Annotated Compendium, 1981-1991

For one who was determined to emphasize the scientific evidence in the Kennedy assassination, Blakey seems unable to state either the ballistic conclusions or the neutron-activation conclusions properly.

Page 120: Neutron activation analysis, a metal-matching process,[1] established that the bullet that left fragments in Connally’s wrist was the one found on Connally’s stretcher at Parkland Hospital, the so-called pristine bullet.[2] The ballistics panel linked this bullet to Oswald’s rifle.[3]

Page 121: Neutron activation analysis established that bullet fragments found in the front seat of the limousine were part of the bullet that struck the President in the head, and the ballistics panel linked these fragments to Oswald’s rifle.[4]

In his introduction to the 1993 paperback edition, Michael Kurtz notes that Crime of the Century is “the only full-length scholarly study of the Kennedy assassination.”[5] It is therefore ironic that his treatment of the neutron-activation evidence is more flawed than most of the “nonscholarly” books. Almost every sentence contains serious errors. The entire section must be disregarded. Kurtz seems to understand little about analysis and interpretation, yet charges ahead like a bull. He thinks he knows more than specialists do. He is ignorant and unscholarly in the extreme.

Page 104: Because of the conflicting evidence on the head wounds and movement, no definite conclusion can be reached about the number and direction of the fatal shot(s). There is, however, a scientific test by which objective and definitive conclusions about the head shots[6] can be made.[7]

Neutron activation analysis is a procedure whereby objects, such as bullet fragments, are bombarded with nuclear radiation.[8] The irradiated objects will display different degrees of radiation according to their chemical composition. Each of the chemical elements composing the object will emit gamma rays,[9] which can be measured in amounts as small as one-billionth of a gram.[10] Each Mannlicher-Carcano bullet is composed of copper, lead, silver, antimony, bismuth, zinc, with traces of other elements.[11] All bullets manufactured by the Western Cartridge Company, the firm which made the ammunition used in Oswald’s rifle, were manufactured with the identical mixture of elements.[12] Since each Carcano bullet contains the same volume and weight of each element, the results of neutron activation analysis totals[13] will be the same for each element in all bullets.[14] If the totals do not match, then more than one type of ammunition was used.[15] Neutron activation analysis was performed on Bullet 399, a bullet fragment removed from Governor Connally’s wrist, one of the bullet fragments found in the front seat of the limousine, and two fragments removed from President Kennedy’s head during the autopsy.[16] Because of the precision of this test, it could have been an extremely useful aide (sic) in determining whether one or more different types of ammunition were used in the assassination.[17] Unfortunately, many bullet fragments and other pieces of evidence were not tested. Of those fragments tested, only the silver and antimony were measured.[18] No copper was measured, even though it composed a much higher proportion of the total weight of bullets than either silver or antimony.[19] Despite these limitations, the results of the neutron activation analysis do provide very strong evidence of more than one assassin.[20]

The results for both silver and antimony demonstrate that Bullet 399 did not match the fragment removed from Governor Connally’s wrist.[21] This means that Bullet 399 could not have caused the Connally wrist wound.[22] The Kennedy head fragments did not match the limousine fragment and therefore could not have been caused by it.[23] The Kennedy head fragments did not even closely resemble the Connally wrist fragments or Bullet 399, nor did the limousine fragments.[24]

These results mean that at least two different types of ammunition were used in the assassination.[25] Since the Kennedy head fragments contained 20 percent less silver and almost 40 percent less antimony than Bullet 399, the result is that there must have been different lots of ammunition.[26] Since we know that Bullet 399 was a Mannlicher-Carcano round, the Kennedy head shot(s) may not have come from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.[27]

These comments are based on the assumption that the tests, which were conducted at the Atomic Energy Commission’s nuclear testing facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were performed properly. Many vital pieces of evidence were not tested.[28] For example, copper tracings around the bullet holes in President Kennedy’s coat should have been compared with the copper jacketing in Bullet 399.[29] Both fragments from the front seat of the limousine and the three fragments from the rear of the limousine should have been compared with each other in order to determine whether or not all came from the same bullet.[30] The copper, silver, antimony, and other elements from the live bullet found inside the firing chamber of “Oswald’s” rifle should have been compared with the elements in the other fragments to see if they matched.[31]

Neutron activation analysis could still be a positive, certain determination of the question of how many rifles were used in the assassination.[32] It is the most precise and objective procedure available.[33] Experts can and do disagree about the medical evidence, the Zapruder film, the ballistics tests, and the like. The results of neutron activation analysis (or another new procedure, flameless atomic absorption spectrometry), however, are scientifically objective and beyond argument.[34] Unfortunately, it was not done at the time, at least as completely and accurately as possible.[35]

Page 164: While [HSCA expert witness Larry] Sturdivan provided only conjecture to support his arguments [that the head shot came from the rear], another committee witness, Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, a chemistry professor at the University of California at Irvine, presented hard scientific evidence to substantiate his. Dr. Guinn subjected various bullet fragments to neutron activation analysis, a process whereby objects are irradiated with nuclear radiation[36] and the different levels of radiation according to their weight is measured;[37] the precise chemical composition of a substance can be measured in units as tiny as parts per billion.[38] In the field of ballistics, neutron activation analysis has proven a valuable instrument for identifying bullets and bullet fragments.

In the Kennedy assassination case, neutron activation analysis could be used to determine whether Bullet 399, bullet fragments removed from the president’s brain and from the governor’s wrist, and the limousine fragments came from the same ammunition and if that ammunition matched Oswald’s rifle.[39] In September 1977, Dr. Guinn tested these materials and surmised that the fragments from the governor’s wrist came from Bullet 399, a powerful and convincing scientific substantiation of the single-bullet theory.[40] Guinn also found that the fragments removed from President Kennedy’s brain matched the fragments found in the limousine, proof that only one bullet, fired from Oswald’s rifle, struck the president in the head.[41] Dr. Guinn reported that neutron activation analysis revealed evidence of only two bullets, both Mannlicher-Carcanos of the exact type used in Oswald’s rifle.[42] Dr. Guinn’s analysis, therefore, fully supported the medical evidence and the Warren Commission’s findings that all bullets striking the president and the governor were fired from Oswald’s rifle.

