Annotated Compendium, 1992

John R. Crain and Philip A. Rogers—The Man on the Grassy Knoll
Charles A. Crenshaw, M.D. with Jens Hansen and J. Gary Shaw—JFK: Conspiracy of Silence
James R. Duffy—Conspiracy: Who Killed JFK?
Editors of Executive Intelligence Review—Dope, Inc.
Sam and Chuck Giancana—Double Cross
Warren Hinckle and William Turner—Deadly Secrets
Joan Hubbard-Burrell—What Really Happened? JFK
Jim Keith, ed.—The Gemstone File
Raymond Marcus—The HSCA, the Zapruder Film, and the Single-bullet theory
Stanley J. Marks and Ethel M. Marks—Yes, Americans, A Conspiracy Murdered JFK!
Robert D. Morrow—First Hand Knowledge
John M. Newman—JFK and Vietnam
Carl Oglesby—Who Killed JFK?
L. Fletcher Prouty—JFK
Dick Russell—The Man Who Knew Too Much
Bill Sloan—JFK: The Last Dissenting Witness
Jean Stafford—A Mother in History
Ralph D. Thomas—Missing Links in the JFK Assassination Conspiracy
Jonathan Vankin—Conspiracies, Cover-ups and Crimes
Alan J. Weberman and Michael Canfield—Coup d’État in America
Barbie Zelizer—Covering the Body

For a book whose prologue states that its only fictions are Oswald surviving and being tried in Texas without JFK’s being autopsied there, the book’s section on NAA evidence surely seems odd. The NAA analyst is the wrong person working for the wrong governmental body in the wrong decade, the bullet fragments are misidentified, only two of the five fragments are mentioned because it is wrongly portrayed that all the tiny fragments had disappeared, NAA is completely mischaracterized, and procedures for determining similarity and dissimilarity are distorted beyond recognition. Other than that, the passage is flawless.

Brown’s book provides one of the two or three worst discussions of NAA and the assassination of all the books reviewed here. It is best disregarded in toto.

Page 318: After a brief pause, [prosecution attorney Matthews] called Dr. Vincent Guinn to the stand. At the defense table, Carolyn Jeffries put on her coat and left, and this time, [defense attorneys] Barnes and Dean nodded their heads, “Yes.”

Barnes rose. “Your Honor, while we are waiting for this next witness, inasmuch as the pathology testimony seems to be concluded, the defense at this time would like to admit the document, CE 2011, presented earlier at the conclusion of testimony of FBI Agent Todd, Reference Rifle Bullet C1, which indicated that, when interviewed by FBI Agents Bardwell Odum or Elmer Lee Todd, Darrell C. Tomlinson and O.P. Wright of Parkland Hospital, Special Agent Richard C. Johnsen of the Secret Service, and James Rowley, Chief of the United States Secret Service, were all unable to identify the pristine bullet which we have been discussing, CE 399.[1] Based on the clear and obvious lack of chain of possession found in that report, I would move that CE 399, the pristine bullet allegedly discovered at Parkland Hospital, be excluded from evidence at this time.”

“Your Honor, the prosecution is clearly at a loss here. There is only one bullet under consideration, CE 399. Mr. Tomlinson found a bullet, passed it to his supervisor, Mr. O.P. Wright, who then turned it over to Secret Service Agent Johnsen at the hospital. Agent Johnsen returned with the group that departed Love Field, reported to his headquarters, gave the bullet to his ultimate superior, Mr. Rowley, who then passed it to Special Agent Todd, who then initialed it. Agent Todd identified it.”

“Four generations of identification too late. If the others don’t identify it—all of them, Agent Todd might as well have initialed a cannonball,” Barnes added.[2]

“The defense is on solid ground here, Mr. Matthews. The exhibit is excluded. Carson, let’s swear in this obviously bewildered Dr. Guinn.”[3] Guinn, slightly shaken by the dramatic exchange that took place during his entrance, was sworn, and established as an expert witness.

Matthews moved right to the attack with the witness: “Dr. Guinn, can you briefly tell us about your scientific specialty, neutron activation analysis?”

