This course's distinctive approach to the evidence
JFK researchers instinctively think that they have come a long way in 36
years. Given the huge integrated effort over that time, it's quite natural to
expect so. But as a Chinese fortune cookie once reminded me all too wisely,
"Do not confuse activity with accomplishment." The collection of
articles presented here under "History" > "The Warren
Commission Period" humbles us by showing in graphic detail just how closely
the topics of today's debate resemble those of the first year or so after the
assassination. In many ways, JFK debate hasn't progressed at all—it
may have more details, but the topics remain the same.
The persistence of the topics of debate means simply that those basic
questions haven't been answered. How many shooters were there? How many shots
were fired? How many shots hit from the front? How can the single-bullet theory
be countered? Who was behind the assassination? Who were the shooters? How did
they get away so cleanly, without leaving a trace? Why did the Bethesda doctors
botch the autopsy so? Were they part of the cover-up? Was the Warren Commission
part of it, too? The list is endless.
In turn, the lack of answers for these questions means that something is
seriously wrong with the debate. It is the thesis of this course that the
problem lies in how the evidence is approached. The debaters lack a systematic
approach to the evidence and, because of that, allow much evidence in that
should be excluded. To use the distinction first proposed by Herbert L. Packer,
they fail to distinguish between what is interesting and what is important. The
important evidence is, of course, the physical evidence, of what we call the
"strong" evidence. It represents a minority of the total evidence,
perhaps as little as 5% or less. The interesting evidence is much of the
remainder, which tends to be witness testimony. In short, the key to
understanding the JFK assassination lies in focusing first on the important
evidence and second, if at all, on the interesting evidence. This approach
requires discipline but provides great rewards—focusing
in physical evidence allows us be sure of a few important things (the
"core" conclusions) rather than being unsure of everything. The core
conclusions allow us to see the assassination in a whole new light. The
constraints imposed by the core also offer rigid guidelines for evaluating new
evidence and ideas as they arise.
But what are we to do about the other 95% or 99% of the evidence? Do we just
throw it away? For much of it, the answer is yes. For some of it, however, the
answer turns out to be a qualified no. Evidence of intermediate character, that
is, provided by witnesses under unstressed and reliable conditions, can
sometimes be used provided that we are extremely careful with it and remember
that deductions from it can never be conclusive. We are presently developing
that important second step and relating it to the first step.