Page 180: One of the House Select Committee’s most important witnesses, Dr. Vincent P. Guinn of the Chemistry Department at the University of California at Irvine, performed neutron activation analysis on several of the items of physical evidence in the Kennedy assassination. Dr. Guinn compared the chemical composition of bullet fragments removed from Governor Connally’s wrist with that of Bullet 399, and the composition of two Kennedy head fragments with the fragments found on the floor of the limousine. He concluded that the Connally wrist fragments and Bullet 399 were from the same bullet, while the Kennedy head fragments and the limousine fragments came from the same bullet.[43] Dr. Guinn stated that only two bullets were used, and that both were Mannlicher-Carcanos.[44]

On the surface, the neutron activation analysis tests performed by Dr. Guinn provided strong support both for the single-bullet theory and for the contention that the fatal head shot was fired from Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle. Since the wrist fragments and Bullet 399 matched each other,[45] the committee accepted Dr. Guinn’s thesis that they came from the same bullet.[46] Likewise, the committee endorsed the Guinn theory that the head and limousine fragments came from the same bullet.[47]

A more careful analysis of the neutron activation analysis tests, however, shows numerous deficiencies that contest all of Dr. Guinn’s central conclusions. First, of the more than thirty bullet fragments in John Kennedy’s head, only two were subjected to the test. The rest remained embedded in brain tissue and skull bone.[48] That two head fragments matched each other does not mean that the others did so.[49] Second, Dr. Guinn did not analyze the large copper fragment found in the limousine. The origin of that fragment, therefore, remains scientifically unproven.[50] Third, Dr. Guinn had previously performed neutron activation analysis on Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition, one of the bullets being from the same manufacture and production lot (Western Cartridge Company, lot 6003) as bullets from Oswald’s rifle. None of the bullets matched each other. Moreover, Guinn analyzed pieces of the same bullet, and they, too, failed to match. For example, the four pieces of the bullet from lot 6003 had figures ranging from 7.9 to 15.9 parts per million (ppm.)[51] silver, from 80 to 732 ppm. antimony, and from 17 to 62 ppm. copper.[52] Dr. Guinn himself admitted that “some Mannlicher-Carcano bullets cannot be distinguished from each other.”[53]

The most serious shortcoming in Dr. Guinn’s analysis is his failure properly to interpret that data from the assassination fragments.[54] For example, the Connally wrist fragment contained 25 percent more silver and 850 percent more copper than Bullet 399. It also contained 2400 percent more sodium and 1100 percent more chlorine, and it contained 8.1 ppm. aluminum, while Bullet 399 contained none. Similarly, the Kennedy head fragments and limousine fragments contained wide disparities in their chemical composition. Guinn and the committee, therefore, were hardly justified in their conclusions about “matches.” Since different parts of the same bullet show different chemical values, and since the actual assassination fragments tested differed sharply in their values, the neutron activation analysis hardly lent scientific weight to the single-bullet and lone-assassin theories.[55]

Jean Davison’s entire book is a model of common sense and reasoned judgment. Her passage on NAA is no exception.

Page 281: …A whole bullet recovered from a stretcher at Parkland Hospital was said [by the Warren Commission] to have transited both men; it was soon called “the magic bullet” by critics who insisted that it could not have caused so much damage and remain virtually intact. But neutron activation tests have now linked this missile rather firmly with fragments removed from Governor Connally’s wrist, thus supporting the one-bullet hypothesis.[56]

Hurt’s long discussion of NAA is flawed by is near-total lack of attention to important issues such as its sensitivity and accuracy. Instead, he limits himself to a low-level “he said, she said” presentation of little importance. It is full of logical errors.

Page 78: Since efforts to duplicate the assassin’s timing and accuracy had failed, and since there was no hope for establishing the chain of possession of CE 399 after the hospital muddle, the FBI turned in 1963 and 1964 to a highly technical scientific analysis of bullet fragments called emission spectrography. These tests held the potential for showing that various fragments of metal associated with the shooting either could or could not come from the same missile.[57]

It is unlikely that any aspect of the Warren Commission’s effort is more contradictory and confusing than the spectrographic examination of the recovered bullet fragments. While it is simple under such testing to establish that two fragments are not from the same source, proving that they are from the same source is not so easily achieved.[58] What is important to show is the percentage of elemental composition of particular fragments. When two fragments have nearly identical percentages of certain components—such as lead, copper, antimony—then it is probable that they share a common origin.[59] If, on the other hand, the percentages of composition are dissimilar beyond a certain range, it becomes virtually certain that the source is different.[60]

The presentation of findings of the FBI’s spectrographic analyses of fragments was, as it appeared in the Warren Report, incomprehensibly vague. Years later it would become clear that the handling of the matter bordered on the duplicitous.[61] The commission staff lightly interrogated an FBI ballistics expert about the spectrographic tests, but his references to what had been done by his colleagues in spectrographic analysis were little more than hearsay evidence.[62] When the commission swore in the actual spectrographic expert—and he was called as the very last witness in the commission’s history—not a single question was asked of him relating to the spectrographic analysis of the bullet fragments.[63] (Questions to him were confined to those concerning the paraffin tests.) A key question would have dealt with the results of spectrographic testing on the bullet fragments to determine for once and for all if fragments of the Magic Bullet were found in both Kennedy and Connally. That question was never asked.[64]

In its report, the Warren Commission noted that several of the fragments were “similar in metallic composition,” a description commonly considered meaningless.[65] Thus, there was established no firm evidentiary link between the Magic Bullet and the fragments taken from Connally’s body.

For seventeen years, Harold Weisberg sought the test data of the FBI’s original spectrographic analysis. Weisberg, along with his volunteer lawyer James H. Lesar, argued ceaselessly that it made no sense for the government to conceal this information. In the first place, Weisberg argued, the material was supposed to represent an objective scientific analysis of historical significance, and secondly, it was supposed to weigh in favor of the official findings.[66]

There were several peculiar rulings as Weisberg’s case moved slowly through the courts, but none more so than Judge John Sirica’s agreement with what the Justice Department claimed was the attorney general’s position that it was not in the “national interest” to divulge the test results of the spectrographic analyses. The government was never required to explain how release of such a standard scientific analysis could threaten the national interest. Earlier, the government argued that release of the then six-year-old test results could lead to the “exposure of confidential informants…possible blackmail and, in general, do irreparable damage.” (Much later, James H. Lesar determined that the attorney general had not actually said what the Justice Department claimed that he had said.)

