said. The President authorized the Defense Department to say that ships with missiles are leaving Cuba./2/ The President suggested that an attempt be made to take pictures of a passenger boat returning to the Soviet Union with Russian troops.
/2/For text of the statement, November 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.
Secretary McNamara reported there had been no reaction to today's aerial reconnaissance mission. The weather was bad. A request was made and permission granted to fly five U-2 flights and twelve low-level flights, some to photograph cave areas.
Secretary Rusk said we were heading toward a UN Security Council meeting during which the Russians would announce that there are no Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secretary General U Thant has put forward a suggestion that the five Latin American Ambassadors in Havana be named as inspectors and travel throughout Cuba./3/ Our problem is how to manage recurrent rumors in the U.S. and Latin America that the Russians are not moving out their missiles but merely putting them into caves. He said we must have evidence to reply to such allegations.
/3/As reported in telegram 1661 from USUN, November 7, 6:30 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) The Department of State responded that it would be prepared to have U Thant make such a proposal with certain provisos: that Castro not learn that it had been first discussed with the United States; that U.S. aerial surveillance would continue; that the inspection team have full freedom of movement in Cuba; that it be an agent of and report to U Thant; that it have adequate logistical and technical support; and that it would be supplemental to ICRC inspection of incoming cargoes and U.S. along-side inspection of outgoing cargoes. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers--Cuba)
Secretary Dillon asked whether we were trying to get a bargain with the Russians or avoid one. The President replied that we have a little time now and we should play out our negotiations slowly. He said we wouldn't invade with the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. We might make a formal commitment not to invade when the Soviets comply fully by removing the IL-28 bombers and we have assurances that there will be no reintroduction of strategic missiles. We must continue aerial reconnaissance until a UN substitute is in place or until we have ground inspection. He asked State to draft a statement covering our plans for continuing inspection. He said our posture with the Soviets should be such as to avoid the appearance of holding back in the light of the rapid withdrawal of Soviet missiles.
Mr. Bundy said the only weapons in the proclaimed list which we must really get out are the IL-28 bombers. Secretary McNamara agreed.
The President said we must continue aerial surveillance. The Soviets say that inspection is now a Cuban problem. But we must make clear to the Russians that if they retaliate against our surveillance planes they will be held responsible. We are supporting a Latin American atom-free zone. The UN is discussing a proposal to send teams to carry out on-the-ground inspection in Cuba. If we get the IL-28 bombers out we might be prepared to lift the quarantine.
The President then asked for a memorandum spelling out what the Russians had agreed to and what we had agreed to.
Secretary Rusk said the proposal to use the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana as inspectors is a help but it is not complete. The President said these Ambassadors could look at caves and inspect possible Soviet submarine base sites. The problem is how we can hurt Castro without a quarantine which stops Soviet ships.
Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Latin American States to break relations and we might tell our allies to get their ships out of the Cuban trade.
Mr. Nitze circulated a Defense Department paper on what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down./4/ General Taylor orally stated the Chiefs' views./5/ We must first find out whether a shoot-down is an isolated incident or whether it is the first of a series of actions undertaken with deliberate intent. We have a choice of hitting the offending source or if the shoot-down were deliberate, an air attack destroying the IL-28 bombers and the SAM sites. The President asked at what point we would give up low-level reconnaissance missions. We appeared to be running out of targets. He asked for a surveillance plan adequate to meet our interests on the assumption that the bombers remain and on the assumption that the bombers are taken out. He asked the group to meet again tomorrow/6/ to decide whether we should go to the mat on the IL-28 bombers or whether we should say the Soviets have now completed their agreement to remove the missiles and move on to other problems.
/4/In the paper, November 7, Nitze's courses of action included private and public warnings to the Soviet Union, reimposition of the quarantine, and, if additional reconnaissance planes were shot down, U.S. attacks on the specific SAM sites. If attacks continued, all SAM sites in Cuba would be destroyed. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22-11/23/62) See the Supplement.
/5/The Joint Chief's views were sent to McNamara in JCSM-872-62, November 7. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962) See the Supplement.
/6/See Document 162.
Bromley Smith/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 7, 1962, 9:32 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-762. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Thompson and U. Alexis Johnson; cleared by Cleveland, Gilpatric, Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Johnson.
1223. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. We have received from the Soviet Ambassador here a confidential indication/1/ that the Soviet Government takes strong exception to the list of weapons we consider offensive in accordance with the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev which you furnished Mr. Kuznetsov (Urtel 1606, November 2)./2/
/1/See Document 157.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 133.
The Soviets take position that Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement related only to missiles. They also consider quarantine proclamation an illegal act and that they will ignore list of offensive weapons in that document.
Our primary purpose is to get the MRBM's and IL-28 bombers out and we would be prepared to go far in reducing the list of offensive weapons in order to achieve this purpose. When Kuznetsov is in a position to negotiate (which may not be until Moscow gets him instructions following our approach to the Soviet Ambassador here last night) you may go as far as necessary toward the following minimum list:
1. Surface-to-surface missiles. (We are prepared limit these to MRBM's and IRBM's and drop mention of those designed for use at sea, and propellants.)
2. Bomber aircraft.
3. Any nuclear warheads for missiles, nuclear bombs for aircraft, or any other type nuclear weapon.
With regard to the Komar-class torpedo boats you might, however, inquire whether Soviets intend to furnish any additional craft of this kind. What we are concerned about are the missiles and bombers with their immediate supporting equipment, and you could explain that point five in your letter to Mikoyan was included to prevent setting up of bases complete except for missiles which could quickly and secretly be brought in.
This modifies the instructions contained in section 2 Deptel 1034,/3/ "Definition of Offensive Weapons."
/3/Reference is to telegram 1147 to USUN, October 31, repeated to Moscow as 1034; Document 125.
On submarines you should take the position that we are relying on Soviet assurances against the establishment of submarine bases in Cuba and our assumption that they did not intend to furnish such offensive weapons system to Cuba.
Rusk
160. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Under Secretary of State (Ball), the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 8, 1962, 10 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Ball told Bundy about the call from Stevenson saying he was concerned they have not seen the President's reply to Mr. K./1/ Ball knows it was agreed it not be sent up to them. Someone will have to placate him because he is upset about the fact they can't conduct their business unless they at least know what the exchanges are at all levels. Bundy thought they were too leaky and Ball said he couldn't say that to him because his answer would be they haven't leaked anything and Washington has leaked everything.
/1/Johnson called Ball at 9:55 a.m. to report that he had just spoken to Stevenson who complained that he had not received the President's answer to Khrushchev's letter of November 5 (Document 145). Johnson told Stevenson that there was agreement in Washington not to send Kennedy's response of November 6 (see Document 155) to the Mission at the United Nations. Stevenson told Johnson the Mission could not operate without it. Johnson asked Ball what should be done. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)
Bundy said he knew the substance of what was in the message. He could read it when he is down here. Bundy was afraid if it were sent to him it would be all over the place. Ball suggested we send it up to him with someone who could show it to him and bring it back. Bundy thought that was all right. Ball told him we should do something because he was upset about it, and he is a member of the Cabinet. Bundy suggested it for his eyes only/2/ and Ball should explain to him the reason we are being edgy about this is the very existence of secret correspondence with K has been a nuisance in the past; the moment anyone says there is a message, we have to show it to Alphand; then we are in trouble--as the message of the 26th shows. That is the reason for the absolute rigid rule; they don't go anywhere but to people working in Washington and Moscow on the list approved by the President personally. Ball suggested that Bundy mention this to the President.
Johnson said the Secretary wants to get together at 12 over here./3/ We are waiting for confirmation from Bob. We would be happy if Ted and Bundy could come. Bundy replied he would come.
/2/At 10:15 on November 8, Ball called Stevenson to tell him that the President's letter "was an attempt to nail it down to the IL-28's," and that only 4 or 5 people know of it. Stevenson said that unless the Mission knew what was being said at other levels, they could not operate. Ball told Stevenson he was "sure this was an oversight." He would check it out and get the message to Stevenson right away. (Ibid.)
/3/Rusk met with McNamara, Nitze, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Cleveland,
Gilpatric, Martin, Thompson, and Manning from noon to approximately
2 p.m. McGeorge Bundy joined the meeting at 12:45 p.m. (Johnson
Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the meeting
has been found.
161. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)
Washington, November 8, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/63. Top Secret.
LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
Problem: What kind of continuing surveillance is required for our protection if offensive weapons are withdrawn with and without some inspection on the ground?
1. In general, it can be stated that our continuing aerial surveillance requirement is to obtain complete high level coverage of Cuba and of the Isle of Pines each thirty days, plus a sufficient number of low-level flights or on site ground inspections to check out specific locations which may appear, from high-level photography or from other intelligence, to be suspicious.
2. It is estimated that a schedule providing complete higher level coverage of Cuba once every thirty days would allow elasticity in the scheduling of overflights. This should permit selecting days for flight when the weather was relatively good and therefore should lead to a requirement for no more than approximately six flights per month to produce complete coverage of the island. In perfect weather conditions, complete coverage of the island could be obtained in one day by four U-2 aircraft.
3. We do not yet have the capability to provide search coverage of Cuba by oblique photography. There is a shortage of cameras for this purpose, and for the foreseeable future the oblique technique will not provide adequate coverage of interior locations.
4. The number of flights required for low-level photography would depend almost entirely on the extent to which suspicions about specific locations arise as a result of high level surveillance or other intelligence and the adequacy of on site ground inspection. In the absence of reliable ground inspection, low-level surveillance would be required as needed to check suspicious locations. The minimum requirement would seem to be to schedule a sufficient number of such low-level flights to protect the "right" to them even if no suspicious locations were indicated by U-2 photography of other intelligence. This political consideration would indicate a requirement for perhaps two such overflights a month.
5. In addition to aerial, and such on site inspection as may be
available, we would plan to continue all other avenues of intelligence
including continuing surveillance at sea of shipping bound for
Cuba. Any unexplained increase in such shipping would be a ground
for increased suspicion.
