FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

76. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Cuba, 1962. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information.

INTELLIGENCE NOTE

Soviets Continue to Seek Abandonment of Quarantine While Missiles Stay

Ships Turning. Yesterday's pattern of Soviet ships turning off their Cuban courses has continued. Apparently only tankers are still on course. One, the Bucharest, has cooperated with us by indicating, on request, that its cargo was POL. It was permitted to proceed.

Soviet Intentions. Moscow's immediate purpose still appears to be to leave the initiative for an incident up to the US. In doing so its reasons are probably (1) the desire to identify the US as the aggressor, and (2) recognition that if an incident occurs, the USSR will be helpless at the site of the incident and will face the choice of escalation. We believe Moscow is reluctant to make the latter choice.

Political Action. Soviet strategy at the moment still is designed to gain time and flexibility for political action, designed to get the quarantine stopped while the missiles stay in Cuba. By the turn-around of its ships Moscow is, in effect, already complying with the U Thant proposal, although formally it may refuse to do so; it is thus seeking to exert pressure for at least tacit US abandonment of the quarantine. For the moment it seems intent on insisting that there can be no restriction on weapons in Cuba and that these weapons are designed solely to defend Cuba against aggression. It is probably waiting (1) to see how much momentum will develop for a trade involving US strategic bases, and (2) whether the US is prepared to exert further force to achieve removal of missiles already in Cuba. Until it obtains greater certainty on these points, it will probably keep its missiles in place.

77. Paper Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, October 25.

Washington, October 25, 1962.

SOVIET TACTICS IN THE SHORT RUN

Soviet reaction since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis indicates Soviet short run tactics are governed by the following considerations:

1. The USSR's first objective in the present stage of the crisis is to retain the bases in Cuba. The Soviets not only see considerable military value in these installations, but they regard them as a telling demonstration of the long-proclaimed shift in the "world relation of forces." Particularly now that the US has committed itself to their elimination, they believe that, if they can prevail, they will have scored a political victory of such proportions that opportunities for further advances will open up in all the areas of East-West contention.

2. Thus the immediate Soviet aim is to deter the US from more drastic action. At the same time, they wish to keep the risks under control.

3. Their diplomatic moves and conduct at sea to date suggest that they fear further US action may be imminent and wish not to have their prestige further engaged if this should occur. Thus they have turned back a number of ships, refrained from spelling out their commitment to Castro in as strong a fashion as previously, and tried to represent the crisis as primarily between Cuba and the US.

4. The primary Soviet tactic will be to draw the US into negotiations, meanwhile getting a standstill. The Soviets calculate that, if this can be done, they will have laid heavy inhibitions upon further US unilateral action and that, with the passage of time, the existing bases will become part of the status quo. They prefer, of course, that the lifting of the quarantine be made a precondition of negotiations, but they probably will not insist upon this. They will probably propose or accept any of several forms of negotiation in addition to their own proposal for US-Soviet-Cuban talks.

5. At the present juncture the Soviets probably view a summit meeting as an appealing proposal to keep open the line of negotiation, especially if a stalemate in the UN approaches which might free the US to take military action. With a summit in prospect they would estimate the pressures for the US to wait would be great. A summit therefore would buy the Soviets some additional time, offer a forum to make a reasonable case, confuse the issues, and raise the political costs of further US action. At the same time, they would not want to be faced at the summit with an ultimatum or an unyielding US position which if it resulted in further actions would redouble the humiliation to the USSR and Khrushchev personally. On balance they probably feel that as long as the US did not appear determined to take action the summit offers more advantages than drawbacks.

6. Although the Soviets would like to minimize the risks at the present juncture, they find it very difficult to acquiesce in the US quarantine. Their reported reaction to U Thant's appeal suggest that they could accept for some time a tacit agreement whereby they refrained from sending patently military cargoes into the quarantine area and the US allowed other vessels through upon a verbal declaration of cargo. It is unlikely that the Soviets will submit to boarding, since in doing so they would be accepting the quarantine. So long as they wish to avoid incidents, therefore, they will be extremely anxious to determine how the US intends to enforce the quarantine.

7. At some stage a quarantine incident would probably commend itself to the Soviets as one means of raising tensions and thereby multiplying international pressures upon the US. The best circumstance would be to lead the US into attacking a manifestly peaceful vessel. If the Soviets decide that such an incident is desirable, they would be primarily concerned with subsequent political exploitation and might not undertake an immediate equivalent reprisal against the US.

8. The time will probably come when the USSR decides that it would be useful to increase tensions by stepping up the element of threat in their pronouncements. Even in this circumstance, however, they are likely to continue avoiding any further commitment to Cuba so long as they remain uncertain about US intentions.

9. With respect to the missiles already in Cuba it seems highly improbable that the USSR will agree to withdraw in the absence of major US concessions elsewhere. There is one circumstance, however, in which a break in this Soviet position might occur. The USSR would regard a successful US military action against the bases, or against Cuba as a whole, as a very great defeat, which might substantially stiffen Western determination to resist Soviet demands in other confrontations, e.g. Berlin. If, therefore, they believed that US military action was all but imminent and unavoidable, they might make a last-minute offer to dismantle the bases in return for some Western concession which, while not offsetting their loss, offered some prospect of saving face. They might even attempt to dispose clandestinely of their missiles. It is difficult to conceive, however, how the Soviets could frame such moves or time them properly. Thus in this circumstance they might decide to let the US attack proceed and to recoup as much as possible thereafter through political exploitation and, perhaps, an off-setting injury to US interests elsewhere.

78. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 26, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Bundy--First two or three items; have you got a minute?

Ball--Oh, sure.

Bundy--We have boarded the Lebanese/1/ and care(?)/2/ wants to have it got out by Sylvester right away in order to restore our credibility before flag plot leaps.

/1/Bundy is referring to the boarding of the Marcular at 7:50 a.m. on October 26 by personnel from the destroyers Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy about 180 miles northeast of Nassau. No prohibited cargo was found and the ship was subsequently allowed to continue to Havana. (Department of Defense news release 1745-62, October 26; Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, SecDef Cable Files, Cuba)

/2/A blank at this point in the source text was filled in by hand with "care(?)."

Ball--I don't see any harm in that.

Bundy--I think that's dandy. It turns out to be Soviet charter, did you know that?

Ball--Yes, and reconditional.

Bundy--Yes, and it even had an unidentified cargo. Second, we have got this very neat point of how to organize the process of Stevenson's instructions today. My suggestion would be that we not have them at the 10:00.

Ball--Not have the instructions?

Bundy--No, not have the two of them--Stevenson and McCloy.

Ball--Well, the only advantage of having them is to get the flavor. Not go into the instructions necessarily.

Bundy--No, no. Well then let's do it that way. Let's have them at the meeting in order that they were at the meeting and then we better work out--Bob McNamara and the Attorney General are all steamed up about getting a think tank going like the ones we had last week. And I think they are right about that and they are going to want to borrow space in your Department to do it.

Ball--OK.

Bundy--Which I am all for. It seems to me that those two things--we will have to generate an instructions working party and maybe it's all one thing--maybe the instructions will lead to what the rest of the problems are.

Ball--I had McCloy in for breakfast this morning, with Cleveland, going over the instructions.

Bundy--How was he?

Ball--He is all heated up. He is a very good fellow.

Bundy--Is he clear and strong?

Ball--Yes, very clear and very strong. What I want the President to suggest when he talks to him is now--to say to Stevenson--"When you and McCloy talk to Thant" and "When you and McCloy do this . . ." And if necessary, if he raises any question then you can say "Well, look, from the bipartisan position of this thing, this is in election time, we have got to keep it bipartisan."

Bundy--You feel there has been some question of Jack's energy and clarity and . . .

Ball--No, no, no.

Bundy--That's nonsense.

Ball--He is very, very clear in what the objectives have to be and he is very firm and tough.

Bundy--OK, good news. I will feed that to the President ahead of the meeting.

Ball--I think it is very important that that point be made because what is happening right now is they haven't given him anything to do.

Bundy--Well then he certainly should say to them at each stage and you should emphasize and the President should and you should bring them both to the 10:00 o'clock.

Ball--Yes, that's right. I think the way to handle it is the President just takes it for granted that McCloy is in on all the talks, because he isn't in on anything at the moment. This has got to be made clear.

Bundy--Otherwise, you will lose him for one thing.

Ball--Knowing my old friend I can tell you that this has got to be made explicit and the bipartisan way is the way to play it.

Bundy--Right. I will pass that to the Boss and I will have a word with you before the meeting if there is any difficulty about it.

Ball--All right.

79. Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 26, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's account of this meeting is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 317-318. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement. The record of action of the meeting, prepared by McGeorge Bundy, is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) Gilpatric's 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

Director McCone summarized the attached intelligence memorandum, including a statement on the current status of Soviet air readiness./1/

/1/The summary of this CIA memorandum, [document number not declassified] (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) which recorded information available as of 6 a.m. October 26, is in the Supplement.

Mr. McCone described the celebration which took place in Havana following the arrival of the tanker Bucharest which had been allowed to pass the quarantine line because it was carrying only oil, which is not now contraband. He said non-Bloc ships could be used to carry military materials if they had been chartered on a bare boat basis by the Russians.

