1. The history of the Cuban project begins in 1959 and for the purposes of the survey ends with the invasion of Cuba by the Agency-supported Cuban brigade on 17 April 1961 and its defeat and capture by Castro's forces in the next two days.
2. Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the Agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Annex A) and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program:
a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.
b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.
c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization.
d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance groups.
3. The budget for this activity was estimated at $4,400,000. The breakdown was: Political action, $950,000; propaganda, $1,700,000; paramilitary, $1,500,000; intelligence collection, $250,000.
4. This document, providing for the nourishment of a powerful internal resistance program through clandestine external assistance, was the basic and indeed the only U.S. Government policy paper issued throughout the life of the project. The concept was cl assic. The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which become publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with Cuban exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private American businessmen. The hand of the U.S. Government wo uld not appear.
Preparatory Action
5. Some months of preparation had preceded presentation of this paper to the President. In August 1959 the Chief of the Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting [excised] to discuss the creation of a para-military capability to be used in Latin Amer ican crisis situations. At this time Cuba was only one of a number of possible targets, all of which appeared equally explosive. The Chief of the Para-military Group prepared a series of staff studies for the Western Hemisphere (WH) Division on various as pects of covert limited war-fere and urged the creation of a division paramilitary staff. He also set up a proprietary airline in [excised]for eventual support use
6. In September 1959 the WH Division assigned an officer to plan potential Agency action for contingencies which might develop in a number of Latin American countries. There was a lack of sufficient readily available operational information on potential t arget areas, so a requirement, with special emphasis on Cuba, whose Communist control was now becoming more and more apparent, was sent throughout the intelligence community, and resulted in a three-volume operational study.
7. By December 1959 these studies had produced a plan for training a small cadre of Cuban exiles as paramilitary instructors, these in turn to be used for training other Cuban recruits; in a Latin American country, for clandestine infiltration into Cuba t o provide leadership for anti-Castro dissidents.
Organization of Branch
8. On 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban opera-tion. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and two at Santiago Base.
9. The branch also began negotiations for a Panama training site. Its officers reconnoitered the area of Miami, Florida, in search of suitable installations for office space, warehouses, safe sites, recruiting centers, communications center, and bases for the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out of Cuba.
10. At the same time Headquarters and the Havana Station were conducting a study of Cuban opposition leaders to prepare for the formation of a unified political front to serve as the cover instrument for clandestine operations and as a rallying point for anti-Castro Cubans. They were also making a map reconnaissance of the Caribbean, seeking a site for a powerful medium-wave and short-wave radio station.
Preliminary Progress
11. As a result of this intensive activity over a relatively brief period the Agency was able to report considerable preliminary progress and to predict early performance in a number or respects, when it carried its request for policy approval to the Pres ident in mid-March of 1960.
12. Among the facts so reported (Annex A) were: That the Agency was in close touch with leaders of three major end reputable anti-Castro groups of Cubans whose representatives, possible together with others, would form a unified opposition council within 30 days; that the Agency was already supporting opposition broadcasts from Miami, had arranged for additional radio outlets in Massachusetts, [excised]and [excised], and that a powerful "gray" station, probably on Swan Island, could be made ready in two months; that publication of an exile edition of a confiscated Cuban newspaper had been arranged; that a controlled action group was distributing propaganda outside Cuba, and that anti-Castro lecturers were being sent on Latin American tours.
13. The President was further informed that an effective intelligence and action organization inside Cuba, responsive to direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created within 60 days and that preparations for the development of an adequate paramilitary force would require "a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight."
Policy Discussions
14. Discussion at high policy levels of the Government had preceded submission of this program to the President. In the last months of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of several departments and agencies and charged by NSA 5412 with responsibility for policy approval of major covert action operations, considered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During January And February of 1960, the Director of Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's program. Concern was expressed over the length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles into action, and there was discussion of U.S. capabilities for immediate overt action if required. The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men were ready if needed and that the first of them could be airborne within four hours after receipt of orders. Members of the group urged early formation of an exile junta. The Agency announced its intention of requesting funds to pursue the program, and no objections were raised by the group.