The witness began to speak in highly technical language, and had to be reminded by Matthews that it was urgent that everyone in the courtroom be able to understand the process.[4] In essence, he was telling the witness to speak English and calling the jury stupid, but he got away with it.[5] The witness then explained that if a given substance is bombarded with neutrons, it will yield a given, observable chemical result. If a similar substance is tested, similar results should follow. Different substance, different results. In all, a very precise science which was emerging in many ways, one of which was in the area of police work. “Though I am not, I confess, a policeman,“ Guinn concluded.

“I show you CE 843, fragments of bullets found in the presidential limousine, Dr. Guinn—”[6]

“Your Honor,” Barnes began slowly, “let the record show that we are all accepting in good faith that those fragments came from the presidential limousine. There has been no testimony, and no documentation, and given the handling we’ve seen consistently with regard to evidence in this case, those pieces in CE 843 could be most any bullet fragments, though my sense of skepticism inclines me to believe that they originated sometime as Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition.”[7]

“No, Your Honor, as I said, I just want the record to show that this evidence was introduced without foundation.”

“It is my conclusion that it is highly probable that they came from two bullets, and that they were of Mannlicher-Carcano origin.”[9]

“Doctor, are those tests reflected in this FBI report which shows that there were no significant differences found in the various fragments?”

“Yes,” the witness answered quickly, as if it were an answer the prosecution did not want to hear.[10]

“Thank you very much, Doctor,” said a confused Matthews. “No further questions.”

Barnes asked for, and was granted, a moment with Bob Dean, to stall until Carolyn Jeffries returned. After stalling as long as possible with small talk, Barnes was told to proceed. He then rehashed the essence of neutron activation analysis with the witness, drawing out its precision as a testing vehicle. Playing the part of the doubting nonscientist, Barnes asked questions to make sure the jury understood exactly how the procedure worked, including the margin for error. The witness assured him that there was none—that was the beauty of this new endeavor.[11] In all, it was a time-consuming but worthwhile process, as Barnes knew jurors were impressed by phrases like “scientifically proven.” Matthews let Barnes drone on, as he was confident with Guinn’s bona fides and testimony.

“So,” Barnes concluded, “you test a sample of an item, and you get a very exacting, precise readout?”

“Then, Doctor, if you tested something else, and the readout was not identical, that would indicate that the substance was not identical to the earlier substance tested?”

“Also correct,” Guinn answered. “See, it’s really easy to understand.”[12]

“Indeed it is,” Barnes answered him. “Because a while ago, to refresh the jury’s recollection since I took you on that scientific detour, you testified that the fragments you tested exhibited ‘no significant differences.’ That statement hints that there were, in fact, differences, which, although they may not be significant, are differences nevertheless and your testimony just a few moments ago told how exact and precise this work is.”[13]

“There were differences in the samples.[14] The FBI chose the wording of their report. ‘No significant differences’ is an interesting wordplay, as you discovered, Counselor.”[15] Barnes was satisfied. Matthews now understood why Guinn had answered “yes” the way he had. At that moment Jeffries came back into the courtroom carrying a moderate-sized grocery bag.

“Dr. Guinn, did you encounter any difficulties or any unusual circumstances in conducting these tests on which the prosecution is basing their case?”

“Well, I was told to make a comparison of some small fragments—the ones described in CE 843 are sizable portions of bullets. But I was asked to make comparisons of smaller fragments, and when the materials were delivered to me, I found myself opening empty boxes.”

“Just that. Two, perhaps three containers holding nothing but air. I even used a tiny magnet like a vacuum cleaner, and there was literally no metal in any of those containers. I don’t have any idea what they wanted me to test.”[16]

“I see…Well, with the fragments you did test, those which showed ‘no significant differences,’ could you tell the gun which fired them?”

“And the FBI, in reporting ‘no significant differences,’ was essentially, then, reporting differences?”

Barnes went and got the grocery bag at the end of the defense table. “Let’s test out your science, Doctor, in a way that everyone in this courtroom can understand. You’ve spoken of matching samples and similarities, so…”—Barnes reached into the bag and withdrew a quart of milk, in a standard red and white container. “As an expert witness, Doctor, can you identify this?”

