Who
Killed Whom and Why?
Dark Thoughts About Dark Events
M.S. Arnoni, The Minority of One, January 1964
All speculation about the forces behind the
shocking murder of the late President John F. Kennedy and about its political
repercussions suffers from a severe limitation; for while any analysis must aim
to embrace the whole epos, the assassination itself is probably a mere prelude
to an historical tragedy the scope of which is not yet discernable. Another
problem for the analyst is the border line between the believable and the
unbelievable in the mind of the public. This border line is set by national
biases to a far greater extent than by actual objective judgment of facts,
events and likelihoods. What Americans reject as inconceivable developments
culminating in the assassination is largely based on mental preconditioning. The
popular view of the American body politic as a free and democratic set-up
responsive to the spontaneous wishes of the majority lulls many people into
rejecting without examination any theory predicated on sinister schemes within
the power structure. The distance and strangeness of foreign peoples enable
Americans to recognize and even to exaggerate the degree of cynicism involved in
the internal power struggles of other countries, especially if they happen to be
hostile toward those countries. No tale of intrigue ever sounds too wicked to
American ears if the setting is the Kremlin, or some Latin American palace. But
when it comes to America, well, we know we are “basically” the most decent
and democratic of nations, and that shadowy deeds probable elsewhere are
impossible here; and that even if they do occur, they are exceptions, dark spots
on an otherwise innocent national record.
This prejudice is a virtual guarantee against penetrating
popular inquiry into the facts behind the assassination of President Kennedy;
yet it is probable that the truth here is in direct proportion to its
unacceptability by the popular American mind, and that its sinister nature is
far more marked than Americans can imagine of the American Establishment. It is
no coincidence that the foreign press, including the friendly foreign press, was
immeasurably more ready than newspapers here to treat the assassination as an
outcome of a possible political plot within high echelons of effective American
power.
Hundreds of circumstances and details pertaining to the
killing, the suspected assassin, the assassination of the assassin, the behavior
of the Dallas police, etc., etc., will give rise to a whole new field of
literature. Scores of books will be written over decades, pointing out the
incompatibility of accounts which are now being taken at face value. This
literature will be justified by the truism that the closer we are to historic
events in place and time the more difficult it is to perceive the truth about
them.
In spite of all these disadvantages, the political observer
cannot subdue his urge to theorize and speculate. Man’s intellect includes a
blind stubbornness about admitting ignorance; and we often pretend to know best
that about which we know least, as witness religion.
Thus, on the assumption—not necessarily correct—that we
can already discern some major implications of the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, we can choose between the theory that the President fell victim to a
lone maniac, and the theory that his murder was carried through by an organized
conspiracy.
The theory of the lone killer seems less feasible when one
considers the perfectly smooth machinery of the assassination, plus the obvious
glibness with which the authorities in Dallas came up with a quick and popularly
acceptable solution of the case. Indeed the local head of police seemed eager to
close the case in spite of the distinct possibility that it has not yet been
opened. Serious questions arise. Why were the Dallas police so eager falsely to
link Lee Harvey Oswald with leftist groups and causes? Why was it made possible
for Jack Ruby to kill him? Did anyone help Oswald to establish a biography which
would seem to link him both to the shooting and to an expedient political motive
for it? Did anyone help him to get to Mexico when he went there in late
September, and to apply there for both Cuban and Soviet visas? Under what
circumstances was Oswald hired, so short a time before the Presidential visit,
to work at the warehouse from which the fatal shots were allegedly fired? Was
the trajectory of the fatal bullets consistent with the geographic relation
between the target and the window from which the shots were allegedly fired? Did
the public announcement of the route of the Presidential party give Oswald
enough time to plan, prepare and place himself within the range of the target?
If not, from whom did Oswald learn the route before it was publicly announced?
Who knew the route before a public announcement was made of it? Why was Lee
Oswald allowed to leave a building surrounded by police, and from which the U.S.
President had been shot, merely upon establishing that he was employed in it? As
it is now clear that Oswald was not
connected with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, what motivated him to make
statements prior to the assassination which would enable the police to link him
with that organization after the shooting? Was Lee Harvey Oswald a walking
corpse, a fall guy, doomed even before the assassination to die? And if so, did
he die after fulfilling an assassin’s role, or only as a decoy? Was the
assassin condemned to death by the very people who assigned him to shoot? If so,
when did the execution take place—with the shooting of Lee Oswald, or with the
shooting of Dallas Patrolman J.D. Tippit? The first reports of the murder of
Patrolman Tippit also related that a Secret Service man had been wounded; since
then, nothing has been heard about that Secret Service man. What was his
relation to Patrolman Tippit; and is it possible that the two were shot in a
duel between them?