Mr. McCone reported that he had stood down a CIA operation which involved sending into Cuba by submarine ten teams involving fifty people. He said he did not believe this should be done by CIA unilaterally./2/

/2/The operation is described in an October 25 memorandum from Carter to McCone; for text, see CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 311-312.

The President agreed and asked that the proposal to put ashore the ten teams be discussed by the Special Group (NSC 5412) today. The President further suggested that the Mongoose operation be reconstituted, possibly as a subcommittee of the Executive Committee, and oriented toward post-Castro Cuban problems. The President stressed the importance of tying together all existing groups engaged in covert activities in order to integrate our planning.

Director McCone raised the question of the location of the SS Oxford, a communications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ship which is now standing some ten miles off Cuba. He expressed his concern that this very valuable ship might be destroyed by hostile action. The President said this was an operational problem, the Navy should have the authority to control this ship, but it should take into account CIA's concern.

Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittees are at work--one on Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze, one on forward planning, chaired by Walt Rostow, and one on worldwide communications problems, chaired by William Orrick, who is working closely with the Defense Communications Agency.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although preliminary measures are to be initiated. He referred to the amount of sensitive information which has been leaking to the press and urged that information about future actions must be more carefully guarded.

Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the quarantine. The Defense Department was authorized to release information on the boarding of the Lebanese ship, the Marucla, the first dry cargo ship which had been loaded in a Soviet port. In the event that comparisons were made between stopping the Lebanese ship and permitting an East German ship to go through the quarantine line, the point will be made that the East German ship carried only passengers.

Secretary McNamara read a list of Bloc ships and their locations and noted that there would be no intercepts at sea today. The tanker Graznyy is apparently moving but will not cross the line today. He suggested that shortly we should embargo fuel used by bombers and substances from which airplane fuel is made, i.e. petroleum products.

The President suggested that if we decide to embargo bomber fuel, we should also mention the fact that we were embargoing fuel which was contributing to the operational capability of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk asked that POL not be embargoed for at least twenty-four hours in order to avoid upsetting the U Thant talks now under way in New York.

Under Secretary Ball asked for agreement on the embargo of petroleum as the next step in the effort to increase pressures--the timing of the embargo to be decided later in relation to the New York talks.

Secretary Dillon stated his reservations concerning this course of action. He said it ended up in stopping Soviet ships. Thus, a confrontation with the Russians would not be over the missiles, but over Soviet ships. He believed we should go for the missiles rather than force a confrontation with the USSR at sea.

A decision on adding petroleum to the embargo list was delayed until the political path was decided upon.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that construction on the strategic missile sites in Cuba was continuing. He asked that public announcement be made of our continuation of air surveillance. He recommended that daylight reconnaissance measures be flown today and a night mission tonight, including the dropping of flares.

Secretary Rusk asked that the night mission not be flown because of the unfortunate effect which it might have on the U Thant negotiations in New York.

Secretary McNamara thought that one way of avoiding reaction to night reconnaissance was to inform the Cubans and the Russians in advance that we were initiating such flights.

Ambassador Stevenson opposed any public announcement of our surveillance activities.

The President directed that we dramatize the fact that the missile buildup in Cuba is continuing. He authorized daylight reconnaissance measures but decided to delay night flights.

Secretary Rusk praised Ambassador Stevenson's UN performance. He urged that USIA keep the pressure on the Cuban people and mentioned the dropping of leaflets over Cuba.

Acting Director Wilson requested that better aerial pictures be made available to USIA for distribution. The President authorized the use of any reconnaissance pictures, including those used by Ambassador Stevenson in his UN speech.

Secretary Rusk summarized political actions now under way. He said the object of the talks with U Thant today was to set up some form of negotiations with the Russians in New York. The objective would be to obtain a commitment from the Russians that there would be no further construction at the missile sites in Cuba, no further Soviet military shipments, the defusing of existing weapons in Cuba, UN inspection of all nuclear-capable missiles, and an observer corps on the ground in Cuba of 350 technically able inspectors. The U.S. quarantine would continue until a UN quarantine is in place. UN teams would be put into specified Cuban ports. U.S. Navy ships would stay close to all Cuban ports to ensure that there were no landings unknown to the UN inspectors and no cargoes anywhere which UN inspectors did not see.

Mr. McCloy stated that our quarantine was vital and should be kept in place until the Russians had accepted all of our conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we must make clear to U Thant that the quarantine is related to the Soviet missiles rather than to Soviet military shipments to Cuba.

With respect to the proposed atomic-free zone in Latin America, Secretary Rusk said that Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone would be exempted, but that possibly we might have to accept a ban on the storage of nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone. Conceivably, the proposal would hinder the transit by air of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs were very cool toward the proposal of a Latin American atomic-free zone, but, personally, he favored the idea if it was conditioned on the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

General Taylor said the Chiefs had no formal position on the proposal, but they were very sceptical as to its efficacy. He felt that discussion of this proposal would divert attention from the Soviet missile program. He was also concerned about its effect on the defense of Panama and on our submarine defense system. He added that, if, as a result, a proposal was made for an atomic-free zone in Africa, the French would have real problems in connection with their weapons testing program. Secretary Rusk said this last point could be met by telling the French they could use our nuclear weapons test sites if their African sites were put off bounds.

Mr. Sorensen pointed out that if the OAS would support the atomic-free zone proposal, Cuba would be in violation and action could be taken to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba.

Secretary Rusk felt that it was better for us not to participate in such action as would be necessary if it were done by an organization, i.e. the OAS, to which we belong.

The President noted that the plan proposed by Brazil not only calls for an atomic-free zone in Latin America,/3/ but it also encompasses a guarantee of the territorial integrity on all Latin American States. He asked whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba. Secretary Rusk commented that we are committed not to invade Cuba, having signed the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

/3/This proposal was first made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly by the Brazilian Representative on September 20. It was subsequently submitted to the First Committee as draft resolution A/C.1/L/312.

Secretary Rusk read a draft cable which he wished to send to the Brazilian Ambassador in Cuba outlining an approach to Castro,/4/ with a view to persuading him to break with the Russians. In commenting on the draft cable, Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of getting Soviet missiles out urgently.

/4/The draft has not been identified, but see Document 81.

Mr. McCone expressed his dislike of a situation involving continued control of Cuba by Castro. Even if the Soviet missiles are removed, Castro, if he is left in control, will be in an excellent position to undertake the Communization of Latin America.

Secretary Rusk said the present position is that Cuba ties to the USSR are not negotiable. Mr. Bundy pointed out, and the President agreed, that our objective was to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President said work on the missile sites has to cease and we have to verify what is going on at the sites every day during the talks in New York. As to the message to Castro, he agreed in general, but wanted to have another look at it. He doubted that it would do any good, but it might be undertaken if done now with the greatest urgency.

Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiations now under way with U Thant and the longer talks which would follow if agreement can be reached with the Russians in New York. He said the immediate talks were aimed at getting a 24-48-hour standstill on the missile buildup in Cuba. He acknowledged that in these talks it would be impossible to obtain an agreement to make the weapons inoperable. He wanted to know whether he should seek a standstill on all Soviet arms or only offensive weapons. He would seek to get a commitment that there be no further construction, but it would not be possible to set up a system to ensure that the weapons were made inoperable and kept inoperable. In addition, he needed to know whether in return we would be prepared to suspend the quarantine.

Ambassador Stevenson said the aim of the longer term talks would be the withdrawal from this hemisphere of the strategic missiles and the dismantlement of existing sites. He predicted that the Russians would ask us for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey.

Mr. McCone disagreed with Ambassador Stevenson's linking of Soviet missiles in Cuba to U.S. missiles in Turkey. He said the Soviet weapons in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap in continuing to carry out our commitments to the free world. He urged that we do not drop the quarantine until the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba. He believed that we must keep up the momentum so far achieved by the quarantine.

The President said we will get the Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons. He said our objective should be to prevent further military shipments, further construction at missile sites, and to get some means of inspection.

Mr. McCone urged that any inspectors sent to Cuba be U.S. inspectors knowledgeable about strategic missiles.

The President said he understood Ambassador Stevenson to be asking for time during which he would try to negotiate the withdrawal of the missiles.

Secretary Rusk doubted that we could get any pre-conditions to negotiation.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the Soviets could not back down merely in return for dropping the quarantine.

Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of obtaining a guarantee that the nuclear missiles would be disassembled from their launchers.

Mr. Bundy said negotiations for a standstill or a standdown were not enough for our security because we must press, in addition, for guaranteed inspection of Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said we could not negotiate for two weeks under the missile threat which now exists in Cuba.

The President noted that there appeared to be little support for Ambassador Stevenson's plan. If the quarantine would not result in the Soviets withdrawing the missiles, what will we do if negotiations break down?

Mr. Bundy said when the interim 24-48-hour talks fail, then our choice would be to expand the blockade or remove the missiles by air attack.

General Taylor urged that we increase our reconnaissance activity in order to keep informed as to what was happening in Cuba.

