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******************DOCUMENT # 1  *******************


Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)(1)


Washington, September 1, 1963


Here is a first crack at draft instructions.(2)  In my talk to Mac, he expressed the
fear that Dean Rusk will be very sensitive to any statements that appear to make
you responsible for recommending a change in policy or getting deeply into
political matters.  Hence, I have tried to couch this in the most diplomatic possible
language while at the same time making clear that you can inquire in any area
whatever.  In particular, note the language about "refining" our present policy.(3)

Checking this against General Krulak's first draft(4) to General Taylor, I see that
my draft does not include a reaffirmation of our basic resolve to see the war
through.  This could well be added as an initial sub-paragraph for what you would
say to Diem, but should be accompanied by reference to the President's
announced position of assisting those actions which will further the anti-Communist effort, while at the same time discouraging and refusing support to
those actions that do not.

I understand that you are meeting with the President and Dean Rusk this
afternoon.(5)   I have only talked to Mac on the phone, but will be working with
him just as soon as we can get together.  For your information, he may bring up
the suggestion that State be  represented not by Walt Rostow but by Marshall
Green, Hilsman's new deputy.  Green is a very old friend of both Mac and myself
and is and is a particularly good observer, unscarred by emotions. in many ways,
I would consider him preferable to Walt, and it may be that he would also sit
better with Dean Rusk.  

W.P. Bundy(6)


**************************

Notes:

(1) Source: Department of State, William P. Bundy Papers, Chron (ISA) 1963. 
Top Secret.
(2)  Attached to the source text, but not printed.  For the instructions as approved,
see  Kennedy's note to McNamara dated 21 September 1963, FRUS IV, p 278.
(3) Reference is to a sentence in the Bundy draft in the last paragraph which
reads: "The principal objective of your mission is to obtain information that will
assist me in further refining our present policy and in directing the necessary
actions to make it effective, to be carried out in a concerted fashion by US
representatives in the field under Ambassador Lodge, as well as through
Washington agencies concerned."
(4) Not found.
(5) Rusk and McNamara met alone with the President from 4 to 4:45 p.m.,
September  9, in an "off-the-record meeting." No account of this meeting has
been found. (Kennedy Library, President's Log Book)
(6) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature .


***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT # 2 ************



Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Vietnam


Washington, September 17, 1963-9:28 p.m.


CAP 63516.  Eyes only personal for Ambassador Lodge.  Dept pass immediately. 
Deliver only one copy.  No other distribution in Dept whatever.  From the
President.

1.   Highest level meeting today has approved broad outline of an action
proposals program designed to obtain from GVN, if possible, reforms and
changes in personnel necessary to maintain support of Vietnamese and U.S.
opinion in war against Viet Cong.  This cable reports this program and our
thinking for your comment before a final decision.  Your comment requested
soonest.

2.   We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in
immediate future.  Therefore, as your most recent messages suggest, we must
for the present apply such pressures as are available to secure whatever modest
improvements on the scene may be possible.  We think it likely that such
improvement can make a difference, at least in the short run.  Such a course,
moreover, is consistent with more drastic effort as and when means become
available, and we will be in touch on other channels(2) on this problem.

3.   We share view in your 523(3) that best available reinforcement to your
bargaining position in this interim period is clear evidence that all U.S. assistance
is granted only on your say-so.  Separate telegram(4) discusses details of this
problem, but in this message we specifically authorize you to apply any controls
you think helpful for this purpose.  You are authorized to delay any delivery of
supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is
in U.S. interest, bearing in mind that it is not our current policy to cut off aid
entirely.  In other words, we share your view that it will be helpful for GVN to
understand that your personal approval is a necessary part of all U.S. assistance. 
We think it may be particularly desirable for you to use this authority in limiting or
rerouting any and all forms of assistance and support which now go to or through
Nhu or individuals like Tung who are associated with him.  This authorization
specifically includes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you are
authorized to set those in train or hold them up further in your discretion.  We
leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of privacy or publicity you
wish to give to this process.

4. Subject to your comment and amendment our own list of possible helpful
actions by government runs as follows in approximate order of importance:

a. Clear the air-Diem should get everyone back to work and get them to focus on
winning the war.  He should be broadminded and compassionate in his attitude
toward those who have, for understandable reasons, found it difficult under recent
circumstances fully to support him.

A real spirit of reconciliation could work wonders on the people he leads; a
punitive, harsh or autocratic attitude could only lead to further resistance.

b. Buddhists and students-Let them out and leave them unmolested.  This more
than anything else would demonstrate the return of a better day and the
refocusing on the main job at hand, the war.

c. Press-The press should be allowed full latitude of expression.  Diem will be
criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the domestic and foreign press at
this time would bring praise for his leadership in due course.  While tendentious
reporting is irritating, suppression of news leads to much more serious trouble.

d. Secret and combat police-Confine its role to operations against the VC and
abandon operations against non-Communist opposition groups thereby indicating
clearly that a period of reconciliation and political stability has returned.

e. Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove targets of popular
discontent.

f. Elections-These should be held, should be free, and should be widely
observed.

g.  Assembly-Assembly should be convoked soon after the elections. The
government should submit its policies to it and should receive its confidence.  An
Assembly resolution would be most useful for external image purposes. 

h. Party-Can Lao party should not be covert or semi-covert but a broad
association of supporters engaged in a common, winning cause.  This could
perhaps be best accomplished by disbanding the party and starting afresh.

I. Repeal or suitable amendment Decree 10.

j. Rehabilitation by ARVN of pagodas.

k. Establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs.

l. Liberation of passport issuances and currency restrictions enabling all to leave
who wish to.

m. Acceptance of Buddhist inquiry mission from World Federation to report true
facts of situation to world.

5. You may wish to add or subtract from the above list, but need to set
psychological tone and image is paramount.  Diem has taken positive actions in
past of greater or less scope than those listed, but they have had little practical
political effect since they were carried out in such a way as to make them hollow
or, even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martial law already nominally lifted, Assembly
elections scheduled, and puppet bonzes established).

6. Specific "reforms" are apt to have little impact without dramatic, symbolic move
which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real.  As practical matter we share
your view that this can best be achieved by some visible reduction in influence of
Nhus, who are symbol to disaffected of all that they dislike in GVN.  This we think
would require Nhus departure from Saigon and preferably Vietnam at least for
extended vacation.  We recognize the strong possibility that these and other
pressures may not produce this result, but we are convinced that it is necessary
to try.

7. In Washington, in this phase, we would plan to maintain a posture of
disapproval of recent GVN actions, but we would not expect to make public our
specific requests of Diem.  Your comment on public aspects of this phase is
particularly needed.

8. We note your reluctance to continue dialogue with Diem until you have more to
say, but we continue to believe that discussions with him are at a minimum an
important source of intelligence and may conceivably be a means of exerting
some persuasive effect even in his present state of mind.  If you believe that full
control of U.S. assistance provides you with means of resuming dialogue, we
hope you will do so. We ourselves can see much virtue in effort to reason even
with an unreasonable man when he is on a collision course.  We repeat, however,
that this is a matter for your judgment.

9. Meanwhile, there is increasing concern here with strictly military aspects of the
problem, both in terms of actual progress of operations and of need to make
effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort.  To meet
these needs, President has decided to send Secretary of Defense and General
Taylor to Vietnam, arriving early next week.  It will be emphasized here that it is a
military mission and that all political decisions are being handled through you as
President's senior representative.

10. We repeat that political program outlined above awaits your comment before
final decision.  President particularly emphasizes that it is fully open to your
criticism and amendment.  It is obviously an interim plan and further decisions
may become necessary very soon.