162. Summary Record of the 23d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:30 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.
A press release was revised and approved for the Defense Department to issue, copy attached./1/
/1/Attached, but not printed, for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.
The problem of long-term surveillance requirements was discussed. A paper by Mr. Nitze was circulated./2/ Another surveillance paper will be prepared covering three contingencies:
/2/Document 161.
a. The missiles are out and we obtain satisfactory on-the-ground inspection.
b. The missiles are out but we do not obtain satisfaction on ground inspection.
c. The missiles and the IL-28 bombers are taken out.
There followed discussion on how pressure could be kept on Cuba without continuing the quarantine. None of the suggestions were quick acting. A proposal was made to ask the allies to put the maximum pressure on Castro so as to avoid a situation in which we would be retaliating for a shoot-down of one of our reconnaissance planes. Ambassador Thompson urged that we keep the maximum amount of flexibility until Khrushchev replies to our last letter/3/ and until the Mikoyan talks with Castro in Havana are completed.
/3/Document 155.
The President said the key issue is whether we lift the quarantine if the IL-28 bombers don't come out. Do we resume the quarantine and stop Soviet ships if we don't get the bombers out? He thought we would know more in twenty-four hours about what we should do. He was inclined not to reimpose the quarantine, but he did favor pressure on our allies to keep their ships out of Cuba.
Secretary Rusk suggested that two courses be studied. The first, reimposition of the quarantine, and the second, covert actions against Castro.
Five U-2 flights and ten low-level flights were authorized for tomorrow. Secretary McNamara reported that there was no reaction to today's flights, but the weather had been bad, i.e., clouds had obscured the targets.
Bromley Smith/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
163. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, November 8, 1962, 11 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-862. Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, Yost was the drafter. (USUN Files: FRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) Received at the Department of State at 11:04 p.m. and relayed to the White House at 11:14 p.m.
1697. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba. Fol is summary of this evening's meeting of Stevenson, McCloy, and Yost with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich. Full report follows:/1/
/1/An 18-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission from 5 to 8:30 p.m., is ibid., 1-A October/November meetings.
Sovs gave us position as of today of nine vessels leaving Cuba carrying 42 missiles. They pointed out vessels, while commencing voyage in Florida Strait, in fact turning eastward and proceeding through Bahama Strait by Crooked Island. They said masters of vessels have been given instructions concerning uncovering some missiles and concerning use of helicopters. (This info being telephoned this evening to Navy Department.)
Kuznetsov, after declaring Sovs have complied with their commitment to withdraw offensive weapons and that it is now up to us to comply with its commitments of guarantees to Cuba, read list of seven points which he felt should be embodied in our commitment. These seven points were elaboration of Castro's five points/2/ supplemented by US acceptance of what Kuznetsov described as U Thant's plan for UN presence in Caribbean, including US, Cuba, and other LA states, to observe carrying out of obligations by all parties. Stevenson made clear guarantees we envisaged are those defined in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 133.
In reply to Stevenson's repeated inquiries about IL-28s and rehearsal of record defining bomber aircraft as offensive weapons, Kuznetsov rigidly maintained Sov position that these were never included in definition of offensive weapons and that Sovs had now fully complied with their commitments to remove offensive weapons from Cuba.
As to warheads Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev's statement that all offensive weapons will be removed from Cuba means that there will be on Cuba no warheads related to such weapons. He went on to specify that "such weapons" means those loaded on vessels and now proceeding to the Soviet Union. He added that in fact warheads were loaded on board ship and carried out of Cuba immediately after decision to remove missiles had been taken. This being the case any further talk about verification of removal of warheads is pointless. Moreover it would be absurd to suggest warheads might be left behind after missiles removed since warheads without missiles are not weapons and cannot be used.
When Stevenson pointed out Sovs had not kept commitments made by Khrushchev for UN verification of dismantling of sites in Cuba Kuznetsov replied that implementation of this verification of course depended on Cuban agreement, which had not been forthcoming. Para in summing up Stevenson pointed out (1) that in so far as concerns IL-28s Pres's letter of Oct 27/3/ had referred not only to missiles but to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use" and that Khrushchev's reply had made no objection to this stipulation; (2) that verification of withdrawal of warheads is no more "pointless" to US than verification of removal of rockets and that furthermore no reference had been made to nuclear aerial bombs; (3) that US guarantee to Cuba in terms set forth in exchange of correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev would be forthcoming when conditions are met, conditions being removal of all offensive weapons systems from Cuba and appropriate verification. Guarantee is clear and conditions are clear, he concluded, but transaction is not yet complete. If Soviet Union would help to complete transaction by removal of bombers and by enabling US to verify removals of all nuclear components, then we will give guarantees pursuant to exchange of correspondence, in form of declaration in the SC if that appears to be most suitable means.
/3/See Document 95.
Stevenson
164. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 9, 1962, 9:25 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Bundy: Who is going to take the planning burden on the business the President clearly wants to work through of what we do short of direct reimposition of the quarantine in the event of IL-28 trouble?
Ball: I thought I would get together with Alex over the weekend,/1/ and we will try to figure out something.
/1/November 10 and 11.
Bundy: Is that good enough timing? That is really the puzzle in my mind. Are we going to want to do more this weekend or do we want to let this thing sit a few days.
Ball: There are two big unknowns in this. One is the reply from Moscow,/2/ and the second is the Mikoyan report./3/
/2/Reference is to Khrushchev's November 12 reply (Document 171) to Kennedy's letter of November 6 (Document 155).
/3/The report of his discussions with Castro.
Bundy: Yes, it would be hard to make a concrete plan.
Ball: It is hard to go too far without knowing at least one of the two. On the other hand, we can come out with some planning on assumptions. This business of reimposition of a quarantine is much too brutal and much too hazardous. This is the last resort of solution because it would have to be undertaken in an atmosphere where we would be really going it alone, I think. But there are other things; I wasn't at all satisfied with what we came up with yesterday. I was not feeling well the last couple of days.
Bundy: I know. The raw materials are in these papers, but someone has to go work and actually develop the scenario. One of the immediate questions is how soon do we begin to say in a relatively disagreeable tone that if the bombers don't go the deal is off. Our view is it is not only off but pressure needs to be applied on this.
Ball: That is right. Furthermore I think we have to have a fairly definite philosophy about where we are going to aim our barrage--whether we are going to try to let the Russians off the hook to some extent and concentrate on the Cubans, or whether we are going to try to hold their nose strictly to it with whatever consequence there may be.
Bundy: It might be better--one could just make a shift--OK, we are now going to treat this as a Cuban problem.
Ball: That's right, and much could be said about that, I think. As a matter of fact this is what I put forward with McNamara before you came in the meeting yesterday./4/ That it would be better to try to move it over and then treat it as a Cuban problem and help the Russians themselves to disengage from the situation, get maximum freedom of action there ourselves, so that we can really bring that problem to a solution without prejudicing our larger interests with the Russians, is the way I would see it. Now the Russians are helping it this way, and particularly the Cuban assertion yesterday in the UN which was reported that the bombers were theirs; if we could build up this kind of a set of documentation, then we would be in a position to say we appreciate the Soviet Union had done what it could; that the Cubans are being recalcitrant, and we couldn't possibly give assurances. Furthermore, since the Soviet Union has indicated that they are not in control of the situation, we must have freedom of action.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 160.
Bundy: Yes. Would you press on to direct action against Cuba?
Ball: Well, I think it could lead there. But leave the second stage business; then we would start in on pressures on the Cubans. In the meantime, with a kind of tacit understanding with the SU, this may be the best course. I don't think that is an impossible direction.
Bundy: Nor do I.
Ball: I will get some of this stuff pulled together.
Bundy: I think we would do better not to try to do contingency planning; although the President wants work to go on, he won't sit still for the thing that he doesn't know and what I would say to him today is what I would like to do is to ask the Department, let your office be the center, to be the center of production of a respectable plan for a situation in which these things become Cuban property and we react accordingly. I think that probably is the likeliest development. If they say they will get them out, our whole planning problem changes. I think the President's view is that he would buy this if it doesn't lead him to a nose-to-nose with the Soviets, and he would want the strongest program that doesn't do that. I'll talk to him along those lines.
Ball: This, I think, is the best possibility.
Bundy: I'll talk to him along those lines. I think we will probably have to have an Executive Committee meeting later this afternoon,/5/ for news and wrap up for the weekend the best we can. He is not going to Glen Ora until tomorrow midday. I think he would probably want to get the thing organized this afternoon if he can. Do you see any objection to that? The President does not want to take a weekend, I am sure, in any way that would complicate process, but the UN isn't going to be a lively forum, and Mikoyan hasn't come back, etc.
/5/There was no Executive Committee meeting the afternoon of November 9.
Ball: We just have too many unknowns in the equation.
Bundy: That is the way I feel about it.
165. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
November 9, 1962, 12:30 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball and Johnson were in Washington.
AES: We had a long one last night. The report was sketchy on it./1/ They started off by trying to inject right away at the outset the guarantees and wanted to know why we evaded the subject, etc. Then we brought it around to the IL-28s and the other items we were interested in, and they keep pulling it back to the guarantee and set forth all of Castro's points in their language. We kept it right on the language of the letters. We broke up with another deadlock. Now they have asked for an emergency meeting for 1:30./2/ I think we are at a point where unless something breaks in Havana or Moscow, or unless they have something new to present today (it might be Mikoyan's return or something from Moscow, I don't know), we are at the point that they have said all the warheads relating to the missiles have been withdrawn. Whether there are any aerial bombs withdrawn they don't say on that. We are at a point where we have [to] decide on the subject of the warheads. Whether we are willing to accept a certification that all warheads from planes have been withdrawn and won't be reintroduced, or whether we have to take a position later on the IL-28s; and then do we have another problem in the post-facto verification. Then the question of continuing safeguards. On that we have come to the conclusion there is nothing we can do [sic] their promise they won't reintroduce these weapons until we get around to some inspection system regarding a nuclear-free zone or some other action through the UN. If there is some other idea on that, we would like to know what it is.