The President decided to delay night reconnaissance missions, at least until the Soviets turn down U Thant's proposal. He also agreed that we should announce publicly that construction work at the missile sites in Cuba was going on and that, therefore, we will continue our aerial reconnaissance flights. The President also wanted attention called by a White House spokesman to his earlier speech which insisted that work at the missile sites in Cuba cease. The President decided that a presentation of the current situation should be made to the Congressional Leaders.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

80. Memorandum From ABC Correspondent John Scali to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Elite-Psalm Documents. Confidential; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Ball, and Thompson. The source text bears the handwritten notation "Secretary has in hand." For Hilsman's account of drafting of this memorandum and his subsequent discussion with Rusk see To Move a Nation, pp. 217-218. Printed in part in Pierre Salinger, With Kennnedy, p. 274.

Alexander S. Fomin, Sov Emby Counselor, at lunch which he sought urgently, asks if State would be interested in settlement of Cuban crisis along these lines:

Bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for US pledge not to invade Cuba.

I said I didn't know but that perhaps this is something that could be talked about. He said if Stevenson pursued this line, Zorin would be interested. Asked that I check with State and let him know. He gave me his home telephone number so I could call him tonight, if necessary.

Fomin claimed that Cuban delegate to UN during Security Council debate asked for such no-invasion assurances in return for dismantling but that he got no reply. I told him I'd followed the UN debate very carefully but could not recall any such remarks on Cuban's part.

Fomin also said Russia had been forced "to make some concessions" to Communist China in order to convince them to stop the fighting against India. He declined to say what under my questioning. But he recalled they hadn't helped the ChiComs with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons in the past, even tanks, and hinted it might be aid in the conventional field.

Scali/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Washington, October 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2662. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin, cleared with U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk.

1055. Ambassador from Secretary. We believe time has come for representative friendly country to discuss with Castro alone predicament in which Soviet actions have placed him. We also believe Brazilian Ambassador in Havana is best person to do this and therefore wish you to see Hermes Lima as soon as possible to secure his agreement to instruction to their Ambassador along following lines. This approach to Castro should be handled in such way as make absolutely clear to Castro it is solely Brazilian initiative. Naturally we would hope matter could be handled by Brazilians with greatest discretion. In this connection we feel strongly that need for complete secrecy between FM and Ambassador in Havana only, and absolute accuracy, is so great that the instructions should be taken to Havana by special courier in special airplane as soon as possible (FYI. Important should not be any Brazilian cables referring this subject. End FYI.) Report reaction niact.

Would wish instructions to Ambassador Luis Batian Pinto to read substantially as follows:

1. The world now knows without any question and in great detail the nature and size of the buildup of Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. There can be no valid question in anyone's mind on this point.

2. The action of the Soviet Union in using Cuban soil as sites for offensive nuclear missiles capable of striking most of the Western Hemisphere has placed the future of the Castro regime and the well-being of the Cuban people in great jeopardy.

3. The countries of the Inter-American System have unanimously called for their removal and approved and are participating in the meas-ures being taken to eliminate this Soviet threat to all of them.

4. The Soviet Union is turning around its cargo ships in face of US quarantine which the countries of hemisphere have authorized. Not only is the Soviet Union failing to support Cuba on this matter, but numerous feelers have been put out by high Soviet officials to allied governments for exchanges of their position in Cuba for concessions by the NATO countries in other parts of the world. Thus you are not only being used for purposes of no interest to any Cuban, but deserted and threatened by betrayal.

5. It is also well known that work is proceeding rapidly to complete and make operational the offensive nuclear missile installations and to assemble the IL-28 bombers. The threatened countries clearly cannot sit still while the threat against them is being increased in this fashion. Further steps will have to be taken against Cuba and very soon.

6. Castro might recall that President Kennedy has said publicly that only two issues were nonnegotiable between Castro and the US--the military-political ties to the USSR and the aggressive attitude toward the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. This view will be shared by other members of the Inter-American System. Of course this now means giving up the offensive nuclear capability being established in Cuba and sending home Soviet military personnel, on which help can certainly be given if needed. From such actions many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the US, could flow.

7. Time is very short for Cuba and for Castro to decide whether to devote his great leadership abilities to the service of his Cuban peoples or to serving as a Soviet pawn in their desperately risky struggle for world domination by force and threat of force.

8. If Castro tries to rationalize the presence of these missiles as due to Cuban fear of a US invasion, Ambassador Batian should reply that he is confident that the OAS would not accept an invasion of Cuba once the missiles were removed and that the US would not risk upsetting hemispheric solidarity by invading a Cuba clearly committed to a peaceful course.

Rusk

82. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 26, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting is from McCone's account, which is reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 319-321.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 26 October 1962

PRESENT

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey; Mr. Wilson

1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably-increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get CIA into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time.

3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizable number of Cubans could be trained quickly.

4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level.

5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with Mongoose affairs.

6. Mr. McNamara thought that Mongoose in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion.

7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

a. CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery.

b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

c. General Lansdale should develop further plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning.

d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all Mongoose activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

Thomas A. Parrott/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 26, 1962, 5:16 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland and cleared in draft by Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, Chayes, Martin, McCloy, Stevenson, and Nitze. Repeated to Moscow.

1105. For Stevenson. Subject: Cuba: Talks with Acting Secretary General U Thant.

At beginning of first meeting with SYG you should take occasion restate basic US position that early removal nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba is the essence of the matter. We understand that the Secretary General is proposing first a discussion of some form of standstill or freeze (covering arms shipments to Cuba, the build up of offensive weapons in Cuba, and our quarantine action), to be followed by broader talks on peaceful settlement of the larger issue created by Soviet introduction of missiles and other offensive weapons into an island just off our shores.

While we are willing to handle matter in two stages, we would emphasize at the start that the build up must stop, and the weapons must be removed before too long and that these things must be done under inspection arrangements that insure against secrecy and cheating. We would emphasize further that the OAS quarantine action will not be lifted until the threat which provoked it is removed.

Within this framework of policy, following is for your guidance in early discussions with SYG and Soviet delegates.

1. We understand procedural state of affairs to be as follows:

a. Security Council has adjourned sine die and all efforts will be focused for next two or three days on US-USSR discussions through or with Thant.

b. Both U.S. and USSR (not at this stage Cuba) have agreed to meet with Thant for discussion "modalities".

c. What SYG calls discussion of "modalities" is not an attempt to solve basic problem (which from our standpoint is removal of offensive weapons from Cuba) at one stroke, but must at least attempt to achieve a condition which would involve (i) no more offensive arms being delivered to Cuba, (ii) no further build-up of missile sites or bomber facilities, and (iii) any existing Cuban nuclear strike capability being kept inoperable.

d. Achievement of such a standstill will require a substantial administrative effort by SYG with assistance of a number of countries, to put UN in position to guarantee that standstill would be effective while negotiations designed to remove threat to Western Hemisphere could be brought to a conclusion.

2. The problem of "modalities" divides naturally into two parts, (a) UN control of shipments to Cuba and (b) UN observation of Cuban compliance with suspension of further build-up with safeguards to ensure inoperability of any nuclear strike capacity.

3. Control of Shipments to Cuba:

a. FYI. The US Fleet would remain approximately as deployed at the present time. US Naval Force would maintain surveillance to discover any attempt to off-load or trans-ship at locations other than designated UN ports. Responsible US Fleet Commander in the area would report any violation he might observe to Washington which would bring violation to attention of SYG or head of UN observation operation. It would have to be understood by SYG from the outset that US surveillance continues and latent force is in background. End FYI.

b. All Cuba-bound ships would be required to enter Cuba at ports designated by the UN. On present basis, sea traffic to Cuba consists of one or two ships arriving per day.

c. UN inspectors would be stationed at those ports in adequate numbers. With necessary cooperation Cuban authorities they would inspect arriving ships of all nationalities to verify the presence or the absence of any arms as defined by SYG. FYI. A list of "prohibited material" presently included in Presidential Proclamation and supplementary orders under it will be provided for your guidance in discussing this point. End FYI. These UN inspectors would be given full access to all such ships.

4. UN observers would be stationed in the main military and civilian airfields in Cuba. Their mission would be to:

a. examine incoming cargo shipments to verify presence or absence of offensive weapons or components thereof, and

b. assure grounding of bomber aircraft.

5. Observers would be stationed in adequate numbers to ensure no further construction or improvements of MRBM or IRBM sites, and to ensure that any existing missiles are kept inoperable.

6. FYI. Preliminary Department of Defense estimates would require close to 500 persons for the three tasks identified in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. End FYI.

7. Inspectors to be provided under this procedure must be of such technical competence as to insure that they are able in fact to identify items of offensive military equipment, and to carry out control functions at airports and missile sites. FYI. Not only must inspectors be physically placed to observe what is there, they must also have the authority to observe separation of components of the missile system to ensure that the missiles are inoperable. End FYI. While many of the personnel would in practice be performing administrative functions, several dozen well-trained technical people would be required and number of countries from which they could come is limited.

