Department Seal

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume V
Soviet Union

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

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370. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 6, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WHEAT USSR. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Krimer and approved in U on November 15. The meeting was held in Ball's office.

SUBJECT
U.S. Sale of Wheat to U.S.S.R.

PARTICIPANTS
(See attached list)

Under Secretary Ball said that he and Ambassador Thompson were scheduled to go abroad late Friday and therefore would like to find out before their departure whether a reply to the proposal made at the last meeting/2/ had been received by Mr. Borisov from his government.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 366.

Mr. Borisov replied that he had reported the proposal to his government but had not as yet received an answer. The only additional information he had came from American newspapers.

Mr. Ball said that since their last conversation the other day, a number of possibilities had been explored. There was no U.S. Government agency which would be in a position to handle the wheat transaction in the manner proposed by Mr. Borisov. As Mr. Borisov undoubtedly knew, the grain export trade of the U.S. was handled by four large companies primarily, and in this case, too, it would be these four companies which would handle the bulk of the transaction, since it was difficult for smaller companies to handle a deal of this size. At the moment, the best way to proceed appeared to be for private American grain trading companies to make their proposals to the Soviet wheat delegation on a C & F basis. The government had already taken a number of steps, and intended to take some additional steps, in order to make it easier for the companies involved to make acceptable proposals to the Soviets on a C & F basis. A part of the movement of the wheat would still involve American vessels, but, since the offers to be made would be on a C & F basis, the freight would be a matter of concern to the American company only. Furthermore, since freight constituted only one element of their costs, competition among them for the volume the Soviets were interested in would tend to bring the C & F price down to a basis acceptable to the Soviets. Thus, instead of our saying to them that we proposed to sell them 2-1/2 million tons of wheat at a given price, for delivery during a specified period of time, the matter would be handled by private companies making individual C & F offers for delivery to Black Sea and Baltic ports.

Mr. Borisov asked a number of questions to clarify the proposal. They were answered by Mr. Ball by a restatement of the above provisions. Mr. Ball added that there was enough flexibility in this type of transaction for private grain dealers to be prepared to absorb some of the elements of costs involved.

Mr. Borisov asked whether his understanding that the price would be uniform, regardless of which ships would be used, was correct.

Mr. Ball answered that individual grain dealers would approach the delegation with specific orders. Company A might be higher than Company B. Mr. Borisov did not have to accept any offer which did not suit him. To Mr. Borisov's question as to whether the type of ships used would make any difference in price, Mr. Ball stated that he wanted to be clear about the fact that American vessels would be used along with vessels of other countries, that if a company were to negotiate the sale of, say, 1/2 million tons, the price for that quantity would be uniform since shipping costs would have been averaged out.

Mr. Manjulo asked whether the requirement that no company handled more than 25% of the total quantity involved, would still apply. This was answered by Mr. Ball in the affirmative.

Mr. Borisov said that it would have been better for him to deal with one firm only, but that he understood the situation. He went on to say that he thought the American market was somewhat different from that of other countries. In no other country did he have to settle commercial matters with a State Department or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He thought that the State Department would have enough to do with problems of its own without getting involved in commercial matters. He wanted to clarify another question which pertained to Soviet ships. Supposing that agreement had been reached on the transaction under discussion, there would be other matters to be taken up as well, in which the question of discrimination would inevitably be brought up. What did the State Department intend to do about this problem?

Mr. Ball said that he had had at least four telephone conversations with the Secretary of Labor since last talking to Mr. Borisov, and had expressed to the Secretary the concern which the State Department felt in this matter./3/ Any suggestion about Soviet ships not being handled in American ports was certainly not U.S. Government policy and this matter would also be taken up with the heads of the unions involved. As he had told Mr. Borisov the other day, in this country unions were independent, and while he felt that some progress would be achieved, the government could not give them instructions in this matter.

/3/Memoranda of Ball's telephone conversations with Secretary of Labor Willard W. Wirtz are in the Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, USSR.

Ambassador Thompson remarked that some of these unions had also discriminated against American owners of ships sailing under flags of convenience. While the government would use its influence to alleviate this situation, it was not in a position to guarantee any specific results. At the present time there were four Canadian ships which had been struck in Chicago.

Mr. Borisov said that Soviet unions also were not subject to direct control by the Soviet Government. However, when necessary, their government did influence the unions to do that which was considered desirable by the government. Whenever the government sincerely desired to improve relations with a given country it took whatever measures were necessary to smooth out any difficulties, and vice versa, if they desired to worsen their relations with any given country, they took the appropriate measures for that purpose. Since their unions were independent, they, too, could create a problem by a policy of not handling ships of American registry. He thought that in such an event Mr. Ball would lose no time in summoning the Soviet Ambassador in order to register a resolute protest against such a policy. Today's press again contained an article about Soviet ships with a statement that they would be picketed if they attempted to load wheat in this country. (Mr. Borisov handed Mr. Ball a clipping from an American newspaper.) In this connection the second question, then, was what would happen if he and Mr. Ball should come to terms, yet nothing could be accomplished because of such union policy.

Mr. Ball said that Mr. Borisov undoubtedly was aware of the fact that in recent years there were a number of instances when unions had struck rocket factories, nuclear plants, etc. yet the government found itself helpless to remedy this situation completely. The government was unhappy about the actions of some labor leaders but could not do much to improve the situation.

Mr. Borisov said that rocket factories and nuclear plants were, of course, internal matters, but, when unions began to interfere with the conduct of international relations, then it seemed to him that the State Department should be in a position to take action. Continuing, he said that he would report the present proposal to his government, and asked whether his understanding that the American firms were ready to do business was correct. When answered that this was so, he said that he would in that case detain the "Exportkhleb" negotiators whom he had just instructed to return home. He asked whether anything should be put in writing between the governments, perhaps something in the nature of an exchange of letters.

Ambassador Thompson thought it would be best for the present not to put anything in writing since the U.S. Government would be dealing with the trade and so would Mr. Borisov or his representative. He thought it would be best not to involve the government, as that might lead to a number of complications.

Mr. Borisov said that in the Canadian transaction, the Soviet Government had exchanged letters with the Canadian Minister, Mr. Sharp. Mr. Sharp had stated in the letter that Canada was prepared to sell a given quantity of wheat on specific terms. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade acknowledged the receipt of that letter and signified its acceptance of the terms.