One of the most astonishing facts learned by Weisberg was that the FBI testing never attempted to determine the percentages of the elemental composition of the fragments.[67] Even more peculiar was that no effort was made to compare any of the fragments with the unspent bullet found in the chamber of the Oswald rifle.

As Weisberg’s case plodded on, a break came in early 1973, when a volume of Warren Commission correspondence was released by the National Archives. The material was not classified, and it is not known why it was withheld from the public for nearly a decade.[68] Among the material were letters from FBI Director Hoover in which he makes reference to the pertinent spectrographic analysis.

Hoover’s comments were disappointingly vague, even more so since there were no indications that any effort was made in the analysis to determine whether the fragments from Connally’s wrist could be positively matched to CE 399.[69] While Hoover avoided making any statement about a comparison between the Connally fragments and CE 399, he did state rather ambiguously that “no significant differences were found within the sensitivity of the spectrographic method.”[70] There is another statement that the fragment from Connally’s wrist is “similar in composition” to one of the fragments found in the limousine.[71]

It is significant that the evidence on spectrographic analysis should come tiptoeing to the fore, out of channels, merely hinting that it was supportive of the Warren Commission. There is virtually no doubt that if the tests had been clearly supportive of the commission conclusions, the commission would have trumpeted the news and the proof to the world. Such support would be the only evidentiary link between CE 399 and any bullet that struck anyone in the presidential limousine on November 22, 1963. It was a support critically absent.[72]

The most stunning news to emerge from the long obscured Hoover correspondence was that the Warren Commission went beyond the science of spectrography in its quest for support. In 1964 the FBI had apparently agreed to conduct neutron activation analyses on the bullet fragments—a process that, according to Scientific American magazine, utilizes radiation “to measure the concentration of trace elements often in amounts less than a billionth of a gram.” (It was through neutron activation analysis, for example, that scientists in 1961 began to suspect that Napoleon died in 1821 from arsenic poisoning—a determination made by submitting bits of his preserved hair to neutron activation analysis.) The application of this technique is virtually boundless.[73]

Again, chances are excellent that if the results of neutron activation testing had yielded support for the basic Warren Commission findings, the commission would have also heralded these results in its report. But not a word about these tests appears in the report or in the twenty-six volumes of supporting testimony and exhibits.[74] Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the commission ever received the complete results of the neutron activation testing. The first indication that the Magic Bullet and the fragments were subjected to neutron activation analysis came years later in the surprise appearance of the letters between the Warren Commission and FBI Director Hoover.

As conveyed from Hoover to the commission, the news was muted to say the least. In his letter written in July 1964, Hoover first mentions the spectrographic tests and that “no significant differences were found” among the fragments. Then, almost in passing, Hoover continues: “Because of the higher sensitivity of the neutron activation analysis, certain of the small lead fragments were then subjected to neutron activation analyses and comparison with larger bullet fragments.” Hoover then notes that the stretcher bullet (CE 399) was analyzed, along with a fragment from Connally, fragments from Kennedy’s head, and fragments found in different parts of the car.[75]

Hoover concludes: “While minor variations in composition were found by this method, these were not considered sufficient to permit positively differentiating among the larger bullet fragments and thus positively determining from which of the larger bullet fragments any given small lead fragment may have come.”

At best, Hoover seemed to be saying, the neutron activation analyses were inconclusive.[76]

Confusion deepened as the Justice Department, representing the FBI, continued to stonewall legal efforts on the part of Harold Weisberg to force release of all the spectrographic and neutron activation analysis test results. At times, the legal battle became ludicrous, as the government struggled against all logic to keep secret the results. In the spring of 1975, for example, FBI Laboratory Agent John W. Kilty swore in an affidavit: “Neutron activation analysis and emission spectroscopy were used to determine the elemental composition of the borders and edges of holes in clothing and metallic smears present on a windshield and curbstone.”

But Weisberg had never been given the results from the neutron activation analysis of these items. About one month later, after Weisberg had begun pressing for them, Agent Kilty provided a second affidavit, in which he swore to a direct contradiction by stating: “NAA (neutron activation analysis) was not used in examining the clothing, windshield or curbing.”

This sort of performance has not been unusual in the government’s desperate efforts to keep the testing and its results from reaching the public. Finally, the FBI yielded to Weisberg what it claimed was all of its test data. Given the direct contradictions in Kilty’s affidavits, Weisberg remained skeptical about the completeness of the FBI’s disclosures.

In April 1983 a federal court of appeals ruled against Weisberg and found that the FBI had fulfilled its obligations in responding to Weisberg’s requests. With hostility reminiscent of some earlier decisions against Weisberg, the court effectively closed the case forever.

New hope for conclusive neutron activation analysis arose in 1977 with the convening of the House Select Committee on Assassinations.[77] The committee engaged the services of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, a respected scientist and chemist in the field. According to Chief Counsel Blakey, Guinn had no relation to the Warren Commission. However, Guinn himself agreed in 1983 that he has acted as an informal consultant on such matters to the FBI since even prior to the Kennedy assassination.[78]

Using newer equipment—more advanced than what was available in 1963 and 1964—Guinn was able to report to the HSCA in great detail just how the tests were done and how he arrived at his conclusion that it is “highly probable,” if not conclusive, that the fragments taken from Governor Connally’s wrist came from CE 399, the famous Magic Bullet found on the stretcher.[79] Guinn also reported that, on testing, the fragments found in the limousine could be linked to the fragments allegedly removed from Kennedy’s head. And he stated conclusively that he found evidence of no more than two bullets among all the fragments he tested.[80]

This, it would appear, offered strong (if rather late) support for the Warren Commission’s original finding that only two bullets struck Kennedy and Connally. This evidence also represented the first link ever made between the Oswald rifle and a bullet fragment supposedly taken from a victim’s body. That, certainly, is the conclusion embraced by the Select Committee.

There were, however, terrible evidentiary deficiencies in all this—much like the original difficulties in connecting the Magic Bullet to the wounding of Kennedy and Connally. While these deficiencies were discounted by the HSCA, they are worth a close examination.