Dependable first-rate personnel for this operation will be essential, and US should have a strong voice in their selection. Advance preparation of technical teams would include examination of US advice as to where to go and what to look for. Full and free access for UN teams throughout island should be assured. FYI. Quality and political reliability of inspectors would be key to any inspection system. Likelihood that Soviets will permit real inspection their site is so remote that it would be unwise to concede on quality and reliability in return for paper agreement on access to site. End FYI.

8. Violations or suspected violations of agreed arrangements observed by that UN observer team will be immediately notified to the SYG, and would be passed by him to the parties concerned. "All's well" reports should be made around the clock at frequent intervals (every 2 hours); the absence of such reports would be a signal for immediate surveillance of the site by the United States. The US will, of course, retain the right to reactivate quarantine measures or take other necessary action if agreed arrangements are violated.

9. Legal and parliamentary status in the United Nations of arrangements agreed between the parties directly concerned can only be worked out when it is possible to see what kind of a UN operation would be involved. Security Council action would probably be useful at least to place at SYG's disposal the resources he would require for any substantial UN operation.

10. FYI. During talks on standstill arrangements we do not think it would be useful to start process of bargaining on such wider issues, or on possible terms of final peaceful settlement. End FYI.

Rusk

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba Security, Khrushchev Correspondence. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. Relayed to the White House. The original Russian language text, which bears no classification, is ibid. Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 640-643. The source text is a translation done at the Embassy in Moscow, which received the letter at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time. The first section arrived in the Department of State at 6 p.m. and the last at 9 p.m. A "formal" translation, done by the Language Services Division of the Department of State, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

1101. Policy. Embassy translation follows of letter from Khrushchev to President delivered to Embassy by messenger 4:43 p.m. Moscow time October 26, under cover of letter from Gromyko to me.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25./1/ From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I value this.

/1/See Document 68.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would think that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, Communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with US, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world/2/ understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

/2/Garble in the source text. It was subsequently corrected to read "not without an".

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your arguments regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different definitions for these or those military means, indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue now, it is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this, but I say to you: You, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one advance, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction, but one cannot advance with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can advance, without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can advance upon you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to advance thus. I say precisely advance, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful endeavor. We quarrel with you, we have differences in ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes) are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interest in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted--and we are ready to enter such negotiations--and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact--I spoke about it in Vienna--that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the United States which have no contentions between them, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country, we were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US Expeditionary Corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present Government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hand over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet Government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ N. Khrushchev

October 26, 1962. End text.

Original of letter being air pouched today under transmittal slip to Executive Secretariat.

Kohler

85. Editorial Note

According to a 4-page paper in the Sorensen papers at the Kennedy Library, ABC Correspondent John Scali met with Soviet Counselor Alexandr Fomin at 7:45 p.m. on October 26, 1962, and made the following statement:

"I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. My definite impression is that time is very urgent and time is very short."

The paper went on to note that Fomin asked several times if this message came from high sources and Scali replied that it came from very high places. The Soviet Counselor then inquired if it would be possible to have U.N. inspectors also check U.S. bases in Florida and surrounding Caribbean countries. Scali replied that he had no official information on this possibility, but stated that "he felt it would raise a terrible complication for President Kennedy in a period when time was of the essence." Fomin, who left the meeting in haste, said the information would be communicated simultaneously to the highest Soviet sources and to the Soviet U.N. Representative in New York. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers Classified Subject Files, Cuba--Subjects) For a similar account including some of the details of the discussion and drafting of the statement, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pages 217-219. For a memorandum by Scali on this second meeting and reports on similar conversations during the next 3 days, see Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy, pages 274-279.

86. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 8:19 p.m.

1484. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton met at 4:30 pm at Secretariat with SYG, Loutfi, Narasimhan and Rikhye.

1. We pointed out that the real essence of the problem was to get the missiles and the nuclear aircraft out of Cuba.

2. Immediate problems were:

(A) No further weapons or materiel should be introduced;

(B) There should be no further work on the sites;

(C) The missiles presently in Cuba should be inoperable; and

(D) The suspension of the quarantine.

3. As to shipping, if it were agreed that no bloc ships or bloc-chartered ships were to approach Cuba, the only remaining problem would be the inspection of other ships.

4. This inspection could take place at the ports of embarkation, on the assumption that the ship was not calling at a bloc port, or at the landing ports. Rikhye pointed out that ships declare cargoes at landing ports, which should simplify inspection.

5. We stated that US Fleet would continue to be deployed during interim period, not for purpose of interception but to ensure that there was no trans-shipment at sea or landing at uninspected ports. US Fleet would report any violation to the SYG.

6. It was agreed that the problem of inspection would be quite simple if bloc lived up to Khrushchev agreement to keep bloc shipping away from Cuba.

7. We next raised question of inspection of incoming aircraft at airfields. It was pointed out that few aircraft come in from the bloc, and that the principal problem might relate to incoming cargo planes from other countries.

8. We then raised question of ensuring that IL 28's would be inoperable. Rikhye thought that UN presence might be sufficient check. We pointed out that they were located at a strictly military field, which had previously been closed up. Rikhye agreed it might be practicable to close it up again.

9. As to sites, we said that construction was progressing rapidly through yesterday, and that heavy camouflaging of the sites was being attempted. We pointed out this was vitally important and urgent problem, which required UN inspectors and constant reports by them.

10. SYG said he would send appeal to Castro tonight through Inchaustegui (Cuba) to suspend construction of the sites, and would also speak to Zorin about it.

11. As regards the ultimate dismantling of the sites, SYG said he would insist on a UN team to oversee compliance.

12. We stated that non-operability of existing missiles was a difficult problem which it was essential to deal with. Problem related primarily to medium-range missiles since IRBM missile sites were not yet ready and would not be for some time.

13. We discussed possibility of separating the missiles from the launchers as a guarantee of non-operability. If missiles close to launchers, only a few hours are required for firing, and we must have guarantee against surprise launching.

14. Rikhye said he was sure Soviets would not permit inspectors to look at such equipment. He asked whether UN presence might not give assurance that there would be no attack. Our aerial surveillance was also mentioned as a possible deterrent and a possible Soviet and Cuban guarantee of no attack.

15. We pointed out that problem of crucial importance since the Soviet nuclear striking capacity was estimated to be increased 20 per cent by Cuban installations.

16. SYG again raised question of solving whole problem through assurance by US that it would not attack Cuba and would prevent others from doing so, with resulting dismantling of all Soviet installations, and reiterated that this should be a starting point. He suggested the possibility of the President's writing him a letter to the effect that the US willing to make such a guarantee, if offensive weapons withdrawn, which he would use in negotiations.

17. We pointed out that the OAS would have to be consulted in any such connection, which the SYG said he understood. We also referred to problem of what LA states considered Cuban indirect aggression against them.

18. As regards UN inspection teams in Cuba, SYG said it would be much easier to get Cuba to agree if there were some reciprocity for face-saving purposes, such as UN inspection of Cuban refugee camps to prove no military training, and to ascertain that no evidence of preparations for any invasion of Cuba.

19. With reference to the constitution of the UN inspection teams, we pointed out that they must include sophisticated experts who understand enough of missiles to know what to look for. We pointed out that US ought to be able to designate or nominate people for the team.

20. SYG said it would be difficult to include nationals of US and USSR, and that he was sure that teams would have to be composed of neutrals. It was pointed out that many neutral countries now know quite a bit about missiles as a result of Geneva conferences.

21. It was agreed that the US could brief the teams ahead of time to show them what to look for. Rikhye said that he would be glad to get together with a US expert on missile matters to discuss the inspection problem as related to missiles. Comment: Suggest such expert be sent to New York immediately.

22. As regards publication of SYG's recent letters to and from President and to and from Khrushchev, SYG asked Zorin as to publication. Zorin said he had no instructions and would ask for them. Until agreement to publish was received from Soviet, SYG said publication of such letters should be withheld.

23. General atmosphere was quite relaxed and friendly. SYG much less concerned with blockade than at earlier meeting with Yost and Plimpton,/1/ and seemed much more aware of site construction and missile operability problems and need for inspection. He clearly putting principal emphasis in his mind on possibility of US guarantee to Cuba as short-circuit solution of whole problem.

/1/The Mission to the United Nations had reported on this conversation at 11:30 a.m. in telegram 1479 from New York, transmitted at 4 p.m. (Ibid.) Since Stevenson was still in Washington, Yost and Plimpton had represented the U.S. side. The discussion generally proceeded along the lines above.

Stevenson

87. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. For Macmillan's record of this conversation, see At the End of the Day, pp. 209-212.

President: Hello, Prime Minister.

PM: Hello, what's the news now?

President: Well, Governor Stevenson saw U Thant this afternoon/1/ and made our proposals about the importation of arms ceasing, and that work on these bases stopping and leading to eventual dismemberment. There are some reports around, some Russian conversations, but it's rather unofficial and unreliable, about some thought that it's possible they might do something about withdrawing the weapons if they could get a territorial guarantee of Cuba. But that is so unofficial that I'm not in a position now to know whether there's anything to it or not. Khrushchev told U Thant that he would keep his ships out of there for the time being, but he wouldn't do it very long. He isn't giving us very much because actually he's got no ships in the area anyway. But at least he's made that announcement; he's keeping his ships out of there for the time being. We are continuing the quarantine. The build-up of the sites continues, however. And I put a statement out this afternoon describing how the build-up is going on, so that unless in the next 48 hours we get some political suggestions as to dismantling the base we're then going to be faced with a problem of what to do about this build-up./2/

/1/See Document 86.