Mr. Ball thought we could give a letter to the Soviets to the effect that the U.S. Government was agreeable to the sale of wheat by private grain traders to the Soviet Union in large amounts, 2# million tons or more, and that the government would endeavor to see to it that the grain would be made available.

Mr. Borisov thought that in principle this was satisfactory, but would like to have one point added, a statement to the effect that the U.S. Government would, within the limits of its power and authority, facilitate the consummation of the transaction. He did not necessarily have the Department of State in mind for such a statement.

Mr. Ball said that Secretary Freeman could give the necessary assurances about grain being made available. The government would advise the trade of the broad condition of offers to be submitted and would take the necessary steps in order to facilitate the sale. As to delivery the government was not really competent. This would have to be handled by the private grain trading companies themselves.

(Mr. Manjulo brought up the matter of Soviet vessels again but was stopped by Mr. Borisov who told him that this should await further directives from Moscow.)

Ambassador Thompson said it was his frank view and opinion that the U.S. Government could influence the trade unions better if it were not known that an agreement existed. If the unions knew that agreement had been reached, they would undoubtedly create some additional difficulties.

Mr. Borisov said that he would of course keep any such letter confidential.

Mr. Ball added that he would have to consult with his associates as to exactly what kind of wording such a letter should contain, particularly in view of the fact that other Departments were involved.

Mr. Borisov wanted to reiterate the gist of the understanding. As he understood it then, first, private firms would make offers to the Soviet wheat delegation on a C & F basis; second, the government would see to it that the grain would be available on the market; third, that all possible assistance would be given to the private firms in the execution of this transaction.

When this was confirmed, Mr. Borisov said he would so report to his government.

Mr. Ball added that he hoped quick agreement could be reached because he and Ambassador Thompson would otherwise be forced to change some rather detailed plans they had made for their departure on Friday afternoon.

Pending Mr. Borisov's getting further instructions from Moscow, it was agreed that another meeting be held at 10:00 a.m. Friday in order to discuss commodities other than wheat which had been brought up at the first meeting./4/

/4/At 5:20 p.m. Ball called the President and told him that the Soviet delegation seemed to like the U.S. proposal. He made a similar call to Secretary Freeman. (Memorandum of telephone conversations; ibid.) At 11 a.m. November 7, the President convened an advisory meeting, attended by Ball and Freeman, to discuss the sale of wheat to the USSR. The discussion focused on rates, availablitity of U.S. tankers, and other issues involved in shipping the wheat. A tape recording of the discussion at the meeting is ibid., President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Tapes 118/A55 and 118/A56.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United States
Under Secretary of State George W. Ball
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
William Krimer, L/S, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.
Sergey A. Borisov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
Viktor M. Manjulo, Chief, Administration for Trade with Western Countries, Ministry of Foreign Trade
Nikolay I. Kuzminski, Chief, Interpreters' Section, Ministry of Foreign Trade
Eugeni S. Shershnev, Commercial Counselor, Embassy of U.S.S.R.

 

371. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WHEAT 17 USSR-US. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting was held in Ball's office.

SUBJECT
U.S. Sale of Wheat to U.S.S.R.

PARTICIPANTS
(See attached list)

Under Secretary Ball asked if Mr. Borisov had received any reaction from Moscow with reference to the previous meeting.

Mr. Borisov answered that he had received a directive to confirm the arrangements and that, therefore, now practical business transactions could begin. He did have some minor items to clarify, pertaining to the exchange of letters.

Mr. Ball had prepared a draft which he wanted to show to Mr. Borisov and hoped this matter could be completed prior to his departure this afternoon. (The draft of the letter was interpreted to Mr. Borisov by Mr. Kuzminski.)/2/

/2/The draft has not been found. The final text reads:

"In confirmation of the conversations we have had during the last few days, the United States Government is prepared to prescribe licensing conditions which will enable the United States grain trade to offer approximately 2-1/2 million tons of wheat for delivery to the Soviet Union on a CAF basis prior to May 31, 1964.

"The appropriate Departments and Agencies of the United States Government are prepared to take such steps as are within their competence to facilitate the execution of these transactions. I should be glad of your confirmation that the Soviet Union desires to purchase wheat of approximately this amount provided it is available at reasonable prices in relation to the world market." (Ibid.)

A copy of Borisov's confirming letter, also dated November 8, is attached to Ball's letter.

Mr. Borisov said that on all principal matters the letter was acceptable, but that he would like to have two minor changes if possible, though he would not insist on them. Where the quantity was stated to be 2-1/2 million tons he would prefer to have it read "2-1/2 million tons or more."

Amb. Thompson said that a definite figure was used in order to be able to comply with the requirement that no dealer handle more than one-fourth of the total quantity.

It was agreed to change the wording to read "approximately" 2-1/2 million tons.

A second amendment requested by Mr. Borisov was an extension of the period of shipment to May 31 instead of April 30.

Assistant Secretary Johnson thought there might be some conflict there with reference to the price support legislation which expired May 15.

Mr. Borisov mentioned that at one of the previous meetings Mr. Roosevelt/3/ had proposed extension of delivery time in order to get into the period of lower freight rates. Mr. Borisov had consulted with his foreign trade organization which had agreed to such a change.

/3/Under Secretary of Commerce, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

Mr. Ball thought this would be agreeable.

As to the rest of the letter Mr. Borisov asked permission to think it over, though in principle it was "O.K." He went on to say that inasmuch as the wheat question had been resolved, trading firms should now be informed to that effect. At the Embassy reception yesterday he had talked with representatives of several firms who had had no further information beyond the original directive.

Mr. Ball replied that there remained some details to be worked out between the government and private firms in order to keep the price to a minimum. He had not wanted to give any further advice to private trading firms until after having heard from Mr. Borisov this morning. These instructions would now be released.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked how long this might take and was answered by Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson that this would be done very quickly and it was agreed, therefore, that the wheat question could be considered to be completed.

Mr. Ball asked Ambassador Thompson to comment on the broader problems of trade between our two countries.