By Dr. Guinn’s own admission, the wrist fragments that were originally tested in 1964 had vanished by the time Guinn began his work for the HSCA. The trouble with this, as critics were quick to point out, is that there is no way to be certain just what Guinn was testing. He did have several containers of metal fragments from the National Archives, and some of the fragments could be matched to the Magic Bullet by neutron activation analysis.

Guinn explained to the Select Committee that the Archives had assured him that he had been given “the only bullet-lead fragments from this case still present in the Archives.” Guinn stated: “Presumably those [missing fragments] are in existence somewhere…but where they are, I have no idea.” He also told the committee that the original fragments would not have been destroyed by the 1964 testing. It has never been clear what happened to the original specimens.

In view of such unnerving capriciousness in the handling of vital evidence, it was difficult to take seriously Guinn’s findings of support for the official version of the assassination. It was perfectly obvious that Guinn could have been provided with fragments from the Magic Bullet and that tests would show such fragments to have a common origin.[81]

Following his testimony before the HSCA, Guinn explained to the reporters and critics who swarmed about him in the corridor that it was only after he received the evidence from the Archives that he discovered that he was testing fragments different from those originally tested. When he weighed the particles, he found that none of the individual weights corresponded with those noted when the FBI attempted the tests in 1964.[82] According to a tape recording of the hallway interview, Guinn was refreshingly candid in describing a hypothetical case: “Possibly they would take a bullet, take out a few little pieces and put it in the container, and say, ‘This is what came out of Connally’s wrist.’ And naturally if you compare it with [CE] 399, it will look alike…I have no control over these things.”[83]

The situation with the comparison of the Kennedy brain fragments to the limousine fragments was similarly tainted, calling into question the legitimacy of the fragments said to have come from the President’s car. On March 31, 1964, an FBI expert testified to the Warren Commission that the FBI laboratory had established a ballistics link between the limousine fragments and the Oswald rifle. The testimony of the expert was unequivocal in its certainty of the connection—despite the gross deformation of the fragments.[84]

It is interesting and perhaps significant that this testimony came at the time the Warren Commission informed the FBI that it wanted the firearms evidence submitted to an outside laboratory for “reexamination.” That suggestion, not disclosed until years later, was met with rage on the part of J. Edgar Hoover. The FBI director wrote: “It is obvious the Commission does not have confidence in our laboratory.” The exact issues behind this argument are not clear.[85]

In spite of this dispute, the FBI expert’s ballistics testimony a few days later was readily accepted by the Warren Commission. There was, however, a rather serious deficiency in the evidentiary status of the fragments in question. There was no firm indication, even at that relatively early stage, that the fragments had come from the limousine. It is unlikely that any court in the land would have accepted such evidence without serious challenge. Not only were the fragments unidentified, but they were also said to have been discovered nearly twelve hours after the crime, after the limousine had been parked in a milling crowd at the hospital in Dallas and then flown to Washington.[86]

Eight weeks after this expert testimony, an FBI agent took the tiny fragments to the two men who had been credited with discovering them. Up until that point, the fragments had not been marked for even the simplest identification purposes. Despite the passage of more than six months, each man—one a Secret Service agent and the other a White House staffer—identified a crumpled, unmarked fragment as the very one he had found in the limousine. How such identification was possible has never been explained.[87]

As for the legitimacy of the fragments said to have been recovered from the President’s brain during the autopsy, one has only to review the shocking manipulation of medical evidence, as described in Chapter 3. That manipulation, along with the proven destruction and disappearance of vital medical evidence while in the hands of authorities, stirs little confidence in the legitimacy of the two fragments said to have come from President Kennedy’s brain.[88]

The most astounding deficiency in the Select Committee’s neutron activation analyses is one that has remained undisclosed until now. In his testimony explaining his testing procedure, Dr. Guinn went to elaborate lengths to establish the basis for his testing of the fragments. He pointed to certain unusual characteristics of this particular batch of Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition that permitted him to conduct effective tests and analysis of the material. Basically, the most significant unique characteristic of the ammunition is “that there seems to be no uniformity within a production lot” of certain elements, such as antimony. This characteristic appears to a layman to permit enormous ranges in the presence of certain elements in the metal, but ranges that Guinn insisted are normal.[89]

Guinn described the particular batch of Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition upon which he based his tests: “The Western Cartridge Co. reportedly made 1 million rounds of each of 4 production runs…They were made at different times in 1954, and reportedly those are the only lots they ever produced, and we had boxes from each of those lots.”

If these bullets were “the only…ever produced” by Western Cartridge, Guinn’s test basis might have been legitimate in that single respect. However, there is a strong indication that, on this count, Guinn’s presumption is flatly wrong. While Guinn’s source for his information is not clear, it is obvious that he was not aware of pertinent FBI information, buried in the published Warren Commission papers, that states quite the opposite.

The FBI document, which is a memorandum over the name of J. Edgar Hoover, reports an interview with a Western Cartridge Company representative, who explained the source of the Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition in the United States: “The Western Cartridge Company…manufactured a quantity of 6.5…Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition for the Italian Government during World War II. At the end of the war the Italian Carcano rifle, and no telling how much of this type of ammunition, was sold to United States gun brokers and dealers and subsequently was distributed by direct sales to wholesalers, retailers and individual purchasers.”

If in fact the cartridges believed to have belonged to Oswald came from this, earlier, batch of Western ammunition, then Dr. Guinn had based his whole testing procedure on the wrong bullets.[90] It is, of course, Dr. Guinn who made so much of the importance of having precisely the correct batch of ammunition upon which to base his neutron activation analysis.[91]

Whatever the truth, there is little reason for confidence in the Select Committee’s scientific work on the elemental composition of the bullet fragments.[92]

Despite such preposterous difficulties with the evidence—difficulties having nothing to do with Guinn’s professional performance—the committee accepted Guinn’s scientific findings as support of certain essential aspects of its own position as well as those of the Warren Commission.

