Trust is not enoughThis essay considers trust and distrust, and in particular whether distrusting a person or an organization is enough to discredit its statements or evidence. I will show that contrary to what is often assumed by JFK researchers, simple distrust is not enough.
    Increasingly, conspiracists are using past omissions and errors by the FBI, the Secret Service, and other governmental agencies—which in principle are not to be denied unless one believes in a perfect world—to justify distrusting them completely and then rejecting whichever of their statements and evidence are convenient at the moment. They offer statements such as:

• "How can anyone ignore all the proof of lying by the government?"
• "In view of the FBI’s record of tampering with evidence and destroying evidence, how can anyone trust any evidence that the FBI offers?"
•  "How can educated people not realize that the FBI is so dishonest?"

Perhaps the ultimate expression of this view is the statement of one critic that nearly the entire credibility of the Warren Commission Report stands or falls on whether we can trust the evidence provided them by the FBI. Naturally, this critic soundly rejects the report.
    Let us examine the general argument underlying the mindset of distrustfulness. It can be expressed in four steps:

1. The government has lied to us, etc. at some time in the past.
2. Therefore, it may lie, etc. again.
3. Therefore, we can’t trust its assertions or evidence.
4. Therefore, we reject its assertions and evidence. (Rarely stated directly, but confirmed by the actions of researchers when they refuse to deal with consequences of evidence they distrust.)

This argument is triply fallacious and must be rejected. First, even if we grant that the premise in Step 1 is accurate for the JFK case (which is seldom demonstrated), the conclusion in Step 2, that the government may lie again, is fallacious because it is based on the invalid principle of induction—that a conclusion from one instance can be applied to another. (The correct version of Step 2 would be that we cannot know whether the government will lie again.) This then invalidates the conclusion in Step 3, that we can’t trust the government in specific instances—the second fallacy. (The corrected Step 3 would state that we cannot know whether to trust the government’s assertions and evidence.) The next problem stems from the fact that between Steps 3 and 4, two major points are missing, namely that ways for testing and validating evidence exist, and that the government itself has built into its system of evaluating evidence multiple safeguards such as chains of custody, testifying under oath, and using forensic procedures to check evidence. This invalidates the conclusion in Step 4, that we must reject all evidence from the government—the third fallacy. (Step 4 should state that we cannot know whether we should reject any or all evidence from the government or from any other source.) On balance, we might call this overall argument "The three fallacies of doubt."
    Doubters and critics can also fool themselves into thinking that they are being more careful with evidence than the government is, when in reality they are doing the opposite. They ignore the fact that through its legal system, the government inserts these safeguards between the distrust embodied in Step 3 and the rejection in Step 4. In effect, the government is telling us not to trust its own institutions if we can’t validate their evidence. It is thus subjecting itself to a rigorous and objective test, whereas the critics are settling for the hasty conclusion of dismissing the statements and evidence out of hand. Furthermore, the government is being harsher on itself than on others—whereas it commonly applies the standard of "Trust but verify" to international treaties, concerning itself it admonishes, "Don’t trust us until you verify us." By contrast, critics say to the government, "We knee-jerk distrust you and so don’t need to verify you." If their own government will go the extra mile and recognize that trust is not enough, shouldn’t the critics?
    The logically sound attitude toward the government (or any other agency or person, for that matter) can be expressed formally in three chains of logic, each of which applies to a different hypothetical situation:

1. The government has never lied in the past.
2. We cannot predict future behavior from its past behavior.
3. Therefore, we cannot know whether the government will lie in the future—ever or in any specific instance.

1. The government has lied in the past.
2. We cannot predict future behavior from its past behavior.
3. Therefore, we cannot know whether the government will lie in the future—ever or in any specific instance.

1. The government has always lied in the past (never told the truth in the past).
2. We cannot predict future behavior from its past behavior.
3. Therefore, we cannot know whether the government will lie in the future—ever or in any specific instance.

    In other words, no matter whether the government has never lied, has sometimes lied, or has always lied, we can say nothing with certainty about whether it will lie in the future. When the critics conclude that because the government has lied in the past, it will always lie in the future, they are using a fallacious modification of the second logical train above, saying in effect, "You lied once, you will lie ever after." This is far stronger than even the common "Once a liar, always a liar." Such unjustified negativism violates both classical logic and established American legal practice (where a witness’s previous lies cannot be used to discredit his present testimony).
    How then should we handle the question of trust? The solution is easy—forget about the track record of the source and evaluate its evidence and assertions individually and with an open mind. Trust nobody, and check them all equally. I am puzzled why so few JFK researchers take that next step and try to check the government’s individual statements and evidence. Since the government itself tells us we should do this, why do the critics refuse? I come up with only four possible reasons, none of which please me:

1. Critics don’t understand their argument well enough to realize that they should be checking all evidence.
2. They don’t know how to check evidence (as is obvious from the critical literature).
3. They are unable or unwilling to learn (it’s hard and requires time, patience, and discipline).
4. They are afraid of the answer (nothing breaks an argument like valid evidence).

"Pleasing" notwithstanding, I believe that all four of these reasons apply to today’s critical community. Specific examples will be presented in another essay.