Ambassador Thompson said that he thought Mr. Borisov was familiar with the principal problem pertaining to increased trade between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It was primarily a question of credit and was subject to the provisions of Congressional legislation, such as the Johnson Act. This in turn was related to the outstanding Lend-Lease balances. The last time that a discussion had been held with Soviet representatives, two conditions for a settlement of the Lend-Lease balances were laid down by the Soviet side: first, the extension of government credit from the Government of the U.S. to the Soviet Union and second, the conclusion of a trade agreement extending most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that the U.S. Government, as such, was not in a position to extend long term loans to other countries, we had never really been able to conclude negotiations even though there was some indication that we could agree on the amount of the outstanding Lend-Lease balances. As to long term credit, the U.S. Government took the position that this was a matter for private concerns to negotiate, provided that the Lend-Lease matter had been settled. Mr. Ball interjected that this, of course, did not exclude the possibility of the government guaranteeing credit extended by private firms to the Soviet trading organization. Ambassador Thompson continued by asking whether Mr. Borisov was prepared to discuss a broader settlement of outstanding trade problems or whether he wanted to deal with individual specific commodities.

Mr. Borisov said that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate on the broader basis. The head of his government, Mr. Khrushchev, had repeatedly said this in many of his statements. He had emphasized that he was of the opinion that the development of trade leads to the establishment of good relations between countries and that, therefore, such trade should be encouraged. Mr. Borisov thought he really did not need to say this, since all present knew this very well. He was sure they also knew that the establishment of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was a fundamental condition of world-wide peace. The Soviet Union was therefore ready to negotiate on a very broad basis. In this connection, a number of questions arose. One such question was whether the U.S. was prepared to cease discriminatory treatment of Soviet commodities, Soviet vessels in American ports and prohibition of certain trade transactions.

Regardless of whether a trade agreement were concluded, such discrimination would have to be discontinued, for, as long as it existed, it was difficult to expand trade. Perhaps some of these discriminatory measures and practices came about as a result of the Cuban situation, but he knew that there were many reasonable people in the U.S. Government and that therefore ways and means to do away with these practices could be found. He had meant to say this in the way of a preamble.

Mr. Ball wanted Mr. Borisov to know that from the point of view of the U.S. Government we were dealing here with three distinct kinds of problems: (1) Congressional legislation, (2) administrative regulations, and (3) the unions' strong position with reference to Soviet shipping. With reference to the first problem, there was no American legislation which hindered expanded trade with the Soviet Union. As to the second type of problem there were only some administrative regulations connected with Public Law 480. (Mr. Chayes added that there were also some regulations pertaining to port security and inspection requirements.) The PL 480 program merely stated that the U.S. Government could not charter ships of nations engaged in trade with Cuba for PL 480 grain shipments. But this only affected the U.S. Government itself, not private companies. (Mr. Chayes introduced a slight correction by recalling that there were certain legislative provisions in the AID bill prohibiting military or economic assistance to countries engaged in the Cuban trade.) Thus, Mr. Ball continued, we come to the problem which we have discussed in previous meetings, namely, the unions' attitude towards loading Soviet and other Eastern European vessels. We had two distinct sets of longshoremens' unions in this country: the unions on the Pacific Coast, whose leadership was quite independent of the East Coast and Gulf Coast unions, did not adopt the same strong position towards Soviet and Eastern European shipping, as did the latter. However, even with the East Coast and Gulf unions, this attitude was only their position at this moment. It did not mean that it was permanent and could not be altered. In the last few days, Mr. Ball had had several conversations with the Secretary of Labor, who would try to persuade union leadership to change their position. It should be understood, though, that the Secretary of Labor was not always successful in his attempts at persuasion. Thus, for example, persuasion had failed with reference to the four Canadian vessels which had been struck in Chicago, and the government was now seeking court injunctions to solve that problem. Mr. Ball thought that the shipping difficulties could eventually be worked out if a broader trade agreement were negotiated.

Mr. Borisov pointed out that shipping was only one of the problems. Supposing that the shipping problem had been solved, there still remained the problem of a boycott of Soviet commodities. American firms had been refused licenses for Soviet commodities, and even if a firm succeeded in purchasing Soviet goods, it would still be handicapped. As an example, he cited the fact that in order to import Soviet chromium ore it had been necessary to obtain State Department assistance. He understood, however, that the ore had been unloaded in an East Coast port where the unions' attitude was particularly reactionary. The State Department had been successful enough to influence the unions; about 150,000 tons of the ore had been unloaded and paid for, and the transaction had been completed quite normally. He therefore came to the conclusion that when the U.S. Government was willing to exert its influence it could do so successfully.

Mr. Ball said that he would wish he could share Mr. Borisov's hopeful attitude. In some cases the government could, by exerting great efforts, achieve some success. In others again, it could not. But again, he wanted to emphasize that this was the kind of problem which tended to disappear once normal trade relations had been established.

Mr. Borisov said that he had a specific proposal to make and that was to negotiate either a renewal of the old trade agreement which had been discontinued in 1947 or a new one, to be negotiated in Moscow or Washington.

Mr. Ball thought we would be interested in exploring the possibilities of concluding a broad kind of trade agreement.

Amb. Thompson said he did not think it would be useful to either side to be unrealistic as to the practical problems of Congressional attitudes to any trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Such Congressional attitude would be governed by overall relations between the two countries. It was therefore necessary to take steps to develop a climate which would tend to remove such obstacles. He did not think it was possible to remove them in a single step.

Mr. Borisov agreed that he did not think it possible to settle all problems overnight. The question therefore, was what initial steps the U.S. Government was prepared to take in order to develop broader trade. For the Soviet side he could say that they were prepared to place large orders in the U.S. His foreign trade organizations were even now placing large orders for a variety of equipment in Western European countries. Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson surely knew that the Soviet Union was in the process of developing a chemical industry. For the time being, they were primarily interested in chemical fertilizer plants. They were prepared as a first step, to place an order for such a plant in this country, but wanted to know what steps the U.S. Government could take to facilitate such a transaction. Mr. Borisov thought this to be a realistic approach to the problem of developing broader trade.

Mr. Ball said that we would be interested in exploring such possibilities.

Mr. Borisov continued to the effect that if this were really possible, he would be prepared to conduct negotiations for that purpose. He wanted to remind Mr. Ball that recently the two countries had exchanged delegations of specialists for the purpose of studying trade problems. The American delegation to the U.S.S.R. headed by Mr. Ernest Rubin of the Department of Commerce had visited ports and other cities in the Soviet Union and had met with many organizations. Their delegation, headed by Mr. Alkhimov had been here. The delegation included the head of a chemical fertilizer association, a Mr. Glintsev. He had sounded out American firms with reference to the sale of a fertilizer plant. The firms had appeared to be interested, but were unanimous in saying that they had not had any directive from "above". Mr. Borisov proposed to send another group of fertilizer plant specialists if this appeared to be promising.