/1/See Document 163.
/2/The emergency meeting turned out to be merely a protest by Kuznetsov over the way that three U.S. naval commanders were intercepting Russian ships, see Document 166.
Ball: I think that here it is certainly not accepted that we could simply take their word for it because of the fact that in the President's letter itself he specified as one of the conditions some continuing safeguards. I think what the real posture probably is that unless they are willing to provide for some kind of continuing inspection on the ground which, with Cuban cooperation, might be worked out under the UN arrangement, that we would have to continue to assure ourselves of the situation through the closest kind of surveillance, which would mean continued aerial reconnaissance, etc. I would hope we would not have to be too specific at the moment.
AES: I wouldn't agree altogether, if I may say so. I think we would continue the surveillance without arguing and announce publicly.
Ball: I think that is probably right, as far as any specifications of the surveillance is concerned, but I think that we reserve the point on safeguards on the assumption that they have to be some kind of arrangements or something of the sort on the ground.
AES: That immediately becomes reciprocal with them, and they say, well how about mutual observation on your ground?
Ball: On this one, I would avoid getting into any specification on the thing.
AES: We can't avoid it.
Ball: The reason why they are pressing so hard on Castro's five points, etc. is to make a record for the negotiations in Cuba that they want to be able to go back and tell Castro that they fought his battle to the bitter end, but that there is no give on our side. I think the way to get a clear definition of position here, which we are going to try to do later this afternoon, but certainly our tentative strategic direction is to say that as far as the Russians are concerned they are doing what they can subject to their being able to control Castro. We have the option of accepting their arguments that they can't control Castro or trying to take the position that Castro is, after all, just a creature of theirs and holding them to the performance themselves. We should insist that we still have to have the safeguards provided in the arrangement, which means some form of ground inspection and some form of being able to satisfy ourselves against reintroduction. This is something we would then have to work out with Castro. But since the guarantees are for the benefit of Castro, without Castro's cooperation in these things, we couldn't possibly give securities. The advantage of this course is that it permits the Russians to disengage if they want to which would leave us free to pursue other subjects with them without the embarrassment of the Cuban problem, while reserving freedom of action on our own part to deal with Castro.
AES: There are two problems here. One is how we liquidate our deal with the Russians as to ground inspection. I don't think we should talk about surveillance.
Ball: I agree. What we have to say to them is that we obviously cannot give assurances as long as Castro is in position on the IL-28s which are an offensive weapon and could be used against the other LA countries and against us, nor can we give such assurances unless we have some ability to safeguard ourselves against the reintroduction of weapons into Cuba. If we are unable to work these things out with Castro, then there is really a problem if the decision is in Castro's hands and it leaves the problem between Castro and ourselves.
AES: All right. This is exactly where we are. We are not a fraction of an inch ahead. The question is whether we go any farther today.
Johnson: I think we have to wait to see what they say at 1:30, whether there has been any reflection from the exchange.
AES: I wonder if you think the time has come that we talk about the alternative of verification of warheads by ship inspection as we proposed and the aerial bombs, or whether we would be inclined to take their certification.
Johnson: I wouldn't do that yet.
Ball: I don't see how we can. I don't see how we could ever defend it.
Johnson: If we get the IL-28 question resolved, then we might consider what is fact--that you have no way of verification. They have no means of delivery.
AES: Your feeling is as far as today's meeting is concerned you don't go any farther than we have?
Ball: Right.
166. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, November 9, 1962, 2:15 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Gilpatric said AES wanted him to tell Ball that the emergency meeting Kuznetsov called was simply for the purpose of registering a protest about the way three naval ships were acting in intercepting the Russian ships. They were trying to stop the ships, and one ship wasn't even on the list--Alexandraska. They wanted us to do something about it and Gilpatric said they were. It was an over-zealous Commander. They thought it was going very well this morning. There was no word about Mikoyan's return, and the Russian Ambassador made a fine speech about Mrs. Roosevelt this morning, which is interesting.
Ball asked if they pulled the tarps off and Gilpatric said they
have been pulling the tarps off, getting down to what they call
the rubber pants, which is enough to get an identification. Ball
asked if the picture looked good enough to be persuasive and Gilpatric
replied they thought so; they haven't received them yet. They
show, for example, fins and they show where the conduits were
run. He thought they would correspond with the Red Square pictures
sufficiently. The dimensions are right. They think it is going
along pretty well.
167. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
November 9, 1962, 4:15 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball was in Washington.
AES: I wonder if you would care to submit this afternoon at the meeting/1/ a suggestion which I could dictate.
/1/The Executive Committee meeting.
GWB: I think the meeting has been called off.
AES: Maybe you could send it over to Kennedy to be reflecting on.
GWB: OK.
AES: You know about our meeting today and the protest on the ships?/2/
/2/See Document 166.
GWB: Yes.
AES: That is all it amounted to. It seems to me highly desirable to liquidate--this is all pending, no developments from Moscow or from Castro, I mean Havana. If this continues this way indefinitely, we are going to start to lose ground here; talks are going to start, and it will reverberate around the country. I think that is good reason to try to cut this off with the Russians and liquidate this part of it if we can and then see what is left in the way of possibilities for negotiation with the Cubans through the OAS. In any event, I could dictate the memo:
(Memo written up separately)/3/
/3/Printed as an attachment.
Just chew on that for a while and extricate us from the deadlock we are in now. This would give them their five Castro points in the forum where we can handle it best--in the OAS, and meanwhile get the munitions out of there and the only verification we will ever get on the warheads anyway.
GB: The thing about that is it leaves Castro in an extremely favorable position, doesn't it.
AES: He has lost his aircraft, his missiles, his nuclear striking capability; he has a guarantee against invasion by the US and nothing else.
GB: He still has his SAM sites and the missiles he never really thought were his anyway.
AES: We are never going to get them, I don't think, without knocking them out.
GB: What disturbs me is from the point of view of the whole American state system, he has come out in a good position. He has guarantee with no obligations.
AES: No, he has given us a guarantee he won't reintroduce these weapons into Cuba and the Soviets have given guarantee that they won't reinstitute. The point is the problem of verification at the completion of the present transaction is in Castro hands and he isn't playing ball. Now, mind you this is only contingency planning in the event we don't get any break from Moscow now or ever.
GB: Let me say the majority view here is in favor of doing what you are trying to do which is to draw a line under the Russian undertakings and say we are prepared to accept at face value your statement that you have gone as far as you can go. The difference here is how Castro will proceed from there. It is then what we do as far as Castro is concerned. First, are we prepared to give him any undertakings at all until he does something himself which would be, I think, from the point of view of most of the people in Washington, which would require more than simply mutual undertakings. He would really have to provide for some kind of on the spot inspection or something of the sort of continuing presence that would provide some real safeguards or at least the appearance of safeguards. The alternative approach is maybe the thing to do is to let the Russians disengage along the line that you suggest and say to them you have done everything you can do and thanks very much; we still have the problem of dealing with Castro because our guarantee is with Castro and we may have to deal with him by ourselves and see if the Russians would not be prepared to let it go at that.
AES: As to the future safeguards, the only thing we will get is a promise the Russians won't reintroduce unless we get ground inspection from Castro and Castro will put that on a reciprocal basis. Therefore tying to liquidate the Russian deal and if we come off with everything we anticipated, then that leaves us with dealing directly with Castro on any future assurances beyond his promise not to reintroduce.
GB: I think you will find there is a great deal of accord on the first part.
AES: You can't impose on Castro obligations to do things because the Russians didn't comply.
GB: Well, but the whole business of giving him an assurance was conditioned upon certain things being done, some of which are in his behalf.
AES: That is what worries me. You can withhold the assurance on invasion and cut off now and say we didn't get strict compliance and therefore we are not ground inspection, and the people will say over here they have had virtual support of everything they expect and they are now reneging on their promise. I just don't want to get in the position of anybody charging us with bad faith or nonperformance on our part. I don't want to get so close to that line.
GB: Let me think this over.
AES: Of course this may all change when word comes from Moscow.
GB: No intimation from your friend as to when Mikoyan might have something.
AES: No, I think we are stuck here for the present and I think he has got down there and they are just going to work us over on these five points and we won't really achieve anything.
GB: I'll have this thing typed up and give it some thought.
Attachment/4/
/4/No classification marking. This paper was discussed at the
24th meeting of the Executive Committee, November 12, 11 a.m.,
see Document 170. The Department of State sent this memorandum
to the White House on November 14. (Kennedy Library, National
Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62)
Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy
I won't review the negotiations to date with which you are generally familiar.
Unless there is some break from Moscow or Havana--I think the situation is deadlocked, and I suggest trying to conclude the transaction with the Russians to enable us to get into contact with Cuba through the OAS or directly. Realizing that the Soviets may not be able to control Cuba, I suggest consideration as a contingency of a formula for terminating the present transaction somewhat as follows:
1. If the Soviets will remove the IL-28 bombers and give us some means of verification (fuselages at sea) and formal assurance (in the Security Council) that all nuclear warheads for missiles and air nuclear bombs have been removed, and
2. If the Soviets will give us some means (through the five Latin countries having diplomatic relations, for example) verify compliances above ex post facto (I assume our reconnaissance will also verify without any agreement by the Soviets or Cubans), and
3. If the Soviets and Cuba will give us a formal public promise (in the Security Council) not to reintroduce these weapons into Cuba,
4. We will call off the quarantine and give Cuba the formal guarantee (in the Security Council) against invasion and ask other Latin States to do likewise.
The open question then would be: reciprocal guarantees by Cuba and other Latins and the United States against interference, subversion, sabotage, support for attacks, etc., together with some system of mutual verification by international inspection. This should be worked out through the OAS, if the other Latin states think it worthwhile.