********************************************
Notes:

(1) Source: Washington Federal Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files:
FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (63) 19 GVN.  Top Secret; Flash; Eyes Only.  Prepared in
the White House and sent to the Department of State for transmission to Saigon. 
Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 545-547.

In a memorandum to Rusk , McNamara, McCone, Harriman, and Robert
Kennedy, September 17, Bundy stated that he drafted this cable.  Bundy attached
a draft of CAP 63516 which was similar although not identical to the text printed
here.  Bundy's memorandum reads in part: "I have taken the liberty of doing a
draft of a possible instruction that would initiate action under what we are now
calling Phase I of Track 2-namely, a final effort of persuasion and pressure short
of a decision to dump the regime no matter what." (Kennedy Library, National
Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous, Part 11)
(2) Not further identified.
(3) Document 111, Foreign Relations of. The United States, Vietnam 1961-1963,
Vol IV, August-December 1963, page ???.




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******************DOCUMENT # 3  *******************



Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State(1)


Saigon, September 18, 1963-5 p.m.


536. For President only, pass White House directly, no other distribution
whatever.  Re your CAP 63516.(2)

1. If Secretary of Defense and General Taylor come to Viet-Nam, they will have
to call on President Diem and I will have to accompany them.  This will be taken
here as a sign that we have decided to forgive and forget and will be regarded as
marking the end of our period of disapproval of the oppressive measures which
have been taken here since last May.  It would certainly put a wet blanket on
those working for a change of government.  The family are only too anxious to
promote the idea that everything is finished and cleared up, and we
should now go ahead and win the war.

2. Believe, therefore, that Secretary of Defense and General Taylor should come
with eyes open knowing that this is what the reaction will be.  It is quite
impossible at their level to distinguish between the political and military.

3. I have been observing a policy of silence which we have reason to believe is
causing a certain amount of apprehension and may just be getting the family into
the mood to make a few concessions.  The effect of this will obviously be lost if
we make such a dramatic demonstration as that of having the Secretary of
Defense and General Taylor come out here.(3)

Lodge



(1)  Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US.  Top Secret;
Immediate; Eyes Only.  Received at 7:58 a.m. and passed to the White House at
8:25 a.m.  Also see: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963,
Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 255.
(2) Foreign Relations of. The United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 252ff.
(3) McGeorge Bundy called Rusk to discuss this message at 10:19 a.m. The
transcription of the conversation began as follows:

"B said Pres asked B to check with Sec on the incoming.  Sent it around for
distribution to those present yesterday p.m. What he is thinking about is best
message back and best way of structuring the mission so as not to have
consequences Lodge is concerned about."
The conversation concluded  "Sec said last para is crucial to whole business.  B
replied this is Bob's preference.  Meet with Harkins in Hawaii but Pres thinks you
have to look at it to see it.  Sec hopes we will not announce anything until further
communication with Lodge.  B said nothing will be announced.  Mentioned stop
order to UAJ and Sec will talk to Harriman about it." (Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) The last sentence is a reference
to the question of including U. Alexis Johnson in the McNamara-Taylor party.



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******************DOCUMENT # 4  *******************




Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, September 18,1963, 10:05
a.m.(1)

Governor Harriman called Mr. Bundy.  He asked what is the reaction to the
answer from Lodge.(2)   Mr. Bundy said he and Mike talked to the President on it
a few minutes and he has some ideas which Mike is putting into draft reply.(3) 
He thinks we should be able to stage manage so doesn't give Mr. D any comfort
and doesn't undercut Lodge.  Thinking about going back to him making mission
more palatable.  Suggestion personal counsel with people at table yesterday as
to how they would advise doing it, They talked about making it military and not
joint mission.  Governor said Alex(4) fairly high fellow in State Dept; also bit
brainwashed by Nolting.  Mr. Bundy said he would make the point to Secretary. 
Governor said perhaps Secretary will want to send a lower level fellow.  Mr.
Bundy said knowing of Governor, Roger, and Mike's relationship, they would have
a representative if Mike went.  Mr. Bundy said he would call the Secretary.


****************************
NOTES: 

(1) Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Telephone Conversations.  No
Distribution.  Transcribed by Mildred Leatherman.

(2) See Lodge's Embtel 536, dated 9/18/1963.  Foreign Relations of the United
States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 255.
(3) For the telegram as sent, see infra.
(4) U. Alexis Johnson.


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******************DOCUMENT # 5  *******************


Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam(1)


Washington, September 18, 1963-4:52 p.m.


431. Personal for Ambassador Lodge from the President.  No other distribution.  I
appreciate your prompt comment and I quite understand the problem you see in
visit of McNamara and Taylor.  At the same time my need for this visit is very
great indeed, and I believe we can work out an arrangement which takes care of
your basic concerns.  Will you let me have your comment on the following as
soon as possible:

1. We can make it clear here, and McNamara and Taylor can make it clear in
Saigon to the GVN, that this visit is not designed to bring comfort to Diem.  My
own thought is that in any visit McNamara makes to Diem he will want to speak
some home truths on the military consequences of the current difficulties, and
also to make it clear that the United States Government is not open to oriental
divisive tactics.

2. We can readily set up this visit as one which you and I have decided on
together, or even as one which is sent in response to your own concern about
winning the war in the current situation.  For example, we could announce that the
purpose of the mission is to consider with you the practical ways and means of
carrying out my announced policy that we will support activities which will further
the war effort in South Vietnam and avoid supporting activities which do not.  The
whole cast of the visit will be that of military consultation with you on the
execution of the policy which you and I have determined.

3. As our last message(2) said, my own central concern in sending this mission is
to make sure that my senior military advisers are equipped with a solid on-the-spot understanding of the situation, as a basis both for their participation in our
councils here, and for the Administration's accounting to the Congress on this
critically important contest with the Communists.  Having grown up in an
Ambassador's house, I am well trained in the importance of protecting the
effectiveness of the man on-the-spot, and I want to handle this particular visit in a
way which contributes to and does not detract from your own responsibilities.  But
in the tough weeks which I see ahead, I just do not see any substitute for the
ammunition I will get from an on-the spot and authoritative military appraisal.

4. I do not think I can delay announcement of the McNamara mission beyond
Saturday (3), and I will be grateful for a further prompt comment on this message
(4) so that we can be firmly together on the best possible handling of the
announcement and of the mission itself.

Rusk


****************************
NOTES: 

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US.  Top Secret;
Immediate; Eyes Only.  Drafted in the White House and sent to the Department of
State for transmission to Saigon.  Bundy's covering memorandum to Rusk,
September 18, reads: "As I said on the telephone, the President is very clear in
his mind that he wants this to go out at once, but I am sure he would be
responsive to any amendment you yourself would wish to propose to him."

On the White House draft of this telegram there is a marginal note indicating that
McNamara also received a copy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files,
Vietnam Country Series, State Cables) Also printed in United States-Vietnam
Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, p. 548.

(2) Document 125.  Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963,
Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 252.  See Deptel CAP 63516 dated
9/17/1963 above.

(3) September 20.

(4) Lodge responded to the President in a message transmitted in telegram 540
from Saigon, September 19, received at 1 1: 18 p.m., September 18.  See
Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 253n4.






***************************************************************
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*********DOCUMENT # 6  ************

Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

Saigon, September 19, 1963-4 p.m.


544. Eyes only for President only, pass White House directly, no other
distribution.  Re your CAP 63516.(1)

     1.   Agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present
government in immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do
whatever we can as an interim measure pending such an eventuality.