15. The project to unseat Castro had thus become a major Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operating branch, requiring a great amount of detailed day-to-day attention in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with other agencies and departments of the Government.
16. The activities described to the President continued at an accelerated rate, but the financial approach to the project was relatively cautious in the early weeks.
Financial Preparations
17. On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of $900,000 for the rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on 7 April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the $900,000 had been obligated. By 30 June an additiona1 $1,000,000 was obligated.
18. In April the Director of Central Intelligence told a meeting of WH/4 personnel that he would recall people from anywhere in the world if they were needed on the project. From January 1960, when it had 40 people, the branch expanded to 588 by 16 April 1961, becoming one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services, larger than some divisions. Its Table of Organization did not include the large number of air operations personnel who worked on the project and who were administered by their own unit, the Development Projects Divison (DPD), nor did it include the many people engaged in support activities or in services of common concern, who, though not assigned to the project, nevertheless devoted many hours to it.
19. In the early months of the project there were intensive efforts to organize an exile front group, to get a broad and varied propaganda program under way, to begin a paramilitary program, and to acquire sites in Florida and elsewhere for training and recruit-ing activities and for office space.
20. The so-called "Bender Group" composed of project politi-cal action officers, was set up as a notional organization of American businessmen to provide cover for dealing with the Cubans. After a series or meetings in New York and Miami a nominally unified Frente Revoluionario Democratico (FRD), composed of several Cuban factions, was agreed upon on 11 May 1960.
Propaganda Activity 21. Radio broadcasts from Miami into Cuba were continued under the sponsorship of a Cuban group. Preparations were made for exile publication of Avance, whose Havana plant had been seized by Castro. Anti-Castro propaganda operations were intensified throughout Latin America, and a boat for marine broadcasts was purchased. The Swan Island radio station, on which the President had been briefed, was completed and on the air with test signals by 17 May.
22. The action-cadre instruction training program was being prepared, and $25,000 worth of sterile arms were being sent to the Panama training base, which was activated 11 May. At the some time Useppa Island, Florida, was acquired as a site for assessment and holding of Cuban paramilitary sites and for training radio operators. Screening of paramilitary recruits had begun in Miami in April, and the training in Panama began in June.
23. The Miami Base was opened on 25 May in the Coral Gables business district under cover or a New York career development and placement firm, backstopped by a Department or Detense contract, and on 15 June a communications site, with Army cover, was open ed at the former Richmond Naval Air Station, which was held under lease by the University of Miami. Safe houses were also acquired in the Miami area for various operational uses. The use of other sites for project activities, in the United States and othe r countries, was acquired for varying periods as time went on.
24. Project officers were engaged in liaison on numerous matters. In April they reached an agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service on special entry procedure for Cubans of interest to the operation. They consulted with Voice of America a nd the United States Information Agency on propaganda operations. There were many discussions with the Federal Communications Com-mission on the licensing of Radio Swan and with the Defense Bepart-ment concerning its cover. The State Department was regula rly consulted on political matters.
Uneasy Front
25. Although Cuban leaders had formed a "front" at Agency urging, it was an uneasy one. They wore by no means in agreement, either among themselves or with Agency case officers, on politics or on operations.
26. Power struggles developed early in the life of the FRD. The Cuban leaders wanted something to say about the course of pare ilitary operations. As early as Racy 1960 one of the more prominent leaders was urging-an invasion on a fairly large-scale-from a third country. ,
27. By June the American press was beginning to nibble at the operation, principally at Radio Swan, some or the stories implying that it was not a completely legitimate commercial venture.
Another indication that operational security was less than perfect was a statement by a defected Cuban naval attache that it was com-mon knowledge among exiles in Miami that a certain Cuban leader was backed by the Agency and that "there were entirely too many Americans running around the area waving money."
28. On 22 June the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence briefed the National Security Council on the project. Ultimate objective of the training program, according to the paper prepared for this briefing, was a minimum force of 500 men split into appro ximately 25 teams skilled in organizing, training and leading indigenous dissident groups, each team to be provided with a radio operator. Preparations were under way for creating an exile Cuban air force, and attempts ware being made to develop maritime capabilities for support of paramilitary groups.