Ironically, this evidentiary conclusion was in perfect harmony with the nearly hopeless quagmire that has distinguished the history of the Magic Bullet.[93] Nearly two decades after President Kennedy’s death, the best experts in the land produced conclusions which, valid or not, were presented so unconvincingly that there was little evidence of a shift in the public’s perception of the case. And however valid the conclusions in the eyes of the government experts and some critics,[94] the revelation of yet new tainted basic evidence—in this case the disappearance of some of the bullet fragments—so sullies the whole atmosphere that the findings seem unlikely ever to be accepted by more than a handful of American citizens.[95]

Liberty Lobby (various articles from “The Spotlight”)—J.F.K.: The Mystery Unraveled

Howard L. Brennan with J. Edward Cherryholmes—Eyewitness to History
Armand Moss—Disinformation, Misinformation, and the “Conspiracy” to Kill JFK Exposed

Alan Adelson—The Ruby Oswald Affair
Don DeLillo—Libra
Judy Donnelly—Who Shot the President?
Jim Garrison—On the Trail of the Assassins
Donald L. Kimball—Assassination: The Murder of John F. Kennedy
David E. Scheim—Contract on America

Belin doesn’t seem to understand the subtleties of neutron-activation analysis, probably because he is not trained analytically. He takes the NAA experts at their word, when he should be evaluating their results critically. He also doesn’t understand that in comparison analysis, difference but not identity can be proven. Like Guinn, he gets the right answer for the wrong reason.

Page 54: Since 1963, several panels of medical experts have examined the evidence to determine whether the “single-bullet theory” was correct and whether there was any evidence of any shots striking Kennedy from any direction other than the rear. All these panels have concluded that indeed there was a bullet that entered the back of Kennedy’s neck, exited from the front, and then struck Connally.[96]

Moreover, since 1963, a new test known as “neutron-activation analysis” has been performed on the bullet fragments from Connally’s wrist and the nearly whole bullet that fell off his stretcher. This test takes two samples of material and bombards them with neutrons and compares their radioactive characteristics. The comparison reveals the minute composition of these two samples, including any minor impurities, and if there are virtually none, the results will mean that the material is identical and came from the same source.[97]

There were minute bullet fragments that had been removed from Connally’s wrist. The physician who operated on that wrist said these fragments weighed less than a postage stamp. The Warren Commission critics have asserted that the single bullet, Exhibit 399, could not cause all of the damage it did because there was too much weight of bullet fragments that still remained in Connally and that since Exhibit 399 was nearly whole, it must have been a different bullet that struck his wrist.[98]

But the wrist wounds could not have been caused by a pristine bullet. Otherwise, the wrist would have been shattered. The neutron-analysis test corroborated that, indeed, all of Connally’s wounds had been caused by the single bullet.[99]

That bullet, according to ballistics tests, lost little of its velocity as it passed through Kennedy’s neck. It struck no bones. The arguments of the Warren Commission critics that Exhibit 399 could not be the single bullet did not depend on whether the bullet had passed through Kennedy’s neck but really on the argument that two different bullets struck Connally. His physicians disputed this, the wound ballistics’ tests on the wrists of cadavers disputed this, and all of the neutron-analysis tests refuted these claims.[100] The overall record is clear: One shot did indeed strike the back of President Kennedy’s neck, exited in the front, and hit Connally, causing all of his wounds. And the fatal shot did strike President Kennedy from behind.[101]

Page 190: Several aspects of the investigation of the House committee were well done…”Neutron-activation analysis” tests were performed on the bullet fragments from Connally’s wrist and the nearly whole bullet that fell off his stretcher; these tests corroborated the single-bullet findings of the Warren Commission.[102]

Pages 196–197: I sincerely regret that Professor Blakey and I have been at odds with one another, because a substantial portion of the work that was done by the House Select Committee on Assassinations was worthwhile—particularly the findings of the independent panel of medical experts, who concluded that the same bullet that passed through President Kennedy’s neck struck Governor Connally, and the neutron analysis of the bullet fragments.[103]

Marrs’s discussion of NAA is shallow and almost completely wrong. Erroneous points include the definition of NAA, the analytical precision of its results, how the composition of different types of ammunition varies, the HSCA’s reason for repeating the NAA, Dr. Guinn’s qualifications and how “researchers” viewed his selection, Guinn’s professional ethics, the meaning of fragments with changed weights, how Guinn viewed these different weights, and the implication of a possible fifth lot of WCC/MC ammunition.

Page 446: Unreported in the [Warren] Commission’s report or volumes was an account of even further scientific testing—this time using neutron activation analysis, a sophisticated method of determining differences in composition by bombarding the test object with radiation.

This wording is suspiciously deceptive, since any difference in composition is evidence that the fragments are not from the same ammunition.[104]

Faced with scientific evidence that Kennedy and Connally were not struck by the same bullet, the House Select Committee on Assassinations decided to conduct their own tests.[105] But researchers’ hopes dimmed with the Committee’s selection of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn to conduct the tests. Guinn admitted he had been an informal consultant to the FBI even prior to the Kennedy assassination. And predictably, Guinn concluded that it was “highly probable” that fragments taken from Connally’s wrist came from CE 399.[106]

This seemed to be the strong clear evidence researchers had been looking for, even though it appeared to support the single-bullet theory. Guinn’s conclusions were warmly embraced by the House Committee. But it was later learned that the wrist fragments originally tested in 1964 were missing. And Guinn publicly admitted that the fragments he tested were not the originals from the National Archives.[107]

Author Henry Hurt quoted Guinn as admitting how fragments from CE 399 could have been substituted for the missing fragments:

Guinn also reported that he had examples of the ammunition from the four production runs in 1954 made at Western Cartridge Company, manufacturers of the Mannlicher-Carcano bullets. “…Reportedly those are the only lots they ever produced, and we have boxes from each of those lots,” Guinn told the Committee.

If this was indeed the only ammunition ever produced, the results of Guinn’s tests gain credibility. However, a Warren Commission document dealing with an interview of a Western Cartridge representative reveals this comment:

If the ammunition supposedly used in the Oswald rifle came from this World War II batch, then Dr. Guinn tested the wrong bullets. This is another example of how seemingly indisputable evidence in the assassination diminishes upon closer examination.[109]

Michael R. Beschloss—The Crisis Years
Mark Lane—Plausible Denial
Mark North—Act of Treason
Kerry W. Thornley—The Idle Warriors
Craig I. Zirbel—The Texas Connection

Kenneth Klein—Facts Knit the Single-Bullet Theory (Article in Los Angeles Times, 24 December 1991)

This brief article is filled with errors about NAA, forensic techniques, and the results of Guinn’s analyses. It’s a pity that reporters can’t or won’t take the time to understand the basics of what they are writing about.