Mr. Ball thought this would be the best way to get started.

Ambassador Thompson said that two problems presented themselves in this connection. First, the question of licensing would have to be discussed with other Departments. Second, and more important, was the question of payment terms and credit and this was precisely the area where we would encounter problems under the Johnson Act. The Johnson Act, however, only concerned long term credit but did not affect normal commercial credit of 180 days or less.

Mr. Borisov said that in Europe and in Japan the Soviet Union had obtained terms long enough to permit the setting up and developing of production of such plants, that is 6 to 7 years. Supposing that Mr. Glintsev were to come here for the purpose of starting negotiations, and that we could come to terms on all questions including technical, commercial and other questions, what measures would the U.S. Government be prepared to take with reference to Soviet goods?

Mr. Ball thought a suggestion from the U.S.S.R. as to the type of commodities they would be prepared to offer to the U.S. would be of interest.

Mr. Borisov said that it was clear that the question of boycott of Soviet goods would still have to be resolved. Would licenses be granted so as not to boycott Soviet commodities? As to the actual items of merchandise this would be up to the commercial people such as Mr. Shershnev and others, and up to American purchasers.

Mr. Ball said that there were no boycott provisions in any of the legislation of the U.S. The only legal question to be decided was whether most favored nation terms could be extended to the Soviet Union. To clarify, historically, following the passing of the Tariff Act of 1932, a series of negotiations with various countries had led to reciprocal agreements for the reduction of tariffs with many Western European countries. The question of whether such most favored nation treatment could be extended to trade between a country whose private citizens conducted foreign trade and a country where foreign trade was handled on a state basis was something that had to be considered. Congress had repeatedly taken the position that countries with whom over the years negotiations which had led to mutual concessions, had been conducted, were entitled to lower tariffs. They had earned it. But Congress was not prepared to extend most favored nation treatment to other countries, which had not made such concessions. In any case, to the extent that a trade agreement could be negotiated with the Soviet Union the question of tariffs was not too important. He thought that many things which the Soviet Union wanted to export would be either free of duty or would be subject to very low duty only, such as for example, chromium ore. It is for this reason that a list of the commodities would be of interest to us, so that the problem could be studied in its specifics.

Mr. Borisov said that at a previous conversation he had already explained that it was not the Soviet Government itself which did the buying or selling but the foreign trade monopoly which had been established in 1918. It has been this way since then, it is this way now, and they did not intend to change this situation. Purchases abroad were made by an All-Union trade association, which had its own budget, and was responsible for its own activity. This provision was in the charter of the association. It seemed to Mr. Borisov that Americans were not too well informed as to what had happened with reference to Soviet foreign trade within the last two years. A new tariff had been established which contained two primary categories. Very low duties, or none at all, applied to countries which had a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Higher duties applied to countries which had no trade agreement. Therefore, their foreign trade organizations always had to calculate where it would be more advantageous to buy, taking the tariffs into consideration. For example, a trade agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany provided for very low tariffs. Since no trade agreement with the United States was in existence, higher tariffs applied. The foreign currency department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade supervised all transactions to make sure that purchases were made where this was most advantageous. He therefore thought our Congress, too, was not too familiar with actual conditions in the Soviet Union. In a conversation between Chairman Khrushchev and Secretary Rusk the question of buying in the U.S. had been raised and answered by Mr. Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would buy American goods if they were competitive. When Mr. Borisov said that, as a first step, he was prepared to buy chemical equipment in the U.S., he did not mean that he was prepared to pay a higher price than usual or that he would absorb the higher duty, since the foreign trade association was not permitted to overpay, and in its turn to over-charge its customer organizations. He was sure, therefore, that Mr. Ball would understand this was not a matter of solving problems for him only, but also presented problems to be solved by the U.S.

Mr. Ball said that we would be interested in exploring this matter further, for the present perhaps between Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Dobrynin.

Mr. Borisov wanted to clarify another question. In a discussion between Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Dobrynin the question of patents and licenses had been raised. He did not quite understand the place of this problem in the discussion of broadening trade.

Mr. Ball said that he had in mind some concern for the protection of technology in the sale of equipment and plants to the Soviet Union. When an American company sold to a Western European country, it would not expect that such European country would take this technology, copy it and then sell it to others in competition with the American firm's products. We were interested in working out this problem. If we were to sell plants and equipment to the Soviet Union we would not want the Soviet Union to reproduce identical equipment and sell it in Western Europe, or even to reproduce the same equipment for use within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Borisov said that obviously there were many cases when American and Soviet inventions were made quite independently of each other and differed in minor details only.

Mr. Johnson remarked that such similarity presented a problem even where major problems of patent protection and licensing had been solved, that it was this major problem we were dealing with.

Mr. Borisov agreed, but said that this was usually handled by means of special clauses in contracts concluded between seller and buyer. Such clauses did not, of course, provide that the final products of plant and equipment purchased could not be sold abroad.

Mr. Ball did not think this problem presented too many difficulties.

Mr. Chayes said that, in fact, we had studied Soviet law and its provisions for the protection of technology. He felt that in recent years, from our point of view, acceptable arrangements for the protection and licensing of technology had been adopted.

Ambassador Thompson thought the Soviets would find it easier to buy here if they were members of the world-wide patent union.

Mr. Johnson said that the U.S. was a member of two major international patent organizations.

Mr. Borisov did not think that this matter should be the subject of intergovernmental agreement but should be provided for in each specific case, by means of special clauses in the contract. It appeared to him that this was more a problem of conversation than actual difficulty or danger. The Soviet Union fulfilled its obligations. Moreover, two years ago a special foreign trade organization section dealing with patents and licenses had been set up in order to protect not only foreign patents in the U.S.S.R., but also Soviet patents abroad.

Mr. Shershnev added that the Soviet Union had begun registering its patents in the U.S., as well as American patents in the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Borisov concluded this subject by stating that he felt patents should not present any great problem. As for the last question raised by Ambassador Thompson, with reference to Lend-Lease, the point of view of the Soviet Government was the same as during the last conversation conducted by Ambassador Menshikov in 1960. He would repeat that point of view: the Soviet Union could reach agreement on the settlement of Lend-Lease payments but on the same two conditions--(1) that a trade agreement be concluded and (2) that the question of credit be resolved. Did he understand Ambassador Thompson correctly to the effect that the credit question could be resolved in an overall Lend-Lease settlement?

