CABLEGRAM FROM BUNDY TO LODGE, October 30, 1963
Source: U.S. Involvement in the Overthrow, of Diem, 1963;
Congressional Hearings; pp 65-67.


1. Your 2023. 2040. 2041 and 2043 examined with care at highest
levels here. You should promptly discuss this reply and
associated messages with Harkins whose responsibilities toward
any coup are very heavy especially after you leave (see para. 7
below). They give much clearer picture group's alleged plans and
also indicate chances of action with or without our approval now
so significant that we should urgently consider our attitude and
contingency plans. We note particularly Don's curiosity your
departure and his insistence Conein be available from Wednesday
night on, which suggests date night be as early as Thursday. 

2. Believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive
effect on its decisions. We believe that what we say to coup
group can produce delay of coup and that betrayal of coup plans
ta Diem is not repeat not our only way of stop- ping coup. We
therefore need urgently your combined assessment with Harkins and
CAS (including their separate comments if they desire). We
concerned that our line-up of forces in Saigon (being cabled in
next message) indicates approximately equal balance of forces,
with substantial possibility serious and prolonged fighting or
even defeat. Either of these could be serious ar even disastrous
for U.S. interests, so that we must have assurance balance of
forces clearly favorable.

3. With your assessment in hand we might feel that we should
convey message to Don, whether or not he gives 4 or 48 hours
notice that would (A) continue explicit hands-off policy, (B)
positively encourage coup. or (C) discourage.

4. In any case, believe Conein should find earliest opportunity
express to Don that we do not find presently revealed plans give
clear prospect of quick results. This conversation should call
attention important Saigon units still apparently loyal to Diem
and raise serious issue as to what means coup group has to deal
with them.

5. From operational standpoint, we also deeply concerned Don only
spokesman for group and possibility cannot be discounted he may
not be in good faith. We badly need some corroborative evidence
whether Minh and others directly and completely involved. In view
Don's claim he doesn't handle "military planning" could not
Conein tell Don that we need better military picture and that Big
Minh could communicate this most naturally and easily to
Stillwell?  We recognize desirability involving MACV to minimum,
but believe Stillwell far more desirable this purpose than using
Conein both ways.

6. Complexity above actions raises question whether you should
adhere to present Thursday schedule. Concur you and other U.S.
elements should take no action that could indicate U.S. awareness
coup possibility.  However, DOD is sending berth-equipped
military aircraft that will arrive Saigon
Thursday and could take you out thereafter as late as Saturday
afternoon in time to meet your presently proposed arrival
Washington Sunday. You could explain this being done as
convenience and that your Washington arrival is same. A further  
advantage such aircraft is that it would permit your prompt
return from any point en route if necessary. To reduce time in
transit, you should use this plane, but we recognize delaying
your departure may involve greater risk that you personally would
appear involved if any action took place. However, advantages
your having extra two days in Saigon may outweigh this and we
leave timing of flight to your judgment.   

7. Whether you leave Thursday or later, believe it essential that
prior your departure there be fullest consultation Harkins and
CAS and that there be clear arrangements for handling (A) normal
activity, (B) continued coup contacts, (C) action in event a coup
starts. We assume you will wish Truehart as charge to be head of
country team in normal situation, but highest authority desires
it clearly understood that after your departure Harkins should
participate in supervision of all coup contacts and that in event
a coup begins, he become head of country team and direct
representative of President, with Truehart in effect acting as
POLAD. On coup contacts we will maintain continuous reporting
with prompt account of any important divergences in assessments 
of Harkins and Smith.     

8. If coup should start, question of protecting U.S. nationals at
once  arises. We can move Marine Battalion into Saigon by air
from Okinawa within 24 hours - available. We are sending
instructions to CINCPAC to arrange orderly movement of seaborne
Marine Battalion to waters adjacent to South Vietnam in  position
to close Saigon within approximately 24 hours.     

9. We are now examining post-coup contingencies here and request
your immediate recommendations on position to be adopted after
coup begins, especially  with respect to requests for assistance
of different sorts from one side or the  other also request you
forward contingency recommendations for action if coup i  (A)
succeeds, (B) fails, (C) is indecisive.       

10. We reiterate burden of proof must be on coup group to show a
substantial possibility of quick success; otherwise, we should
discourage them from proceeding since a miscalculation could
result in jeopardizing U.S. position in Southeast Asia.