     2.   Virtually all the topics under paragraph 4, letters a to m, have been
taken up with Diem and Nhu at one time or another, most of them by me
personally.  They think that most of them would either involve destroying the
political structure on which they rest or loss of face or both.  We, therefore, could
not realistically hope for more than lip service.  Frankly, I see no opportunity at all
for substantive changes.  Detailed comments on items a to m are contained in
separate telegram.(2)

     3.   There are signs that Diem-Nhu are somewhat bothered by my
silence.  According to one well placed source, they are guessing and off-balance
and "desperately anxious" to know what US posture is to be. They may be
preparing some kind of a public relations package, possibly to be opened after
the elections.  I believe that for me to press Diem on things which are not in the
cards and to repeat what we have said several times already would be a little
shrill and would make us look weak, particularly in view of my talk with Nhu last
night at a dinner where I had a golden opportunity to make the main points of your
CAP 63516 as reported in 541.(3)

     4.   Also, I doubt that a public relations package will meet needs of
situation which seems particularly grave to me, notably in the light of General Big
Minh's opinion expressed very privately yesterday that the Viet Cong are steadily
gaining in strength; have more of the population on their side than has the GVN;
that arrests are continuing and that the prisons are full; that more and more
students are going over to the Viet Cong; that there is great graft and corruption in
the Vietnamese administration of our aid; and that the "heart of the army is not in
the war".  All this by Vietnamese No. 1 General is now echoed by Secretary of
Defense Thuan (see my 542) (4) who wants to leave the country.

     5.   As regards your paragraph 3 on withholding of aid, I still hope that I
may be informed of methods, as requested in my 478, September 11,(5)  which
will enable us to apply sanctions in a way which will really affect Diem and Nhu
without precipitating an economic collapse and without impeding the war effort. 
We are studying this here and have not yet found a solution.  If a way to do this
were to be found, it would be one of the greatest discoveries since the enactment
of the Marshall Plan in 1947 because, so far as I know, the US has never yet
been able to control any of the very unsatisfactory governments through which we
have had to work in our many very successful attempts to make these countries
strong enough to stand alone.

     6.   I also believe that whatever sanctions we may discover should be
directly tied to a promising coup d'etat and should not be applied without such a
coup being in prospect.  In this connection, I believe that we should pursue
contact with Big Minh and urge him along if he looks like acting.  I particularly
think that the idea of supporting a Vietnamese Army independent of the
government should be energetically studied.

     7.   I will, of course, give instructions that programs which can be
effectively held up should be held up and not released without my approval
provided that this can be done without serious harmful effect to the people and to
the war effort.  Technical assistance and dollar support to communications
support programs may be one way.  This would be a fly-speck in the present
situation and would have no immediate effect, but I hope that it may get
Vietnamese officials into the habit of asking me to release items which are held
up and that, over a long period of time, it might create opportunities for us to get
little things done.

     8.   But it is not even within the realm of possibility that such a technique
could lead them to do anything which causes loss of face or weakening of their
political organization.  In fact, to threaten them with suppression of aid might well
defeat our purposes and might make a bad situation very much worse.

     9.   There should in any event be no publicity whatever about this
procedure.  If it is possible to halt a program, I intend to appear not as a czar but
as one who will try to do his best to put the item back on the track.

     10.  As regards your paragraph 6 and "dramatic symbolic moves", I really
do not think they could understand this even if Thao wanted to, although I have
talked about it to Diem, and to Nhu last night (see my 541).  They have scant
comprehension of what it is to appeal to public opinion as they have really no
interest in any other opinion than their own.  I have repeatedly brought up the
question of Nhu's departure and have stressed that if he would just stay away
until after Christmas, it might help get the appropriation bill through.  This seems
like a small thing to us but to them it seems tremendous as they are quite sure
that the army would take over if he even stepped out of the country.

     11. Your para 8. I have, of course, no objection to seeing Diem at any time
that it would be helpful.  But I would rather let him sweat for awhile and not go to
see him unless I have something really new to bring up.  I would much prefer to
wait until I find some part of the aid program to hold up in which he is interested
and then have him ask me to come and see him.  For example, last night's dinner
which I suspect Nhu of stimulating is infinitely better than for me to take the
initiative for an appointment and to call at the office.  Perhaps my silence had
something to do with it.

Lodge


**********************************

NOTES: 

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET.  Top Secret;
Immediate; Eyes Only.  Received at 7:04 a.m. and passed to the White House at
8:35 a.m.

(1) Document 125. FRUS Page 252
(2) FRUS, p 258.
(3) Supra
(4)  In telegram 542, September 19, Lodge reported the gist of a conversation
between D'Orlandi and Thuan in which Thuan reportedly stated that the war was
going badly and that he would be glad to leave Vietnam.  Lodge commented that
Thuan's statement, taken with Big Minh's of September 18, was a good indication
of just how badly things were going in Saigon.  Lodge's concluding observation
was: "So we now have both the Secretary of Defense and the number one
General on record not just the Saigon rumor mill." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 S VIET)
(5) FRUS, p 171.




***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT # 7  ************



Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State(1)


Saigon, September 19, 1963-4 p.m.

545.      Eyes only for President only, pass White House directly, no other
distribution.  This telegram supplements my 544.(2) I am in general agreement
with list of "possible helpful actions" with the important qualification that items are
for most part not possible of attainment.  They involve leopard's changing his
spots.  Specific comments on correspondingly lettered items paragraph 4 follow:

     a.   Clear the air.  Diem is, of course, in a sense already trying to get
everyone back to work and focussed on winning the war.  That is, he would like
them to forget or ignore or accept his interpretation of recent events.  He is in his
present situation precisely because he took a deliberate decision not to be broad-minded and compassionate and not to adopt a real spirit of reconciliation.  Much
the same comment applies as in a.

     [b.] Diem will not let any of the leadership elements out unless he is
satisfied that they are thoroughly cowed and will cause no further trouble.  He will
not leave them unmolested if they turn out to be uncowed.  His whole approach
with Buddhists and students has been to terrorize them.  If he were now able to
convince students, for example, that they would not be molested, chances are
very great that demonstrations, etc., would get completely out of hand.  This is on
assumption that there had not been simultaneously a radical change in the
government.

     c.   Press.  For the moment foreign press appears to be operating as
freely as before August 20, censorship is off, dispatches are going through
without delay.  I do not think Diem would consider changing GVN policies on
domestic press.

     d.   Secret and combat police.  This would be equivalent to asking Diem
to tie both hands behind his back.  He will abandon operations against opposition
when he is satisfied they are no longer a proximate threat and resume them when
he concludes that they are.

     e.   Cabinet changes.  Popular discontent does not run particularly to the
Cabinet but to the family.  I should not be surprised to see some Cabinet
reshuffling after elections, but I would not expect it to have any measurable effect
on popular attitudes, since public would not expect new blood to have any more
authority than the old.  For example, there is a brand new Foreign Secretary, Mr.
Cuu, and he is the most shameless sycophant I have ever seen.

     f.   Elections.  These are now ten days away.  We have already reported
before elections postponed that there are only about half as many candidates as
the last time and that there was widespread apathy among voters.  Elections will
not be a meaningful expression of popular will and could not at this stage be
made to seem so, even with most skillful press agentry.  Government will
probably have to make massive and well observed effort to get voters to polls.

     g.   Assembly.  GVN may well submit policies to Assembly for vote of
confidence, but I do not really believe that this will have much effect on the
"external image."

     h.   Party.  Diem might conceivably agree to abolish Can Lao party. 
However, as we have previously estimated, something else would immediately
be created to take its place, because a secret political organization is an
essential part of the family's power base and scheme of operation.

     I.   Decree No. 10. Possibly something can be done on this.

     j.   Rehabilitation of pagodas.  This is going forward and is probably
nearly completed.

     k.   Ministry of Religious Affairs.  Department previously rejected this
idea in favor of Council on Religious Affairs (Deptel 1196).(2)  Believe this was
right decision.

     l.   Liberalization of passport issuances, etc.  This is a key control
device which Diem would not consider giving up.  It would probably work against
our own interests, in removing from the country much of the solvent opposition.

     m.   Buddhist inquiry mission.  GVN would not permit free inquiry by
outside body, in my opinion.

