1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath |
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
376. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, November 12, 1963.
//Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting No. 105, December 6, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. For McCone's account of this meeting, see Document 375.
SUBJECT
Cuban Operations
A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.
Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates run from 25 to 50.
Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.
(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton," (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.
A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year. The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.
(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.
(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.
(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other.
(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country.
(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in Nicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica. Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous groups once they become operational.
A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr. FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.
The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations, especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any Latin American country.
The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed, CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end (November 15 though 17).
The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.
Paul Eckel
377. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, November 12, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret; Sensitive.
I talked this afternoon with William Attwood and told him that at the President's instruction I was conveying this message orally and not by cable. I told him that the President hoped he would get in touch with Vallejo to report that it did not seem practicable to us at this stage to send an American official to Cuba and that we would prefer to begin with a visit by Vallejo to the U.S. where Attwood would be glad to see him and to listen to any messages he might bring from Castro. In particular, we would be interested in knowing whether there was any prospect of important modification in those parts of Castro's policy which are flatly unacceptable to us: namely, the three points in Ambassador Stevenson's recent speech/1/ of which the central elements are (1) submission to external Communist influence, and (2) a determined campaign of subversion directed at the rest of the Hemisphere. Reversals of these policies may or may not be sufficient to produce a change in the policy of the United States, but they are certainly necessary, and without an indication of readiness to move in these directions, it is hard for us to see what could be accomplished by a visit to Cuba.
/1/Not further identified.
I left it to Attwood how much of this he would convey in the initial message to Vallejo, and I also gave him discretion as to how this message was to be transmitted, with the proviso that it must be clear at all times that we were not supplicants in this matter and that the initiative for exploratory conversations was coming from the Cubans. Attwood indicated to me that he expected Lisa Howard to telephone Vallejo and then probably to get on the line himself to handle the conversation along the lines stated above. Attwood will report the results of this communication and in the event that an arrangement is made for Vallejo to come to New York Attwood will come to Washington to concert a position for his use in this conversation.
McG. B./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
378. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 25, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Cuba--Item of Presidential Interest
1. I assume you will want to brief the President/1/ on Bill Attwood's Cuban exercise which is presumably still in train (see attached)./2/
/1/President Johnson. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.
/2/Reference is to a November 19 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, reporting that Attwood had talked with Castro's confidant, Dr. Vallejo, who invited him to Cuba and promised that the visit "would be very secure." Attwood replied that he could not come at this time and preliminary talks in New York were essential. Vallejo could not come to New York, but Cuban U.N. delegate Carlos Lechuga would discuss an agenda for the talks with Attwood in New York. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65)
2. My own thinking on this one, vis-a-vis the events of November 22, is still very fluid; but here it is. Basically, the events of November 22 would appear to make accommodation with Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was. While I think that President Kennedy could have accommodated with Castro and gotten away with it with a minimum of domestic heat, I'm not sure about President Johnson. For one thing, a new President who has no background of being successfully nasty to Castro and the Communists (e.g. President Kennedy in October, 1962) would probably run a greater risk of being accused, by the American people, of "going soft". In addition, the fact that Lee Oswald has been heralded as a pro-Castro type may make rapprochement with Cuba more difficult--although it is hard to say how much more difficult.
3. If one concludes that the prospects for accommodation with Castro are much dimmer than they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood's present effort loses much of its meaning. We would appear to have three alternative courses of action in handling the present status of the Attwood-Lechuga tie-line.
(a) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell Lechuga that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about an agenda with Lechuga.
(b) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga does not call over the next couple weeks (the Cubans may feel that November 22 has stopped all bets), he should take the initiative and get a message across to the Cubans, that despite recent events, we are still prepared to hear what is on Castro's mind.
(c) We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls about setting up an appointment between Attwood and Lechuga, that Attwood should schedule such a meeting for a few days later and call us immediately. However, if Lechuga does not call him, Attwood should take no initiative until and if he hears from us.