Adlai E. Stevenson/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
168. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 9, 1962, 5:30 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Ball told Bundy he hoped to get over to him by 10 a.m. tomorrow a memorandum/1/ which is a general kind of planning memo which incorporates some views of the DOD which came out of their meeting this afternoon./2/ It sets up various courses of action based on pretty much the same assumption that we if we don't get the IL-28s out or any security against reentry, but that we take the Russians at their word. It amounts to a consideration of direct military action to achieve it or a continued system of surveillance with the expectation of Cuba drawing fire and then taking some action on that. He is attaching a proposal of Stevenson,/3/ which Ball does not endorse, but which he wanted the President to see on negotiating with Castro. It will give good plane reading if he wants it.
/1/Document 169.
/2/No other record of this meeting has been found.
/3/See the attachment to Document 167.
169. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy
Washington, November 10, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject
Files, Cuba, General, 11/7/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A note on
the source text indicates that it was part of the President's
weekend reading for November 10.
SUBJECT
Suggested Policy Line for Cuban Crisis/1/
/1/Under a covering memorandum of November 10, Ball sent a copy of this memorandum to the Executive Committee "for information and comment." He noted that it "was hastily prepared at the request of the White House" and that it had been slightly revised since submission to the President. Ball also noted that the memorandum created the impression that the optional courses of action were mutually exclusive. They were not and combinations were "possible and perhaps desirable." (Ibid.)
Assumptions
Until we have received a definitive Soviet answer regarding the IL-28s and a reliable report as to the progress of the Mikoyan-Castro discussions, we must be ready to proceed on any one of four assumptions:
Assumption A. That the USSR will remove the IL-28s and will arrange adequate ground inspection.
If the removal of the bombers is sufficiently assured and the inspection arrangements adequate, we could presumably regard the incident as closed and give some form of guaranty regarding the invasion of Cuba. These arrangements would, of course, need to include more than a provision for Second-Phase inspection by the five Ambassadors. But even that limited progress might indicate a sufficiently forthcoming attitude to make possible some Third-Phase solution through a nuclear-free zone or otherwise.
Assumption B. That the USSR will arrange ground inspection, but will refuse to remove the IL-28s on the ground that these are Cuban property.
This seems rather unlikely. If the Cubans should agree to yield on the question of adequate ground inspection, (which means something more than mere Second-Phase arrangements for inspection by the five Ambassadors) then it is hardly likely that they would insist upon the retention of the IL-28s.
Assumption C. That the USSR will agree to withdraw the IL-28s, but will assert that they are unable to arrange ground inspection because of alleged Cuban objections.
Assumption D. That the USSR will neither remove the IL-28s nor provide arrangements for ground inspection and continuing safeguards. Khrushchev will excuse his non-performance on the ground that Cuba is a sovereign country, the IL-28s belong to the Cubans, and Castro is unwilling to permit any form of ground inspection.
Under either assumption C or D we would be presented with a major choice of policy. Stated in large terms, two available lines of policy would seem worth consideration:
First, we might take the position that Cuba is effectively a puppet of the Soviet Union since it is economically dependent on Moscow; therefore, regardless of Cuban intransigence, we would continue to look to the Soviet Union to enforce the Kennedy-Khrushchev undertakings.
Or second, we might take at face value the Soviet assertion that Russia cannot control Castro. In that event we would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate our pressure on Cuba. In that event, not only would we refuse to give any assurance of noninvasion, but we would make it clear that we could not tolerate--for reasons not only of our own security but of the security of the Hemisphere--that Castro be left in the possession of offensive weapons.
Advantages of Second Line of Policy
The second line of policy seems preferable from the point of view of the total American interest, for the following reasons:
1. The shifting of the burden of responsibility would minimize the dangers of a direct confrontation with the USSR, which might escalate into a larger conflict.
2. It would assist Khrushchev in extricating the USSR from an involvement in Cuba which is proving progressively more costly and less profitable.
3. It would eliminate the Cuban question from the US-USSR dialogue and thus permit progress on other major issues.
4. It would provide freedom of action for the United States to deal with Castro directly, both on its own behalf and on behalf of the other American states.
Continuing Course of Action Regarding Cuba
If the United States should encourage the de facto disengagement of the USSR from its Cuban involvement and thus achieve a measure of freedom of action against Castro, the question would remain: What course of action should we then elect to follow?
Presumably that course of action should include the following elements:
(a) It should be consistent with our position that the United States cannot accept either the continuance of offensive weapons in Cuba or the absence of adequate safeguards against the introduction of new offensive weapons.
(b) It should be designed to undermine the authority and prestige of Castro, both in Cuba and in the eyes of the world.
(c) It should be directed towards setting in motion a train of events that would progressively enhance the American ability to deal decisively with Castro.
(d) It should involve the least possible direct challenge to the prestige or authority of Chairman Khrushchev and the USSR.
Available Options
Four possible courses of action would appear worthy of serious consideration:
1. Direct military action against Cuba.
2. Resumption of the quarantine on the basis of an expanded list.
3. Continued systematic aerial surveillance with the strong possibility of provoking interference that might lead to limited or general military action.
4. Solution through Security Council Arrangements.
I--Direct Military Action
As contemplated in a paper prepared by the Department of Defense, direct military action would be taken against the IL-28s./2/ Preparation for this action would consist of an announcement indicating the measures thus far taken by the USSR to comply with the agreement but emphasizing that the United States would have to take necessary actions to eliminate the threat created by the bombers. The President would, however, be "prepared to ensure that these actions will not include an invasion of Cuba." The actions described in the Department of Defense memorandum are as follows:
/2/The "Defense paper," which is quoted from extensively, has not been found.
"1. Issue a warning that action to remove the bomber threat is about to be taken, that the areas where these aircraft are located should be evac-uated by all personnel, and that any attack on U.S. aircraft will be met with appropriate counter action.
"2. Conduct the air attack by selective and discriminate attack:
"a. At the present time it is estimated that such action within the next few days would require attacks (1) on San Julien Air Base with 16 F101 strike aircraft (includes local suppression aircraft) armed with napalm, 2.75" rockets and 20mm ammunition, accompanied by 8 F-104/F8U aircraft equipped with GAR 8 missile to fly low level CAP, (2) on Holguin Air Base with 8A4D aircraft armed with napalm and Zuni rockets and 8F8U-2/F4H aircraft as CAP equipped with Sidewinder/Sparrow missiles and 20mm ammunition (with suppression provided by 8F8Us armed with Zuni rockets and 20mm).
"b. If the attack is delayed beyond the next 48 hours, dispersal of IL28s may require attack on additional airfields.
"3. In the absence of air counter action, the attack should be strictly confined to the destruction or serious damaging of the IL-28 aircraft by the most precise air attack means available. If there is air counter action, the suppression of this action by the assigned suppression aircraft would be required."
Arguments for Direct Military Action
(a) Such action would presumably be effective in eliminating the threat from these offensive aircraft;
(b) It would be action consistent with our conduct of the Cuban affair, i.e., it would be "clear cut, forthright and have been fairly signaled in advance".
(c) With its preponderant military strength the United States could promptly deal with any Cuban reaction.
Arguments Against Direct Military Action
(a) It would be regarded as a direct attack against Cuba and the Soviet Union might feel compelled to intervene on Cuba's behalf in order to save face, or react elsewhere.
(b) In the absence of any direct Cuban attack on the United States or any other OAS country, world opinion might tend to regard the United States action as excessive--particularly in view of our own maintenance of bomber bases around the world and the disparity in size and resources between the United States and Cuba.
(c) It might well provoke Cuban reaction against Guantanamo and possibly even against the Southeastern United States (presumably by MIGs).
II--Resumption of Quarantine on an Expanded Basis
The scenario for the reimposition of the quarantine is described in a Department of Defense memorandum as follows:
"(1) A public announcement should be made by the President, or other high government official, that:
a. Uncrating, assembling and readying of IL-28 jet bombers has continued.
b. The UN has been frustrated in its attempt to establish adequate inspection of incoming ships.
c. The UN has been frustrated in its attempts to establish adequate on-site inspections.
These aircraft with a combat radius of 740 miles remain a threat to the entire Caribbean, the northern portion of South America, Mexico, and the southern portion of the United States.
(2) The United States will maintain the present quarantine until the bombers are removed and adequate on-site inspections, including appropriate long term agreements, are achieved. The United States supports the Brazilian Resolution and believes that it may offer an adequate long term solution, not only to the present crisis, but to future crises of this kind. If the Cubans fail to comply, the United States will have to consider taking additional steps.
(3)
a. If no steps are taken to remove the bombers as a result of this statement, then the US should extend the quarantine to petroleum, reiterating our position that we will lift the quarantine if the bombers are removed and adequate inspection is permitted. The inclusion of petroleum under the quarantine would have immediate and sharp reflections within Cuba. Not only normal oil consumption, but nearly all electric power production in Cuba is dependent upon fuel oil. The Cubans are estimated to have 60 days' supply of gas and diesel fuel oil, and approximately 110 days' supply for power and industrial use. Sabotage could further reduce this stockpile if necessary. For this reason, it would seem very likely that if such a quarantine were established, compliance should be forthcoming shortly thereafter."
Arguments for Quarantine
(a) At the present time not only the OAS but the NATO countries strongly support our insistence on adequate inspection--and, perhaps to a lesser extent, on the removal of the IL-28s.
(b) The Soviet Union might be willing to withhold the further supply to Cuba of items on the proscribed list in order to reduce its investment in a rapidly wasting asset; for this reason it might secretly welcome a US blockade.
(c) The quarantine might result in the strangulation of the Castro regime without any direct loss of life.
(d) The imposition of a quarantine on shipments of POL would be directly relevant to the immobilization of the IL-28s.
(d) Even were the Soviet Union to run the blockade, the resulting confrontation could perhaps be restricted to sea warfare--an arena in which we have a clear advantage. The danger of escalation might, therefore, be less than in the case of any form of bombing attack on Cuba which might result in bombing reprisals elsewhere.
Arguments Against Quarantine
(a) The renewed quarantine would be a direct challenge to the Soviet right of free sea transit. It would thus fail to meet one of the criteria listed earlier--an action directly operating only on Cuba.