Lodge


******************************************

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET.  Top Secret;
Immediate.
Received at 7:16 a.m. and passed to the White House at 8:02 a.m.  FRUS IV, p
262ff.
(2) Supra.  FRUSIV, p 260
(2) FRUS Vol. iii, p. 364.


***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT #   8  ************



Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Harkins) to the commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)(1)



Saigon, September 20, 1963-6:55 p.m.

MAC J00 7585.  Ref A. Saigon to SecState 542.(2) B. Saigon to SecState 556.(3) 

I had read ref A prior to a meeting with Sec Thuan this afternoon and among
other things we discussed how the war was going, Strategic Hamlet program,
Thompson report(4), and the wealth of rumors that were still going around
Saigon.  I said one of the rumors was that he (Thuan) wanted to resign and get
out of the country.  He categorically denied this and said it was fantastic.  He said
any such rumor that could be spread around deeply endangered his life.  He said
that he was discouraged for a time and that his health was not too good and that
he said he thought he would like to have an Ambassador's post some place.  He
asked me to please try to "squelch" even the discussion of such a rumor that he
wanted to resign or that he could get anybody else to go with him.

     Ref B (556) which is an unevaluated statement by General (Big) Minh: I
have this to say-since I have known Big Minh a year and one-half, though I have a
very high estimate of his leadership qualities, he has contributed nothing to the
war effort here either as commander of the field command or as an advisor to the
President.  In fact, he has done nothing but complain to me about the government
and the way it is handled ever since I have been here.  As you know, Big Minh
has been under suspicion since 1960 and has never been given reg command of
troops since that time and he has been kept in positions where people keep a
dose watch on him.  My intelligence people, in analyzing his statement, feel this:
that he might have been again attempting to probe-the US position to elicit an
expression of support for a coup.  This was Minh's first meeting with Americans
since the 21st of August and this might also explain his eagerness to
communicate his views.  The statement that 80 percent of the populace no longer
supports the government can certainly not be confirmed.  We have no evidence
to indicate that numbers of students are turning in desperation to the VC, though
there is some element of collusion between student group leaders and the
National Liberation Front.

At the meeting today with all senior advisers, none evidenced any disaffection of
the middle ranks.

As I have said before, you can get almost any viewpoint you want and some of
these indicate there are still coup discussions going on among the military.  We
will continue to evaluate all statements as well as we are able.


************************************

(1) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series,
Defense Cables.  Secret: Immediate; Personal.  Also sent personal to Taylor.   A
note on the source text indicates that the President-saw this cable.  Received at
the JCS at 9:54 a.m. The JCS relayed this message to the Department of State
exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman; to CIA exclusive for Helms; and
to the White House exclusive for Bundy.  Also see: "Foreign Relations of the
United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963," page 274.
(2) See Foreign Relations of. The United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV,
August-December 1963, page 261n5.  See above footnote # 5 on Embassy cable
544 dated  9/19/1963.
(3)  Foreign Relations of. The United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 272.
(4) Not further identified.


*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT # 9  *******************


Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House, Washington, September
23,1963, 10 a.m.(1)



SUBJECT:  Meeting on McNamara/Taylor Mission to South Vietnam

Present at the meeting at 10:00 a.m. this date were: President, Secretary
McNamara, General Taylor, Acting Secretary Ball, Mr. McGeorge Bundy.



The President signed the draft instructions to Secretary McNamara (2) and then
supplemented those instructions by a number of comments.

1.   He thought that it would in fact be necessary for Secretary McNamara to
see President Diem twice.  In these visits he should press the need for reform
and change as a pragmatic necessity and not as a moral judgment.  If the
Secretary and General Taylor reach the conclusion from their own investigations
that such change is essential for the winning of the war, they should press this
conclusion strongly.

2.   The President did not think that threats to cut off aid were likely to be
effective.  Since in fact only small changes were likely to be made in the
immediate future, it would be better to let such adjustments speak for themselves.

3.   The President thought that Diem would undoubtedly be aware of U.S.
connections with his opposition and that Secretary McNamara and General
Taylor should simply avoid such matters and concentrate upon the positive
accomplishments of the last decade and upon the very high level of U.S. support
and cooperation which has characterized the period as a whole.  He also thought
that General Taylor in particular could emphasize the affirmative decision of 1961
and the hopeful prospects as they appeared a year ago, as against the graver
situation which has now developed.

4.   The President thought it would be desirable for some member of Secretary
McNamara's party--perhaps General Taylor--to press these same points with
brother Nhu separately, especially if President Diem did not include his brother in
meetings with Secretary McNamara.  It would be important that the setting and
background of any such meeting should be such as to minimize the danger of its
use by Nhu as a proof of continuing American support for him.

5.   The President asked Secretary McNamara if the members of his expedition
could be counted on for security vis-a-vis the press, and Secretary McNamara
assured him that he planned to take most energetic measures to prevent leaks by
members of his mission.

6.   Mr. Ball suggested, and the President agreed, that a further effort be made
to emphasize to the SVN government the folly of sending Mme.  Nhu to the U.S.
at this time. (In this connection the President noted that Mme.  Nhu had now
included "junior U.S. officers" under her fire; he remarked that as long as she had
limited her criticism to the President, her opposition had not been serious but that
an attack on subordinates of the Pentagon was obviously intolerable.)

7.   The President emphasized to Secretary McNamara the importance of
getting to the bottom of differences in reporting from U.S. representatives in
Vietnam.  Secretary McNamara agreed that this was a major element in his
mission and said that his own judgment was more and more that the Ambassador
and his associates were thinking in terms of the future course of the struggle in
the light of the present behavior of the regime, while General Harkins and the
military were reporting on the present or very recent military situation and
discounting the possible impact of political events on the future course of
operations. (This estimate coincided precisely with what the President himself
had said some days earlier after reading Lodge's major cable 478 from
Saigon.)(3)

8.   The President was sure that Diem would spend a good deal of time on his
troubles with the press.  He thought Secretary McNamara, should agree that the
press has not always been right in its accounts. (The President thought there was
a great deal of truth in Joe Alsop's column that morning(4) which dealt with the
zealous spirit of criticism and complaint among certain newspapermen in
Saigon.) But the only way to deal with such press criticism was to get on with the
job.  "The way to confound the press is to win the war."

9.   General Taylor thought it would be useful to work out a time schedule
within which we expect to get this job done and to say plainly to Diem that we
were not going to be able to stay beyond such and such a time with such and
such forces, and that the war must be won in this time period.  The President did
not say "yes" or "no" to this proposal.



*********************************
NOTES: 

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD.  Top Secret. 
Drafted by McGeorge Bundy who sent a copy to Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and
Hilsman under cover of a memorandum, September 23, which noted: "The last
sentence of the first paragraph of the instructions was inserted by the President
after I reported the divergent views on it to him at Bob McNamara's request."

 (2) JFK memo to SecDef McNamara dated 21 September 1963. Foreign
Relations of The United States, Vietnam, 1961-1963," Vol IV, August-December
1963, page 278f.

(3) See Embtel 478 dated 9/11/1963, in Foreign Relations of The United States,
Vietnam, 1961-1963," Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 171f.
(4) Joseph Alsop's column, "Matter of Fact," entitled "The Crusaders," appeared
in The Washington Post, September 23.




*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   10 *******************




Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Hilsman) to the Acting Secretary of State (1)


Washington, October 1, 1963.


SUBJECT

Possible Political Proposals at the United Nations General Assembly re Viet-Nam

It is possible that during the UNGA consideration of the Ceylonese resolution on
human rights in South Viet-Nam(2) certain political suggestions regarding Viet-Nam may be made by other delegations.  If any formal proposals are made they
would, of course, be referred to the Department by USUN for instructions.