Ambassador Thompson said that in previous conversations the Soviet Union had always spoken in terms of U.S. Government credits. This was not practical, but once a settlement of the Lend-Lease claims had been achieved, any American firm would be in a position to extend normal commercial terms to the Soviet Union, in some cases possibly with a U.S. Government guarantee.

Mr. Borisov wanted to clarify why he had raised the question of credit. Actually, any significant volume of trade with the U.S. had been discontinued long ago. It was evident that the Soviet Union would have practical difficulties, though he emphasized that this would not be impossible, to pay all at once for everything that it wanted to buy in the U.S. Therefore, it would be necessary to begin rehabilitating their relations with American firms. During the past seven to ten years the Soviet Union had purchased capital equipment on the world market on credit terms. Assuming that the trade agreement could be concluded once again, it would be primarily concerned with purchases of capital equipment. The Soviet Union would want to obtain the same terms here as were available elsewhere. Being exporters of capital equipment themselves, they too sold on credit, for if they did not do so, no one would buy from them. It was a well-known fact that in developing countries American and Western firms were competing with the Soviet Union in selling equipment, and it was natural that whoever sold for less and on better terms got the business. Therefore, their interest in credit was quite logical. Actually, it did not mean the introduction of anything new into international trade. This, then, was the Soviet proposal on a settlement of outstanding Lend-Lease claims.

Mr. Ball thought that this offered a basis for serious discussions. For the present, such talks would perhaps be best conducted between Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Dobrynin, to see if something could be worked out, that could subsequently be formalized in Moscow or in Washington.

Mr. Borisov said that he would have no objection to such discussions and assumed that Ambassador Dobrynin would not object to them either although, should another convoy be detained in Germany, the Ambassador might be out of circulation for two or three days.

Mr. Ball said that the government would take the necessary steps to get the grain trade active with a view to producing specific offers to the Soviet wheat delegation.

The Soviet group took a few minutes to consult among themselves with reference to Mr. Ball's draft of the letter mentioned earlier, and, following the changes suggested there, the meeting was concluded.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United States
Under Secretary of State George W. Ball
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Assistant Secretary of State G. Griffith Johnson
Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor
William Krimer, L/S, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Sergey A. Borisov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
Viktor M. Manjulo, Chief, Administration for Trade with Western Countries, Ministry of Foreign Trade
Eugeni S. Shershnev, Commercial Counselor, Embassy of U.S.S.R.
Nikolay I. Kuzminski, Chief, Interpreters' Section, Ministry of Foreign Trade

 

372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, November 12, 1963, 7:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PS 7-1 US-USSR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Guthrie and approved by Tyler.

1544. Tyler called in Dobrynin November 12 to discuss Barghoorn arrest./2/ Said he was sure Dobrynin could appreciate concern in American intellectual community and Congress over arrest. Felt he must tell Dobrynin this event cannot but have an injurious and damaging effect on mutual efforts expand and improve relations in cultural, scientific, and educational fields. Said he felt very strongly only way to minimize such damage would be immediately to release Professor Barghoorn. Tyler said the immediate purpose his demarche was to associate himself strongly with efforts of our Consul in Moscow, which so far unavailing to be put in touch with Barghoorn.

/2/On October 31 Frederick Barghoorn, a Yale University professor who had arrived in the Soviet Union on October 7, was arrested by Soviet authorities and held incommunicado until the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed the U.S. Embassy of his detention on November 12.

Tyler stressed that US Government attached very great importance to this. He concluded by saying he felt it in interests both countries to minimize and reduce very strong feeling which arrest had created in this country.

Dobrynin said he had thus far received only bare information concerning arrest and would report conversation to his government. Went on to say that Soviet authorities must have had strong evidence against Barghoorn to have taken such strong action as arrest.

Rusk

 

373. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 13, 1963, noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PS 7-1 US-USSR. Secret; Immediate.

1629. Eyes only Secretary and McGeorge Bundy. Arrest of Professor Barghoorn. Appreciate instructions and discretion authorized Deptel 1545, Nov 12./2/ It seemed to me point would be more effectively made if we served warning on blocking group and Soviet Govt on reaction this unwarranted arrest in United States and inevitable repercussions affecting group's visit, thus putting bee on them.

/2/Dated November 12 and transmitted at 9:01 p.m. (ibid., PS 7-1 US-USSR Barghoorn), it informed the Embassy in Moscow that the President was "greatly concerned" about Barghoorn's arrest and that he had authorized Kohler to withhold or invalidate the visas for a Soviet exchanges group about to leave for the United States.

Counselor for Cultural Affairs Staples accordingly reached Mamedova, organizer of group, ten minutes before she was to leave for airport, and had following conversation:

"I said I was calling under personal instructions from Amb. I said we informed by MID that distinguished American Professor, Frederick Barghoorn, arrested on charges of espionage. I said I wished warn Mrs. Mamedova that American reaction to this unjustifiable arrest is very strong at very high level in both official and private circles. I said this is bound have serious effect on her group's visit. I said that if they intend to go in face of this circumstance they must expect unfavorable reception.

"Mamedova said, 'This is terrible news. What is his name?' She said she had not heard anything about this, that her group 'is very far from all these things.'

"'We must find out what happened,' she said. 'I don't know what I can do but whatever we can do we shall try. There cannot be of course any connection between a public organization and government action in a case like this.'

"I said her group was high-level group with obvious influence and that I brought this matter to their attention on official instructions."

Minister Stoessel has just returned from FonOff, where he saw head American section. He protested Barghoorn's arrest in strongest terms, stressing great concern in official and academic circles in U.S. over this action against eminent scholar. Stoessel said it was fantastic to link man of Barghoorn's stature with espionage and noted adverse effect this would have on our relations, mentioning specifically impact on reception of Mamedova group along similar terms as expressed by Staples.

Smirnovsky reiterated Barghoorn arrested as spy; fact that he prominent scholar made his espionage activities even more unfortunate. He said could not accept any link between Barghoorn arrest and Mamedova group. Latter going U.S. with view to improving relations between our countries, whereas Barghoorn was spy working against good relations.

Smirnovsky said could give no details re alleged espionage activities of Barghoorn: "Investigation is still continuing." He agreed pass on Stoessel's request that Consular Officer be permitted see Barghoorn, and made no comment to Stoessel's observation that apparent 12-day delay in informing us of arrest was unjustifiable.

I have requested urgent appointment see Gromyko.