(b) Khrushchev yielded to the threat of our quarantine once by turning his ships around. He could not afford the humiliation of doing so a second time--especially after the missiles have been removed and he has claimed to have complied fully with his undertakings.
(c) Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons to safeguard USSR technology. He would not have a similar motive for holding back tankers filled with POL.
(d) The USSR could not stand idly by while the economy of a Socialist state was slowly strangled; the loss of face and appearance of impotence would be too high a price for it to pay.
(e) The quarantine would be resented by several of our NATO friends, including the UK, which never acknowledged its legality. They acquiesced before because the limited quarantine did not affect their trade; they might well refuse to recognize a blockade which cut off valuable shipping of POL--particularly since there is a fairly widespread feeling that we have already won our point by expelling the missiles.
III--Enforced Aerial Surveillance
It is suggested that, instead of reimposing the blockade, we should undertake a systematic and unremitting air reconnaissance over Cuba, both high and low until such time as
(1) Castro yielded on inspection and the removal of the IL-28's;
(2) Castro was overthrown; or
(3) The reconnaissance provoked an armed response that justified our taking direct military action enabling us, at least, to eliminate the IL-28's.
Arguments for Reconnaissance
(a) This course could be justified under the authority of OAS action.
(b) It would be thoroughly consistent with our position that we could not tolerate a situation in which we neither had safeguards against the introduction of offensive weapons nor adequate observation to insure that offensive weapons presently in Cuban hands would not be used.
(c) It would--hopefully--avoid direct confrontation with the USSR.
(d) It would provide a means for imposing a constant public humiliation on Castro. No Government can permit national air space to be constantly invaded without demonstrating its weakness, both at home and abroad.
(e) Castro could not continue for very long to stand down his planes and restrain his anti-aircraft fire without publicly acknowledging his own weakness. The result would be that sooner or later he would almost certainly attack our planes, which would permit an escalating scale of reprisal and counter-reprisal that could permit us to deal conclusively with the problem of Castro.
IV--Solution Through Security Council Arrangements
This course of action is explained and recommended in the attached memorandum of Governor Stevenson./3/
/3/See the attachment to Document 167.
CONCLUSION
The Problem of Choice
Direct action against Cuba on the basis suggested in Section I can probably be ruled out. Such a course of action would probably be regarded by world opinion as excessive, and it would involve grave risks of provoking retaliation elsewhere in the world.
Realistically, the choice would appear to be between an expanded quarantine, as recommended in Section II, or enforced surveillance, as recommended in Section III.
The decision between these alternative lines of policy turns in large part on a judgment as to the extent to which Khrushchev might in fact be prepared and able to disengage from Cuba. If, as a result of Castro's obduracy, he could cut his investment and leave Cuba without specific security commitments, he might be willing to turn his back while the United States took advantage of the opportunities provided by Castro's response to continued--and necessarily harassing--low and high level surveillance.
On the other hand, if it is felt that Khrushchev could not sit idly by while we forcibly eliminated the IL-28's and wiped out the SAM sites, the surveillance course might appear too dangerous.
On this assumption an expanded quarantine has much to recommend it. If the quarantine route is followed no military action need be taken directly against Cuba; therefore, Khrushchev would not be called upon to respond to what he must necessarily denounce as imperialist aggression. Under these circumstances Khrushchev might be prepared to see Cuba go down the drain through the slow strangulation of a blockade.
But the vice of the blockade is that it directly engaged the prestige of the USSR since it interferes with the freedom of movement of the Soviet merchant fleet. Khrushchev would have to denounce the United States for piracy--as he has already done--and for seeking to starve a small country whose only fault is its allegiance to Communism, and his supine acquiescence in that piracy would be read by all the world as a humiliating confession of impotence.
Against the background of these considerations, the questions for decision must include the following:
1. Would Khrushchev be ready to absorb the prestige loss of acquiescing in a reimposed quarantine or would he feel compelled to use his submarines against our naval vessels?
The existence of substantial doubt regarding the answer to this question suggests that before a quarantine were reimposed some effort might be made to sound out Soviet reactions.
2. If the quarantine did result in limited naval action, how would this affect other US-USSR relationships?
3. Even assuming that we encouraged Khrushchev to disengage from Cuba, if surveillance led to even limited bombing, could the Soviet Union afford to stand by while a nation was attacked that the USSR had vowed to defend? Might not the prestige costs be too great?/4/
/4/On November 12 Nitze prepared for McNamara a suggested Department of Defense position paper on Ball's memorandum to the President. It dealt with Ball's memorandum on a section-by-section basis. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, McNamara's Working Papers) See the Supplement.
George W. Ball
170. Summary Record of the 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 12, 1962, 11 a.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:24 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement.
In response to the President's question, General Taylor said that SAC is still on DEFCON 2. Other forces have been reduced to DEFCON 3. The President suggested that the level of alert might be reduced toward the end of the week, but he did not wish to make a decision now.
Secretary McNamara said any reduction in the state of readiness of U.S. forces would be a sign to the Soviet Union. The Russians would know immediately if our state of alert was reduced. He suggested that no reduction be made today. However, SAC should stand down as soon as possible because the present alert involves burning out large amounts of spare parts. The air defense units should also stand down, but this could not be done without giving a signal to the Russians. Secretary McNamara said he would recommend later this week when the reserve air defense units called up last month should be returned to civilian life.
Director McCone summarized current intelligence./1/ He called attention to NIE 84-4-62 [SNIE 85-4-62] which summarizes Castro's capability for subversion in Latin America and lists military equipment which the Russians have given to Castro./2/ The President commented that we should watch very carefully the use of Cuban arms to promote subversion in the hemisphere.
/1/In McCone's memorandum of this meeting, which was mistakenly thought to have taken place at 4 p.m., the Director of Central Intelligence described his intelligence briefing. McCone noted that assembly of IL-28s was continuing, that the Soviet Union had given Cuba $550 million in military equipment and spare parts since August 1, 1962, and therefore Castro had the ability to support subversion all over Central America and the Caribbean as well as in the northern tier of South American countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)
/2/The conclusions of this SNIE, November 9, are summarized in footnote 1 above. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-4-62, see vol. XII, pp. 234-235.
Secretary Rusk reported there had been no change over the week end on the political side. We had received no reply from the Russians on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers from Cuba. We had heard nothing about the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations in Havana.
Ambassador Stevenson reviewed the deadlocked negotiations with the Russians in New York. His talking paper is attached./3/ It contains the specifics of a package to be presented to the Russians in an effort to end the New York negotiations and to seek a solution by negotiating with the Cubans directly or through the OAS. He commented that no proposals were being made in New York and the momentum of the negotiations there was slowing down. U Thant's proposal to name five Latin American Ambassadors as inspectors has encountered Cuban objections. An effort is being made to sell the idea of choosing any five Ambassadors agreeable to the parties concerned. The Soviets are refusing to give in on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers and are insisting on the five points which Castro put forward some time ago.
/3/See the attachment to Document 167.
Ambassador Stevenson said his proposal was aimed at ending the negotiations. He felt that the Russians would probably reject his package. Before presenting it to the Russians we would consult the major Latin American states to see if it was acceptable to them. If the Russians accepted, the transaction would be ended. If they came back with counterproposals, we might have to add to the package such things as an agreement to allow inspection of Cuban camps in the U.S. If it is rejected, we should avoid unilateral action as is proposed in the State Department papers./4/ We should make every effort to go with the Latin American states and keep them unified with us.
/4/See Document 169.
Secretary Rusk said he agreed we should continue to follow a policy of seeking multilateral actions. He urged that we stay on our original course until we get a reply from Khrushchev. He preferred this course to Stevenson's suggestion of putting forward a new proposal now.
The President asked whether we should give a guarantee against invading Cuba if the Russians refused to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we should not. If the Soviets refused to withdraw the bombers, we should make a full statement in the UN Security Council.
Mr. McCloy, who has been taking an active part in the negotiations, recommended that we make the following offer to Kuznetsov. If the Russians would agree to take out the IL-28 bombers by fixed future date, we would lift our quarantine at once. He asked whether we should give a guarantee covering only invasion. He said he believed Khrushchev was under real pressure and urged that we deal with the Cuban problem from a world point of view and with regard to U.S./USSR relations rather than as a U.S./Cuba problem. He believed we should make the Russians an offer covering Cuba. Khrushchev then might be easier to deal with on Berlin. He suggested that we talk about normalization in the Caribbean and offer to talk to the Russians about other problems. Khrushchev needs a facesaving device. He can't back down again. We should make an informal approach to him now before he comes down very hard in opposition to further measures necessary to resolve the Cuban crisis.
The President commented that the quarantine was losing credibility. He added that in all papers discussing a no-invasion pledge the word "assurances" be used rather than the word "guarantee."
Ambassador Stevenson again urged that we put our final position to the Russians before they put their final position to us.
Secretary Dillon asked how the U.S. could give an assurance not to invade Cuba without some safeguard covering the reintroduction of strategic missiles to Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we could rely on aerial reconnaissance plus promises from the Cubans and the Russians.
Secretary Rusk asked whether we should lift the quarantine if the Russians promised to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. He felt we should maintain our insistence on aerial surveillance and on on-site inspection but lift the quarantine if the Russians promise to take out the IL-28s.
Mr. McCloy suggested that we tell the Russians we would give a guarantee if they took certain actions.
The President said he did not want any assurances we might give to be included in any document more formal than a letter.
In response to the President's comment that the ideal arrangement would be a monthly on-site inspection, Ambassador Stevenson said we can't get on-site inspection. Our only hope is to reach some mutual understanding about inspection, such as counting the missiles as they go out on Soviet ships. He doubted we could get approval for a Latin American atom-free zone.
Secretary Rusk said we must have some way in which to answer the waves of reports that offensive missiles are still being put into Cuba by the Russians. Mr. McCloy suggested that we could hold the Russians to the commitment made in the October 26th Khrushchev letter,/5/ i.e., that the Russians would not bring in any weapons.
/5/See Document 84.