29. This briefing contained an expression of doubt that a purely clandestine effort would be able to cope with Castro's increasing military capability, pointing out that implementation of the paramilitary phase of operations would be contingent upon the e xistence of dissident forces who were willing to resist and that such groups had not as yet emerged in strength.
Training in Panama
30. The air training program began to get under way in July 1960 with the screening of Cuban pilot recruits and negotiations with Defense for AD-5s and the Navy being asked to supply 75 instruction and maintenance personnel.
31. In mid-June 29 Cubans had arrived in Panama to begin training in small-unit infiltration.
32. The FRD was resisting Agency attempts to persuade it to move its headquarters to Mexico and was demanding direct contact with the State Department or with some high government office in order to argue its case. It also showed reluctance to become invo lved in the recruiting of Cuban pilots. It presented a budget for $500,000 a month, excluding paramilitary costs, but was told it would have to get along on $131,000 and would get this only if it agreed to move to Mexico. It did agree to furnish 500 paramilitary candidates and initally gave in on the issue of moving to Mexico. It remained there only a few weeks because of harassment by the Mexican Government, in spite of prior agreements to the contrary. It appears that one reason why the PRD leaders were so reluctant to be based in a third country is that they desired to establish a direct, official channel to the U.S. Government.
Emphasis on Resistance
33. In August WH/4 Branch prepared papers for use in briefing the President and the Joint Chiefs or Staff, respectively. By about 1 November it was expected to have 500 paramilitary trainees and 37 radio operators ready for action. It was stated that this group would be available for use as infiltration teams or as an invasion force. The briefing paper for the Joint Chiefs made the point that "obviously the successful implementation of any large- scale paramilitary operations is dependent upon widespread g uerrilla resistance throughout the area."
34. The paper prepared for the President's briefing identified 11 groups or individuals with whom the Agency had some sort of contact and who claimed to have assets in Cuba. The paper for the Joint Chiefs spoke of the problems or obtaining support bases a nd trained man paver and warned that an exile invasion force might have to be backed up by a contingency force, augmented by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel.
35. The terms "invasion", "strike", and "assault" were used in these documents although the strike force concept does not seem to have been given any sort of policy sanction until the Special Group meeting which took place toward the end of 1960.
Plan of Operations
36. The Presidential briefing paper of August 1960 outlined the plan of operations as follows:
"The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Pinar del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerrilla action against the regime.
"The second phase will be initiated by a combined sea--air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerrilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations.
"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area with the guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from these arena into the Havana area also."
37. Expenditures were rapidly running beyond the original estimates. The WH Division estimated operating costs for four weeks starting l July at $1,700,000 and for the fiscal year at approximately $25,000,000. On 19 August an additional $10,000,000 was r equested and obtained. About half of this figure was the estimated cost of paramilitary activities, with about another $2,000,000 estimated for propaganda.
Anti-Castro Broadcasts
38. Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then with anti-Castro broadcasts, Radio programs were also originating in Miami and [excised]. The newspaper Avance in Exile was being published by the end or the summer, and a second paper and a weekly magazine were planned. There had also been some successful black operations. Most such operations had thus far been conducted withou t participation by the FRD.
39. By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for a Latin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broad-cast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was being prepared in Miami.
40. At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (this search went on for some time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, b ut on 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)
41. Late September 1960 saw the almost simultaneous occur-rence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a paramilitary agent on wham the project had set great store.
Maritime Operations
42. Several successful maritime operations took place during the latter months of 1960 before severe winter weather began to make them almost impossible. But the project had only one boat regularly available during this period, and the process of supply-i ng and building up a resistance movement through clandestine means began to seem intolerably slow, especially since during this same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened with 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban internal s ecurity was being tightened.
43. The strike force concept which, as noted, had already begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began to play an ever greater role in ME~ planning. This role became dominant in September 1960 with the assignment to the project, as chie f of its Paramilitary Staff, of a Marine Corps colonel experienced in amphibious operations.