Guinn knew he was being put on, but not why, so he played along: “My expertise suggests that’s a quart of milk.” Matthews wanted to object, but he’d been burned too many times, and he was still mentally sprinting to the point where he could say “The prosecution rests.”

Barnes then walked back to the defense table with the quart of milk in his hand, put the bag down, and removed from it a second, similarly packaged quart of milk. He then returned to the witness stand. “Doctor, in my left hand here is milk you identified. Would you care to hazard your professional opinion again as to what is in my right hand?”

“I’ll only trouble you with one more question,” Barnes said, walking to the end of the jury box with both quarts of milk very available for the jury to see. Then he turned to the witness and said quietly but sternly, “Identified as similar; certainly look similar. Doctor, did they come from the same cow?”

Matthews objected now, but it was all lost on Barnes, who had returned the cartons to the grocery bag and had indicated that he had no further objections. The judge instructed the jury, several of whom were laughing, to pay no attention to the defense’s theatrics. Matthews had no redirect.[19]

DiEugenio’s discussion of NAA is very superficial. It is full of irrelevancies and non sequiturs. For example, his claim that Guinn analyzed different fragments from those originally analyzed by the FBI is not documented, and even if it were true, the perfectly logical explanation is not mentioned. Also, Sprague’s assessment of Blakey is not necessarily the only one that might be offered. Guinn allegedly having tried to work for the WC has no direct relevance to his work for the HSCA. Where are Jerry Policoff’s documents, and what is their nature? All these points are treated so casually as to remove all logical force from the discussion.

Footnote 153, page 378: Blakey tends toward overstatement and disingenuousness. On the Crossfire program[20], he referred three separate times to Oliver Stone’s JFK as “obscene,” because it postulates a government conspiracy. He said the single-bullet theory was substantiated by two tests, a tracing of the trajectory back from the car to the Book Depository and the use of neutron activation analysis. Most experts agree that such a tracing is inconclusive at best.[21] And in this case, the Committee’s outside expert had to move the back wound up for his analysis to work, while the Committee's own medical experts had to move it down for their version to work.[22]

The neutron activation analysis (NAA) was conducted by Dr. Vincent Guinn. (Although Guinn denied that he had ever tried to work for the Warren Commission, Jerry Policoff has produced documents that prove he had.)[23] Guinn concluded from NAA tests that trace elements from CE 399 matched fragments taken from both Kennedy and Connally, which would support the single-bullet theory. But there is a problem. Guinn admitted that the fragments he tested were not those tested by the FBI in the original NAA examinations, which suggests that there may have been some switching of fragments.[24]

James P. Duffy and Vincent L. Ricci—The Assassination of John F. Kennedy (1992)

This brief three-sentence explanation contains four major errors and one misleading statement.

Page 208: Guinn, Dr. Vincent. A nuclear chemist consulted by the Warren Commission,[25] Dr. Guinn examined fragments collected from the wounds that allegedly came from the magic bullet.[26] His findings indicated that they were, in fact, part of that bullet.[27] The House Select Committee on Assassinations later asked him to reexamine this material,[28] but Guinn discovered that the fragments sent to him by the National Archives were not the same weight of those listed in the National Archives records. In addition, other fragments originally considered as evidence in this case vanished completely.[29]

This paragraph from Edward Jay Epstein contains eight significant errors, for an average of two per sentence.

Page 586: In addition [to ballistically matching bullet fragments to Oswald’s rifle], the House Select Committee on Assassination [sic] employed a very advanced form of neutron activation analysis to match the recovered bullet and fragments to the ammunition used in the Mannlicher-Carcano.[30] In this technique, traces from the ballistic evidence are bombarded by neutrons in a nuclear reactor so that the precise composition of elements—antimony, silver, and copper[31]—can be measured by their emissions on a gamma-ray spectrometer to an accuracy of one-billionth gram.[32] Since different batches of even the same brand name ammunition have different ratios of elements in them,[33] it is possible to determine through this analysis whether or not even minute fragments came from the same or different batches of ammunition.[34] The composition of traces from the bullet and fragments were thus compared to that of the unfired bullet found in the chamber of the Mannlicher-Carcano and found to match exactly.[35] This analysis convincingly showed that all the ballistics material that was recovered, and could be tested, came from two bullets,[36] and both bullets identically matched in their composition the ammunition in the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.[37]

Ted Gest and Joseph P. Shapiro—JFK: The Untold Story of the Warren Commission (Article in U.S. News & World Report, 12 August 1992)

In general, this article on the Warren Commission seems well done. Its brief reference to NAA in connection with the single-bullet theory is poor, however. In just two sentences the writers managed to cram four major errors.