A remaining issue was whether the bullet found on the stretcher was the source of the bullet fragments taken from Connally’s wrist. In making the determination, the committee [HSCA] had the benefit of neutron-activation analysis, a highly precise test that was not in existence at the time of the Warren Commission.[110]

The essence of neutron-activation analysis is that every bullet has a unique composition.[111] Using the analysis, it is possible to analyze precisely the composition of a bullet and a bullet fragment to determine whether the fragment came from the bullet.[112] The analysis showed that it is highly likely that the bullet found on the stretcher was the one that passed through Connally’s wrist, leaving tiny fragments behind.[113]

That the single-bullet theory was not only a plausible explanation but, in fact, was the only reasonable explanation for the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Gov. Connally is supported by the facts. The bullet that hit the President and the governor came from the rear; the trajectory of the bullet leads back to the Texas School Book Depository; the bullet was fired from a rifle found on the sixth floor of the depository; the bullet had been deflected before entering Connally’s back, and the fragments in Connally’s wrist came from the bullet found on the stretcher in Parkland Hospital.

Richard M. Mosk—The Plot to Assassinate the Warren Commission (Article in the Los Angeles Times of 30 December 1991)

Richard Mosk served as a member of the Warren Commission’s staff. It is a pity that his article contains errors of fact and logic such as those shown here for NAA. It is also a pity that he did not back up his claims with supporting evidence. These deficiencies remove all sense of forcefulness from his article. This article is reproduced in Stone/Sklar JFK: The Book of The Film (1992).

Scientific evidence (including neutron-activation analysis, which JFK dismisses as “mere physics”[114]) had repeatedly established the single bullet conclusion[115]—that is, one shot struck Kennedy’s neck, exited the front without hitting any bones and hit Gov. Connally causing all of his wounds. To inflict these wounds, the bullet did not have to be deformed or change course, as sarcastically suggested in JFK.[116]

[1]NAA is an analytical technique that can be used to compare the compositions of metal fragments. “Matching” is a mathematical process that is a completely separate step.

[2]Overstatement of probabilistic conclusions.

[3]Understatement of absolute conclusions. The hospital bullet was proven ballistically to have come from Oswald’s rifle.

[4]Same comments as for the previous citation.

[5]Page ix.

[6]Note the use of the plural head shots. Kurtz shows here that he believe JFK’s head was hit by two shots.

[7]The same overstatement of NAA’s capabilities as by so many other writers.

[8]False. The objects are bombarded with neutrons, not nuclear radiation. The nuclear radiation (such as gamma rays) is measured later.

[9]False. Many elements don’t emit gamma rays.

[10]Doubly false. The gamma-rays aren’t measured in billionths of a gram, and detection limits vary greatly with the element.

[11]This sentence gives the impression that MC bullets are composed of six major elements and traces of all the others. In fact, copper and lead dominate the jacketing and core, respectively, with all other elements being minor and trace.

[12]I have no idea where Kurtz got this wrong idea. The centerpiece of Guinn’s methodology was the opposite, that varying compositions and proportions of scrap lead caused elements like antimony to vary widely in the bullets, even when from the same batch.

[13]What does totals mean? This term is never used in neutron activation.

[14]Pure nonsense. Totally at odds with what Guinn found.

[15]Wrong conclusion follows from wrong premise. Use of totals is nonsensical.

[16]False. The fragments from the rear floorboard were also analyzed. Also, Kurtz does not state whether he is referring to the 1964 or 1977 NAA. Later references to 1964 and Oak Ridge indicate that the FBI’s NAA was being discussed. Without specifying at the beginning of the passage that NAA was done twice, Kurtz unnecessarily confuses his readers.

[17]Illogical formulation—obviously one or more types of ammunition were used, because that covers all possibilities. Kurtz should have written ”whether only one type...” or “whether more than one type...”

[18]Silver and antimony are elements, not fragments. The text should read “Silver and antimony were the only elements measured in the fragments tested.”

[19]Copper was not emphasized because the copper in the lead cores is too easily contaminated by copper in the jackets.

[20]Kurtz gives no actual data in this discussion.

[21]Kurtz discusses this claim for the rest of the paragraph before citing evidence for it in the beginning of the next paragraph. That evidence does not support the claim. In a careful reanalysis, Guinn showed the opposite, and offered data for everyone to examine. That’s the scientific way.

[22]False conclusion. Assumes incorrectly that all MC bullets are identical and that NAA has no analytical uncertainties.

[23]False conclusion for the same reasons given in the previous footnote.

[24]Completely wrong. Kurtz seems to have no idea of what he’s writing about.

[25]False deduction from false premises.

[26]Finally the data upon which the previous two paragraphs of conclusions were based!

[27]False deduction. No justification given for why the bullets could not have come from different lots of MC bullets.

[28]Doesn’t Kurtz think the investigators might have had a reason for not testing all fragments separately?

[29]Copper fragments are much harder to analyze for antimony and silver than lead fragments are.

[30]Both front-seat fragments were.

[31]Why? That bullet wasn’t fired. This suggestion is also invalidated by Guinn’s results showing that elements other than antimony and silver are much less useful for tracing bullets—the others vary less and are easily contaminated.

[32]This is getting tedious. Like any analytical technique, neutron activation leads to probabilistic—not definite—conclusions about the number of bullets and rifles used.

[33]No reason given for greater objectivity of NAA. Anyhow, the phrase “most objective” is self-contradictory.

[34]The kindest word for this sentence is “trash.”

[35]The second part of this sentence contradicts the first.

[36]False definition of NAA—the objects are irradiated with neutrons.

[37]“Different levels of radiation ac cording to their weight” is nonsensical. Whole clause is grammatically incorrect, with subject not matching verb.

[38]Here Kurtz confuses the issue by mixing sensitivity and uncertainty of an analytical technique.

[39]False statement. NAA’s results are probabilities, not absolutes, especially when trying to establish origins of bullets and fragments.

[40]False statement. Guinn noted carefully that because his results were probabilistic, they could only be consistent with the SBT, never prove it. His results were necessary but not sufficient.