Kohler

 

374. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 14, 1963, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PS 7-1 US-USSR Barghoorn. Confidential; Flash.

1642. Eyes only for McGeorge Bundy. I am gratified that the President plans to make statement on Barghoorn case in his press conf today/2/ and I welcome opportunity to offer some suggestions on line he might take in terms maximum possible impact on Sov as well as world audience.

/2/On November 13 Bundy had asked Kohler for his views on the line the President should take on Barghoorn's arrest at his press conference on November 14. (Telegram 1559 to Moscow; ibid.)

My own view is that action against Barghoorn by Sov security authorities has undoubtedly disturbed Sov intellectual community and possibly also those elements of Sov bureaucracy which are not primarily concerned with internal security considerations. It is apposite to point out that when making my demarche yesterday to Foreign Office I had distinct impression that Zorin, despite his past role as Soviet "hatchet man" was embarrassed and such views as he expressed on Barghoorn case seemed to me to lack usual conviction which has characterized defense by Foreign Office spokesmen in similar circumstances in past. Smirnovsky, head of USA section who attended Zorin, was clearly uncomfortable and appeared downcast throughout session./3/

/3/Kohler reported on his meeting with Zorin at 4:45 p.m. on November 13 in telegram 1638 from Moscow. In the meeting Kohler expressed the "grave concern" of the President and Secretary of State at the arrest of Barghoorn and read Zorin parts of a telegram that he had from the President of Yale. (Ibid.)

While having of course no direct evidence of their attitude, I am certain that many Sov intellectuals and particularly elements of Sov academic community are deeply upset by Barghoorn's arrest and implications it may have for continued active interchange with Western opposite numbers, although, of course, we must recognize that it would be impolitic, if not dangerous, for them so to indicate to us or other Western contacts.

I believe these considerations should be borne in mind in our handling of Barghoorn case and any public statements we may make with regard to his arrest. The expressed reaction of the American academic community is thus a particularly useful peg on which to hang any public statement, and I would think it desirable for the President amply to exploit the message from Yale University. The tone and emphasis of the Yale statement in my view is exactly right, and it was for this reason, of course, that I used it in my démarche to Zorin.

Naturally the President will wish to supplement his reference to the consternation and shock of the American academic community at Barghoorn's arrest by a reiteration of his own strong personal conviction that the arrest is wholly unwarranted and unjustified along lines set forth in your message to me yesterday.

Further, in any prepared statement the President should plan I would think it advisable to stress his personal concern that the Sovs took an inordinately long time (at least 12 days) to notify the Embassy of Barghoorn's arrest and are continuing to deny access to him by appropriate American officials and that this behavior is in contravention of established international norms with regard to protection of nationals. I would suggest that the formal statement made by the President be on this note.

Finally I would think it useful if the President would avoid any specific threats of reprisal since this might set in motion irreversible trends seriously restricting the maneuverability in policy which is vital, it seems to me, in the present context of our relationships with the Soviet Union. The President, however, should be prepared to deal with inevitable questions with regard to the effect of Barghoorn's arrest on pending negotiations. In this connection I would suggest that he respond along the following lines:

1. If the President should be asked (as we are being asked in Moscow by local American correspondents) what bearing Barghoorn's arrest may have on the tentative agreement to begin negotiations for the renewal of the Cultural Exchange Agreement, now tentatively scheduled November 15, he might express the view that so long as the Soviet Government persists in detaining Barghoorn on grotesque and unwarranted charges it would be inappropriate if not impossible to discuss with the Soviets continuation of exchange arrangements with which such action by the Soviet Government is totally incompatible. He could add that the exchange agreement envisages, among other things, the development of wide contacts between American and Soviet scholars in all fields and Soviet Government's action against Barghoorn raises apprehensions as to how it intends to treat legitimate American scholars in the pursuit of legitimate lines of inquiry. Naturally he would wish in this connection to point out that the exchange negotiations do not involve the US Government alone but require the cooperation and active participation of significant segments of the American society, particularly the academic community. An exchange agreement cannot be implemented nor can it be satisfactorily negotiated without the full cooperation of such elements.

2. If the President should be questioned on the effect of Barghoorn's arrest on continuation of the Consular Convention negotiations, he might state that the issue of protection of nationals is one of the most vital points under discussion with the Soviets in these negotiations. United States negotiators have made it clear and will continue to stress that inordinate delay in notification to American Consular Officials of the arrest of an American national is unacceptable as well as denial of access to him by such officials. In this connection the President will undoubtedly wish to underline the creditable US record on these points with regard to recent clear cases of Soviet espionage against United States.

One final suggestion which I hesitate to put in too positive terms since I recognize that domestic considerations and other requirements may dictate the course of action. With this reservation, I would think it advisable for the President to avoid identifying the Barghoorn case as obvious reprisal for Ivanov's arrest./4/ He could field any such question along this line by simply saying he, like many others, is frequently unable to fathom the motives for Soviet behavior./5/

/4/I.A. Ivanov, an Amtorg employee who had been arrested in New York in October for espionage.

/5/For a transcript of the President's press conference on November 14, during which he made a statement along the lines suggested by Kohler, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 845-853.

Kohler

 

375. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 14, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, USSR & Satellites Grain Sales. Confidential. Drafted by Giles on November 15.

Thursday a.m., November 14, Secretary Hodges received telephone request from Soviet Embassy that he see Borisov on that day concerning wheat transaction. Secretary Hodges agreed to appointment for that afternoon at 3:30 p.m.

Prior to meeting, Secretary Hodges notified State and Agriculture Departments of meeting and invited them to have representative present. Notice of meeting was also given to Mr. Bundy of White House staff.

Meeting with Borisov convened in Secretary Hodges' office at 3:30 p.m. Acting Maritime Administrator Giles and Assistant Secretary of State Johnson were present. Under Secretary Murphy (Agriculture) could not attend due to conflicting appointment. Under Secretaries Ball and Roosevelt were out of the city.

Borisov was accompanied by his interpreter who had been with him on previous meetings at State Department and by three others of his regular group (names not obtained).

Borisov opened conversation by saying he wanted to buy wheat but American traders apparently did not want to sell wheat; that he had received offers on only small quantities and that transportation charges were much above world prices. He wondered if the United States Government could not do something.

Secretary Hodges responded that he did not know why American traders may be offering to sell only small quantities of the proposed 2-1/2 million tons; that it may be due to fact they were waiting for official release of information on shipping guidelines and export licenses which were being made public that day.

