observation and concealment: on the surface and from above
weapons, equipment, and personnel performance: heat, humidity, dust, and water supplies are prominent influences
The desert and riverine Iraq, which is bounded by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, are geographically so different that military forces and operational methods suitable for one region are inapplicable for the other.
Routes to Iraq
Iraq, a nearly landlocked country more than twice as large as Utah, is remote from the United States. Repeated aerial refueling is required for nonstop flights by tactical combat aircraft and military transports, even when overflights rights allow the shortest routes. Maintenance problems will deplete the airlift fleet after repeated round trips to reinforce and resupply U.S. deployments.
Cargo ships en route to Iraq from the U.S. east coast must span the Atlantic, then transit the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal or round the Cape of Good Hope. Vessels that depart U.S. west coast ports cross the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Those long journeys strain suitable sealift, which must deliver most tanks and other heavy equipment, plus perhaps 95 percent of all supplies. Shortages in self-sustaining, break-bulk transports that can accommodate oddly shaped and outsize cargo could become especially pressing. Container ships, designed to carry prepackaged goods, are poorly suited for such purposes.
Iraqi Regions
Iraq measures roughly 550 straight-line miles from Turkey to Kuwait, and about 400 miles east to west at its waist between Iran and the Jordan panhandle. Three geographic regions that feature distinctive topography, climatic regimes, vegetation, and population patterns lie within Iraq's 2,100-mile perimeter: region I, desert and steppe plains that overlap Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; region II, riverine Iraq; region III, northeast highlands (see map below).
Region I. Desert and Steppe. Region I consists of flat or gently rolling plains that stretch from the Persian Gulf to mountains near the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Local relief is slight, although many sizable wadis (water courses dry most of the year) etch the surface, which is mainly thin, hard-packed soil, gravel, and bare rock interspersed with small salt pans and patches of sand.
Most of the region is parched due to low rainfall, high temperatures, and drying winds. Rutbah, a "wet spot" on the road to Jordan, averages 4.7 inches of rain annually, with none in the summer. Kuwait on the coast and Riyadh in Arabia's interior have similar patterns, but less precipitation: 3.5 inches and 3.8 inches, respectively (see Climatic Statistics table). Top temperatures at the latter two stations usually exceed 100 deg.F. every day during the summer months, which is June through September in Kuwait, with a mean daily maximum of 100-112 deg.F. in the shade. Kirkuk, somewhat farther north and on higher ground, is almost as warm. Nighttime temperatures mercifully dip into the upper 70s and low 80s during the same period. Winters are chilly by comparison. Kuwait City and Riyadh, for example, rarely register higher than 80 deg.F. in midafternoon from November through March; mean lows after dark range from the mid-40s to mid-50s.
The paucity of vegetation is not surprising given those climatic conditions. Poor pasture for goats and camels sprouts wherever desert merges with steppe, especially between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers north of Baghdad, but the rest of the region is barren and inhabited only by nomads, except for isolated oases.
The few roads that traverse those wastelands almost all radiate from Baghdad. Only two railways run west from the Tigris River. One short stretch between Mosul and the Syrian border thereafter wends it way toward Aleppo and Turkey. The other links Kirkuk with Al Hadithah, a petroleum refinery and pipeline town on the Euphrates, thence to Rutbah, an outpost on the road to Jordan.
Iraq's major industry is oil, with centers at Mosul and Kirkuk. Revenues therefrom sustain the nation. Principal pipelines run to Turkey, Tripoli on Syria's coast, and the Red Sea. A U.N. "oil for food" agreement stipulates that most Iraqi oil exports must pass through the pipeline to Turkey, but both others long have been closed. [map]
Region II. Riverine Iraq. Riverine Iraq, which corresponds closely to biblical Mesopotamia, is bounded east and west by the Tigris-Euphrates river basins and their common delta from a bit north of Baghdad to the Persian Gulf (about 330 by 170 miles). The region is small compared with deserts and steppes, but infinitely more complex.
The Tigris and Euphrates pursue generally parallel paths across level lands until they converge near an immense marsh called Hawr al Hammar, then continue south as the Shatt al Arab, a single stream that empties into the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates, which depends on runoff from a single distant catchment, has no tributaries in Iraq. Its lower course shrinks from evaporation, percolation, and depletion for irrigation purposes. The Tigris, fed by the Great Zab, Little Zab, and Diyala, flows faster and deeper. Neither, however, ever is less than 500 feet wide and 3-5 feet deep. Neither is easily fordable, even at low water in September and October. Both are apt to flood in the spring, because they flow between levees in region II and the gradient drops only an inch or two per mile for the last 100 miles. Local storms in the Zagros Mountains of southwest Iran occasionally cause the Tigris to rise 10-12 feet in 24 hours, spreading destruction over many square miles.