The Attorney General raised again the question of how we could prove that the Russians are not delivering new arms to Cuba.
Referring to the TV Today show,/6/ the President asked that within twenty-four hours our officials interrogate every Cuban refugee who was making statements about arms going to Cuba. The refugees are naturally trying to build up their story in an effort to get us to invade. We must get to the people the fact that the refugees have no evidence which we do not have. Such refugee statements, if they continue, could make the problem almost unmanageable. He suggested again that we arrange to check every press, radio and TV report made by a refugee and promptly report back to the media involved if there was no evidence behind the refugee allegations.
/6/On the Today show on NBC, a Cuban refugee stated that he knew positively there were 82 missiles in Cuba. As only 42 were removed, 40 remained hidden in caves.
General Taylor raised the question of how we ensure the continuation of necessary aerial reconnaissance in the long range. Mr. McCone pointed out that if the SAM sites are operational, we cannot ensure the continuance of aerial reconnaissance with U-2s.
The President said we should conduct the aerial reconnaissance we consider necessary. We must continue to do this because a UN system has not been created. He asked whether we should tell the Cubans we are continuing reconnaissance or just go ahead and do it. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we cannot tell the Cubans because they would oppose our reconnaissance. The President said our reconnaissance can be based on the OAS resolution/7/ if no other position is acceptable to the Russians. The question is whether we surface our current aerial surveillance.
/7/The resolution of October 23; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 408-410.
Secretary Rusk commented that no secrecy is possible in this hemisphere. Our air reconnaissance does not come under the OAS resolution.
Under Secretary Ball cautioned against building up Castro as being able to defy both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt such an impression would have a bad effect in Latin America.
Ambassador Stevenson said ex post facto verification of the removal of the Soviet missiles is one problem. Such verification we cannot get. Continuing verification that missiles are not being reintroduced is another problem.
The Attorney General pointed out that these two problems were not separable. He wanted to know what we tell the American people we are doing to prevent the reintroduction into Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles. Khrushchev lied once and he could lie again. We must have an acceptable guarantee that there will be no reintroduction of missiles. We can't live without taking some action which ensures us that we know whether or not he is complying with a statement on non-reintroduction of missiles.
The President suggested that we say we are taking every means to ensure that there is no reintroduction of missiles. These actions were taken under the OAS resolution. We would not need to say we were overflying Cuba.
Ambassador Stevenson agreed that we should just overfly Cuba and not say we were doing so. We should get the OAS to say that this hemisphere cannot live with a Cuba which is promoting subversion and action will be taken, if necessary, to prevent Cuban subversion.
The President commented that an assurance covering invasion does not ban covert actions or an economic blockade or tie our hands completely. We can't give the impression that Castro is home free.
Secretary Rusk said we cannot unilaterally amend the Rio Treaty./8/ Any assurance which we would give does not affect the provision in the Rio Treaty which allows invasion under certain circumstances.
/8/The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocity Assistance of 1947; for text, see ibid., Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 789-796.
Ambassador Stevenson said we had to decide whether to give the Soviets a package proposal before hearing from Khrushchev or hold off until we had the Russian reply. If we decide on making a package proposal we must decide whether it is a full package or a partial package.
The President read the proposed wording of an assurance we would give against invasion. He suggested that any assurance which is made should appear as a restatement of undertakings in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty rather than as a new commitment.
Secretary Rusk suggested that no formal statement be given to the press today.
The President asked that a short statement be prepared for him to look at at a 4:00 meeting which would say we are waiting for a Russian reply to our demand that they remove the IL-28 bombers.
Bromley Smith/9/
/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
171. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
Moscow, November 12, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on this message indicated it was first given orally.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I would like to express my satisfaction that the mutual obligations taken in accordance with the exchange of messages between us are being carried out both by your side and our side. One can say that certain favourable results are already seen at this time. We appreciate your understanding of the situation and your cooperation in carrying out the obligations taken by our side. We, on our part, will as always honor our obligations. And I would like to inform you that our obligations with regard to dismantling and removal of both missiles and warheads have already been fulfilled.
We appreciate that we must come to an agreement with you regarding the mutually acceptable means for your side to ascertain that we really carry out our obligations. What has already been achieved in the course of negotiations between our reprsentatives--Kuznetsov, McCloy and Stevenson--and the cooperation reached in the process of these negotiations is a good thing. The same should be said about the cooperation between captains of our ships, which were taking our missiles from Cuba, and corresponding U.S. ships. This is very good, this has created an impression that your side also wishes to cooperate, eliminating the remnants of the tension which only yesterday were very dangerous both for our two peoples and for the peoples of the whole world. Thus, if we proceed from our understanding which was expressed in your message of October 27/1/ and in our reply of October 28,/2/ then we, the Soviet side, have carried out our obligations and thereby have created possibility for complete elimination of tension in the Caribbean. Consequently, now it is your turn, it is for your side to carry out precisely your obligations. We have in mind that apart from the long term obligations that the United States itself will not attack Cuba and will restrain other countries of the Western Hemisphere from doing that, the most important thing which is required today is to give moral satisfaction to world public opinion and tranquility to peoples. And what is required from your side to that end is to lift the so-called quarantine and of course to stop violating the territorial waters and air space of Cuba. If this continues confidence in your obligations will thus be undermined which can only grieve world public and throw us back to the positions to which we must not return after the liquidation of such a dangerous situation. To say nothing of the fact that it would hamper us in the future.
/1/See Document 95.
/2/Document 102.
At present, we must--and we are convinced in that--look forward and draw necessary conclusions from what has happened up till now and from the good which followed due to the efforts of both sides. Therefore, we believe that conditions are emerging now for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests and on all other questions which are ripe and require solution. You have already ended your tests and we shall probably also end our tests in November or at least before the end of this year.
Now it is also necessary to think of some real measures with regard to the question of ensuring more stable security in the world. In this connection we attach great importance to your statement that the US is ready to support idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries. But the basic question, of course, remains that of disarmament, of destroying the whole war machine of states. To give more assurance on the first stage it might be expedient to return to the proposals forwarded by us some time ago on the establishment of observation posts on mutual basis at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways. This would exclude a possibility of a surprise attack if any side does not behave honestly, if it wants to concentrate military equipment and its troops for an attack. Precisely this is pursued by the suggestion made recently by Mr. Thant.
It goes without saying that the question of a German peace treaty still remains and we can not escape from solving it. Moreover what we and you have lived through makes a speediest solution of this question still more imperative.
I do not name other unresolved questions, we have plenty of them, I name only the main problems, on the solution of which the destinies of the world largely depend.
Now about the matter that, as you state, worries you today--about the IL-28 planes which you call an offensive weapon. We have already given you our clarification on this point and I think you can not but agree with us. However, if you do not agree--and this is your right--ask your intelligence after all and let it give you an answer based not on guesswork but on facts. If it really knows anything it must tell you the truth and namely that it is long since the IL-28's have been taken out of production and out of use in our armed forces. And if some planes still remain now--and a certain number of them have been brought by us to Cuba--that was done as a result of your action last year when you increased the budget and called up reservists. We on our part had to take measures in response at that time, having postponed taking those planes out of use as well.
Had there been no such action on your part we would not have IL-28's in existence because they would have been used for scrap. Such is this "formidable offensive" weapon. If your intelligence is objective it must give a correct appraisal of these 12-year-old planes and report to you that they are incapable of offensive actions. We brought them to Cuba only because they can be used as a mobile means of coastal defense under the cover of anti-aircraft fire from their own territory. They can not however fly beyond the limits of that cover since they will be immediately destroyed either by modern anti-aircraft means or by simple conventional artillery; not to speak of interceptors before which they are entirely defenseless. But all this must be known not only to the intelligence but to all engaged in military matters.
Nevertheless we regard your concern with understanding, though on our part we share the desire of the Government of Cuba to possess defensive weapons which would permit [it] to defend the territorial integrity of its country.
Therefore if you meet this with understanding and if we agreed with you on solving other questions in implementing the mutually assumed obligations then the question of IL-28 bombers would be solved without difficulties.
In what way should this cooperation, in our understanding, find its expression and what would facilitate the solution of this question?
We state to you that these bombers are piloted solely by our fliers. Consequently you should not have any fears that they can be used to do harm to the United States or other neighboring countries in Western Hemisphere. And since you and your allies in Western Hemisphere have taken an obligation not to invade Cuba then it would seem this weapon should not pose any threat for you. Moreover, we are aware of what military means are in your possession. If the enemy were threatening us with such weapon we would ignore that threat completely for it would cause us no anxiety whatsoever.
But because you express apprehension that this weapon can be some sort of a threat to the US or other countries of Western Hemisphere which do not possess adequate defensive means we state to you as a guarantee that those planes are piloted by our fliers and therefore there should be no misgivings that they could be used to the detriment of any state.
As you ascertained yourself we have removed the missiles, we also removed everything else related to missiles, all the equipment necessary for their use and recalled the personnel manning those missiles. Now that the missiles are removed the question of IL-28's is an incomprehensible argument because that weapon as I have already said is of no value as a combat weapon at present, to say nothing of the future. Let us come to an agreement on this question as well, let us do away with tension, let us fulfill the mutual pledges made in our messages. We will not insist on permanently keeping those planes on Cuba. We have our difficulties in this question. Therefore we give a gentleman's word that we will remove the IL-28 planes with all the personnel and equipment related to those planes, although not now but later. We would like to do that some time later when we determine that the conditions are ripe to remove them. We will advise you of that.
I think that an agreement on such basis will enable us to complete the elimination of all the tension that existed and will create conditions for life to resume its normal course, that is the blockade would be immediately removed; the pledges of the sides would be registered in the appropriate documents in the United Nations Organization; non-invasion of Cuba and strict observance of her sovereignty guaranteed; the UN posts established in the countries of the Caribbean so that neither one nor the other side would indeed undertake any unexpected actions to the detriment of another state.