In sidebar entitled: Could the Bullet Be Pristine?: Critics of the Warren Commission focus on a variety of factional disputes. Among them: How could a single bullet that the commission said struck both JFK and John Connally have emerged in nearly pristine condition on the governor’s hospital stretcher? Intuition suggests a bullet that both slit Kennedy’s neck and tore through Connally’s chest and wrist should have been disfigured.[38] But tests conducted for the commission staff led to the explanation that the bullet slowed as it passed through Kennedy, reducing the impact when it hit Connally. (Only fragments were found of a second and possibly a third bullet.[39]) At the Edgewood Arsenal near Baltimore, the commission’s ballistics experts supported the theory by firing shots through a model the thickness of Kennedy’s neck and another that approximated Connally’s chest. In further support of the single-bullet theory, in 1978[40] a special House committee used a new technology called neutron analysis[41] to examine bullet fragments from Kennedy’s neck[42] and Connally’s wrist. This test confirmed that the same bullet—Warren Commission Exhibit 399—had struck both men.[43]

These paragraphs contain enough major errors to render them useless. The question is not how much Livingstone got wrong about NAA, but whether he got anything right.

Page 538: Unfortunately, Time’s extensive coverage of the [JFK] film falsified many statements. For instance, we find this comment: “The bullet that hit Kennedy’s head was found in the limousine, and tests indicated that it came from Oswald’s rifle. Moreover, frame 313 of the Zapruder film clearly shows brain matter spraying forward.” Nothing is too clear in Z 313,[44] and no bullet was found in the limousine, only fragments.[45] There is no way that a fragment can be linked to a rifle.[46]

Time gropes on: “Neutron activation tests indicate that the fragments in Connally’s wrist did come from the bullet in question.” This is a completely false statement.[47] The tests were not conclusive,[48] and there was more metal in his wrist than is missing from the “Magic” Bullet.[49]

Page 540: Sadly, the major networks and magazines repeated many of the falsifications of the evidence in the case.

For instance, several points were brought out on ABC’s Nightline and other shows: that “atomic” testing proved that the “bullet” found in the car, or the “bullet” found in Connally’s leg came from Oswald’s rifle,[50] 2) that the bullet fell out of Connally’s leg and was found on his stretcher,[51] 3) that there was scientific proof that the jet effect worked on human heads, which would go backward if hit from behind,[52] 4) that Nova and certain tests proved that the trajectory of the “Magic” Bullet could have struck both men at the same time.[53]

Page 541: As for the so-called atomic testing,[54] I dealt with this in High Treason when I discussed the neutron activation analysis tests. Suffice it to say that the tests were never released by the Warren Commission because they did not prove that the fragments that were found were from the same lot of lead as that of the “Magic” Bullet found at Parkland.[55] The fragments could only be shown to be similar.[56] Millions of bullets might have been made from the same lot of lead, so it would be impossible to prove that they came from a particular weapon.[57] The bullet found at Parkland was clearly a piece of frame-up evidence planted there so that it would connect to the alleged Oswald rifle when found.[58] But the bullet did not actually go through a body or hit bone, or it would not look so perfect.[59]

Donahue clearly worked very hard and long on trying to understand the assassination. A number of his ideas are good, and he deserves to be commended for them. But equally many of his conclusions are wrong, and diminish the overall force of his work. His errors usually arise because of basic flaws in logic, such as trying to draw strong conclusions from the absence of data. Donahue’s mixture of right and wrong conclusions is typical of amateur researchers. We don’t have graduate schools for nothing!