44. In late October the Nicaraguan Government offered the Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto Cabezas, some 250 miles closer to Cuba than the facilities in Guatemala. At about the same time, the Agency requested the Army to supply 38 Special Forces personnel as instructors. Due to prolonged policy negotiations, those trainers did not arrive in Guatemala until 12 January 1961.
Switch in Concept
45. On 4 November 1960 WE/4 took formal action to change the course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along more conventional military lines. Appropriate orders were sent to the Guatem ala Base, which had 475 air and ground trainees on 10 November, and to Miami where recruiting efforts were increased.
46. By this time Miami Base, through liaison with the FRD military staff, had already recruited and dispatched to Guatemala 101 air and 370 paramilitary trainees, plus six specialists (doctors, dentists, and chaplains). The base had also recruited 124 mar itime personnel for manning the invasion fleet that was being acquired.
47. By 28 January 1961 the strike force strength was 644, on 3 February it was 685, by 10 March it had risen to 826, by 22 March to 973. On 6 April 1961 brigade strength was reported at 1,390.
48. On 3 November 1960 WH/4 reported it had only $2,250,000 left for the rest of Fiscal Year 1961, and by 16 December this was almost gone. A supplementary budget estimate was prepared, and an additional $28,200,000 was obtained from the Bureau of the Bud get
Freedom Fund Campaign 49. There were also financial problems on a smaller scale. To publicize Radio Swan, and perhaps to enhance its cover, theCuban Freedom Fund Campaign was organized in November to solicit donations through newspaper advertisements. The radio station, which was budgeted at $900,000 for Fiscal Year 1961, received $330 in gifts during the next few weeks.
50. Bohemia Libre, a handsome weekly magazine, budgeted at $300,000 but actually costing about $35,000 an issue, had bad luck from the start in seeking advertising and once missed an issue on that account. Additional funds had to be sought for it several times. Yet it developed an audited circulation of 126,000, said to be second only to the Reader's Digest in the Spanish-language field.
51. While the project moved forward, acquiring boats, planes and bases, training men, negotiating with foreign govern-ments, seeking policy clarification, training an FRD security service, publishing magazines and newspapers, putting out radio broadcasts, and attempting to move arms, men and propaganda into Cuba by sea or air, the FRD, in whose name most of this activity was being carried on, was making little progress toward unity.
52. Members would resign in a huff and have to be wheedled back. Each faction wanted supplies to be sent only to its own followers in Cuba, while groups inside were reluctant to receive infiltrees sent in the name of the FRD. The FRD coordinator had his own radio boat which made unauthorized broadcasts until halted by the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal, Bureau of Investigation.
Provisional Government Plans
53. Tentative plans for a provisiona1 government ware first discussed with FRD leaders in December, and this set off a flurry of intrigue and bickering which delayed the recruiting process and did nothing to advance the cause of unity. In mid-January Miami Base reported that "the over-all problem is simply to main-tain the Frente (FRD) as an operational facade until military action intervenes and a provisional government can be established." Until the question of how and by whom such a government was to be selected could be answered, the base reported, "we are at political dead center."
54. This dead center remained until very near the target date and was only resolved by an ultimatum to the FRD Executive Committee directing its members to agree on the chairman for a Revolutionary Council or risk the loss of all further support.
55. However, in selective ways the FRD proved to be a responsive and useful instrument. An example of this was the counterintelligence and security service which, under close project control, developed into an efficient and valuable unit in support of the FRD, Miami Base, and the project program.
56. By mid March 1961 this security organization comprised 86 employees of whom 37 were trainee case officers, the service having graduated four classes from its own training center) whose chief instructor was a [excised] police officer.
Security Activities
57. The FRD's service ran operations into Cuba, many of them successful. It built up a voluminous set of card files on Cuban personalities. One of its most helpful services was reporting on meetings of FDR committees and other anti-Castro groups and on po litical maneuvering within the FRD hierarchy. It also helped in recruiting for the strike force at a time when the political leaders were sabotaging the effort. Security and counterintelligence teams were also trained for integration with the strike force. These had the primary mission of securing vi tal records And documents during the invasion and a secondary mission of assisting in establishing and maintaining martial law.