It may well be, however, that political suggestions or comments regarding Viet-Nam may be made as obiter dicta in speeches to the General Assembly or during
corridor conversations.  It would seem desirable that we have approved lines of
reply for U.S. representatives to use at their discretion to insure that U.S. views
are clearly known before ideas and positions of other delegations crystallize.

The anticipated suggestions from other delegations and proposed U.S. lines of
reply are as follows:


1.   Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam.

Proposed U.S. Response: As President Kennedy stated in December, 1961,(3)
"The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause
of peace and our primary purpose is to help [South Viet-Nam's](4)  people
maintain their independence.  If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will
stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are
taking to assist [South Viet-Nam's] defense efforts will no longer be necessary."
Thus, if the Communist regime in Hanoi will cease and desist in its subversive
aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States can withdraw its
forces from that country.

2.   Neutralization of South Viet-Nam

Proposed U.S. Response: Neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone would pave the
way for an early Communist take-over of that area.  Without external assistance
the armed forces of South Viet-Nam could not withstand the aggressive
pressures of the much larger armed forces of the Communist regime in North
Viet-Nam.  Moreover, the Hanoi regime, as is currently obvious, has developed
an extensive subversive and guerrilla network in South Viet-Nam which could at
any time overthrow the government of a neutral South Viet-Nam.  

If there is to be any discussion of the neutralization of Viet-Nam, it can only be in
terms of the neutralization of all of Viet-Nam when the Communists in North Viet-Nam are prepared to agree to give up political power and control in their zone.

3.   Elections for the Reunification of Viet-Nam

Proposed U.S. Response: We support the position of the Government of the
Republic of Viet-Nam that elections can be held only when there is real
assurance that the electorate in North Viet-Nam will be free of coercion.(5)


**********************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54,
Organizations and Alignments.  Secret.  Drafted by Mendenhall with the
concurrences of Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Deputy Director of the
Office of United Nations Political Affairs.  Sent through Harriman.

(2) As of October 1, the Ceylonese draft resolution was being modified in informal
negotiations.  In the resolution, the General Assembly expressed its concern
"With the serious violation of the human rights of the vast majority of people" of
South Vietnam.  The second operative paragraph requested the Secretary-General: "To communicate this res to authorities of South Vietnam, to consult with
them with a view to alleviating the situation, to take all appropriate steps to help
restore the human rights of the people of SVN, and to keep the GA informed of
developments relating to this situation." The draft resolution was transmitted in
telegram 1076 from USUN, October 1. (Ibid., Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)

(3) For text of this statement, Kennedy's part of an exchange of messages with
Diem, December 15, 1961, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: John R Kennedy, 1961, P. 801.

(4) All brackets are in the source text.

(5) Harriman initialed his approval of all three proposals.


*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   11   *******************






SAIGON CAS 34026, 5 October 1963
TO STATE FROM LODGE                               (REF: CAS SAIGON 1445)
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM LODGE

Reference Big Minh-Conein meeting (Cas Saigon 1445).  While neither General
Harkins nor I have great faith in Big Minh, we need instructions on his approach. 
My recommendation, in which General Harkins concurs, is that Conein when next
approached by Minh should:

1.   Assure him that US will not attempt to thwart his plans.
2.   Offer to review his plans, other than assassination plans.
3.   Assure Minh that US aid will be continued to Vietnam under Government
which gives promise of gaining support of people and winning the war against the
Communists.  Point out that it is our view that this is most likely to be the case if
Government includes good proportion of well qualified civilian leaders in key
positions. (Conein should press Minh for details his thinking Re composition
future Government).  I suggest the above be discussed with Secretary McNamara
and General Taylor who contacted Minh in recent visit.



***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT #   12   ************



6 Oct 1963



FROM: CIA
TO: Lodge

74228

Re CAS 1445
I.   Believe CAP 63560 gives general guidance requested REFTEL.  We have
following additional general thoughts which have been discussed with President. 
While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave impression
that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military
assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of
military effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working
relations with U.S. we  would like to be informed on what is being contemplated
but we should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans
or any other act which might tend to identify U.S. too closely with change in
government.   We would, however, welcome information which would help us
assess character of any alternate leadership.

2.   With reference to specific problem of General Minh You should seriously
consider having contact take position that in present state his knowledge he is
unable  present Minh's case to responsible policy officials with any degree of
seriousness.  In order to get responsible officials even to consider Minh's
problem, contact would have to have detailed information clearly indicating that
Minh's plans offer a high prospect of success.  At present contact sees no such
prospect in the information so far provided.

3.   You should also consider with Acting Station Chief whether it would be
desirable in order to preserve security and deniability in this as well as similar
approaches to others whether appropriate arrangements could be made for
follow-up contacts by individuals brought in especially from outside Vietnam.  As 
we indicated in CAP 63560 we are most concerned about security problem and
we are confining knowledge these sensitive matters in Washington to extremely
limited group, high officials in White House, State, Defense and CIA with whom
this message cleared.


***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT #   13   ************



5 Oct 63


FROM: McGeorge Bundy to Lodge


CAP 63590 
Your 1964 most helpful.

We will continue to be grateful for all additional information giving increased
clarity to prospects of action by Don or others, and we look forward to discussing
with you the whole question of control and cutout on your return, always assuming
that one of these D-Days does not turn out to be real.  We are particularly
concerned about hazard that an unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid
direct engagement, will be laid at our door by public opinion almost everywhere. 
Therefore, while sharing your view that we should not be in position of thwarting
coup, we would like to have option of judging and warning on any plan with poor
prospects of success.  We recognize that this is a large order, but President
wants you to know of our concern.


***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT #   14   ************





SUBJECT:  Vietnam

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, Director
McCone, General Taylor, General Krulak, Under Secretary Harriman, Mr. Alexis
Johnson, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Helms, Mr. Mendenhall (State), Mr. Colby (CIA),
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith



Mr. Colby of CIA gave the current status of coup forces.  He estimated that the
pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces were about even, approximately 9800 on each
side, with 18,000 listed as neutral.  The briefing was illustrated with a CIA order
of battle map.(2)

The President asked what Diem had learned from the attempted coup in 1960. 
Mr. Colby replied that Diem now had much better communications with military
forces deployed outside Saigon.  He could thus call into Saigon rapidly loyal
forces to oppose rebel forces in the city.  The 1960 coup was frustrated when
forces outside Saigon remained loyal, moved into Saigon, and defeated the
forces which had surrounded the palace.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the assessment just given the group be sent
to Saigon to see if our officials there agreed with it.  He asked whether
Ambassador Lodge should return to Washington now and mentioned that some of
those present felt he should stay in Saigon.

Secretary Rusk said we must assume that Diem and Nhu have heard rumors
about a coup.  The question for us is whether we think there is enough prospect
of a successful coup to make the decision to keep silent.  Should we let the coup
Generals know that a protracted civil war must not be the result of their efforts to
overthrow Diem?  Should we tell them we would support them only if the coup is
short and bloodless?  If fighting between the two sides takes place,,each win ask
for our help. ff we support Diem, then we will disrupt the war effort because we
will be acting against those Generals who are now fighting the war against the
Viet Cong.  If we support the rebel Generals, then we will have to guarantee that
they are successful in overthrowing the Diem government.


Ambassador Lodge was asked by General Don to stick to his departure plan so
Lodge should go ahead as he had planned.  We now have little information.  We
need 48, not 4, hours advance notice of any coup.  We should put our faith in no
one, including General Don.  We should caution the Generals that they must have
the situation in hand before they launch a coup.  We should tell them we have no
interest whatsoever in a long civil war in South Vietnam.