Borisov then referred to high American shipping rates; that he understood from his last conversation with Under Secretary Ball that American shipping would be available at reasonable rates in relation to world prices; that this meant shipping at world rates; that Mr. Ball had indicated the U.S. Government would be able to make arrangements about shipping, etc. Borisov referred to copy of Under Secretary Ball's letter of November 8th./2/

/2/See footnote 1, Document 371.

Secretary Hodges responded that he was not present at his conversations with the State Department, and Assistant Secretary Johnson would have to speak to that.

Mr. Johnson replied to Borisov that Mr. Ball had not said American shipping rates would be the same as foreign rates but that on a C and F basis, with no more than 50% American vessels used, the difference between American and foreign rates would narrow, that foreign rates could be expected to go up and any difference in the delivered prices on the total transaction would not be significant. Mr. Johnson said the "arrangements" by the U.S. Government Mr. Ball referred to meant the publication of the export control bulletin and the shipping rate guidelines. Mr. Johnson also reminded Borisov that present U.S. wheat price is some 6 cents per bushel below the Canadian price and this meant the U.S. Government was really helping to hold down the "world price" on wheat.

Secretary Hodges said to Borisov he wanted to emphasize that U.S. shipping rates are higher than foreign rates because of higher American wages and costs. Secretary Hodges said, you will have to pay higher rates on shipping in American vessels. There is no way to get around that, and will be no way. The Secretary reminded Borisov that he had told him on the occasion of their first meeting upon arrival in this country that rates on American vessels are higher.

Acting Maritime Administrator Giles pointed out that the U.S. Government had taken important steps to resolve the shipping problem on a fair basis. That initially it was understood and agreed 100% of the wheat would go on American vessels. This had been reduced to 50%. That in addition rate guidelines for the larger vessels had been reduced 20% over the strong objection of shipping industry people. That a spokesman had strongly criticized the Administration earlier this week. (This was Max Harrison, president of the American Maritime Association in speech to the AFL-CIO Convention.) Thus, the U.S. Government had met the Soviet Government more than half way in an effort to resolve the shipping rate matter.

Secretary Hodges again mentioned the current difference between the Canadian and U.S. prices on wheat, with current U.S. price more than $2.00 per ton below the Canadian price on comparable grade.

At various points Borisov commented to effect that the matter of U.S. costs and arrangements on shipping was an internal matter for the U.S., that the Soviet Government could not subsidize U.S. shipping but that the U.S. could do so if it wished.

The conversations ended with Borisov asking the Secretary to do what he could in finding out about the market situation and bringing about the best situation. The Secretary stated he could not set prices, that was done by the buyer and seller but he would do the best he could in finding out why American traders are not offering to sell in large quantities and do what he could generally to be helpful. Borisov responded by saying he did not ask for anymore than the Secretary's best.

The conference ended at approximately 4:50 p.m.

Further notes by writer of this memorandum

Prior to the conference with Borisov it was learned through Maritime Administration sources that the Soviets had received an offer from Continental of 200,000 tons of wheat at $81.50 per ton, ($15.50 for shipping) and had received an offer from a small trader (Kerr) of 30,000 tons at $79.50 ($13.50 for shipping). Both of these offers were turned down by the Soviets. Borisov did not mention having an offer of $79.50 per ton delivered to Odessa.

On Friday morning Giles exchanged information and views with Under Secretary Murphy, and also reported developments by phone to Under Secretary Roosevelt who was then in Richmond.

There was further exchange of information and views between Secretary Hodges and Under Secretary Murphy Friday about 2:30 p.m. Mr. Murphy had learned from grain sources the Soviets had a contract form prepared and would ask next week for best offers on 650,000 tons of wheat for delivery each month during January, February, March and April. Through Maritime Administration, received information that this week the grain people had stopped asking for shipping quotations, that no one was looking for tonnage for the Soviets because the Soviets had turned down what seemed to be reasonable offers. The shipping broker (by the name of Najor) said he had been in direct contact with the Soviets Thursday evening and they told him they could pay no more than $12.00 for shipping. They also told him they were awaiting further instructions from Moscow. Najor reported he had also heard the Soviets had "put pressure" on the Hungarians for buying American wheat at too high prices.

Secretary Hodges decided Friday afternoon in conversation with Under Secretary Roosevelt (who had just returned) and Giles that he (Secretary Hodges) should not initiate any follow-up contact with Borisov at this time.

Robert E. Giles/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

376. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 16, 1963, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PS 7-1 US-USSR Barghoorn. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to London.

1679. Gromyko summoned me to MFA 12 noon today to inform me of Sov Govt decision, on personal intercession Khrushchev, to expel Barghoorn from USSR, probably today. Action by Sov Govt, Gromyko said reading from prepared statement, was in response deep concern expressed by President. He stressed Barghoorn clearly guilty of espionage as evidenced by documents found on his person and by his own deposition.

Gromyko voiced expectation on behalf Sov Govt that US Govt would take steps immediately release Ivanov. Finally, he pointed out if any US official should attempt publicly justify Barghoorn's conduct and thus cast doubt on Sov action against him Sovs would publish results investigation.

Gromyko said MFA would be in touch later today with Consular Section re details release Barghoorn. In response my inquiry, he confirmed Sovs would make brief announcement of release to press this evening and indicated no objection our doing likewise. Accordingly, Emb plans inform local American correspondents later today, preferably after firm word on release time received. Emb intends limit remarks to press to brief statement Sov Govt had decided release Barghoorn in recognition President's expressed concern at his arrest and will decline further comment.

Full text Gromyko's statement follows immediately./2/

/2/Transmitted in telegram 1680, November 16. (Ibid.)

Stoessel

 

377. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 21, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on November 21.

SUBJECT
Recent developments in relations with the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

On the occasion of the Soviet Ambassador's call today, I remarked that recent developments in our relations had not been good. He said he was quite concerned about this and said he was sure that in Moscow they were at a loss to understand what was happening. He mentioned recent public speeches, the furor about the Barghoorn case and the autobahn incidents, Mr. Ball's trip,/2/ and the wheat deal. He said that as he had little time today, he would like to have me around soon for a longer talk about these matters. I observed that with respect to speeches, that he should keep in mind that when Government officials talk about how strong we were in the military field, this had a relationship to our efforts to keep down the military budget. He said he could understand this but such speeches had different interpretations elsewhere, including Moscow.