4. I choose 3(c) above. While November 22 events probably make accommodation an even tougher issue for President Johnson than it was for President Kennedy, a preliminary Attwood-Lechuga talk still seems worthwhile from our point of view--if the Cubans initiate it. We have little or nothing to lose and there will be some benefits; at a minimum, we should get a valuable reading as to what Castro regards as negotiable (e.g. the Soviet tie-line?) and a hint as to how he views the effect of November 22 on Cuban/U.S. relations. At the same time, if the Cubans, who have the ball, feel that all bets are off, we should take no initiative until we have thought the problem through carefully.
If we decide that course 3(c) is the right one, the sooner we call Attwood, the better. In view of his and Stevenson's activist tendencies in this matter, it seems conceivable to me that, not hearing from Lechuga in the near future, they will approach him and assure him that we feel the same way and that we are still prepared to hear what Castro has on his mind.
GC
379. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 25, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Cuba--Bill Attwood
1. Attached is an unsolicited chronology from Bill Attwood which describes the activities of the Cuba-Attwood tie-line from November 11 to the present. Apparently, the memo was dispatched on November 22, but because of the recent events, did not reach us until today.
2. I do not think that Bill's chronology changes the sense of the memo which I sent to you earlier today./1/ It does bring up a couple other points however.
/1/Document 378.
(a) Assuming we decide to let the Lechuga-Attwood tie-line continue its present limited course, shouldn't we tell Bill to gently ease Lisa Howard out of the picture? (November 22 offers him a good excuse--"We are naturally re-studying the situation in light of recent events.") Her inclusion at every step so far (see attached), frankly, makes me nervous.
(b) In view of the fact that you once mentioned to me that you wanted the written tracks of this operation kept to a minimum, do you want me to tell Bill that he needn't send us any more chronologies? Or did you mean that you wanted no written tracks between Bill and the Cubans? (I personally feel that the chronologies are valuable; they give us a more accurate picture of what is going on in New York than oral briefings and permit us to exercise a closer control.)
GC
Attachment/2/
/2/Secret.
Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff
New York, November 22, 1963.
Following is an addition to my memorandum to you dated November 8, 1963:/3/
/3/Document 374.
On November 11, Vallejo called Miss Howard again to reiterate their appreciation of the need for security and to say that Castro would go along with any arrangements we might want to make. He specifically suggested that a Cuban plane could come to Key West and pick up the emissary; alternatively they would agree to have him come in a U.S. plane which could land at one of several "secret airfields" near Havana. He emphasized that only Castro and himself would be present at the talks and that no one else--he specifically mentioned Guevara--would be involved. Vallejo also reiterated Castro's desire for this talk and hoped to hear our answer soon.
On November 12, Bundy called me and I reported Vallejo's message. He said this did not affect the White House decision that a preliminary talk with Vallejo at the United Nations should be held in order to find out what Castro wanted to talk about--particularly if he was seriously interested in discussing the points cited in Stevenson's October 7 speech. Bundy suggested I transmit our decision to Vallejo, stressing the fact that, since we are responding to their invitation and are not soliciting a meeting, we would like to know more about what is on Castro's mind before commiting ourselves to further talks in Cuba.
On November 13, I went to Miss Howard's apartment and called Vallejo at home. There was no answer. She then sent a telegram asking that he call her at his convenience.
On November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him my message--that we would want to talk to him here at the United Nations before accepting an invitation to go to Cuba. She said that, if he wished to confirm or discuss this further with the U.S. official, he could call him (Vallejo) at home on the evening of November 18. Vallejo said he would be there to receive the call. Meanwhile, he did not exclude the possibility of his coming to the United Nations and said he would discuss it with Castro.
On November 18, Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and passed the phone to me. I told him Miss Howard had kept me informed of her talks with him and that I assumed he knew of our interest in hearing what Castro had in mind. Vallejo said he did, and reiterated the invitation to Cuba, stressing the fact that security could be guaranteed. I replied that we felt a preliminary meeting was essential to make sure there was something useful to talk about, and asked if he was able to come to New York. Vallejo said he could not come "at this time". However, if that's how we felt, he said that "we" would send instructions to Lechuga to propose and discuss with me "an agenda" for a later meeting with Castro. I said I would await Lechuga's call. Vallejo's manner was extremely cordial and he called me "Sir" throughout the conversation.