Shallow lakes, swamps, mud flats, canals, ditches, dikes, and causeways consequently abound. Water supplies are plentiful but biologically polluted and sometimes brackish. Heat comparable to that in the desert and coupled with high humidity encourages cultivation on Iraq's most arable land. Date groves, other fruit, vegetable gardens, and rice are especially popular. Human occupants, however, stifle in summer, covered with perspiration and powdery dust borne on nearly ceaseless northwest winds known as Shamal.
Riverine Iraq contains about three-fourths of the country's population. An estimated 4.8 million live in Baghdad, the capital and main metropolis. Basra, the second biggest city and largest port, housed about 1.5 million according to the 1977 census, before the eight-year war with Iran (1980–1987) and Saddam Hussein's "cleansing" campaigns against Shiites in southern Iraq after Desert Storm reduced that total by about two-thirds. Most towns of 10,000–100,000 people also occupy region II.
The road and rail net is much denser in region II than elsewhere in Iraq. Most routes are built on embankments to ensure firm foundations and avoid washouts. [map]
Military Implications
The geographic regions just described influence military plans and operations at every organizational level. This area analysis views strategic, tactical, and logistic implications mainly from the standpoint of senior commanders.
Key Terrain. Key terrain, the environmental foundation for military objectives and targeting policies, constitutes physical features, natural and artificial, the seizure, retention, destruction, or indirect control of which would confer distinctive (sometimes decisive) advantages on a country or coalition.
Four strategically critical areas are identifiable within Iraq. All are cities and associated activities:
Baghdad, the seat of government, transportation and communication center, and cultural heart of Iraq easily leads the list. Many military installations, power plants, chemical warfare production facilities, an oil refinery, missile sites, and major airfields lie within a 50-mile radius.
Heavily fortified Tikrit, 90 miles north of Baghdad, is Saddam Hussein's birthplace and a power base occupied by die-hard supporters.
Kirkuk and Mosul are focal points of Iraq's petroleum industry. Oil fields, refineries, and associated facilities are found nearby, along with large military bases and airfields.
Basra, the principal port, is the primary point of entry from the Persian Gulf.
Three categories of targets could substantially diminish friendly as well as enemy military capabilities if severely damaged or destroyed.
Transportation bottlenecks along roads and railways clearly qualify as key terrain. Only a few bridges span the Tigris and Euphrates, all would be difficult to replace, and bypasses are far between.
Movement to or from region II would be difficult if attacks on dikes and dams flooded flatlands.
Disruption of oil production and distribution facilities could cripple Iraq's economy and hamper military operations for long or short periods, depending on the pressure points selected. Power plants that run the system are especially vulnerable.
Avenues and Obstacles. Roads that traverse region I to and from Iraq are few, but that deficiency inhibits military movement much less than elsewhere because the hard, flat surface simplifies cross-country trafficability for wheeled as well as tracked vehicles. The author, for example, long ago journeyed from Damascus to Baghdad by bus, with rare glimpses of any formal route. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that sharp stones and thorns as thick as a thumb inflicted 161 flat tires on the 1st Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National Guard when it moved north from Riyadh to blocking positions in August 1990.
Off-the-road travel seldom is inviting in riverine Iraq, where mushy ground makes it difficult to circumvent one-lane bridges and villages with narrow streets. The Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt al Arab are imposing barriers to east-west movement. Hawr al Hammar and the delta obstruct north-south traffic as well.
Distance seldom is considered an obstacle, but tanks and other armored vehicles tend to break down on long trips. Wheeled transporters accordingly are often the mode of choice when enemy action seems unlikely.
Long trips are the rule in Iraq. It is more than 350 miles by road from Baghdad to Basra, for example, and about the same distance from Baghdad to the Jordanian border. Airborne light infantry divisions that lack much mobility on land must be motorized, provided ample helicopter supports, or be assigned relatively static missions.
Desert and steppe terrain favors airborne and airmobile operations, although high winds and dust may limit opportunities. Riverine Iraq, in contrast, offers few large drop zones and landing zones (rice fields may be best). The delta in such regards seems similar to Vietnam; reeds that flank the Shatt al Arab, for example, exceed 20 feet. The 36-mile delta coast also discourages large-scale amphibious assaults. Shallow waters, shoals, muddy shores, and few usable exits typify that territory.
Observation and Concealment. Land forces in the desert enjoy almost unlimited observation, except during dust storms. The sere, flat landscape, virtually devoid of vegetation, allows fine fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons. Occasional wadis (usually dry stream beds), isolated dunes, and folds in the ground afford the only cover.
Aerial observers claim clear views as far as the eye can see. Vehicular columns on the move in region I raise telltale clouds of dust that mark their location and line of march. Formations at rest also are visible. U.S. armed forces, which enjoy air superiority, consequently have a huge advantage.
