Subject: Kill JFK=Kill rapprochement
Date: 22 Jun 1999 08:04:02 GMT
From: atlasrecrd@aol.com (Atlasrecrd)
Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy.jfk

Washington, November 25, 1963.  From: Gordon Chase
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba,
Contact
with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Cuba--Item of Presidential Interest

 Basically, the events of November 22 would appear to make accommodation
with
Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was. While I think that President
Kennedy could have accommodated with Castro and gotten away with it with a
minimum of domestic heat, I'm not sure about President Johnson. For one
thing,
a new President who has no background of being successfully nasty to Castro
and
the Communists (e.g. President Kennedy in October, 1962) would probably run
a
greater risk of being accused, by the American people, of "going soft". If
one
concludes that the prospects for accommodation with Castro are much dimmer
than
they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood's present effort loses much
of
its meaning. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell
Lechuga that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about
an
agenda with Lechuga.  Assuming we decide to let the Lechuga-Attwood tie-line
continue its present limited course, shouldn't we tell Bill to gently ease
Lisa
Howard out of the picture? (November 22 offers him a good excuse--"We are
naturally re-studying the situation in light of recent events.") Her
inclusion
at every step so far, frankly, makes me nervous.

Washington, December 3, 1963.
//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba,
Contact
with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive.

1. Last week, (after President Kennedy's death) Lechuga told Lisa Howard
that
he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to have a discussion
with
Attwood. Lechuga wondered whether things were still the same. Miss Howard
said
she didn't know anything. She later passed the information to Attwood.
2. Bill ran into Lechuga today at lunch, by accident. After Lechuga
expressed
condolences, Bill mentioned that Miss Howard had told him that Lechuga had
received the above mentioned letter. Lechuga confirmed that he had been
authorized to have a preliminary discussion with Bill (he did not mention
from
whom the letter had come although he had previously told Miss Howard that
the
talks were authorized by Castro). Lechuga wondered how things now stood.
Bill
told Lechuga he would let him know. They also agreed, that from this point
on,
there was no further need to use Lisa Howard as an intermediary.
3. Bill doesn't know whether Castro wrote the letter before or after the
death
of President Kennedy. In any event, Lechuga has apparently received no
stop-order since the assassination. One might assume, therefore, that the
assassination has not changed Castro's mind about talking to the U.S.
4. The ball is in our court; Bill owes Lechuga a call. What to do? Bill
thinks
that we have nothing to lose in listening to what Castro has to say; there
is
no commitment on our side. Also, it would be very interesting to know what
is
in the letter.
I am also dying to know what's in the letter and two weeks ago I would not
have
hesitated. But things are different now, particularly with this Oswald
business. At a minimum, such a talk would really have to be a non-event. I,
for
one, would want to think this one over carefully.
 One main problem is that, in his meeting with Lechuga, Bill may tend to
convey
a spirit of accommodation, which, when reported, could relieve Castro of an
increased anxiety which the assassination of President Kennedy seems to have
produced and which is in our interest to maintain. Therefore, we should
stress
to Bill that he must convey the sense of an interested but non-committal
listener, completely confident of his position. Expressed in words, the mood
should be roughly as follows:
"Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We
intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressure against
you
until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover,
you
can forget about getting 'another Cuba' in the Hemisphere. We have learned
our
lesson and 'another Cuba' is simply not going to happen. If you don't feel
you
can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite
content
to continue on our present basis."