This would be the best solution which can be anticipated especially having in mind the tension that we lived through and the abyss we came to. And I believe, Mr. President, that you yourself understand that we were very close to that abyss. But you and we soberly and wisely appraised the situation and maintained self-control. Let us now give a complete satisfaction to the public.
What happened should now prompt us to make new great efforts so that no repetition of such events should be allowed because if we succeeded in finding a way out of a dangerous situation this time, next time we might not safely untie the tightly made knot. And the knot that we are now untying has been tied rather tightly, almost to the limit.
We displayed an understanding with regard to the positions of each other and came out of a critical situation through mutual concessions to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. Let us now give joy to all peoples of the world and show that this conflict really became a matter of yesterday, let us normalize the situation. And it would be good if on your part efforts were made to make the normalization a complete, real normalization and it is necessary to do this in the interests of all peoples and this is within our power.
Sincerely,/3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
172. Summary Record of the 25th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 12, 1962, 5 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to the President's Appointment Book, this meeting began at 5:30 p.m. and lasted until 6:15 p.m. (Ibid.) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement.
Mr. Bundy summarized Khrushchev's reply/1/ to the President's message of November 6th./2/ The strategic missiles and warheads are out of Cuba. The IL-28 bombers might come out at some point, but would be removed under Soviet control.
/1/Document 171.
/2/Document 155.
There was a discussion of the McCloy offer which involved lifting the quarantine in return for the Russian promise to take out the IL-28 bombers. The question of safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons would not be raised now because we have a limited set of unilateral safeguards to use which we do not want to lose.
Secretary Rusk said that there was an issue over whether the Soviet commitment on missiles and warheads was to be public or private. We would wish it to be public and Khrushchev wishes it to be private.
The President said we could live for two weeks with no public knowledge of the Soviet commitment.
Secretary McNamara asked if we are not willing to accept the situation as it now exists on the basis of the Soviet reply, would we reimpose the quarantine?
Mr. Bundy commented that the IL-28 bombers appear not to be a sticking point.
The President said we still have the questions of continued surveillance and the form of an assurance against invasion. The quarantine is not our only move. We could set the IL-28s off against the quarantine and our assurances against invasion off against safeguards covering reintroduction of missiles.
Ambassador Stevenson referred to the words in Khrushchev's reply "at some point" and commented that this was not a specific time but meant that the bombers would come out when Khrushchev gets what he wants, such as assurances against an invasion.
Ambassador Thompson said that the timing of our commitment not to invade was important to Khrushchev because the Communist Central Committee will be meeting in Moscow soon.
Secretary Rusk suggested that we concentrate on a deal involving the quarantine offset against withdrawal of the bombers, but that we add that to the other subjects to be discussed.
Mr. Bundy suggested we might tell Khrushchev that he should give the order to remove the bombers, that we would then check on their removal, and verifying that the bombers had left, we would lift the quarantine. He proposed that an informal note be sent now and a letter later.
There was a discussion of the alternatives which consist of a public announcement that the bombers are coming out or verifiable proof that the bombers are being recrated, plus private assurances that they will be removed. The question of whether we should ask the Russians to remove them within thirty days was raised. The consensus was that Khrushchev should be told that he should give the order to remove the bombers, and when we observe the crated bombers leaving Cuba on Soviet ships, we will lift the quarantine./3/
The President decided that we should not announce any message from Khrushchev. The public reason a second meeting had been held today was because the group's business had not been finished in the morning.
The President approved up to five U-2 flights and ten low-level sorties for tomorrow.
Bromley Smith/4/
/3/For the message as passed to the Soviet Union, see Document 173.
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
173. Editorial Note
At 8:30 p.m., on November 12, 1962, Robert F. Kennedy went to the Soviet Embassy's reception for the Bolshoi Ballet. The Attorney General gave Ambassador Dobrynin an oral message. According to a typed note with a handwritten note by Bromley Smith, the message was: "if the Soviet Union will at once give the order to start removing IL-28's and complete the removal in 30 days we would be prepared immediately to announce the removal of the quarantine." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former Soviet Union has made available the following version of what Robert Kennedy proposed to Dobrynin:
"During the second meeting with A.F. Dobrynin on the evening of November 12, R. Kennedy, under instruction from the President, formulated the US proposal in this way: `N.S. Khrushchev and the President agree in principle that the IL-28 aircraft shall be withdrawn within a certain period of time. Following this agreement the US will immediately, even tomorrow, lift all quarantine, without waiting for the completion of the aircraft pullout. The US side would, of course, prefer that the agreed time period for withdrawing the IL-28 aircraft were made public. However, if the Soviet side has any objections to making it public, the President will not insist. N.S. Khrushchev's word would be quite suffice. As for the period of time, it would be good if the aircraft were withdrawn within, say, 30 days.'" (This proposal was received in Moscow on November 13.)
Arthur M. Scheslinger, Jr., in Robert Kennedy and His Times,
writes an account of the Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, page 549.
174. Memorandum of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 13, 1962, 11 a.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. A note on the source text indicates the meeting was "Held at State Dept." This was not one of the official numbered Executive Committee meetings. According to Rusk's Appointment Book, he and Ball--and apparently the rest of the Committee minus the President--met in Ball's office from 11 a.m. to noon. (Johnson Library)
Purpose of the meeting was to crystalize policy concerning procedures to be followed in view of information received on November 12th concerning the disposition of IL 28s and other matters.
Kuznetsov requested meeting with McCloy at 3:00 o'clock;/1/ it was expected that this meeting might reveal Soviet position. In view of this, no firm policy position was developed, although there was an extended discussion of our position with regard to the IL 28s and also the question of inspection.
/1/See Document 175.
It was agreed that the IL 28s must be removed, and if they were removed, we could remove the quarantine. If the IL 28s are not removed, then it was felt we could take several steps to exert more pressure on Castro and the Soviets, and these would involve a meeting of the OAS to restate their policy, a statement by the President indicating non-compliance on the part of the Soviets, economic measures by the OAS, and a tightening of the quarantine. It was felt that one or several of these steps could be taken to extract a commitment to remove the bombers. However, we should not make a "no invasion" commitment unless appropriate measures for inspection were agreed upon by the Soviets and Castro.
McCone took a strong position covering the points outlined in attached memorandum of November 13th, warning against the serious long term outlook for Cuba and indicating that he felt the Soviets were trading on Castro's position and they in effect, could dictate Castro's terms if they so desired. Meeting did not seem disposed to go as far as McCone recommended, although the Vice President strongly supported this position.
The attached notes are pertinent./2/
/2/The notes were not attached.
Also at a meeting on Monday, November the 12th at 5:30 in the White House with all present,/3/ Mr. Bundy outlined the substance of a communication which had been received, expressing Khrushchev's views in response to the exchange of letters of November 5th and 6th. It was decided that the communication needed study and hence its receipt was noted and a meeting arranged for the following day.
/3/See Document 172.
The attached notes are pertinent./2/
John A. McCone/4/
Director
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone
LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR CUBA
It is my belief that a Castro-Soviet Communist Cuba, whose stated intentions and past actions are to support and spread subversion throughout Latin America, is unacceptable to the United States and should be unacceptable to most, if not all, Latin American states.
It can be said that through the removal of the missiles (and we must assume but do not know positively that all are removed) and the removal of the IL 28s (if this can be negotiated) the threat to the security of the United States and the Latin American states from a nuclear strike is removed. However, two serious problems remain:
One, no means have been established to reasonably guarantee that offensive missiles will not be reintroduced or, if offensive missiles remain on the island, that they will not be secretly placed in operational status. Aerial surveillance will help, but will not guarantee our ability to detect such an activity. Ground inspection would if properly organized and granted freedom of movement. But this has been denied by Castro and the denial is now supported by Mikoyan.
Furthermore, the SAM sites if operating can effectively deny aerial inspection. There can be no explanation for Soviet insistence on leaving the SAM sites except to shield future clandestine emplacement of offensive weapons such as MRBMs and IRBMs if the Soviets choose at some future time to reintroduce these weapons systems.
A combination of aerial inspection and properly organized ground inspection would give an effective guarantee against reintroduction of missile systems. The ground inspectors would have to have freedom of action so that they could make on-site checks of the ever increasing refugee and agent reports of the storing of missiles and their equipment in caves, which cannot be totally dismissed.
Therefore prior to a "no invasion" commitment we must have complete arrangements for inspections and they cannot be frustrated by either the Soviets or Castro.
Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equipment. He also now has amphibious equipment capable of supporting insurgency movements against any of the Caribbean, Central American states or states in the northern tier of South America. Castro has never changed in his determined effort to subvert these states. He has trained insurgents by the thousands; there are large numbers, they are in Cuba now in training. His insurgents are directed against a number of Central and South American states. He repeatedly expresses violent intentions against the organized governments of these states. Therefore one can only conclude that he would use his newly acquired amphibious lift and a substantial part of his excess arms to support insurgents who can readily overthrow neighboring governments. Our policy should anticipate this and should be designed to take action regardless of how extreme to remove this threat if the eventualities mentioned above materialize.
J.A.M.
175. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the Mission to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
November 13, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Ball was in Washington. There is no time on the dateline of the memorandum, but the call had to have taken place after 6:40 p.m. when the meeting between Stevenson and Kuznetsov concluded.
Stevenson--Kuznetsov started by saying that he had a very serious protest against the over-flights over Cuba./1/ They were unlawful in that they violated Cuban airspace, and they would only make negotiations more difficult. The Soviets understood the categorical objections of the Cubans, and these were a violation of the feelings and integrity of the Cubans. They complicated settlement, and we should stop them now. The Soviets have fulfilled all their obligations. The Americans have no convincing arguments for continuing such over-flights which only injure the feelings of the Cubans and increase tension. He hopes the US will consider this protest with due attention. Our answer was that the President's letter provides for UN observation and supervision of the fulfillment of this agreement. That has not been possible because the Soviet Union was unable to make such arrangements; we have had to use this means of reassuring ourselves that there was in fact compliance. These flights are in fact, Jack McCloy said, an element of stability. They have given us our only assurance of compliance. They have enabled us to detect what went, what was going on in Cuba, and we must continue to use these over-flights until the IL-28's are removed and any suggestion that they should be ended is most disquieting.