The President agreed that Ambassador Lodge should leave Saigon for
Washington as he had planned.  He thought the rebel Generals should talk to
General Harkins.  He said the odds were against a coup.  He suggested that
General Harkins be put in charge of our mission in Saigon when Ambassador
Lodge leaves.  If Ambassador Lodge delays his departure, Diem will know we are
aware of coup plans.  It would be good to have Ambassador Lodge out of the
country when a coup takes place.

Regarding the estimate that the pro- and anti-Diem forces are evenly balanced,
the President commented that it always looks this way until the coup actually
begins.  Then support for the coup is forthcoming, as was apparent, for example,
in Korea.

General Taylor cautioned against looking at the Vietnam situation as if it were a
football game.  He said a few key people are crucial to the success of a coup and
are more important than total numbers.

The President asked that we try to find out who these key people are.

Secretary McNamara asked who of our officials in Saigon are in charge of the
coup planning.  He suggested that the Deputy Chief of Mission, Trueheart, the
Acting Chief of CIA, [less than 1 line not declassified], and General Harkins form
a group which would (a) jointly decide on what our agent Conein would say and
do and (b) hear all of Conein's reports.  If any of the three disagree, a report
would be sent back to Washington at once.  General Harkins may not know what
the Embassy and CIA are now doing.  Trueheart should head the Vietnamese
country team until the coup was initiated.  At that time, General Harkins would
take over with Trueheart becoming his political adviser.

Director McCone did not agree that a troika should be set up in Saigon.  He said
it would be better for the CIA officer to take direction rather than participate in a
decision-making group.

The Attorney General, acknowledging that he had not seen all of the reports, said
that in his opinion the present situation makes no sense to him on the face of it. 
The situation in Vietnam is not comparable to that in Iraq or in a South American
country where a coup could be brought off promptly.  The situation now is no
different than that of four months ago when the Generals were not able to
organize a coup.  To support a coup would be putting the future of Vietnam and in
fact all of Southeast Asia in the hands of one man not now known to us.  Diem
will not run from a fight or quit under pressure.  A failure of a coup risks so much. 
The reports we have are very thin and the information about the assets which the
rebel Generals have at their command is limited.  We have a right to know what
the rebel Generals are planning.  We can't go half way.  If the coup fails, Diem
will throw us out.  If we send out the draft cable((3) as it stands, it will appear that
we are in favor of a coup and only want more information.  "My view is the
minority view."

Secretary Rusk replied that if we say we are not for a coup, then the coup-minded
military leaders will turn against us and the war effort will drop off rapidly.
 General Taylor said he agreed with the Attorney General.  When pressed by the
President, General Taylor said that even a successful coup would slow down the
war effort because the new central government would be inexperienced.  In
addition, all of the province chiefs appointed by Diem would probably be replaced
by a new government.

Director McCone said he agreed with General Taylor.  The failure of a coup
would be a disaster and a successful coup would have a harmful effect on the war
effort. 

The President asked General Taylor why all the province chiefs would be
replaced.  He replied that as Diem appointees they would be loyal to Diem, and
therefore, not trusted by the rebel Generals who had overthrown Diem.



Secretary Rusk said the important question was whether the rebel Generals could
achieve quick success.  He felt that in the long run, if the Diem government
continued, the war effort would go down hill.

Mr. Harriman said it was clear that in Vietnam there was less and less
enthusiasm for Diem.  We cannot predict that the rebel Generals can overthrow
the Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the country to victory over the Viet
Cong.  With the passage of time, our objectives in Vietnam will become more and
more difficult to achieve with Diem in control.

The President said it appears that the pro- and anti-Diem military forces are
about equal.  If this is so, any attempt to engineer a coup is silly.  If Lodge agrees
with this point of view, then we should instruct him to discourage a coup.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the most unfortunate development would be a three-day civil war in Saigon.  The time remaining for us to instruct Lodge is very short. 
If a military plane were sent to pick up Lodge, the Ambassador could stay longer
in Vietnam during the uncertain days immediately ahead.

Secretary McNamara thought that we ought to leave it up to Ambassador Lodge
when he would leave Saigon for Washington.  In commenting on the draft cable,
he said he thought Lodge would read it as a change of signals.  Lodge now
believes that he is not to thwart a coup.  The draft instructs him to call in General
Harkins, which would be difficult to do in view of the fact that Lodge is not now
keeping General Harkins informed of developments.  The Ambassador should be
given an option to delay his return if he wishes.

The President asked what were Lodge's existing instructions.  In reply, Secretary
Rusk read a paragraph from the October 5 telegram.(5) The President agreed to
ask Lodge what he thought he ought to do about returning to Washington.  Mr.
McGeorge Bundy said the working group would rewrite the draft cable.

Bromley Smith(6)


**********************************
NOTES: 

(1) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Meetings on Vietnam.  Top Secret.  Drafted by Smith.  Another record of
this conference, drafted by Mendenhall, is ibid., Hilsman Papers, Countries
Series-Vietnam, White House Meetings, State memcons.  In "To Move a Nation,"
Hilsman gives a detailed description of this meeting, pp. 518-519.  Also see:
Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 468ff.

(2) Not found.  Mendenhall's record of this conference contains a more complete
treatment of Colby's briefing as follows:

"Mr.  Colby opened with an intelligence assessment of the lineup of forces pro-
Diem and pro-coup.  He indicated this assessment was not based on the
information from General Don just received by cable, but rather on an overall
CAS assessment of available information.  He said that the pro and anti GVN
forces in Saigon number about the same on each side: 9,800.  There are also
about 18,000 forces in the Saigon area which can be classified as neutral.  Of the
key elements, he listed the Presidential guard, the special forces, and the armor
unit in the Saigon area as pro-GVN, except for one element of the Presidential
guard.  He listed airborne, air force and some parts of the Marine forces as anti-palace.  In response to the President's question, he stated that the only change
since August is that two Marine units have moved over to the palace side.

"Mr.  Colby said that there are two main categories of coup groups: (1) Can Lao
dissidents; and (2) the Generals.  There is some contact between these two main
categories, but not very much."

The reference to the "information from General Don just received by cable" is to
Document 225 in Foreign Relations of The United States, Vietnam 1961-1963,
Vol IV, August-December 1963, page ???. 

(3) For the telegram as sent, see below and document #236: Foreign Relations of
the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 473
and Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol II, pp 782-783.  No draft version has
been found.

(4) In Mendenhall's record, Rusk is paraphrased as follows: "if a major part of the
Vietnamese military leadership feels that the war against the Viet Cong could not
be won with the Diem Government then it is a major risk for the U.S. in continuing
with this government." According to Mendenhall's record, "The Attorney General
remarked that he was aware of no support for the view of certain Vietnamese
military leaders that the war could not be won with the Diem Government. 
General Taylor expressed agreement with the Attorney Generals' point of view."

(5) Apparent reference to Deptel 534 dated 10/5/1963: Foreign Relations of The
United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 371ff
and US-Vietnam Relations, vol 12, p 574.

(6) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT # 15  *******************





Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington,
October 29,1963,6 p.m.(1)


SUBJECT: Vietnam

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Krulak, Under Secretary
Harriman, Assistant Secretary Hilsman, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. William Bundy,
Mr. Mendenhall (State), Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith



A revised cable to Ambassador Lodge was circulated to the group (copy
attached).(2)

The President commented that he was not so concerned now about the kind of a
government which would exist after the coup as he was about the correlation of
pro- and anti-Diem forces.

Secretary McNamara agreed and asked that the draft cable stress our objection
to a situation in which there would be major fighting between the Diem forces and
the rebel Generals.