/2/For text of this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 812.

PM: (garbled) Well as I see it--one idea you just mentioned is that Cuba might be made like Belgium was--an international guarantee of inviolable country which all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability independently. Is that a possibility?

President: Well, that is a matter that it seems to me we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next 24 hours--as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. That would leave Castro in power. It would leave the Russians perhaps free to ship in a good deal more of defensive equipment and they have shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armored vehicles, with very sophisticated conventional equipment, and so on. But it may be a possibility, but I could probably give you more information about that by tomorrow night. But at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet.

PM: Yes, well all right. Well, another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with the team and insure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion.

President: Yes, that is correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations. That's correct.

PM: (garbled) I am quite sure that U Thant would have done such a thing. (more garbled) He might suggest to the UN that he would go . . . with a team of experts which would supervise the matter during the talks.

President: Yes, there's some suggestion of that. Also they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida and Nicaragua, Guatemala and Swan Island. That came up in the conversation with the Governor. I am looking into it. I don't think we've got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect. But this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the Governor's conversation. So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to, and whether the Russians are interested in it or not. We will know a little more, I think, by tomorrow afternoon. In the meanwhile the quarantine stays; he doesn't send ships in; we let a ship pass this afternoon, but there are no other ships within 48 hours or so, so we don't expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued build-up, and I issued a statement on that today. I think I could probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals than U Thant's conversation with Stevenson. I'll send you a report on that tonight and then you will have it in the morning.

PM: If we want to save face, would it be worthwhile our undertaking to keep open eyes on all exiles which are here in England during the same period, during the conference.

President: Let me put that into the machinery and then I will be in touch with you on that.

PM: (unintelligible)

President: Good, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the Department. I think we don't want to have too many dismantlings, but it's possible that that proposal might help. They might also insist on Turkey and Italy, but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that that may be advantageous.

PM: (garbled)

President: Yes, that is correct. I will let Stevenson know that and he will have that in mind in the conversation.

PM: That's correct. You will send your message tomorrow and we will continue this tomorrow.

President: That's correct. I think we just have to wait until we fully analyze this conversation. I haven't seen the entire conversation, but I think that there may--and the prospect of a trade of these missiles and some guarantees of Cuba is still so vague that I am not really in a position to say that there is any possibility as yet. Maybe by tomorrow evening at this time we'll know better.

PM: Yes, but of course at this stage any movement by you may produce a result in Berlin which will be . . . (garbled) . . . that's the danger now . . .

President: Well, we're not going to have any problem at sea because he is keeping his ships out of there, and as I say we let one ship pass today for the very reason that you've named. On the other hand, if in the end of 48 hours we are getting no place and the missile sites continue to be constructed, then we are going to be faced with some hard decisions.

PM: (a garbled reference to Berlin)

President: That's correct, and that is really why we have not done more than we have done up until now. But of course on the other hand if the missile sites continue and get constructed and we don't do anything about it, then I would suppose that it would have quite an effect on Berlin anyway.

PM: Yes . . . (garble) I will send you a message concerning them and you will send me U Thant's conversation.

President: Yes, I'll send you a memorandum based on the copy of the conversation that Stevenson had with U Thant. I will also keep in touch with you tomorrow at this time if you--or otherwise I'll send you a message tomorrow. Maybe I'll send you a message unless we have got something immediate; and No. 3, we will not take any further action until I have talked to you in any case. I won't bother to call you tomorrow, because I may be down--I may be away from here tomorrow evening, and I assume you may be too. But I will send you a message if there is anything new, and in any case I will talk to you on the phone before we do anything of a drastic nature.

PM: . . . thank you. . . . (garble)

President: Prime Minister, I'm going to send you a note tonight or tomorrow morning about asking if it's agreeable with you if General Norstad stay on until January 1st, that there be an overlap with Lemnitzer's tour of duty; that Lemnitzer go over there and take over the American forces and be there and have that 60-day period to be sort of adjusted to his new responsibilities. You'll be getting a formal letter, and I didn't want to say anything about it because we haven't been in touch with General de Gaulle as yet, who is very sensitive in these NATO matters. But I will be in touch with you and I would assume probably that that suggestion would be agreeable to you?

PM: It is indeed very sensible. . . .

President: Good. Well, I'll be in touch in a formal way with you tomorrow on that matter and I'll send you tonight the memorandum on the U Thant conversation--and I hope all goes well.

PM: Thank you very much (garble)

President: Good, fine, Prime Minister, and I'll be in touch with you very shortly. Thank you and good night.

PM: Good night.

88. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

SUBJECT

Report Number Three of the Planning Subcommittee/1/

/1/Reports number one and two (ibid.) are included in the Supplement.

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Friday morning, October 26, 1962.

2. It was agreed that, unless the U Thant initiative led to prompt negotiations, the three major requirements were:

a. To maintain diplomatic and public focus on the continued exist-ence and expansion of offensive installations in Cuba;

b. To increase the degree of our pressure and to build anxiety in all quarters that more decisive action will be required of the U.S. to eliminate the offensive installations; and

c. To maintain a diplomatic track which holds open the possibility of a peaceful resolution on terms consistent with the President's speech.

3. The planning process was brought into focus around the following major problems:

a. An operational and political scenario for the extension of the blockade to POL. (ARA, Mr. Hurwitch)

b. Operational and political track involving progressively increased pressure building up to an airstrike against missile installations. (Amb. Thompson; Messrs. Rowen and Kitchen)

c. A consolidated negotiating track. (EUR, NEA, S/P)

d. Assessment and recommendations concerning possibilities and dangers in Cuban political situation. (ARA)

e. Regular daily reassessment of Soviet intentions and appropriate posture for U.S. (S/P, Mr. Harvey)

f. Assessment of Free World political position vis-a-vis the crisis, with recommendations for U.S. action. (Mr. Jorden, USIA, and appropriate State Department bureaus)

g. Post-crisis Cuba: conditions of coexistence with Hemisphere. (ARA)

4. The planning tasks listed in Report Number Two are either going forward or will be consolidated into the tasks listed above.

89. Memorandum Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 26, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WW Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is attached to an undated memorandum of transmittal to the President and to an October 26 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, which states that it was prepared in response to a "direct request" from Bundy on October 24.

SUBJECT

Negotiation

1. Background. The optimum setting for US-Soviet negotiations, particularly at the Summit, would be one in which Soviet offensive weapons had already been removed from Cuba. This may not be feasible. If so, the question of how to undertake negotiations with the Soviets will present itself against the background of either:

(a) Soviet acceptance of some proposal involving cessation of Soviet site construction and perhaps of Soviet shipping to Cuba; or

(b) ascending US economic and military pressures on Cuba.

These two alternatives are not wholly mutually exclusive. The actual situation may include both some diplomatic progress and some increased US pressure.

2. Basic Strategy. Our purpose, in negotiations, should be:

(a) To afford the Soviets face-saving cover, if they wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba.

(b) To pave the way, if the negotiations fail, for expanded US economic or military action to remove the weapons.

(c) To use the crisis to reach agreement on other measures that would, in any case, be in our interest.

3. Allied Interests. In pursuing these purposes:

(a) We must have full and intimate consultation with our allies.

(b) It is essential to avoid any implication that we are trading off pre-crisis allied or US interests to secure removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba.

Failure on either of these fronts could undermine the Alliance.

4. Level. The best way to attain the purposes in para 2 may be through a Summit meeting. At this level, it may be easier to widen the scope of the negotiations in such a way as to resolve the crisis without an obvious and humiliating Soviet backdown. Other levels and forums are also available, however, the situation may well develop so as to make these alternatives more feasible and useful.

5. Prior Action. Before any negotiation opens, we should take two actions to help set the stage:

(a) Assuming that negotiations take place before the Cuban issue is settled, we should make clear that, if negotiations do not succeed, we will take early action to remove Soviet offensive weapons.

(b) We should seek an immediate allied decision in principle to set up the small pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral seaborne force (Italians, Turks, Greeks, US, and perhaps Canadians) proposed by Ambassador Finletter in Polto 506,/1/ and we should make clear our intent to provide interim coverage with Polaris and other external forces. We should then urge the Turkish and Italian governments to get quietly on the NAC record what we would take to be their intent, in any event, in this circumstance, i.e., to phase out IRBM's in view of both the prospect of a Southern Command force and the interim Polaris and other US coverage.

/1/Document 75.

6. Negotiations. We should make crystal clear, in negotiations, the sharp division between Cuba and other subjects on which we would wish to negotiate regardless of whether there was a Cuban crisis. In negotiations about Cuba, we should demand early agreement on removal of Soviet offensive weapons, possibly in the context of a Latin American (and, if necessary, African) "nuclear free" zone, in return for the end of the quarantine. In respect of other subjects, some of which could be dealt with rapidly and simultaneously with Cuba and some of which would take longer, we might try to do business as follows:

(a) Arms Control.