58. The service also carried.on radio monitoring and con-ducted interrogations and debriefings. An indication of its alertness and efficiency is the fact that it supplied Miami Base with its first information on the location of a C-54 plane which was forc ed down in Jamaica after a mission over Cuba. The chief of the service was largely responsible for personally persuading the crew of the downed plane to return to the training camp.
59. In the first three months of 1961 the problem faced by the project ware many and complex. Although the Army Special Forces instructors had finally arrived in Guatemala the brigade trainee quota was still only half fulfilled and a call went to the training camps for special recruiting teams to be sent to Miami. Meanwhile trainees who had been in the camp for several months had had no contact with the political front and were wondering what sort of a Cuban future they were expected to fight for. Disturbances broke out, and the project leaders persuaded three FRD figures to visit the camp and mollify the men.
Training in the U.S.
60. During this period the Nicaraguan air strip which had been placed at the project's disposal was being made ready for use and two new training sites were activated. Although a definite policy determination on the training of Cubans in the U.S. had never been made, 25 tank operators were success-fully trained for the strike force at Fort Knox. Another eleventh-hour training requirement was fulfilled when the project acquired the use of Belle Chase Ammunition Depot near New Orleans. This was used for the training of a company--sized unit hurriedly recruited for a diversion landing and of an underwater demolition team.
61. During the period between the U.S. national elections and the inauguration of President Kennedy the Government's policymaking machinery had slowed down. A number of piecemeal policy decisions wore vouchsafed, but not all the specific ones the project chiefs were pressing for, for example, authority for tac tical air strikes and permission to use American contract pilots.
62. President Eisenhower had given a general go-ahead signal on 29 November and had reaffirmed it on 3 January 1961, but the impending change in administration was slowing matters down. For example, a proposed propaganda drop was turned down on 13 January for this reason. on 19 January, at the Special Group's last meeting before the inauguration, it was agreed that a high-level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and Defense, should be set up as soon as possible to reaffirm the basic concepts of the project.
Preparations Endorsed
63. Such a meeting was held 22 January, and the project and current preparations were generally endorsed. At a meeting with the new President on 28 January the Agency was authorized to continue present activities and was instructed to submit the tactical paramilitary plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for analysis. Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to get a high-level internal review of the plan, it was briefed to Gen. Cabell, Gen. Bu11 (consultant) and Adm. Wright (ONE). By 6 February the Joint Chiefs had returned a favorable evaluation of the strike plan, together with a number of suggestions.
64. On 17 February the Agency presented a paper (Annex B) to the President which outlined three possible courses of action against Castro.
65. Noting plans for early formation of a government in exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro regime under Bloc support and observed: "Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infea sible to overthrow the Castro regime except by the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option or action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.
66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla groups not feasible and advocated a surprise landing of a mili-tary force, concluding that the brigade had a good chance of overthrowing Castro "or at the very least causing a damaging civil car withou t requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba."
67. Following presentation of this paper to the President, the project leaders were given to understand that it would be at least two weeks before a decision would be made as to use of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand the force up to 1,O0O for the time being.
Movement of Agents
68. Although the invasion preparations were absorbing most of the proJect's energies and funds WH/4 Branch was still attempting to nourish the underground. There were six success-ful boat operations, carrying men and materials, in February and 13 in March, and two successful air drops in March. Infil-tration of agents was continuing. As of 15 February Miami Base reporte d the following numbers and types of agents in Cuba: Counterintelligence, 20; positive intelligence, 5; propaganda, 2; paramilitary, 4. As of 15 March the base reported that these numbers had risen, respectively, to 21, 11, 9, and 6.
69. By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami Base had grown to 160. The intensity of activity there during the latter months of the operation is indicated by the record of a day picked at random - it happened to be 9 February - -when 21 case officers spent 140 man hours in personal contact with 125 Cubans.
70. Successive changes in the operational plan and post-ponements of the strike date are discussed later in this report and are documented in Annexes C, D, and E. Detailed policy authorization for some specific actions was either never fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of embarka-tion.