The President said the burden of proof should be on the coup promoters to show
that they can overthrow the Diem government and not create a situation in which
there would be a draw.  We can discourage a coup in ways other than telling
Diem of the rebel Generals' plans.  What we say to the coup Generals can be
crucial short of revealing their plans to Diem.  The paragraph referring to post-Diem government matters should be dropped.  Lodge should be told that from
here we can see that a disaster could take place and that if the rebels can't win, it
would not be sensible for them to go ahead.  Lodge feels that the coup is
comparable to a stone rolling down hill which can't be stopped.  If this is so, then
no one can say that we are to blame for the coup, no matter what we do.

In reviewing a request for a country team assessment of the coup situation, the
President asked that we make clear to Lodge the doubts we have concerning the
military strength of the rebel Generals and ask him to ask the rebel Generals how
they plan to deal with a situation in which their military strength is apparently
inferior to that of the Diem regime.

The President reiterated his suggestion that Lodge should tell the Generals that
they must prove they can pull off a successful coup or, in our opinion, it would be
a mistake to proceed.  If we miscalculated, we could lose our entire position in
Southeast Asia overnight.

The President said that he agreed that Lodge should return to Washington by
military plane, the time of his departure to be left up to him.

Bromley Smith(3)


***********************************
NOTES: 

(1) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Meetings on Vietnam.  Top Secret.  Drafted by Smith.  And Foreign
Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December
1963, page 472.

(2) Not found, the cable as sent follows.

(3) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   16   *******************


Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)(1)



Washington, October 29, 1963-7:22 p.m.



Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge from McGeorge Bundy.


1.       Your 2023, [document number not declassified], 2041 and [document number
not declassified](2) examined with care at highest levels here.  You should
promptly discuss this reply and associated messages with Harkins whose
responsibilities toward any coup are very heavy especially after you leave (see
paragraph 7 below).  They give much clearer picture group's alleged plans and
also indicate chances of action with or without our approval now so significant
that we should urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans.  We note
particularly Don's curiosity your departure and his insistence Conein be available
from Wednesday(3) night on, which suggests date might be as early as Thursday.

2.       Believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on its
decisions.  We believe that what we say to coup group can produce delay of coup
and that betrayal of coup plans to Diem is not our only way of stopping coup.  We
therefore need urgently your combined assessment with Harkins and CAS
(including their separate comments if they desire).  We concerned that our line-up
of forces in Saigon (being cabled in next message)(4) indicates approximately
equal balance of forces, with substantial possibility serious and prolonged fighting
or even defeat.  Either of these could be serious or even disastrous for U.S.
interests, so that we must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable.

3.       With your assessment in hand, we might feel that we should convey message
to Don, whether or not he gives 4 or 48 hours notice that would (a) continue
explicit hands-off policy, (b) positively encourage coup, or   discourage.

4.       In any case, believe Conein should find earliest opportunity express to Don
that we do not find presently revealed plans give clear prospect of quick results. 
This conversation should call attention important Saigon units still apparently
loyal to Diem and raise serious issue as to what means coup group has to deal
with them.

5.       From operational standpoint, we also deeply concerned Don only spokesman
for group and possibility cannot be discounted he may not be in good faith.  We
badly need some corroborative evidence whether Minh and others directly and
completely involved.  In view Don's claim he doesn't handle "military planning"
could not Conein tell Don that we need better military picture and that Big Minh
could communicate this most naturally and easily to Stilwell?  We recognize
desirability involving MACV to minimum, but believe Stilwell far more desirable
this purpose than using Conein both ways.

6. Complexity above actions raises question whether you should adhere to
present Thursday schedule.  Concur you and other US elements should take no
action that could indicate US awareness coup possibility.  However, DOD is
sending berth equipped military aircraft that will arrive Saigon Thursday and could
take you out thereafter as late as Saturday afternoon in time to meet your
presently proposed arrival Washington Sunday.  You could explain this being
done as convenience and that your Washington arrival is same.  A further
advantage such aircraft is that it would permit your prompt return from any point
en route if necessary.  To reduce time in transit, you should use this plane, but we
recognize delaying your departure may involve greater risk that you personally
would appear involved if any action took place.  However, advantages your
having extra two days in Saigon may outweigh this and we leave timing of flight to
your judgment.

7. Whether you leave Thursday or later, believe it essential that prior your
departure there be fullest consultation Harkins and CAS and that there be clear
arrangements for handling (a) normal activity, (b) continued coup contacts,  
action in event a coup starts.  We assume you will wish Trueheart as charge to
be head of country team in normal situation, but highest authority desires it
clearly understood that after your departure Harkins should participate in
supervision of all coup contacts and that in event coup begins, he become head
of country team and direct representative of President, with Trueheart in effect
acting as POLAD.  On coup contacts we will maintain continuous guidance and
will expect equally continuous reporting with prompt account of any important
divergences in assessments of Harkins and [less than 1 line not declassified].

8.       If coup should start, question of protecting U.S. nationals at once arises.  We
can move Marine btl into Saigon by air from Okinawa within 24 hours if Tan Son
Nhut available.  We are sending instructions to CINCPAC to arrange orderly
movement of seaborne Marine btl to waters adjacent to South Vietnam in position
to close Saigon within approximately 24 hours.

9.       We are now examining post-coup contingencies here and request your
immediate recommendations on position to be adopted after coup begins,
especially with respect to requests for assistance of different sorts from one side
or the other.  Also request you forward contingency recommendations for action if
coup (a) succeeds, (b) fails,   is indecisive.

10.      We reiterate burden of proof must be on coup group to show a substantial
possibility of quick success; otherwise, we should discourage them from
proceeding since a miscalculation could result in jeopardizing U.S. position in
Southeast Asia.



*******************************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET, Top Secret.   
The source text is CIA telegram [document number not declassified] sent to the
Department of State eyes only for Rusk, Harriman, Ball, Hilsman, and Hughes. 
Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara,
Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy; to the White House eyes only for
McGeorge Bundy; and repeated to Honolulu eyes only for Felt.  Also printed in
Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol.  II, pp. 782-783.

(2) Documents 225, 226, 229 and 228, respectively.  See: Foreign Relations of
the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, pages
?????.

(3) October 30.

(4) Follows. Central Intelligence Agency to Station in Saigon, dated 10/29/1963,
time 9:21 pm.  See: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963,
Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 475f.



*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #    17 *******************


Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon(1)


Washington, October 29, 1963-9:21 p.m.



1.       Available info here indicates that Generals do not have clear preponderance
of force in Saigon area, posing possibility of extended fighting, which we wish to
avoid, or even defeat.  We do not refer to overall numerical relationship, but
weighted estimate with recognition of critical factors of key units, surprise,
resolution, disposition, strength, etc.  Would appreciate your review of our
holdings re following units, and their component elements, viewed here as of
decisive importance and your estimate of role they would play in coup initiated by
these Generals.

Presidential Guard.  Two bns totaling 2500 men, fifteen tanks, twelve armored
personnel carriers near Palace, presumed loyal although Don claims one
company and both Thao and Tuyen have claimed that disaffection exists.

The Airborne Brigade.  Six bns totaling 4800 men.  Two bns Bien Hoa area. 
Remaining four bns in Cap Mil-District, especially at Tan Son Nhut.  Don claims
half with coup, Tuyen claimed first, fifth, sixth and eighth bns disaffected.  Many
officers discontented but contradictory reports re Col. Vien loyalty.

Marine Brigade.  Four bns totaling 4500 men.  First and third bns Saig.[sic] 
Second and fourth in IV Corps.  Reports indicate two or three bns reported
disaffected but no firm identification.  No hard reading on Commander Col. 
Khang or unit commanders in terms willingness actively join coup.  Armor first
squadron principally Saigon and north.  Varied collection tanks, armored cars and
personnel carriers.  Commander in past reported as loyal to Diem but some more
recent indications of disaffection by him and by several unit commanders under
him.  Our reading, however, is that unit would be loyal to Palace in coup situation. 
Second squadron My Tho.  Some early indications of pro coup possibilities but
more recent reports leave orientation in doubt.