(i) US and Soviet non-diffusion declarations;

(ii) US and Soviet declarations of intent not to facilitate procurement of MRBM's for land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR. (The US would only enter into such an exchange of declarations after full allied consultations, and would base its declaration on the previously stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procurement for multilateral sea-based force.)

(iii) Safeguards against miscalculations, e.g., exchange of US and Soviet military observation teams, direct communication facilities between US and Soviet national command centers, etc.

(iv) Review of key differences of approach in the Geneva Disarmament and Test Ban negotiations, to determine whether any useful new directive can be given to the US and Soviet negotiators.

(b) Berlin. We would make clear that the troop issue was non-negotiable, but that we were prepared to reach a "Solution C" type agreement, which did not purport to be a final Berlin settlement but which put the matter on ice and allowed East Germans to substitute for the Soviets in access functions. This could be dressed up in various ways--UN observer, no nuclear arms in Berlin, etc.--for face-saving purposes. If the Soviets were interested, this matter could be pursued further at the minister level with other interested parties.

(c) Germany. We might suggest to the Soviets that feasible aspects of the German question--mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers--might be pursued further at the foreign minister level with other interested parties.

(d) Future Summitry. It might be agreed that the heads of the UK and French governments would be invited to meet in a future quadripartite Summit, to review any work done at the foreign minister level in the meantime on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere than the present crisis.

7. Action. If this general course of action commends itself, we should:

(a) move immediately to consultation with our allies;

(b) then move to negotiations with the Soviets, preferably at the highest level.

Speed is of the essence, since passage of time may make less credible our resolve soon to take action to remove Soviet offensive weapons if negotiations fail.

90. Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A Record of Action of this meeting is in the Supplement. McCone's 2 pages of handwritten notes for the meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 331-332. Tape recording transcripts of this meeting are in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Records, No. 41.1 and 41a.1. For two other accounts of this and other meetings on October 27, see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 93 ff. and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 712-716.

Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum./1/

/1/A summary of this memorandum, SC No. 08184/62, is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 328-329. See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the Graznyy, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles. If we asked her to stop and she did, we would inspect the cargo for contraband and release her if, as expected, she had no prohibited material aboard. If she refuses to stop, we would stop her by force and sink her if the cargo included prohibited material.

Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone.

The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown--Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Department to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to prepare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented.

The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries.

Under Secretary Ball reported that the Turks would be very difficult about withdrawal of their strategic missiles, but the Italians would be easier to persuade if we chose to withdraw Jupiters from Italy.

At this point in the meeting the partial text of a Soviet public statement was read by the President as it was received in the room./2/ The President commented that the statement was a very tough position and varied considerably from the tone of Khrushchev's personal letter to the President received last night./3/ The President felt that the Soviet position would get wide support and said we should consider making public the Khrushchev private letter.

/2/Document 91.

/3/Document 84.

Secretary Rusk returned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey and pointed out that this subject must be kept separate from Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Turkish missile problem should be dealt with in the context of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bundy said we could not accept the Soviet proposal on Turkish missiles because the Soviet missiles were not out of Cuba.

The President recalled that he had asked that consideration be given to the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey some days previously.

Under Secretary Ball replied that the Department had decided it could not raise this question with the Turks at this time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction. He said the question had been raised with Finletter in Paris and study was being given to whether any method could be worked out to reassure the Turks if we were going to offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.

Mr. Bundy said we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally, i.e. Turkey, to serve our own interests, i.e. getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President commented that the Russians had made the Turkish missile withdrawal proposal in the most difficult possible way. Now that their proposal is public, we have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles, which, for a long time, we have considered to be obsolete.

Secretary Dillon said that it was possible that the Russians had made their public statement as part of a stalling tactic to provide them with sufficient time for a full-fledged confrontation with us.

The President read a draft statement telephoned from New York by Ambassador Stevenson commenting on the Soviet statement./4/ Ambassador Stevenson argued for releasing his statement in an effort to keep the "peace offensive" from going to the Soviets.

/4/A copy of this statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General.

The President left the meeting at this point with Mr. Sorensen. There ensued a discussion of how to handle the discrepancy between the Khrushchev private letter and the Russian offer made public in the Soviet statement. A suggestion was made that the Russian proposals contained in the private Khrushchev letter be made public.

The President returned to the meeting. He said we must ensure that the construction work on the missile sites in Cuba be stopped at once. He suggested that we talk to the Turks about the missiles, pointing out to them the great peril facing them during the next week. He acknowledged that the Turks were now in no position to make a statement to the effect that they would ask that the Jupiters be withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we tell the Turks they must say that the Jupiter problem is a NATO problem and is not associated with the Cuban missile problem.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the fact that the missiles belonged to Turkey and that only the nuclear warheads are under our total control.

The President returned to a discussion of where we now find ourselves, i.e. we now have Soviet public proposals and Khrushchev's private proposals. What we must seek is an immediate cessation of the work on offensive missiles in Cuba. Once this work stopped we could talk to the Russians.

Mr. Bundy reiterated the view that the threat to us is Cuba. One explanation for the varying Soviet proposals is that the hard line Russians wanted to make public their preferred demands in order to make impossible progress toward the Khrushchev private offer which may have been drafted by those who are less hard-nosed.

The President noted that it appeared to him that the Russians were making various proposals so fast, one after the other, that they were creating a kind of shield behind which work on the missile sites in Cuba continued. He said we had a perfectly defensible position, i.e. work on the missile sites must stop. Secretary McNamara added the thought that these offensive weapons must be made inoperable.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we tell Khrushchev privately that the position in their public statement was impossible for us, but that the position Khrushchev took in his private letter was different and we were studying these proposals. In the meantime, however, time is running out.

The President interrupted to take a telephone call from Ambassador Stevenson in New York. He resumed the discussion by saying that Khrushchev obviously is attempting to limit our freedom of action in Cuba by introducing the question of the missile bases outside this hemisphere.

Mr. Bundy read a draft press statement and Mr. Gilpatric read a statement which he had prepared./5/

/5/Neither of these drafts has been identified further.

Mr. Alexis Johnson reported that he had just been informed that the Turkish Government had issued a press statement saying that the Russian proposal with respect to Jupiters in Turkey was not conceivable.

(As the remainder of the Soviet public statement was received in the Cabinet Room, it appeared that the Russian base proposal involved not merely Turkey but all of NATO.)

Mr. Sorensen introduced a draft statement which was read by the group./6/

/6/Not found.

Revisions were made in the Gilpatric draft, which was issued shortly thereafter in the form attached./7/ This statement emphasized the offensive weapons buildup in Cuba.

/7/For text of the agreed statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 440-441.

The Attorney General said that the statement might make people think that if the Russians stopped the missile buildup in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey. He desired that we make doubly clear that Turkish NATO missiles were one problem and that Cuba was an entirely separate problem.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was crucial for us to stand on the position that we will not negotiate with the Russians while the Soviet missile threat is growing in Cuba.

The President recalled that over a year ago we wanted to get the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because they had become obsolete and of little military value. If the missiles in Cuba added 50% to Soviet nuclear capability, then to trade these missiles for those in Turkey would be of great military value. But we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the Russians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in a bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The Turks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.

The President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had been waiting for one-half hour to see him.

The discussion continued in the President's absence. It was not possible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all NATO basses or referred specifically to Turkey.

The Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position would be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans refused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in Cuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to attack the bases by air.

There was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this proposal was later abandoned.

A draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador Thompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the President's consideration later in the day./8/ The group agreed to meet at the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with the President again at 4:00 PM

/8/The draft is not found; for the letter as eventually sent see Document 95.

(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General repeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases. He preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in order to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships. He said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged that we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday./9/)

/9/October 29 or 30.

Secretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we must notify the Cubans.

Bromley Smith/10/

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

91. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, October 27, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Other copies of this letter are ibid.: Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. This "official translation" prepared by Language Services of the Department of State and an "informal translation" from the Embassy in Moscow are printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1962, pp. 646-649. A note on the source text indicates a copy was sent to Acting Secretary-General U Thant. Problems of Communism reports that this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m., the same time the Russian text was delivered to the Embassy.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant/1/ concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

/1/See Document 59.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev/2/

Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.2

92. Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 27, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

1. Daily Briefing

The situation briefing was omitted today. (Mr. Nitze was detained and Admiral Lee took the chair.)

2. U.S.-Berlin Buildup

It was agreed that Paper No. 7 revised on the date of 27 October 1962/1/ would be sent forward to the Executive Committee on Monday morning, 29 October, with the inclusion of a statement indicating that a supporting study is being prepared which assesses the economic implications for the budget and the balance of payments. This study will be provided by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the DOD Comptroller's office. (Action: Admiral Lee.)

/1/For text of this paper, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 401-402.