These and many other questions remain unanswered; but this
does not necessarily mean that the answers are not known in Washington’s upper
echelons of power. On the contrary; if those in high circles had no answers at
all, vigorous investigations would have been undertaken immediately, and many
secrets exposed. The clues provided by the contradictions in the initial
accounts are so voluminous that any swift and sincere investigation would
undoubtedly penetrate the veil. If the assassin had acted all alone, or if he
represented an insignificant group of fanatics, the formidable investigative
machinery of the authorities could soon pick up the threads, without leaving us
in the dark for even this long.
Instead of such prompt and effective investigation,
however, the public has been promised an abundance of prolonged Executive and
Congressional inquiries. Our assumption is that a sincere investigation could
produce explanations so quickly that the “investigations” promised and in
progress are primarily intended as a whitewash, to convince the people that
everyone has done his job and that no significant parts are missing from the
jig-saw puzzle. This does not necessarily amount to doubting the integrity of
some of the inquiries, such as that to be conducted by the special Presidential
commission. These panels, however, will primarily review evidence gathered by
other investigative bodies. Any fabrication involved in such evidence many have
been so thorough as to render it indiscernible. It is beyond doubt that much
skepticism and legitimate doubt will survive any findings of the official
investigations.
The possibility can by no means be dismissed that important
men in Washington do know the identity of the conspirators, or at least some of
them, and that these conspirators are so powerful that prudence dictates that
they not be identified in public.
Let us make the “fantastic” assumption that President
Lyndon Johnson and Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy know or believe that the
murder was planned by a group of high-ranking officers who would stop at nothing
to end American-Soviet negotiations. However strong their desire to avenge John
F. Kennedy, what course would be open to them? To move against such formidable
conspirators might start a disastrous chain of events. It could lead to American
troops shooting at other American troops. It could lead to a direct take-over by
a military clique. To avert such catastrophes, it might well be considered
prudent to pretend utter ignorance, in the hope that the conspirators might be
removed from power discreetly, at a later date, one by one.
Of course, this theory sounds
absolutely fantastic. But if we are to think about the issues without
“patriotic” prejudice, it is necessary to test its plausibility by imagining
it to be an explanation of the assassination of the head of another country. Few
people in America would have difficulty accepting such a theory about the
assassination of a Soviet, Latin American or Southeast Asian leader; and chances
are that its incredulity in our own case is merely a measure of our
ill-conceived national exceptionalism.
If indeed a few people in Washington know or believe such
to be the background of the assassination, their knowledge or belief may suffice
to render the political ends of the conspirators fulfilled. In such a case
American global policies would henceforth be charted by people aware that
further softening of the Cold war would be challenged by a well organized and
powerful group. Thus the conspirators may cast their shadow over Washington and
the world without openly appearing as a political force.
The Johnson Administration need not necessarily resent
having to reckon with such a force, since “Mr. Johnson has never believed that
the fundamental issues which divide Russia and the democratic nations can be
settled by negotiation.” (Max Freedman in the New
York Post of December 1.) In fact, “the new president is close to the
generals and the admirals. They have frequently bucked the peace policies of JFK
and Secretary Rusk.” (Drew Pearson in his syndicated column of November 26.)
How significant this closeness to the generals and their political backers may
prove is indicated by the fact that “one of the first reports he [President
Johnson] received was from Walt Rostow, the State Dept. advisor who wanted to
take us into war after the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna. This week Mr.
Rostow recommended that this is the time for a new hard line against Moscow. JFK
used to smile at Mr. Rostow’s belligerent advice. Will LBJ know how to
evaluate it?” (Ib.) Thus it seems that at Arlington Cemetery were buried John
F. Kennedy and whatever cautious Cold War stance he imposed upon American
foreign policy.
In this respect, there may be special significance in
President Johnson’s November 27th speech before Congress, both as
to statement and omission. The pains he took to emphasize that John Kennedy’s
policy on civil rights would be continued make sharply conspicuous the absence
of any specific declaration that the policy on American-Soviet negotiations
would be continued as well. Certainly, the new President must have devoted
immediate thought to this paramount question, and it is cause for wonder that he
said nothing about it. If he intends to continue Mr. Kennedy’s foreign policy
but preferred not to acknowledge this fact, what was the reason for his
preference? Is he withholding public commitment on this issue until he has a
chance to neutralize the forces which killed President Kennedy? If on the other
hand he plans significant changes in the policy concerning the Soviet Union and
the Cold War, are these changes in effect imposed by the conspirators and the
fear of them, or are they imposed by a consensus of the views of the new
President and the conspirators?