Page 123: Then in 1973 a bombshell detonated in the form of a previously unknown letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, chief counsel for the Warren Commission. The letter, dated July 8, 1964, revealed that in addition to spectrographic analysis, another kind of test had been conducted on the bullet fragments. This was an extraordinarily precise and, at the time, relatively new procedure known as neutron activation. The process involved irradiating organic or inorganic materials—in this case the bullet fragments—with nuclear particles[60]. The specimens would then emit gamma rays, which could be counted, compared, and analyzed to reveal the exact composition of the substance down to parts per billion.[61] The process was and remains vastly superior to spectrographic analysis and is so accurate it is often referred to as “nuclear fingerprinting.”[62]

Today, neutron activation has found applications in a wide range of areas. Among other things, it is used in agriculture for detecting pesticide residues on crops, in electronics for measuring impurities in silicon semiconductors, in medicine for tracing metals in metabolism, in geology for analyzing minerals, and in law enforcement for analyzing physical evidence from the scene of a crime.

Using the process, police can identify poisons administered to a victim by analysis of the victims hair, compare tiny flecks of paint from hit-and-run automobile accidents, and contrast minuscule spots of dirt or grease, among a host of other applications. Neutron activation conducted on a strand of Napoleon’s hair and on hair removed from the exhumed body of Sweden’s King Eric XIV has shown both men were probably poisoned with arsenic.

Hoover’s 1964 letter blandly noted that “minor variations” were found in some of the Dealey Plaza bullet fragments, including those recovered from the limousine as well as those removed from Kennedy’s brain, but that the differences were not sufficient to permit positive differentiation and or identification. In the years that followed, a number of assassination researchers jumped on this statement as proof of misrepresentation by the FBI director, since, they said, variations of any kind revealed in the precise neutron activation process unequivocally demonstrated the samples originated from different sources.

Donahue agreed it seemed odd that the process was reportedly inconclusive, given the supposed precision of the testing methodology. Then again, he knew that lead used in military bullets is there strictly for weight. As such, bullet manufacturers often use the cheapest lead available, usually waste lead generated in other industrial applications. This means that bullet lead is a nonhomogeneous substance that, when poured in a semiliquid state, can contain random pockets of various substances, including silver and arsenic and any number of impurities.[63]

Donahue therefore reasoned that samples of lead taken from bullets manufactured in the same lot might appear to be exactly the same, or possibly, completely different. A bullet dug up at Gettysburg might not significantly differ in makeup from the lead found in the presidential limo. In other words, it might well be that neutron activation comparison of lead could be considerably less than conclusive.[64]

On the other hand, Donahue believed that neutron activation tests of the jacket materials—the metal that encased the bullets—could reveal a great deal.[65]

With this in mind, Reppert wrote Remington Arms Co., manufacturer of the AR-15 .223 round, and Winchester Western Cartridge Co., makers of the 6.5 millimeter Carcano round, asking for the specific metallic composition of the metal that encased the respective bullets. In time, he received replies. According to Winchester, the 6.5 millimeter Carcano jacket was made of 90 percent copper, 8 percent zinc, and 2 percent impurities. Remington, meanwhile, reported the .223 hollow-point bullet jacket was made of 99 percent copper and 1 percent impurities.

If there were jacket fragments recovered from Kennedy’s skull and they were shown to contain zinc, then the bullet must have somehow come from Oswald’s gun. But if the jacket shards contained only copper and trace amounts of impurities, the bullet could not have come from Oswald’s gun. And the only other high-powered rifle known to be present at the time of the fatal shot was Hickey’s.[67]

As he pondered this, Donahue realized there was a second proof that could be conducted on the jacket pieces: the width of the respective jacket materials. The AR-15 round has a very thin jacket. The Carcano jacket is extremely thick; almost twice as thick as the AR-15 .223 skin. Microscopic analysis of the jacket pieces found in Kennedy’s skull could quickly reveal the jacket width and therefore the type of the fatal bullet.[68]