3. Consultation with Allies

The subject was discussed at length. Mr. Schaetzel stressed the dilemma involved in trying to keep the Allies sufficiently informed to carry them with us while at the same time guarding the security of our deliberations and decisions. He pointed out that it would be highly desirable for the Allies to be kept abreast of the developing situation through official U.S. channels rather than through the press. Proposals were made to have Mr. Thompson and Mr. Nitze give regular briefings to the quadripartite Ambassadors; to have a cable based on these briefings sent to Mr. Finletter for briefing the NAC a few hours later; and to have the Finletter cable used by Defense for briefing the Standing Group and Military Committee. Mr. Schaetzel will have a paper on Monday setting forth this proposal in detail. General Twitchell was asked to put in a paper at the same time on the possibility of supplying screened operational information. Mr. Schaetzel will also look into the question of making similar periodic reports to other nations through our embassies. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel and General Twitchell.)

4. Base Trade-Off

The subject was discussed and while no firm and formal judgments were reached the sense of the group was that the door should be closed as quickly as possible on the idea of trading the U.S. position in Turkey for the Soviet position in Cuba. In connection with the nervousness of the Turks on this score, it was proposed that a special envoy, possibly Mr. Livingston Merchant, should be sent to Ankara to consult with the Turkish government and keep them informed of developments in this area.

5. Khrushchev Letter

(Mr. Nitze joined the meeting at this point.) Mr. Nitze summarized the contents of the letter sent by Khrushchev last night/2/ to the President and also referred to a subsequent TASS release which linked the Cuban missiles with those in Turkey./3/ Mr. Nitze read a draft of a proposed reply/4/ and there was a brief discussion with particular emphasis on its final paragraph which referred to the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. The sense of the group regarding the need to keep Turkish bases from being linked in any way with the Cuban situation was conveyed to Mr. Nitze.

/2/See Document 84.

/3/See the source note, Document 91.

/4/Not found.

6. Administrative

There will be no meeting on Sunday, October 28, except at the call of the chair. Future meetings will be scheduled to begin at 11:30.

93. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 27, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 2:06 p.m.

1494. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton had conference with SYG alone at 11:45 this morning.

1. We showed SYG Khrushchev's message of last night to the President,/1/ pointing out that it contained no reference to Turkey. We also pointed out it in effect conceded existence in Cuba of complete nuclear missile capability. SYG had just seen Reuter despatch regarding Khrushchev's public statement regarding Turkey./2/

/1/See Document 84.

/2/See the source note, Document 91.

2. We pointed out that effect of Khrushchev's Turkey proposal was that, as the result of his own clandestine nuclear intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, he gets a guarantee of Cuban integrity and the removal of the Turkey base, whereas all we get is removal of intrusion which he should not have made anyway.

3. We also pointed out that the Turkey base is not for the defense of Turkey but for the defense of Europe and is part of the whole NATO defensive structure. The removal of that base would upset the European balance of power.

4. We pointed out that these were informal observations and that we had no positive instructions from Washington.

5. We said the Turkish base might be a proper subject for discussion covering various aspects of the overall disarmament and European situations after the status quo had been restored, and that such restoration requires removal of weapons from Cuba.

6. Since all NATO partners involved in Turkey base any negotiations as to its removal would require a great deal of time whereas removal of nuclear weapons from Cuba was an immediate essential.

7. We said it seemed highly probable that the Cuban issue could be very promptly settled on the basis of Khrushchev's first letter, namely, on basis of immediate withdrawal of nuclear weapons as against US guarantee as to territorial integrity and political independence of Cuba, and we urged SYG to press for such immediate solution and for confining all discussions to Cuba and the exclusion of the Turkish base problem.

8. SYG said he would keep these points in mind, but that he did not wish to make any remarks on substance of the matter.

9. He said he hoped the President's reply to Khrushchev would be cooperative and conciliatory in tone, as the SYG does not want the American image tarnished by any public impression that Khrushchev is reasonable and the US not, and that the reply would evidence willingness to negotiate.

10. SYG mentioned the great concern all over world as to seriousness of situation. He said he had received 620 telegrams, most from US, as to his proposals, only 5 of which were negative.

11. SYG said he had urged both Castro and Zorin to have work on sites stopped immediately. Cuban Rep had said he would communicate SYG's request to his govt. Zorin had turned request aside asking how anyone could rely on US intelligence.

12. SYG also said that as to inspection of ship cargoes arriving in Cuba, Zorin had said this question should be addressed to Cuban authorities.

13. While we believe SYG would prefer to confine discussions to Cuba, we have little confidence he will take firm position with Sovs on this point since he shows every evidence of wanting to avoid being caught in middle.

Stevenson

94. Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy of McCone's 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 333-334. A Record of Actions taken at the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) A transcript of this meeting is ibid., President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 42.1 and 42.2.

Secretary McNamara reported on today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One mission aborted for mechanical reasons, according to preliminary reports. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

Secretary McNamara again recommended night reconnaissance missions. The President delayed a decision on night flights pending a full report on today's daylight mission (the night mission was later called off).

There followed a discussion of a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev./1/ The President added to the draft an offer to discuss with the Russians the proposals they had made public./2/ He predicted that Khrushchev would say we had rejected his proposal. The formulation included a comment that Khrushchev must realize that matters relating to NATO must be discussed at a later time. The letter was approved in a revised form.

/1/This draft has not been identified further, but for the final text, see Document 95.

/2/Document 91.

A message to U Thant was discussed and approved. The purpose of the message was to obtain the halting of work on the bases in Cuba as a condition to discussion of various other problems.

Secretary Rusk reported that one of our U-2 planes had overflown the Soviet Union by accident due to navigational error. Soviet fighters were scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The Secretary thought that the Russians would make a loud fuss about this incident.

The President decided not to make the incident public, but be prepared to do so as soon as the Soviets publicized it.

The President asked whether we wanted to continue to say that we would talk only about the missiles in Cuba. He believed that for the next few hours we should emphasize our position that if the Russians will halt missile activity in Cuba we would be prepared to discuss NATO problems with the Russians. He felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. He did feel that if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there would be a serious reaction in NATO countries if we appeared to be trading withdrawal of missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The President responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position.

The President left the room to talk to General Norstad on the KY-9 secure telephone to Paris.

In the President's absence the message to U Thant was further discussed. The Attorney General felt we should say to U Thant: "While these and other proposals are being discussed, would you urgently ascertain whether the Soviet Union is prepared to cease work on the bases and render the missiles inoperable?" U Thant would be asked to convey the President's message to the Russians in New York most urgently.

Secretary Rusk questioned whether the Russians are trying at the last minute to obtain more of a quid pro quo from us or whether they are introducing new elements in the picture merely to weaken our public position worldwide.

Secretary McNamara pointed out, in connection with the current military situation, that a limited airstrike on Cuba was now impossible because our reconnaissance planes were being fired on. He felt that we must now look to the major airstrike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. To do so he said we would need to call up the reserves now.

Secretary McNamara [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. If we could do this he felt that the Soviets would not attack Turkey when we invaded Cuba. Our objective should be to seek to avoid any Soviet attack in Europe as a response to our invasion of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson commented that it was impossible to draw any conclusions from the fact that one of our reconnaissance planes over Cuba had been shot at.

The President returned to the meeting, accompanied by General Lemnitzer.

The President approved the final revision of the statement to U Thant, which was to be phoned to U Thant and released here publicly. (Copy attached)/3/

/3/The text of this message is included in the Record of Actions for the meeting.

The President asked whether we should call together the represent-atives of NATO to report to them what we had done and were planning to do. If we reject Soviet efforts to tie in NATO problems to the Cuban situation, then we could persuade NATO to take the same position. An additional reason for a NATO meeting then is that if the Russians do attack the NATO countries we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking in Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that current military planning provided for 500 sorties to take out the SAM sites, the MIGs in Cuba, and the missiles and missile sites. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President expressed his concern that the alternatives we are facing have not been presented to NATO. NATO does not realize what may be coming and the Europeans do not realize that we may face a choice of invading Cuba or taking the missiles out of Turkey.

Secretary McNamara urged that a NATO meeting be held tomorrow only if we have decided to launch our strike tomorrow. He repeated his hope that we can act in such a way as to reduce the pressure on the Russians to hit Turkey.

Secretary Rusk recommended that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.

The President suggested that we talk immediately to the Turks, explaining to them what we were planning to do with our missiles and then explain the entire situation to the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary Rusk then read a Stevenson draft of a letter to Khrushchev./4/

/4/Not found.

The President said that the key to any letter to Khrushchev was the demand that work cease on the missile sites in Cuba. He predicted that if we make no mention of Turkey in our letter, Khrushchev will write back to us saying that if we include Turkey, then he would be prepared to settle the Cuban situation. The President said this would mean that we would lose twenty-four hours while they would continue to work on the bases and achieve an operational status for more of their missiles. He suggested that we would be willing to guarantee not to invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were taken out.

Secretary Rusk returned to the Stevenson draft, which the President approved as revised. The phrase "and assurance of peace in the Caribbean" was discussed and the reference to no invasion of Cuba was omitted. The President also agreed not to call a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Attorney General commented that in his opinion the Stevenson draft letter was defensive. It sounded as if we had been thrown off balance by the Russians. The State Department draft merely said that we accepted Khrushchev's offer.

General Taylor summarized the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs. Unless the missiles are defused immediately, the Chiefs recommended implementation on Monday/5/ of OP Plan 312, i.e. a major air strike, and, seven days later, OP Plan 316, which is the invasion plan. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

/5/October 29.