On November 19, I called Chase, and reported the conversation.
380. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. Approved by the White House on December 2 and by Thompson on November 27.
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Under Secretary Harriman
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Tyler-EUR
Mr. Bundy--The White House
Mr. Akalovsky--ACDA/IR
USSR
Mr. Mikoyan
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Sukhodrev
SUBJECT
Call by Mr. Mikoyan on the President
[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume V.]
The President then noted that the United States was not planning to invade Cuba, but that the Cuban problem was a very serious one with our people. He hoped that as days came and went we would be able to find a solution there which would make it possible to lead our peoples further towards peace and understanding. Actions already taken had gone part of the way and some lessening of tension had taken place. We had a number of problems at home which were quite troublesome, and if there was any indication at any time that we could in some way bring about better understanding and better relations we would go our part of the way. We were dedicated to our system and intended to preserve it, but this did not mean that we wanted it to dominate or enslave any other people.
Mr. Mikoyan said he was happy to hear these words uttered by the new President of the United States. The President's desire to live in peace and friendship with the USSR and with other nations was in full accord with the views of the Soviet Union.
The President stated that there would be no change in the Kennedy policy. We were very happy that Congress had shown evidences of approving negotiations and exchanges of views between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This had offered us real encouragement not only in their attitude but also in our people's attitude. Our constant purpose, each day, would be to seek to travel the road of peace and to find solutions to many problems that engaged the two sides and to many differences existing between them.
The President continued that as an immediate comment he wished to say that the problem which was the biggest with our people was the result of the Castro-promoted subversion. This inevitably and invariably gave us strained relations. He hoped, however, that in future both sides would find that they had moved further to peace and had made gains greater than even those made by his predecessor and Mr. Khrushchev.
Mr. Mikoyan said he was very much gratified to hear this. However, there was only one point he wished to comment on, namely, the President's remark concerning Cuban subversive activities. He said he could not understand how a small nation like Cuba could subvert anyone, let alone a big power. On the contrary, the whole world could see how small Cuba was being subverted by a number of various, well-financed organizations. The Soviet Union believed that all subversive activities should be ended everywhere. He asserted that he knew Cuba did not want to subvert anyone. In his conversation with Castro, the latter had told him that he wanted good relations with the United States. In his statement on the occasion of the tragedy falling upon the United States, Castro had shown himself as a great humanitarian as he had voiced deep regret about President Kennedy's death. Therefore, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he wished to ask the President not to accept the allegations which were sometimes mentioned in the press. He wanted the President to believe him that good relations with Cuba were in the interest of the United States.
The President responded that his intention had been simply to give an evaluation of the feelings of our people and of what gave them problems. He said he had spoken sincerely and earnestly about US intentions with respect to Cuba. We had no plans for invasion, and we believed that there was no justification for Cuba to invade others by subversion or otherwise. The President reiterated that what he was seeking now was merely to give Mr. Mikoyan an evaluation and expressed the hope that better understanding could flow from this.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
381. Editorial Note
On November 28, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone met with President Lyndon Johnson at Johnson's residence for approximately 30 minutes. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, November 29, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:
"The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)
On November 30 McCone again met with President Johnson with McGeorge Bundy also present. The meeting lasted for approximately 1-1/2 hours and according to McCone's memorandum for the record, December 2, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:
"The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday."
Later on in the memorandum, McCone noted that he reviewed the Cuban overflight program and advised the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which the flights were being carried on. (Ibid.)
The reference by McGeorge Bundy to the meeting of Monday, was
to a meeting with the President on December 2; see Document 383.
The statements by President Kennedy of September 4 (not 5), September
13, and November 20, 1963, all dealt in part with the danger of
Cuban subversion to the Western hemisphere and the United States
intention to prevent it. For texts, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1962, pages 369-370, 373-375, and 461-463.
382. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 2, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Bill Attwood Activities
1. Last week, (after President Kennedy's death) Lechuga told Lisa Howard that he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to have a discussion with Attwood. Lechuga wondered whether things were still the same. Miss Howard said she didn't know anything. She later passed the information to Attwood.
2. Bill ran into Lechuga today at lunch, by accident. After Lechuga expressed condolences, Bill mentioned that Miss Howard had told him that Lechuga had received the above mentioned letter. Lechuga confirmed that he had been authorized to have a preliminary discussion with Bill (he did not mention from whom the letter had come although he had previously told Miss Howard that the talks were authorized by Castro). Lechuga wondered how things now stood. Bill told Lechuga he would let him know. They also agreed, that from this point on, there was no further need to use Lisa Howard as an intermediary.
3. Bill doesn't know whether Castro wrote the letter before or after the death of President Kennedy. In any event, Lechuga has apparently received no stop-order since the assassination. One might assume, therefore, that the assassination has not changed Castro's mind about talking to the U.S.
4. The ball is in our court; Bill owes Lechuga a call. What to do? Bill thinks that we have nothing to lose in listening to what Castro has to say; there is no commitment on our side. Also, it would be very interesting to know what is in the letter.
I am also dying to know what's in the letter and two weeks ago I would not have hesitated. But things are different now, particularly with this Oswald business. At a minimum, such a talk would really have to be a non-event. I, for one, would want to think this one over carefully.
GC
383. Editorial Note
At 6 p.m. on December 2, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk met with President Johnson to discuss Cuba. Also attending were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Director of the United States Information Agency Donald Wilson, and Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, who apparently also attended the meeting, prepared a paper setting forth talking points for Secretary Rusk, December 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba) See the Supplement.
According to a memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
Bundy asked Chase to produce a "Cuban monograph" for
the meeting. Chase produced a paper that he described as "an
effort which attempts to give a broad sense of the main threads
and problems of our policy towards Cuba, with an indication as
to where we appear to be heading." Chase admitted to Bundy,
"I do not yet have a real feel as to how much the President
knows about Cuba," and he was not sure his paper would meet
Bundy's needs, but he suggested Bundy was free to do with it what
he thought best. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) Chase's paper has not been found.
Chase was slated to be the notetaker at the meeting, but in light
of President Johnson's inclination to "abhor a crowd,"
Chase volunteered to drop out. (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy,
December 2; ibid.) If Chase did not attend, there may have been
no notetaker and thus no record of the meeting.
384. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 3, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Bill Attwood's Activities
I refer to our conversation this morning about the next step in the Bill Attwood story. In the event we are going to move soon on this one (after your assurances re Oswald, I, for one, am in favor), for a starter, here are some rough guidelines which you may want to consider.
1. Bill Attwood should call Lechuga and make an appointment to see him. At the meeting he should say the following:
(a) The new Administration has not yet had an opportunity to examine the Cuban question in detail.
(b) However, in deference to the late President's judgment that it is worthwhile to hear what is on Castro's mind, and in view of the fact that what Castro says may have a bearing on the new Administration's eventual assessment of the Cuban situation, I am authorized to hear you out.
(c) (After hearing Lechuga's story.) You can rest assured that the information will be passed on to the proper people. If we are interested in further talks, I will let you know.
2. We should emphasize to Bill that the meeting must be held with complete discretion; should news of the meeting leak out, Bill should be in a position to issue a foolproof denial. In this regard, we are glad that Lisa Howard is now out of the picture. She should be given no intimation that further U.S./Cuban contact is taking place.
3. One main problem is that, in his meeting with Lechuga, Bill may tend to convey a spirit of accommodation, which, when reported, could relieve Castro of an increased anxiety which the assassination of President Kennedy seems to have produced and which is in our interest to maintain. Therefore, we should stress to Bill that he must convey the sense of an interested but non-committal listener, completely confident of his position. Expressed in words, the mood should be roughly as follows:
"Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressure against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover, you can forget about getting 'another Cuba' in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and 'another Cuba' is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns--the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicably together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis."