Special Forces. 1200 men of which bulk in Saigon area, all pre loyal to Palace.

Police.  Uniformed 4500.  No hard info but not considered decisive.  Combat
police 800.  No hard info but presumed loyal to regime.

Fifth Division.  Bien Hoa and north. 9200 men.  We hold bulk as unknown despite
reports certain smaller components have tendencies toward Generals and Don's
claim of whole division.

Seventh Division.  My Tho. 9200 men.  We carried Commander Colonel Dam as
possible joining coup but no hard info this unit.

Air Force.  Possibly susceptible to coup effort but believed by nature not capable
of deciding issue in coup situation.

Other units exist in Saigon area such as Quang Trung training center, military
police, civil guard, territorial regiment, administrative and technical personnel
etc., but these not believed likely to be decisive in coup situation.

2.       Summarizing, comparative forces lineup would appear give Palace quite firm
base in Presidential Guard, Special Forces, with possible help of some Marines,
some Airborne and some Armor.  Coup side is estimated to include some
Airborne, some Marines, some Armor and Air Force and units outside of Saigon
which could not play immediate role.

3.       In answering above, request that availability of transportation, fuel, ammo and
any known GVN control mechanisms over units be considered in connection with
each unit's loyalty and ability to influence a coup in Saigon.

4.       Request that MACV and MAAG be consulted in formulating answers to
above, and that Amb be shown this message.


*****************************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET Secret.  The
source text is CIA telegram [document number not declassified] sent to the
Department of State eyes only for Rusk, Harriman, Ball, Hilsman, and Hughes. 
Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara,
Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy; to the White House eyes only for
McGeorge Bundy; and to Honolulu eyes only for Felt.  Received at the
Department of State at 11:34 p.m.  See: Foreign Relations of the United States,
Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 475.


*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   18   *******************


Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of
State(1)


Saigon, October 30, 1963-11:55 a.m.


1.       On 28 October 1963 Tran Quoc Buu stated to a CAS officer that the CVTC
and the Vietnamese people as a whole would willingly support a military
government brought about by force of arms.  They would support an even tougher
government than the present regime, as long as it proved itself honest and
capable of pursuing a sound policy.  The various opposition groups would accept
such a government also, particularly since such groups lacked organization and
numbers.  The CVTC would not ask for representation in the government but
would carry weight nonetheless, since it was the only independent organization,
with the possible exception of the Buddhist groups, which had a large and
disciplined membership.

2.       Buu added that the key to any change of government at this time is the
military.  Probably nothing will happen until the military acts; then all elements of
the population will immediately rally to the cause, and the present regime would
fall in short order.


********************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET Top Secret;
Immediate.  The source text is CIA Station telegram 2060 from Saigon sent to the
Department of State eyes only for Rusk, Harriman, Ball, Hilsman, and Hughes. 
Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara,
Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy and to the White House eyes only for
McGeorge Bundy.  Repeated to Honolulu eyes only for Felt and to CIA eyes only
for McCone, Carter, and Helms.  Received at the Department of State at 12:15
a.m.  See: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV,
August-December 1963, page 477.



*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   19   *******************



CAS 79407, 30 Oct '63

FROM BUNDY TO LODGE

         1.     Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant
difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para.) and on one
or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2.     We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay
or discourage a coup.  In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced
that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to
stop it.  We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade
coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does
not clearly give high prospect of success.  We have not considered any betrayal
of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly reject that course.  We recognize
the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position
should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to
proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies
intervention.  We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated
above.

3.     Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect
of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to
persuade them to desist at least until chances are better.  In such a
communication you should use the weight of U.S. best advice and explicitly reject
any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference
for present regime.  We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of
U.S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction
between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their
objectives.

4.     We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of
prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126.  We want
continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5.To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we re-
state our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be Chief of Country Team in all circumstances
and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully
informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing
guidance for coup contacts and assessment.  We continue to be concerned that
neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like
with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be Chief of
the Country Team.  Our only modification of existing procedures is that in this
circumstance we wish all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate
consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is sold in [sic]
Conein.  Any disagreement among the three on such instruction should be
reported to Washington and held for our resolution, when time permits.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation
requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most
senior officer with experience of military decisions, and the officer in our view is
Harkins.  We do not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be
publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by
our instructions, which follow in paragraph 6. We do not believe that this switch
will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U.S. posture in
the event of a coup.

a. U.S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and
U.S.-controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the
battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U.S. authorities may in their discretion agree to
perform any acts agreeable to both sides, such as removal of key personalities or
relay of information.  In such actions, however, U.S. authorities will strenuously
avoid appearance of pressure on either side.  It is not in the interest of USG to be
or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U.S. authorities may afford
asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied
obligation of this sort.  We believe however that in such a case it would be in our
interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection
of other Embassies in addition to our own.  This point should be made strongly if
need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within
these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that it should
succeed.

7. We have your message about return to Washington and we suggest that all
public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that
if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure.  We are strongly
sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out
to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you
pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.


***************************************************************
***************************************************************
*********DOCUMENT #    20  ************



Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts(1)


Washington, November 2, 1963-5:49 p.m.


833.  1. We now expect to recognize new regime in Saigon early next week.  All
missions, especially in Western Hemisphere, should be prepared to give full
explanation this decision and sharp distinction between its basis and USG
opposition to military coups against democratic regimes elsewhere.  Elements of
difference are these:

(1)Diem regime had become instrument of complete personal authority of one
family.

(2)Diem regime was deeply opposed not merely by mass of people but
increasingly by its own senior officials, civilian and military. 

(3) Regime was increasingly incapable of giving effective direction to national
effort against Communist subversion and aggression.

2.By contrast, the following can already be said about the government of military
men and leading civilians which is now in control:

(1) This government rapidly reversing previous regime's repression and has
evident and general popular support.

(2) Its declared policy is to transfer political power, in the near future, to a
popularly elected government responsive to the will of the entire people.

(3) It is rallying the nation for renewed prosecution of its war against Communist
aggression.

(4) This government, with the death of President Diem, has in its leadership his
constitutional successor, Vice President Tho. (FYI.  Tho appears to be slated for
Prime Minister's role, but exact status still uncertain.)

Rusk


***************************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 S VIET.  Secret; Priority.
Drafted by Hilsman, cleared with McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk.  See:
Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam 1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 536.


*****************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************
******************DOCUMENT #   21   *******************


Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)(1)


Washington, November 2, 1963-6:31 p.m.


CAP 63602.  Deaths of Diem and Nhu, whatever their failings, has caused shock
here and there is danger that standing and reputation of incoming government
may be significantly damaged if conviction spreads of their assassination at
direction of one or more senior members of incoming regime.  Evidence available
here is thin and conflicting, but simple assertion of suicide obviously will not end
the matter.  We believe that it is deeply in the interest of the regime to make
prompt and full explanation, and if the deaths not by suicide, to emphasize with
clear evidence all mitigating circumstances.  They should not be left under illusion
that political assassination is easily accepted here.  Across the months of
repression and increasing ineffectiveness, American people and government
remember great services to freedom rendered by Diem over many years.


*************************
NOTES:

(1) Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S VIET.  Secret; Eyes
Only.  Sent via CIA channels.  Repeated for information to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara, to the Department of State eyes
only for Rusk, and to the CIA eyes only for McCone.  The source text is the
Department of State copy.  See: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vietnam
1961-1963, Vol IV, August-December 1963, page 537.