71. During the weeks preceding the invasion the pace of events quickened. In early March the State Department asked the Agency not to announce formation of the Revolutionary Council or to commit any untoward act until after the 5-9 March Mexico City Peace Conference. The Cubans conferring in New York dis-agreed on various aspects of a post-Castro platform. The Guatemala ca mp was having counterintelligence problems.
Sabotage Action
72. On 12 March the LCI "Barbara J"successfully launched and recovered a sabotage team in an action against the Texaco refinery in Santiago.
73. During 13-15 March project chiefs were working inten-sively to prepare a revised plan which would meet policy obJec-tions cited by the State Department. On the 15th the new plan was presented to the President.
74. In mid-March ten members were added to the FRD Excecu-tive Committee, the politicians continued their platform talks, and 23 March was set as deadline for choice of a chairman. An intensive defection project was started from Miami Base. A survey was s tarted with the object of determining the trainees' knowledgeability of U.S. involvement in the strike preparations. Trainees at Guatemala were impatient, and a number had gone AWOL.
75. Jose Miro Cardona was unanimously elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.
76. In late March the ostensible owner of the Swan Ialand radio station, thanked all the sponsors of political programs and advised them that no more tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the way for a unity program during the actio n phase of the operation. A Radio Swan listener survey had received 1,659 replies from 20 countries. Ships with strike force equipment were arriving in Nicaragua, and the Guatemala Camp was still receiving trainees as late as the week of 4 April.
Overflights Suspended
77. Cuban overflights were suspended on 28 March. Two reasons have been given for this suspension: (a) that the air-craft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships; (b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during the critical pro-invasion period.
78. For a White House meeting on 29 March papers were pre-pared on these subjects: (a) The status of the defection program; (b) internal Cuban support which could be expected for the 1anding operation.
79. On 5 April the B-26 "defection" plan was prepared in an effort to knock out some of Castro's air force before D Day in a manner which womb satisfy State Department objections. Project chiefs agreed that in event of a policy decision to call off the invasion they would move the troops to sea, tell them that new intelligence made the invasion inadvisable, and divert the force to Vieques Island for demobilization.
80. On 12 April at a meeting with the President it was decided that Mr. Berle world tell Miro Cardona there would be no overt U.S. support of the invasion. The President publicly announced there would be no U.S. support. On 13 April all WH/4 headquarters sections went on 24 hour duty. The Revolutionary Council was assembled in New York and advised that it would be briefed in stages on the military aspects of the project. On 14 April the Council agreed to go into "isolation" during the landing phase of the military operation.
81. The raids on three Cuban airfields were carried out by eight B-26s on 15 April, and destruction of half of Castro's air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography. Afterward, according to plan, one of the pilots landed in Florida had announced that the raids had been carried out by defectors from Castro's own air force. The Council was briefed on the air strike. The diversionary expedition by the force which had been trained in New Orleans failed to make a landing on two successi ve nights preceding the strike.
82. Immediately before D Day, Radio Swan and other outlets were broadcasting 18 hours a day on medium-wave and 16 hours on short-wave. Immediately after D Day, these totals were increased to 55 hours and 26 hours, respectively. Fourteen frequencies were used. By the time of the invasion a total of l2,000,000 pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuta.
83. Late on 16 April, the eve of D Day, the air strikes designed to knock out the rest of Castro's air force on the following morning were called off. The message reached the field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision to cancel the air strike was made after the landing force had been committed.
84. The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owned by the Agency, a U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and seven chartered commer-cial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air forces. These vessels were armed with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two 75-mm . recoiless rifles.
85. In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors.
86. The invasion brigade comprised 1,511 men, all of them on the invasion ships excepting one airborne infantry company of 177 men. The brigade included five infantry companies, a heavy weapons company, an intelligence-reconuaissance company, and a tank p latoon.
87. These troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked on the ships which had been pro-loaded at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from Nic aragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From there they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000 yards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. Those complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy.
88. Of the three follow-up ships, one was due to arrive from Nicaragua on the morning of D Day plus 2 and two others were on call at sea south of Cuba. Additional supplies were available for air landing or parachute delivery at airfields in Guatemala, Nic aragua, and Florida. At a Defense base in Anniston, Alabama, there were also supplies ready for 15,000 men. Altogether there were arms and equipment available to furnish 30,000 dissidents expected to rally to the invasion force.