4. I agree that it is questionable whether Bill Attwood is the man to convey the message. On the other hand, an Ed Martin type who, in his bones, probably does not believe in the possibility of accommodation would not lend the right flavor to the meeting either. There must be a delicate balance. Given the choice between the two types, I would pick the believer, Bill, and arm him with a good, stiff brainwashing and education in Cuban affairs before he meets with Lechuga. Frankly, if really given my choice, I would pick you for the job. Is there any way you could do it and not be conspicuous (e.g. outside New York or Washington)?
GC
385. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 4, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963
1. I spoke to John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of document for the meeting.
(a) The paper will include State's recommendation on how we plan to proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms cache issue./1/ For example, should we push for a break in diplomatic relations among the "soft 5", a break in economic relations between Latin America and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and Cuba?
/1/There were actually two papers, one, entitled "OAS Action Against Cuba" and undated, is ibid. Regarding the second paper, see footnote 2 below.
(b) The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles, low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program). There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages of each of these courses of action, along with State's recommendation in favor or against./2/
/2/The second paper, entitled "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of Force)," undated, was submitted to the Standing Group on December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement.
(c) John will get the paper distributed by Saturday/3/ afternoon so that the agencies will have time to consider State's recommendations before the Tuesday meeting./4/
/3/Saturday, December 7. According to a December 9 memorandum from Chase to Bundy the second paper on unilateral and bilateral action was withdrawn from consideration by the Standing Group by Secretary Rusk for further consideration in State. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65)
/4/The Standing Group met on Tuesday, December 10, to discuss "OAS Action Against Cuba," see footnote 1 above. The Group placed emphasis on measures designed to harass Cuba and restrict arms shipments to Latin America. (Memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric, December 18; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XII, p. 355.
2. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening. Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu.
3. Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG). Attendance at the meeting would be roughly as follows: Ed Martin, somebody from the 7th floor of State, John McCone, Dez FitzGerald or Dick Helms, Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG. Do you have any problems with such a list? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell Taylor, Ted Sorensen?
GC
386. Editorial Note
On December 13, 1963, the Standing Group of the National Security
Council met to discuss Cuba. Two papers were on the agenda. The
first was a Department of State draft entitled, "Possible
Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure
on Cuba," see footnote 2, Document 385. The second was a
December 12 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum entitled "Cuba--A
Status Report." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement.
These two papers were only briefly discussed as the participants
were more concerned with the unsatisfactory results of a November
14-18 surveillance and intercept operation against suspected arms
smuggling into Colombia. The Standing Group did approve certain
actions recommended in the two papers. The Group gave authorization
to CIA to develop the capacity to conduct air attacks against
selective Cuban targets by autonomous exile groups. Assets were
to be in place within 90 days, but this did not constitute authority
to conduct the raids. A general consensus favored endorsement
of intensification of the current program of exile raids on Cuba.
Intensified Department of State action against Free World shipping
to Cuba was also approved. Since the Standing Group was not able
to consider all the actions recommended in the two papers, further
decisions were delayed until a December 19 meeting with President
Johnson. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:
FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) Regarding the meeting with the President,
see Document 388.
387. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, undated.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret. Prepared by Smith. A copy was sent to Chase.
The President reacted to the attached memorandum of December 9 from Mr. Attwood by asking Mr. Moyers what instructions had been given to Attwood. Where he got the memo I do not know.
I reviewed for Mr. Moyers the actions taken since December 9 and reported that consideration of using Attwood in negotiations with representatives of Castro had been under review almost weekly. Timing of a contact had not been considered right.
I recommended that, in the light of the recently announced USSR-Cuba trade agreement and the renewed Russian pledge to aid Cuba by all means if an invasion should be launched,/1/ any contact between Attwood and Castro representatives should be avoided lest we convey to the Cubans we were reacting defensively to the latest Russian actions. I said that a no-contact-now policy reflected the current situation and did not forestall use of Attwood at a later date if a decision was made to do so./2/
/1/Announced in Khrushchev's December 13 speech before the the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he declared that "revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless if the aggressive militaristic circles of the U.S.A. attack it." For text, see The Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 49, January 1, 1964, pp. 3-13. The trade agreement for long-term purchases by the Soviet Union of Cuban sugar was signed by Castro and Khrushchev on January 21, 1964, but apparently was announced earlier.