[41]False statement. Matching is not proving—Guinn stated so explicitly.

[42]There is no type of Mannlicher-Carcano bullet besides that which Oswald used.

[43]Doubly false statement. Guinn stated all his results as being only “to a high probability.”

[44]This is getting tiring. To a high probability, Guinn’s evidence suggested only two bullets. To a high probability, all fragments came from MC bullets.

[45]They resembled each other closely, but did not match because matching is absolute.

[46]False rendition of Guinn’s thesis. He actually claimed that it was highly probable that they had come from the same bullet.

[47]False for the same reason as the previous footnote: Guinn made probabilistic claims, not absolute.

[48]They were left in the head because they were too tiny to be extracted.

[49]But one may not assume that the other fragments would not match, either. Until the remaining fragments are analyzed, they cannot comprise evidence one way or the other. Kurtz wants to slant the argument without any justification. The conical alignment of the fragments means they all came from a single bullet.

[50]So what? Again, lack of data suggests nothing either way. The two large fragment were top and bottom of MC bullets, with total weight less than one bullet. If one decides to choose between one bullet or two bullets as he origin of the fragments, the simpler one-bullet explanation must be chosen because it explains the data as well as the more-complex scenario.

[51]“ppm” is never written with a period.

[52]This is Guinn’s whole point, that individual MC bullets can be told apart.

[53]Doesn’t relate logically to previous sentences.

[54]Kurtz, the historian, is telling Guinn, the forensic NAA expert, how to interpret his data? Get real!

[55]Guinn’s report and testimony explain fully why elements other than antimony and silver were not considered. Kurtz appears not to have considered this information in formulating this paragraph. For the record, copper is avoided because it is too easily contaminated by the copper jacketing, sodium and chlorine are easily contaminated by bodily fluids of victims or during preparation for analysis, and aluminum has not proven to be reliable in the totality of Guinn’s experience with bullet fragments. Guinn focused on the two elements shown by his experience to be the most dependable tracers.

[56]Flawless summary of the NAA.

[57]Overstatement of the capability of emission spectrography. Its results allow for probabilistic statements only, not absolute conclusions.

[58]Doubly wrong sentence. It is frequently not simple to establish that fragments are not from the same source, particularly when their compositions are similar. By contrast, proving two fragment from the same source is impossible chemically, because there may always be an untested source whose composition can’t be distinguished from the first source.

[59]It all depends on how much the potential sources differ. Highly similar sources would negate this sentence.

[60]Again, the degree of dissimilarity must always be related to the dissimilarity of the sources in question.

[61]Says who? No one has shown that the FBI’s vagueness was anything other than appropriate to the large analytical uncertainties of the spectrographic analysis. The FBI knew it couldn’t say much about the origins of the fragments, but regrettably chose not to say why it couldn’t. Their extreme reticence opened the door to all sorts of extreme interpretations of the data, all wrong.

[62]It may have appeared that way, but when Hoover’s letter of 8 July 1964 was released, it said exactly what Frazier had said, right down to the wording.

[63]False criticism. There was nothing more the spectrographer could say—Frazier had previously said all that the FBI was going to release.

[64]This is one of the Great Myths of the critics’ claims. Robert Frazier’s testimony had already answered this point, albeit implicitly. See footnote to Weisberg’s Whitewash (1965).

[65]Actually, the Warren Report shows that all the fragments analyzed were similar in composition. None was noted to be distinguishably different from the others.

[66]If Weisberg was implying that the FBI held back the spectrographic data because they went counter to the single-bullet theory, Weisberg’s implication would be unjustified. There could have been other reasons. Lack of an expected action cannot be given a unique explanation.

[67]Very misleading statement. The FBI expressed the spectrographic results in semiquantitative terms because that was the nature of the actual data, not because their analysis had been incomplete. The power of emission spectrography is consistently overrated by Kennedy-writers.

[68]This sentence is copied without attribution from Wecht (1974), who wrote: “The material had not been classified and it is not clear just why it should ever have been withheld.”

[69]The Great Myth again. But Hoover is simply agreeing with what Agent Robert Frazier testified to. See earlier footnote to Hurt.

[70]This is Hoover’s answer to the Great Question, but no critic ever recognized it as such.

[71]A five-minute reading of Hoover’s letter of Frazier’s testimony reveals that all fragments were similar to one another, period. Limiting the comparisons to any two fragments is incorrect and misleading.

[72]But again, absence of trumpeting does not necessarily mean that the analyses contradicted the government’s position. The analyses might just as well have offered no evidence either way (which they did). Why will no critic recognize this other possibility?

[73]An overly rosy perspective.

[74]How many times must it be repeated that the absence of support does not automatically mean contradiction?

[75]All the fragments that had been recovered.

[76]Why include “at best” here? There is no evidence that Hoover was saying anything but that the results were inconclusive. Hurt seems determined to find a contradiction to the single-bullet theory in the NAA results.

[77]It is ironic that hindsight shows that the FBI’s original neutron activation was conclusive, and Guinn’s later neutron activation was not.

[78]So what? That Guinn consulted for the FBI in no way implies that he had been involved with the Warren Commission.

[79]The newer equipment did not help Guinn explain his procedures or results to the House Committee.

[80]There is an internal contradiction between “stated conclusively” and “found evidence of.” A certainty multiplied by a probability still gives a probability. There is “evidence of” two bullets only, but it is not conclusive. To the casual reader, the sentence appears to mean that he proved that there were only two bullets, but it does not.

[81]This cynical sentence requires two rejoinders. (1) Guinn was provided fragments by an official agency. The burden of proof is on those who say that are not legitimate fragments, not on those who accept them. Neither Hurt nor anyone else has offered proof of a switch. (2) The FBI’s 1964 NAA data, once systematic errors are recognized and removed, confirm Guinn’s 1978 data. This invalidates Hurt’s criticism.

[82]Different weights do not necessarily mean different fragments. Parts of fragments are used up in analyses.

[83]The operative word here is “hypothetical.” Guinn went on to say that he had no reason to disbelieve that he was testing the proper fragments. Most writers don’t tell the readers this.

[84]Is Hurt claiming to know more than the FBI’s ballistic experts?