89. The landing was to be carried out at three beaches about 18 miles from each other on the Zapata Peninsula. The left flak of the beachhead was Red Beach at the head of Cochinos Bay; Green Beah was at the right flank, with Blue Beach at the center. The lodgment to be seized was thus a coastal strip about 4O miles long,.separated from the interior by an sizeable swamp penetrated only by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal roa d from the east.
90. In the early hours of 17 April Cuban underwater demoli-tion teams, each led by au American contract employee, went ashore to mark Red and Blue Beaches. Each of those parties engaged in fire fights with smell enemy forces but accomplished their tasks, and the troops began moving ashore in small aluminum boats and LCUs. Before daylight smarl militia, forces were encountered at both beaches. Those offered little opposition, and rosy of the militiamen were quickly captured.
91. Not long after daylight the airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of sealing off approach roads.
92. At dawn began the enemy attacks which the project chiefs had aimed to present by the planned dawn strikes with Nicaragua-based aircraft against Castro's fields. Action by Castro's B-26s, Sea Furies, and jet T-33s resulted in the sinking of a supply ship, the beaching of a transport, and damage to an LCI. The plan for a landing at Green Beach was thereupon abandoned, and these troops, with their tanks and vehicles were put ashore at Blue Beach. Shipping withdrew to the south under continuous air attack.
93. The air attacks continued throughout the day. The 11 B-26s of the Cuban exile force which were available for close support and interdiction were no match for the T-33 jets. However, at least four of Castro's other aircraft were shot down by machine gu n fire from maritime craft, assisted by friendly air support.
94. The first ground attacks by Castro's forces occurred at Red Beach which was hit by successive waves of militia in the earning, afternoon and evening of 17 April. While ammunition lasted those attacks mere beaten off with heavy enemy casualties and sev eral of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April, the Red Beach Force, nearly out of ammunition, retired in good order to Blue Beach without being pressed by the enemy.
95. In addition to supporting the ground forces and protect-ing shipping on 17 April, the friendly B-26s also sank a Castro patrol escort ship and attacked the Cienfuegos airfield. Four or the friendly B-26s were shot down, while three returned safely to Nicaragua, and four landed at other friendly bases.
96. Attempts were made to resupply the brigade with ammunition by air drops. On the night of 17-18 April one C-54 drop was made at Red Beach and three at Blue Beach, and on the following night Blue Beach received two drops. Preparations for resupply by se a had to be canceled due to enemy air action.
97. At Blue Beach the enemy ground attacks, supported by aircraft, began from three directions on the afternoon of 18 April. Six friendly B-26s, two of them flown by Americans, inflicted heavy damage on the Castro column moving up from the west, using nap alm, bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire to destroy several tanks and about 20 troop-laden trucks. Air support to the Blue Beach troops wss-continued on the morning of 19 April, when three friendly B-26s, including two piloted by Americans, mere shot dow n by Castro T-33s. Jet cover from the Navy aircraft carrier "Essex" had been expected to protect the 19 April sorties but a misunderstanding over timing hampered its effectiveness.
98. In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a reported 1,8OO casualties suffered by the Castro forces, the brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on resupply of ammunition, which had now become impossible. On the night of 18 April, when failure appeared inevitable, the Cuban brigade commander refused an offer to evacuate his troops. And on the morning of 19 April, with ammunition rapidly running out, the brigade was still able to launch a futile counterattack against the for ces relentlessly moving in from the west.
99. In the last hours or resistance the brigade commander sent aseries of terse and desperate messages to the task force commnad ship pleading for help:
"We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold."
"In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must arrive in next hour."
When your help will be here and with what?"
"Why your help has not come?"
100. The last message was as follows: "Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot repeat cannot wait for you."
101. An evacuation convoy was headed for the beach on the afternoon of 19 April. When it became known that beachhead had collapsed the convoy reversed course.
102. Duing the next few days two Americans and a crew of Cuban frogmen succeeded in rescuing 26 survivors from the beach and coastal islands.