/2/On December 11 Chase sent Bundy a memorandum on Attwood's activities. Attwood told Chase there was no pressure to reply as "Lechuga, and the Cubans in general, probably feel that the situation has changed since President Kennedy's assassination. Deep down, they probably don't expect anything hopeful from us." Attwood told Chase that Lechuga "seemed somewhat reluctant to bring up the subject of a letter he had received from Cuba." If the contact was to continue, Attwood wanted to call Lechuga within a couple of weeks, otherwise the matter "would lose momentum and wither on the vine." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65)
BKS
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret.
Memorandum From William Attwood to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)
New York, December 9, 1963.
SUBJECT
Latest Cuban Developments for your talk with the President
As you know, President Kennedy in September authorized me to establish a discreet contact with the Cuban UN representative to verify reports that Castro--if not his Communist advisers--was prepared to go quite far in meeting our terms for normalizing relations.
McGeorge Bundy has the chronological account of what this initial contact led to during October and November. At all times I was in contact with the White House. We never indicated to the Cubans that we wanted to make a deal but only that we were prepared to listen.
Finally, on October 31, Castro invited me to meet him in Cuba and guaranteed both discretion and security. We replied that we would prefer preliminary discussions here at the United Nations to make sure there was something worth talking about.
On November 18, Castro's right-hand man, Rene Vallejo, informed me by telephone that instructions were being sent to the Cuban Representative, Dr. Lechuga, to discuss an agenda with me.
On December 2, Lechuga told me he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to talk with me about certain problems "in a general way". Lechuga said that in view of the President's death he did not know whether we still wished to have such a talk. I told him I would let him know. I then reported this to Gordon Chase in Bundy's office and am now waiting for further instructions.
Personally, I feel that we have nothing to lose by finding out
what is on Castro's mind and what he wants to talk about.
388. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson
Washington, December 19, 1963, 10:55 a.m.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Chase on December 27.
SUBJECT
Cuba
OTHERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond FitzGerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy; William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase
The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)/1/
/1/Chase is apparently referring to a long draft memorandum for the President, prepared by McGeorge Bundy on December 15. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. FitzGerald and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S. Government's economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the discussion covered 6 areas.
(a) Mr. FitzGerald described covert intelligence activities directed against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geographic spread of CIA assets within Cuba.
(b) Mr. FitzGerald described CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.
(c) Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via Canada and Great Britain.
The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program./2/ Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World governments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.
/2/Public Law 88-205, passed December 16; 77 Stat. 379.
(d) Mr. FitzGerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular uprising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.
The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suffer heavy losses at Castro's hands.
(e) Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resist-ance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack on a major target--the Matanzas power plant. Mr. FitzGerald noted that this would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as economically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Administration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.
But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than 50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak--we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro, presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson said that the timing seemed bad--the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more Soviet aid.
General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.
In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas.
It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and because of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to develop an air strike capability./3/
/3/Both Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter and Chief of the Special Affairs Staff Desmond FitzGerald produced memoranda for the record of this meeting. They both indicated that it was President Johnson who made this decision. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963) See the Supplement.
(f) Mr. FitzGerald described CIA's program in aiding two autonomous Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is somewhat to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dissidents. Mr. FitzGerald added that there are some disadvantages in these operations--the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control. But there are advantages too--they operate from outside United States territory and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups.
Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. FitzGerald agreed, that these groups operate a long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids.
2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief.)/4/
/4/Apparent reference to December 18 briefing notes for Acting Director Carter, entitled "The Situation in Cuba." The notes summarized Soviet withdrawals, analyzed remaining Soviet forces in Cuba, assessed the Cuban military as fully capable of deterring internal dissidence and exile raids, and concluded that despite economic problems Castro was very much in control. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting--12/19/63) See the Supplement. Also in the Supplement is a related CIA Special Report, OCI No. 0310/63B, December 13, "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power." (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label)
(a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.