Personnel and Equipment Performance. October or November through March or April are preferred months for military operations, because summer heat seriously degrades the performance of humans and machines everywhere in Iraq and adjacent Arab territory. Dehydration and heat prostration are constant dangers even for acclimatized troops, unless they take proper precautions that include shelter from the sun whenever possible and drinking copious quantities of water, which rarely is readily available in the desert and must be purified in region II. Unless proper preventive measures are enforced, sanitation problems quickly can become unmanageable under the hot sun. Dead bodies swell and burst; flies that feed on garbage and human waste broadcast disease.
Metal is blistering hot to touch from May through September. Aircraft and vehicle maintenance is a clumsy process for mechanics, who must wear gloves. Electronic equipment, including essential computers and sensors, is especially sensitive to these temperatures. Malfunctions occur if air conditioning and other precautions prove insufficient. Heavyweight oil and other special lubricants are required. Armed forces skilled at night fighting are worth a lot in that ovenlike environment.
Abrasive, windblown sand and silt clog machines, jam weapons, seep past engine filters, pit radar scopes, and contaminate food. Grit magnifies maintenance requirements manyfold. Performance in emergency becomes problematic and the service life of equipment shortens, despite all preventive measures. Logistic loads increase commensurately in riverine Iraq as well as the desert, because both regions experience similar problems.
The value of water in the desert is well known. Large-scale deployments far from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers require immense imports to satisfy human needs and keep engines cool. Water for personal consumption by U.S. forces—drinking, cooking, bathing, laundry—presently approximates 11 gallons per day. Vehicles demand 10–12 gallons more. Few collateral casualties would occur if Iraq initiated chemical warfare where permanent settlements are small and scarce, but persistent agents could be militarily disastrous, because it takes about 200,000 gallons of wash water to decontaminate one division. Water for such purpose is plentiful in riverine Iraq, but the closely packed civilian population could suffer under best-case conditions.
Geographic Aspects of "Operation Swamp Storm"
The two geographic regions described above differ dramatically in most respects. Primary overland access to the heart of Iraq, for example, covers watery lowlands between the Persian Gulf and Baghdad. Operation Desert Storm (1991) and what might be called Operation Swamp Storm thus diverge geographically in at least six crucial respects:
Springboard Bases
Desert Storm: Saudi Arabia provided conveniently located operational and logistic bases from which to assault Iraqi armed forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq.
Swamp Storm: U.S. Central Command's plans initially called for simultaneous attacks from north and south, but Turkish leaders disagreed. Turkey authorizes overflights but its military bases are off limits to U.S. air and ground forces.
Population Patterns Desert Storm: Sparse. The likelihood of civilian casualties from combat inside cities was low. Iraqi missile attacks endangered only a few metropolitan areas, such as Riyadh, Dhahran, and Tel Aviv.
Swamp Storm: Dense. A considerable number of Iraqi civilians conceivably could become casualties, because a high percentage of the population occupies a targeted region bounded by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf.
Climate Desert Storm: Hot, dry summers. Temperatures were high during the summertime buildup, but moderated before military operations began. Windblown grit invariably complicated maintenance problems.
Swamp Storm: Hot, steamy summers. Relatively cool temperatures favor military operations well into April. The combination of heat coupled with high humidity (not present during Desert Storm) will make operations miserable if victory is not achieved before summer.
Transportation Network
Desert Storm: Sparse. The dearth of roads limited military mobility very little, because wheeled and tracked vehicles zipped across the hard-packed desert.
Swamp Storm: Dense. Freedom of vehicular movement would be limited in riverine Iraq, despite a network of roads, because dikes, levees, bridges, waterways, and built-up areas impose numerous potential obstacles. Spongy soil limits cross-country bypasses.
Cover and Concealment
Desert Storm: Generally level land, sparse vegetation, and nearly nonexistent permanent habitations severely limited cover and concealment for forces on both sides.
Swamp Storm: Trees, tall grass, and man-made structures provide plentiful hiding places in riverine Iraq. Cover and concealment unfortunately favor static defenders much more than offensive forces, which often must move through open space.
Water Desert Storm: Little or none. Few oases were useful for large military formations.
Swamp Storm: Water is generally plentiful, but mostly nonpotable. If Saddam Hussein doused troops with persistent chemicals, wash water for decontamination purposes would be readily available.
Armed forces, strategies, tactics, and logistical techniques that worked well in wide open spaces during Desert Storm are largely inapplicable in riverine Iraq. U.S. Central Command accordingly requires plans operational that suit conditions in both geographic regions.
Colonel John M. Collins completed a 30-year Army career in 1972, served the next 24 years as Senior Specialist in National Defense with the Congressional Research Service, and has been a distinguished visiting research fellow at National Defense University since 1996. One of his 12 books is Military Geography.
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