/2/Under Secretary Ball visited Europe in mid-November for conversations on economic and trade questions. In London on November 15 he held an extensive discussion with Board of Trade and Foreign Office officials about the differences between the British and U.S. attitudes toward the extension of long-term credits to the Soviet Union. (Telegram 2391 from London, November 15; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2339)

The Ambassador said he was certain that his Government would be baffled by the fact that we had begun discussions about improving trade with the Soviet Union and the fact that immediately thereafter Mr. Ball had gone to Europe and according to press reports had endeavored to cut back Western trade with the Soviet Union. On this point I said I could categorically tell him that the newspaper reports were quite wrong and I said that some of them had undoubtedly been deliberately put out by people with a special interest to serve. I said that speaking quite frankly we were not ourselves concerned in any competitive way about credits to the Soviet Union because of our own legal restrictions. I said that on the other hand, from the point of view of the Western Alliance, we did not think it wise for the Western countries to get into a credit war with each other to see who could give the Soviet Union the longest credit. I pointed out that such developments affected the relations of our Allies with each other and it was this aspect that was of particular concern to us. I said that, moreover, Mr. Ball had not gone to Europe to deal with this question and it was only a minor item on a long agenda. Moreover, I referred to the fact that there were some standard procedures about credit to which most of the Western countries adhered, and that these applied not only to the Soviet Union, but to all other countries. I pointed out that as a country with the largest reservoir of credit, the United States might stand to gain from a competitive point of view if these practices were changed, but we did not believe that this was in the overall Western interest. When he said he understood, nevertheless, that we had tried to reduce the present trade practices of the West with the Soviet Union and to reduce this trade, I said I could assure him categorically that this was not the case.

With respect to the wheat deal, he said that he had not been in on all of the conversations but from the last one he himself had believed that we had agreed to make arrangements so that the Soviets could buy wheat at, or very nearly at, world prices. He said Borisov had so reported to the Soviet Government. He said that Borisov had no authority to go even one dollar over world prices, that he had reported recent developments to his Government, and he did not know what the answer would be./3/ I said that I could see that there was some ground for some misunderstanding but, on the other hand, it was quite clear from the whole tenor of the negotiations that we had not agreed to meet world prices as they defined them, including shipping. I pointed out that Mr. Ball had said specifically that we would not subsidize American shipping to meet the Soviet desires, and that he had said merely that he hoped the arrangements we were making would bring the eventual prices offered reasonably close to world prices./4/

/3/Following the meeting with Secretary Hodges (see Document 375), Borisov had met with Thompson on November 19 and complained about the higher cost of U.S. wheat and the requirement for 50-50 shipping. Borisov ended the discussion by saying the Soviet Union was willing to buy U.S. wheat, but that it was out of the question to pay more than world prices. (Memorandum of conversation, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WHEAT US)

/4/On November 20 the President had called Thompson to ask whether he should send Khrushchev a note thanking him for interceding on the Barghoorn case. Thompson demurred and said he would raise it with Dobrynin. (Memorandum of conversation, November 20; ibid., PS 7-1 US-USSR Barghoorn) Following the conversation printed here, Thompson expressed the President's appreciation to Dobrynin. (Memorandum of conversation, November 21; ibid., S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Thompson Memoranda of Conversation)

 

378. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 23, 1963, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Kennedy. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

1759. Khrushchev, accompanied by Gromyko, Smirnovsky (Head USA Section), Teplov (Acting Protocol Chief) signed book of condolences at Spaso House 12:30 local time today./2/ I had previously been informed by Smirnovsky who called personally at Emb, that Khrushchev would sign book and accordingly, I was on hand to meet him.

/2/For President Kennedy, who was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, November 22.

In private conversation which followed signing ceremony, Khrushchev expressed his deep personal regret and shock at death of President Kennedy for whom, he said, he had great admiration and respect; indicated he and his family had sent messages of condolence to Mrs. Kennedy; and advised that as measure respect and esteem, Mikoyan would leave for US tomorrow to attend funeral as official Sov Govt representative. Khrushchev added that while he did not know President Johnson personally, he felt sure new President shared late President's views and hoped he would have opportunity meet and exchange views with him in future.

I made appropriate reply to Khrushchev, including expression of personal gratitude that he had chosen personally register his esteem for late President by signing book of condolences.

Smirnovsky indicated Mikoyan's passport would be sent Emb today for visaing and presumably Emb will then learn and report Mikoyan's precise travel plans.

Kohler

 

379. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 24, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Secret. Initialed by Rusk and Thompson. Copies were sent to Ball and Bundy.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR, Sunday, November 24, 1963

The Ambassador asked to see me today for what he called a personal conversation, most of which related to the arrangements for Mr. Mikoyan's visit./2/

/2/Mikoyan was visiting Washington for the funeral of President Kennedy.

He raised the question of Mr. Mikoyan seeing the President, and I told him what the tentative arrangements were. He asked about the President's views on foreign affairs, and I pointed out how closely the new President had followed these matters and been kept informed by President Kennedy. I expressed the opinion that, in general, President Johnson would continue the broad policies established by President Kennedy, and drew his attention to the fact that President Johnson had assisted in the formulation of these policies. I said that naturally the new President would have a different style of operation, and I suspected would devote a larger proportion of his time to domestic affairs.

The Ambassador inquired about the relationship of the Attorney General to the new President, and I said I understood that they had worked well and closely together. I said that President Johnson had already expressed his intention to keep most of the Administration intact.

The Ambassador observed that the new President had traveled broadly and was obviously well informed about foreign affairs.

When the Ambassador pressed me for personal advice on Mr. Mikoyan's visit, I said that he would probably be invited to speak on television and that my personal view was that this was not a good time for him to do so regardless of what he said. The Ambassador seemed to agree with this point of view.

I also said that the new President would need time to settle into office, and that I personally thought that Mr. Mikoyan would be well advised not to stay for a long period in Washington on this visit. I pointed out that the public had been highly aroused by the assassination of President Kennedy, that in any country there were crackpots, and it was always possible that there could be unpleasant incidents such as demonstrations which would not be good for either country. The Ambassador also seemed to agree with this judgment.

At the end of our conversation, the Ambassador asked if President Johnson was informed about the private correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. I said that I was not sure that the new President had seen all of the exchanges, but assumed that any that he had missed would be brought to his attention if they were of current significance.

[Continue with Documents 380-390]

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