/1/This meeting was summarized in telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13, 8 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1362) See the Supplement. There is also a 25-page memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 6:40 p.m., in USUN airgram 24, November 14, 2:30 a.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)
Ball--Did we just put it on the removal of the IL-28's?
Stevenson--No, that they should be ended. He said is most disquieting.
Ball--But you didn't say that we would have to continue until the IL-28's were removed.
Stevenson--That was sort of the tenor of what was said. Had it not been for these, we might have been at war, etc. Kuznetsov said regarding on-site inspection by the UN and the allegations that the Soviets did not fulfill its obligation, the obligation stated in Khruschev's letters of Oct. 27 and 28/2/ on which they base their position. In the letter of the 27th he spoke of agreement in principal for verification and stressed that it could be done only by agreement of the Cubans. On Oct. 28, he referred to the letter of the 27th, and then he went on to say that he believes that the Soviets have made many efforts to prove that they are doing everything to come to an agreement with the US in order to assure us that the obligations would be fulfilled. They have made many steps forward. They permitted ship-side verification of the removal of the missiles, and that he is here to explain our position and settle this problem. He believes that all conditions have been created to solve all of our questions in a spirit of mutual confidence in order to normalize the situation in the Caribbean. All the Soviet acts show is, that its obligations have been fulfilled. They had gone further than the agreement in the letter in fact by removing the missiles when the President had only asked for them to be rendered inoperative and the sites dismantled. Then he started off on the usual say about the IL-28's not being offensive, but only defensive, and he volunteered to tell us in detail why they could not be included, were not included, in the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy. He said that the flights over Cuba don't create stability. They are over foreign territories; they create indignation and disrespect for the sovereignty and are a violation of the Charter and international law. They can lead only to further aggravation of the situation. If the parties could come to an agreement, all people would be relieved. As to the proposition that the U-2 had prevented war, what had prevented war was the patience and understanding of K and K, and that they had noted that the leaders could come to agreement quickly, so all questions could be decided if there was a desire to settle them on both sides. They don't think that the U-2 violation of air-space eases tensions; it only aggravates them. He recalled the incident of May, 1960 and the increased tensions resulting from the failure of the Summit Conference in Paris. Also, the recent U-2 flights over the Soviet Union didn't make the situation more favorable. Also the low altitude planes before the eyes of the Cubans are a source of great irritation. Continued flights indicate that the US does not recognize international law and that they are not in the interest of peace or settlement about Cuba. They cannot be justified. In answer we said, we quoted the letters of Oct. 27 and 28 on the agreement for UN observation and supervision to verify compliance. This position was not objected to by Khrushchev in his final letter. We had tried to accommodate the USSR by ship-side inspection and aerial reconnaissance in lieu of on-site inspection by the UN. McCloy referred again to the fact that these photos had helped stability; they disclosed facts that had been denied and the secrecy with which these weapons had been placed, and suggested that they now be stopped before other assurances contemplated by the agreement were completed would be very disquieting. I said that the way to stop these aggravations of Cuba is to conclude this agreement to remove the weapons as quickly as possible. We had tried to accommodate the realities of the situation to help conclude it, and that we expected them to do the same. The best hope for an improved climate is to end this episode as quickly as possible, and to let us hear the Soviet proposals for safeguards against reintroduction of these weapons in the future. As long as these negotiations go on, people are not reassured. All differences have in fact been isolated. We know our respective positions; now let's settle them. Kuznetsov said that he agreed on desirability of prompt solution; that they were making every effort to solve; if the matter were still prolonged, it was the US that doesn't show the same approach to the desirability of the solution that they did. I referred to the President's letter of Oct. 27 with regard to the removal of the quarantine without delay and as to the UN, that they had agreed to stop building the bases and to dismantle them, and that he had gone even further, that they had actually withdrawn the weapons, the missiles from Cuba. That that could have been done only on a final settlement after verification by the UN, had they chosen to interpret the agreement that way. In other words, the Soviet Union has done everything possible to complete the agreement. Then he went on to say--what shall we do to come to a quick agreement. We have been waiting to hear from you so long. The US had fulfilled obligations in some document to be presented to the Security Council. The Soviets bear no responsibility toward the delay. That they too could put forward many questions to prolong the agony if they wanted to. The time has come to agree on all matters and draft a document for the Security Council. They said they wanted to clarify the position of the Soviets on other questions. They discussed McCloy's thing (the open sky proposal) that there should be no secrecy and that to achieve this we have to complete disarmament. The US had refused to accept their proposals to start such observation over some parts of the United States and the SU; also the Soviet proposal to establish observation posts together with certain disarmament measures. These had also been rejected by the United States. Regarding the reconnaissance flights over Cuba, what would be the reaction of the United States if the Soviets overflew our bases all around the Soviet Union? They said that Mr. McCloy said that flights over the Caribbean clarified the situation. If that is so, why do we continue? The way out is to compromise constructive proposals. They asked us what to do to come to quick agreement. That the way to do it was that we would engage in no recriminations about who was responsible to the prolongation of the discussion. That if they didn't know how to do it, we could only repeat what we have said before on many occasions. That was to remove the IL-28s and give assurances with respect to removal of all nuclear components, obtain from Cuba its cooperation for observation, verification, give us their assurances against reintroduction of such weapons and their suggestions for the safeguards for the future. As to what we, the United States, would do--as the agreement says, we would lift the quarantine and then we would give assurances regarding no invasion. Then I went on to say indeed we would lift the quarantine now if the Soviet Union would give us the promise that it was going to remove the IL-28 bombers within, say, three weeks--and the warheads. This was yesterday's proposition, you will recall.
/2/Documents 91 and 102.
GWB--Yes.
AES--That I would defer any discussions of the open skies until some other time as we had all we could manage to resolve this problem at the present. Jack [McCloy] enlarged on the ending of the quarantine on the assurances of the removal of the IL-28s now. This was a further concession on our part and meanwhile we would have to continue the reconnaissance flights to confirm the fact of removal of the 28s. Then Kuznetsov came back and said regarding the 28s you know our position--that they are defensive weapons and can't be regarded otherwise. And if your experts say to the contrary they are deceiving you and they are deceiving the President; that they are used only for training purposes and coastal defense under antiaircraft cover (almost the same language, by the way, as from the latter). We must be trying to delay working out the final guarantees; that we should be talking about a document containing all of our obligations to be presented to the Security Council. That the United States should say to them how we envision working out such a document contemplated by the letter. Regarding the reintroduction of these weapons into Cuba that they would obey strictly the letter of Chairman Khrushchev. Now as to the IL-28s they will study and they will consider the US suggestion, but they want us to know that the Soviet position (and here are some significant words) "as it now stands" is clear. That we should now discuss the longstanding, outstanding issues (I wasn't sure what he meant). Discuss all the questions to see if we can agree. How do we propose to implement our obligation? In response I listed the things that we expected the Soviet Union to do; that the quarantine was already lifted; that we had only one remaining obligation and that was the declaration of the SC regarding the assurances on invasion. I summarized the outstanding obligations of the Soviet Union--the position that we were in now, which was: (1) that the Soviet Union study the removal of the IL-28s; (2) that if they agreed to remove them, we would lift the quarantine at the time that was proper; (3) that we would expect assurances on the removal of the nuclears; that we would expect assurances against reintroduction of the weapons; that we would expect verification in Cuba; that we would expect proposals regarding future safeguards regarding the reintroduction by anyone; and finally that with all of these accomplished that we would make a declaration regarding assurances on invasion in the SC. As to the language on assurances and safeguards we would refer the matter to Washington and we would be glad to discuss our language along with theirs. Kuznetsov said he was not going to deal with the previous questions which had been reviewed during the afternoon but regarding the IL-28s that he must make a further clarification. He wished the US to understand that they reaffirm their position; that the IL-28s are defensive but that he would report the consideration advanced by the US to his Government and then we adjourned. We got the impression today for the first time it looked as though Mikoyan might be waiting to hear from Kuznetsov on what he could get on the overflights and on the guarantees. I thought on the whole it was a more constructive meeting than we had had since the beginning. At least we isolated the problems that are outstanding and that we got on the table all of the things we expected from them and made it clear that the quarantine was already lifted and our declaration on the invasion would be made in SC. I don't think we are through with Zorin on that. He will probably want to have a further argument on that ahead of us. That was about it. He obviously had been fully briefed on the letter and knew it by heart. He spoke again from documents much of the time (position papers) rather than just free style. I think that you can report to the President that we are back where I was talking about on Friday/3/ by getting the whole package before him, and I think personally it is a very good thing and we will now begin to hear one by one as to what they are going to reject and what they are going to take. I rather think they are going to go along on the ILs but we will have arguments on the form of assurance and probably they will never be able to concede the aerial surveillance. They can't do that and we will just have to go on arguing that.
/3/November 9; see Document 165.
GWB--They are probably doing this so that they can tell Mikoyan they made a protest.
AES--Yes, I think that is right. It did occur to me that while they were making this protest that depending on what other considerations may be involved that I am not clear about that if we can slow up a little for a day and run high instead of low it might be a good thing--to see if we can bring them along on agreement on the ILs.
GWB--Well, let me see what we can do on that.
AES--If you can just tell them to leave out the low flights tomorrow and to confine it to the U-2s . . . . At least that is my judgment.
GWB--I think there may be something in that.
AES--I think Jack disagrees with me on that. He doesn't think we ought to change our practices. It seems to me that maybe this is the time when they might be in a crisis there with Castro and that anything that would help there to get agreement on the ILs. I don't know if it is the thing . . . . (checking with McCloy) He feels that if they think they should run low, go ahead and do it. If they don't feel that they have to, then it would be a good idea to ease up a bit. We will send you an overnight on this.
GWB--I'll report this to the President. I think it sounds a little encouraging.
AES--If he wants anything directly on atmosphere, etc. he can call me.
[end of document]
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