[85]Nothing is gained by Hurt’s discussing a disagreement without knowing what it represents.

[86]Hurt seems unaware of the extreme unlikelihood of those milling persons being able to slip into the limousine lead fragments with composition indistinguishable from the exact WCC/MC bullets fired.

[87]Lack of explanation is not to be confused with lack of identification.

[88]A nonargument. Hurt says in essence: “Remember what I told you about the medical evidence. They could have done the same thing with the bullet fragments from the brain.” But Hurt offers no evidence that they did.

[89]“Normal” in the empirical sense—those ranges were measured in the various lots, not theorized about.

[90]This criticism is moot until Hurt offers evidence to show (1) that Oswald actually used bullets from this early lot, and (2) that the chemical properties of this lot differed substantially from those of the four later lots. He has shown neither.

[91]False statement. In Guinn’s Analytical Chemistry article (April 1979, page 484A), he states that he had tested bullets from all four production runs, and noted that the bullets in all runs were very heterogeneous. His HSCA testimony provides additional details.

[92]Totally unjustified conclusion, based on numerous false premises.

[93]This sentence is exactly wrong. Guinn’s conclusion s represented by far the strongest support ever offered for the single-bullet theory. His methodology is simple, straightforward, and easy to comprehend for anyone who will invest some time. That they remained controversial says as much about the receiving public as the way in which they were presented. The correct formulation for Hurt’s sentence is “…the reception for this evidentiary conclusion was in perfect harmony…” The problem was not the conclusion, but how it was received.

[94]A conclusion is either valid or invalid. Its validity does not depend on how it is received by experts and critics, as Hurt suggests.

[95]It only “sullies the whole atmosphere” for those who can’t think straight.

[96]This paragraph is an argument from authority, and so in unlikely to persuade confirmed skeptics.

[97]A bizarre and incorrect summary of how NAA compares samples. A phrase appears to have been omitted: “…including any minor impurities, and if there are virtually none…” should read “…including any minor impurities, and if there are virtually no differences in composition…” This paragraph also ignores analytical uncertainties in the NAA data, which can allow the same results to come from different materials, or different results to come from the same materials. Furthermore, identical results can never prove that two materials came from the same source, because another source may have the same composition. However, sufficiently different results may prove that two materials had different sources.

[98]This paragraph is unpersuasive because it relies on quantitative arguments without citing actual figures.

[99]False statement. Since bullet fragments were recovered from only one of Connally’s five wounds, NAA could relate only that one to the Parkland bullet.

[100]Same comment as previous footnote: The NAA tests dealt with only one of Governor Connally’s wounds. The only way these tests could eliminate a second bullet striking Connally was to assume it would have left fragments in the limousine and then not find evidence of a third bullet among the fragments. While no evidence of a third bullet was found, it seems difficult to assume that a second bullet striking Connally must have shed fragments into the car.

[101]In summary, this section is constructed too shabbily for someone of Belin’s reputation. He seems at his best with simple arguments, such as who saw Oswald shoot Tippit and how close these witnesses were to Oswald as he fled the scene. Subtle or technical arguments seem difficult for Belin.

[102]Wrong—the tests did not simply “corroborate” the WC’s findings. Second sentence copied from second paragraph of page 54.

[103]No such thing as “neutron analysis.”

[104]This sentence is doubly wrong. It assumes incorrectly that neutron-activation data are free of analytical uncertainty, and that different types of ammunition have characteristic and invariant compositions. Marrs offers no justification for either assumption.

[105]This sentence is incorrect historically. The HSCA wanted to repeat the NAA in hopes that refined techniques could link fragments to bullets in ways not possible in the first tests.

[106]These two sentences comprise an unconscionable slur on Guinn’s professional honor. A scientist of his caliber does not produce “predictable” conclusions. Also, Guinn’s report to the HSCA was reviewed by an independent consul tant, who approved his findings. Marrs is declaring Guinn guilty by association with the FBI.

[107]Not so. Guinn admitted that not all his particles weighed the same as previous weights recorded for them. The larger fragments were clearly the same as those tested in 1964. According to a letter of 11 June 1979 from the FBI’s “JWK” to Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, some weight was lost by being consumed in the spectrographic analysis, some was lost in cleaning the surface for the original NAA, and the portions of fragments made radioactive by the original NAA had probably been discarded in the radioactive trash at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Thus the loss in weight of various fragments implies nothing sinister.

[108]Marrs has not told the whole story. Guinn was speaking hypothetically. He clearly did not think such a thing had happened, for he added immediately, “I have to believe that these are honest people.” (Lifton tape recording)

[109]Not true. Marrs’s conclusion has no probative value until some evidence in support of its premise is pro duced. Marrs has produced none, and neither has anyone else. See detailed footnote on same topic under Hurt (1985).

[110] False assertion. Neutron-activation analysis was not only known in 1963–1964, but was used by the FBI on the same bullet fragments.

[111] Triply false statement. First, the essence of neutron activation has nothing to do with bullets; the essence of distinguishing objects chemically is potential differences in their chemical compositions. Second, only MC bullets and others made by Western Cartridge Company vary greatly in composition; Guinn found that bullets made by other manufacturers varied by only 3% or so on the average (in concentration of antimony). Third, neither Guinn nor anyone else said that each bullet was unique, only that MC bullets varied greatly in composition.

[112] Simplistic and false view of distinguishing bullets chemically. Clear chemical differences can make it highly likely that a fragment did not come from a bullet, whereas chemical similarities (or even indistinguishable compositions) only show that the fragment may have come from the bullet.

[113] The chemical analysis showed only that it was highly likely that the bullet and the fragment were indistinguishable in composition. Any statement beyond this requires independent nonchemical information such as total numbers of fragments found.

[114] The actual phrase in JFK was “some fancy physics.” (p. 153 of Stone/Sklar’s annotated screenplay “JFK: The Book of The Film.”)

[115] False assertion. Scientific evidence cannot “establish” (prove) the single-bullet theory because no traceable fragments of lead were deposition in Kennedy’s body or clothing. The SBT remains exactly that—a “theory” supported to a certain level of probability. Regardless of whether it is “probable,” “highly probable,” or the “most probable,” it is important to accept that the SBT is unproven and will probably remain that way.

[116] Unsupported assertions.