Secretary McNamara asked what we should do about air surveillance tomorrow. He stated his recommendation, i.e. if our reconnaissance planes are fired on, we will attack the attackers. General Taylor noted that in order to be ready to invade on Monday, we must continue intensive air surveillance.

The President directed that our air reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. If our planes are fired on, we must be prepared for a general response or an attack on the SAM site which fired on our planes. We will decide tomorrow how we return fire after we know if they continue their attacks on our planes and after we hear from U Thant the Russian reply to our offer.

The President considered a draft message to the Turks about their missile./6/ His objective was to persuade the Turks to suggest to us that we withdraw our missiles. He noted that negotiations with the Turks were very difficult if there was any life left in the proposal which we had asked U Thant to make to the Russians.

/6/Not found.

General Taylor read a late report of the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in Cuba which said that the wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground and that the pilot had been killed. He felt that we should make an air attack tomorrow on the SAM site responsible for shooting down the U-2 plane.

Secretary McNamara said that we must now be ready to attack Cuba by launching 500 sorties on the first day. Invasion had become almost inevitable. If we leave U.S. missiles in Turkey, the Soviets might attack Turkey. If the Soviets do attack the Turks, we must respond in the NATO area. The minimum NATO response to Soviet attack on Turkey would be to use U.S. forces in Turkey to attack, by sea and by air, the Soviet Black Sea fleet. However, we should make every effort to reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on Turkey.

In an informal discussion following the formal end of the meeting, the Vice President asked why we were not prepared to trade the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Under Secretary Ball responded that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. He felt that we could accept the Soviet offer and replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2762. Unclassified; Niact. Regarding the drafting of this message, see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 102, and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714. Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 441-442.

Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m.

1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press:

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26/1/ with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

/1/Document 84.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public./2/ I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

/2/Document 91.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

/s/ John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

96. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, October 30, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba Missile Crisis, Khrushchev Correspondence. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennedy. For McGeorge Bundy's recollections of the meeting with the President during the late afternoon of October 27, at which the decision was taken to send Robert Kennedy to talk with Dobrynin, see Danger and Survival, pp. 432-434.

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said--that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory action but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He asked me then what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba./1/ In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil.

He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo--no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union./2/

/1/See Document 95.

/2/The following typed sentence at the end of this paragraph was crossed out: "If some time elapsed--and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months--I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactory."

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

97. Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 27, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's and Gilpatric's 1-page handwritten notes of this meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2846, Gilpatric's Notes on Cuba. McCone's notes are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 335. The Record of Action for the Meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10)

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the call up of twenty-four air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel and 300 troop carriers. The call up of the air reserve squadrons is necessary to the invasion plan and will also serve to keep the pressure on the Russians. He said mobilization of private U.S. shipping should be initiated tomorrow in order to have sufficient ships available for an invasion.

The President said that if our reconnaissance planes are fired on tomorrow, and if we know the results of U Thant's talks with the Russians, then we should take out the SAM sites in Cuba by air action.

With respect to the Soviet tanker Graznyy approaching the quarantine zone, the Attorney General recommended that we take no action against it.

The President agreed that if the tanker crosses the barrier, we should let it through, but thereafter no Bloc ships would be allowed to cross into the zone.

The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be asked to tell U Thant of the location of the Soviet tanker and ask him to remind the Russians of their statement that their ships would not enter Cuban waters. A decision on whether to intercept the tanker could be taken tomorrow.

Secretary Rusk agreed, adding that the actions we had taken already had created sufficient pressure on the Russians for today.

The President said that tomorrow we could consider increasing the pressure by adding POL to the list of prohibited goods and by publicly announcing the mobilization of U.S. shipping.

The President read aloud the message from General Norstad concerning the tactics to be followed in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council./1/ The message included a list of questions to be answered and ended with a recommendation to reject Khrushchev's offer to trade European missiles for U.S. missiles in Turkey.

/1/This message has not been identified further.

There followed consideration of a draft cable to Ambassador Finletter in Paris instructing him as to how the NATO meeting should be handled. (A copy of this message is attached.)/2/

/2/Document 100.

Secretary Rusk recommended that we not state our preferred position first but present the various alternatives to the NATO members and oblige them to state their preference. We would make clear that we must stand unified with the NATO countries.

The President agreed that our posture should be that of consulting the NATO countries--not pushing for only one course of action.

The Attorney General recommended that we should not take our final position for a few more hours. In the NATO meeting we would do no more than recite the facts and express our objective of trying to keep the situation limited to the Western Hemisphere. We would report the following day to NATO and hold off one more day a decision on accepting the Turkish/Cuban missile trade offer of the Russians. The President agreed to delete from the message the section on our preferred course of action. The NATO meeting tomorrow is to be a briefing and a request for their views. Ambassador Finletter is not to bring up the question of the possible withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

The President did not approve a draft message to Khrushchev dealing with the shooting down of a U.S. plane./3/

/3/Not identified further.

The President agreed that Ambassador Hare would not raise with the Turks the question of withdrawing the Jupiters, but that the State Department would inform Ambassador Hare, for his information, of what we are considering./4/

/4/A copy of the instructions to Hare along these lines is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, NATO, Cables, Turkey.

Personal letters to de Gaulle and Adenauer were given to the President for signature./5/

/5/Copies of these 2-paragraph notes are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

The President asked the group to meet the following morning at 11:00 o'clock.

Low-level reconnaissance missions were authorized. If these planes were attacked, the attacking planes would be fired upon.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

98. Current Intelligence Memorandum

OCI No. 2430/62

Washington, October 27, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT

Soviet Communications to the US of 26-27 October

1. In response to your request, there follows an analysis, prepared jointly by ONE-OCI, of the two Soviet letters to the US of 26 and 27 October.

2. The likeliest explanation of Soviet behavior in addressing two inconsistent letters to the President in such short succession is that, some time after dispatching the first, the Soviet leaders came to believe that the US intended firm or even radical action against the Cuban bases at a fairly early date. They evidently felt it imperative to send and publicize a second letter, containing a more specific proposal, but one still involving substantial Soviet concessions, in an effort to generate pressures which would head off this US action or, if this failed, to make it as costly as possible in political terms.

3. The US reply today leaves the USSR in a difficult position. The Soviets can, if they choose, repeat their Cuba-Turkey offer and complain that US preconditions amount to an unacceptable ultimatum, but they probably now recognize that this may not deflect the US from its insist-ence that the sites be immediately dismantled. Or they can alter tactics radically, going over to a threatening line in their statements and buttressing this with a deliberate maritime incident in the Caribbean and moves to globalize the crisis, e.g., some action against Berlin. Their tactics to date, however, and their apparent belief that the US is determined on further actions, argue strongly against this latter course.

4. A third course would be to accept some of the conditions stated by the US today and to continue the search for negotiations which would lay inhibitions on further US unilateral moves. Already, in return for a removal of weapons from Turkey, calculated to raise doubts in that country and in NATO as a whole concerning the US commitment, the Soviets have now offered substantial concessions. These include not only the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, but inspection of the proc-ess and a time limit volunteered by the USSR. In the process, the Soviets have gone far to acknowledge the truth of the President's original charges. As another result, they have made statements which must seriously undermine Castro's confidence in Soviet support, and even Soviet intentions.

5. Thus the next Soviet position may be less demanding than the Cuba-Turkey swap. We think that they might limit their demands to a US undertaking not to pursue Castro's overthrow. In return, they might agree to cease work on those sites which are not yet operational and to discuss means of "rendering the weapons inoperable," and to move toward some form of international inspection.

99. Editorial Note

In March 1987 former Secretary of State Dean Rusk shed new light on the question of whether the United States would have been prepared ultimately to consider the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for a Soviet agreement to withdraw the missiles in Cuba and defuse the crisis. In a letter to James G. Blight, who helped organize a conference of former participants in the crisis at Hawk's Cay, Florida, Rusk wrote:

"It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba. Mr. Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr. Cordier has never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step."

Rusk's letter was read to the conference of former officials and scholars of the crisis by McGeorge Bundy. Bundy added that Cordier was asked to stand by with the contingency plan the night of October 27. The proposal, he noted, intentionally bypassed the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. The intention was to make it appear to be a U.N. proposal, rather than one that originated in Washington. (James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux/Hill and Wang, 1989), pages 83-84)

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Washington, October 28, 1962, 12:12 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by EUR and NEA, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to all other NATO capitals eyes only info Ambassadors and New York.

Topol 578. USRO pass Embassy.

1. The President desires that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup, (2) President's message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, (3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4) DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

2. You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night October 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by United States not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

3. The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is growing shorter. The United States remains determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressure in even balance to this end.

4. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed US military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing.

5. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the United States Government. At the present rate of speed the first vessel will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur.

6. In these circumstances the United States Government may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere.

7. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the Soviet public message to President of October 27th in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation.

8. FYI. It is of the utmost importance that nothing in your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that US action in Cuba--if it becomes essential--will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countries at least as much as the United States. End FYI.

Rusk

[end of document]

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