(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important.
(c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say./5/ Mr. Ball noted that such U.S./Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations.
/5/In a December 20 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, Chase reported a conversation with Attwood who stated that Adlai Stevenson had mentioned the U.S.-Cuba contact recently to President Johnson. Chase did not know what the nature of the President's reaction was, but he noted "from the tenor of the President's Thursday meeting [December 19], I would surmise that it was somewhere between lukewarm and cool." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Memos re. Cuba Miscellaneous, 11/63-6/65)
3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro.
(a) Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all tend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2.
(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures--e.g. close ports and deny U.S.-financed commodities to lines engaged in Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves. We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba.
(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech,/6/ President Kennedy made two points about Cuba--the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere.
/6/Reference is to an address before the Inter-American Press Association, in Miami on November 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 872-877.
(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.
Note: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettlement is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.
5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache./7/
/7/Reference is to the discovery on November 3 by Venezuela of an arms cache on the beach of Paraguana Peninsula, Venzuela. On November 28 Venezuela announced that the arms were of Cuban origin. For documentation on the reaction of the United States and the Organization of American States, see vol. XII, pp. 352-354.
(a) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas.
(b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report should be ready by about January 10.
(c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices--we may want to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feelers.
6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.
Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution./8/
/8/On December 21 the Department of State announced that the prohibition of unauthorized travel to Cuba was "an essential part of this country's foreign policy." Department of State Press Release No. 640; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, pp. 10-11.
Gordon Chase/9/
/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
389. National Security Action Memorandum No. 274
Washington, December 20, 1963.
//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 274. Secret. Copies were sent to the Departments of Defense and the Treasury.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Cuba--Economic Denial Program
1. At his meeting on Cuba on December 19, 1963,/1/ the President stated his deep concern with the extent of Free World trade with Cuba, and his desire for a detailed memorandum on the subject.
/1/See Document 388.
2. Accordingly, it is requested that State coordinate with Commerce and CIA and prepare a memorandum which includes, but is not necessarily restricted to, the following information.
(a) The extent of the trade between the Free World and Cuba--e.g. the value of the trade and the countries involved.
(b) The commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba, paying special attention to items which are critical to the Cuban economy.
(c) The names and addresses of the principal firms which are directly or indirectly involved with the shipment of commodities to Cuba.
(d) Steps we have taken with foreign governments and private companies to stop trade with Cuba, including the responses of such governments and companies to our pressures.
(e) Recommendations for further action.
McGeorge Bundy
On December 27, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Johnson at his ranch in Texas. According to McCone's December 29 memorandum for the record Johnson told McCone that he wanted to "'change the image of the DCI' from a cloak and dagger role to the role of adviser to the President." McCone responded that was very much in line with his thinking and he was prepared to do anything the President desired. McCone and Johnson then discussed specific items, one of which was Cuba. Their discussion on Cuba went as follows:
"I reviewed briefly the most recent summary (the CIA-DIA assessment of 20 December) of the situation in Cuba, advising the President that there had been no additions to the Soviet forces but no appreciable withdrawal. There had been a substantial turnover in recent months and the probability was that a few hundred--and not more than a few hundred--Soviets had departed. This was about the extent of the net reduction. I said that it appeared that the Soviet activities were entirely of a training nature, that the Cuban SAM trainees had been deployed at SAM sites and that there was a possibility that autonomous Cuban control of the SAM sites would present us with a very difficult situation in the immediate future. The President then asked what could be done if the Cubans decided to use the SAMs against our U-2's. I stated that we could not go without continuing aerial surveillance. We had two choices: either use our 'new development,' which I opposed because of its importance for other purposes, or tentatively to actually 'take out' the SAM sites. The President remarked that this would then mean war and I responded that certainly the destruction of the SAM sites would mean war, that the degree of escalation could not be determined in advance. I stated that this was the most ominous situation that confronted us in Cuba in the immediate future. The President made no comment." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)
The CIA-DIA summary, December 20, entitled "Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba," is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. See the Supplement.
[end of document]
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