The policies of John F. Kennedy were what they were; his
tragic death does not retroactively alter them. It is only human that his
critics were as grieved by his untimely death as were his more ardent
supporters. This does not mean, however, that what he stood for can be seen in
any new light. The possibility that he was assassinated by uncompromising Cold
War or hot war enthusiasts does not vindicate his policies as having been in the
best interest of peace. Our national frame of mind is so conditioned in favor of
ultra-rightist escalation that a man decried as an “appeaser” is not
necessarily a man of peace, any more than a man decried as a “communist” is
necessarily even skeptical about the status quo. If John Kennedy was
assassinated by rabid Cold Warriors, this would not prove him to have been an
opponent of the Cold War. It would merely prove that he had not met their
degree of bellicosity.
In fact, during the last weeks of the Kennedy
Administration, Washington’s reluctance regarding an international détente
was becoming ever more obvious. The late President, Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara and other key men warned with increasing frequency against the
delusion of a thaw. They took pains to put the world on notice that the
international détente could be called off at any given moment, and replaced by
a confrontation of brute force. These warnings were accompanied by deliberate
U.S. efforts to renew tensions involving access to Berlin. Plans for the
creation of a multinational nuclear surface fleet were pushed with vigor by a
Washington not dissuaded by the reluctance of all its partners, with the
solitary exception of West Germany. Any American plan thus involving the West
Germans in a nuclear force is of course incompatible with a sincere approach to
American-Soviet détente. It conclusively proves that the détente was embraced
as a temporary expedient, while the basic policy remained one of military
challenge or blackmail of the Soviet Union.
Nor did these steps reveal any change in the thinking of
the Kennedy Administration since the signing of the partial nuclear test ban
treaty. This treaty was concluded not merely because it imposed few meaningful
limitations upon the signatories; and not merely because the Soviets accepted,
in essence, American proposals (the U.S. having a long record of retracting its
proposals the moment the Soviets agreed to accept them); but primarily because
the U.S. would have irrevocably lost her diplomatic leadership of her allies
unless she went along with them on a minimal agreement with the Soviets. The
treaty was a small concession to these allies, to prevent them from reaching far
more substantial agreements with the Soviet Union, without American
participation or leadership.
Washington thus looked upon the treaty as a mere device for
retaining diplomatic stature among the Atlantic allies. It was therefore
perfectly consistent for the United States to accept the treaty while
simultaneously bending every effort against further diminution of tensions. The
aim was not a détente, but to render a true détente impossible. The push for
the multilateral nuclear surface fleet, the incidents on the Berlin autobahn,
the newly imposed travel restrictions on Soviet bloc diplomats in the United
States, and even the Barghoorn affair, were all part of this policy of sabotage.
And the biggest step toward a new consolidation of the Atlantic alliance was yet
to come. Reliable reports indicate that the Kennedy Administration’s election
campaign gift to the American people was to have been, if all went according to
plan, Cuba. (See “Cuba—Sold Out?” in the November, 1963 TMO.) This gift
was to climax Kennedy’s electioneering, and also to galvanize U.S. allies into
that unity, now lacking, which can be created only in an international
emergency.
If there is any question as to whether President Kennedy
needed to present the American electorate with a Cuban fiesta, or as to whether
he needed a new international crisis to cement the disintegrating alliance,
there can hardly be a doubt that Lyndon Johnson cannot do without such a
victory. What other swash-buckling act can elevate Lyndon Johnson from the gray
pettiness of behind-the-scenes Congressional intriguing to Presidential stature?
How else, but with Cuba at his feet, can he lay claim before the American people
to distinction and grandeur?
Cuba is therefore in mortal danger. Before she is collected
into the United States’ basket, the “Maine” may well be sunk a second
time. This time, unlike previous occasions, at least as much preparation must go
into making it appear that the U.S. is defending her legitimate vital interests
as has gone into the preparations for making Lee Harvey Oswald appear utterly
guilty before he could even argue his innocence. Something “shocking” will
be contrived, something “sudden and perilous” to the United States, and it
will be of a nature allowing only one response—the conquest of Cuba.
When the planned shock comes, it will be so convincing to
the vast majority of Americans that there will be few voices of sanity, and few
to heed. Therefore it is of prime urgency that those of us in America and
throughout the world, who insist that diplomacy must not be a euphemism for
international banditry, must do our utmost now
to create an international climate in which it will be difficult for the United
States to embark on yet another Cuban adventure. Public opinion throughout the
world must be alerted now to the
cunning plans and preparations in progress. “Hands Off Cuba!” must resound now,
before hands are laid upon her.
As for the broader picture, the next few months will show
what the political consequences of John Kennedy’s assassination are to be.
If the Johnson Administration pursues negotiations with the
Soviets with even less vigor, sincerity and good faith than the Kennedy
Administration, the change may well be tacit proof that the conspirators have
achieved their political aim; and that their true target was the late
President’s policies.
December 1, 1963.
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