If there was ever evidence that would categorically prove Donahue right or wrong, it was the jacket material found in Kennedy’s skull. Indeed, the fact that the government had only inadvertently revealed that neutron activation tests had been conducted, that they had never disclosed the results of these tests, that they hadn’t even revealed the results of the less sophisticated spectrographic tests—all this, to Donahue, seemed odd. After all, if neutron activation had been done on the jacket material, and if the results had strengthened the Warren Commission’s case, why wouldn’t the government tout those results? Certainly they’d incorporated far less conclusive evidence in their case against Oswald.[69]

According to Dr. Fisher’s 1968 examination of Kennedy’s skull X rays, close to forty tiny fragments were embedded in the brain. Yet when Fisher’s panel asked to see the brain, they were told it was “not available.” Likewise, when they’d sought to see a number of tissue samples taken from the President’s brain and edge scrapings made from the bone and tissue around the entrance wound to the skull, the requests were again denied.

In fact, the brain, the tissue samples, and the scrapings seemed to vanish in the wake of the autopsy, according to Cyril Wecht, the Allegheny County coroner who’d looked at the photos and X rays in 1972. The brain and slides were not available at the National Archives in the years that followed and no one seemed to have any clue where they’d gone.

To Donahue, that this critical evidence was missing was highly suspect. The telling fact was that the missing materials were probably the only physical evidence that would have contained residue from—and in the case of the brain—pieces of the all-important .223 jacket material.[70]

Donahue and Reppert realized it was imperative to get a look at the neutron activation test data to determine if the bullet jacket fragments were, in fact, tested. Reppert convinced his editors that the Sun should file a Freedom of Information lawsuit to recover the test results. Though it would undoubtedly take time, perhaps the Sun’s attorneys could pry the information out of the FBI.

This section shows how important Donahue considered the NAA data for the fragments to be.

Page 138: The investigator listened intently as Donahue explained how he believed the fatal bullet’s left-to-right trajectory and explosive, disintegrating impact ruled out Oswald as the triggerman. The gunsmith used photos, drawings, and eyewitness accounts to highlight his belief that Hickey’s bullet had been the killing one. He emphasized the importance of obtaining the neutron activation results, and, if possible, the brain, tissue samples, and bone scrapings from the autopsy. He also suggested the committee try to gain access to Warren Commission exhibit 843: three small irregular pieces of bullet removed from Kennedy’s brain during the autopsy. These fragments, like the brain and the tissue samples, could be critical pieces of medical evidence—if any of the fragments were from the jacket rather than the core of the bullet, they could show conclusively whether the jacket material came from an AR-15 or a Carcano.

Donahue went on to explain why he believed the single bullet theory was correct; how so much of the information surrounding that subject had been misconstrued and mangled by both the Commission and the critics. Finally, Donahue urged the committee staffers to interview Hickey himself.

The investigators listened quietly. Finally Moriarty asked: “If you really believe Hickey did it and you know where he lives, why don’t you go talk to him?”

“Because I don’t think that’s my job, Mr. Moriarty,” Donahue replied. “I think that’s your job. Or the job of law enforcement. We’ve already written him a couple of times and he hasn’t responded. If I went over there, he’d slam the door in my face. He’s already threatened to sue me. I’m not afraid of him, but I just don’t see what I could do by going to see him. The only way he’s going to talk is if you people call him to testify under oath.”

The investigators assured Donahue they would do their best. Finding the missing autopsy material was already a priority for the committee, they said, and getting a look at the neutron activation results was something they’d previously discussed as well.”

“There’s a good possibility you’ll be called to testify when our public hearings are held,” Moriarty said. “Right now, I don’t know when that will be, but we’ll definitely be in touch.”

The meeting ended with handshakes and warm words all around. Howard and Katie were much encouraged as they drove back to Baltimore. In the months since he’d discovered the existence of Hickey’s AR-15, Donahue’s conviction about the origin of the fatal shot had never wavered. Now that the committee was apparently pursuing the case, he figured it was only a matter of time before the truth would b e out. [N.B. He hounded Hickey on only a probability!]

The fact that the committee was taking Howard seriously was confirmed for Katie when she received a call the next day from Conzelman, one of the investigators who’d been present at the meeting. Howard was working, so Katie spoke with the staffer at length and tried to answer the follow-up questions he had. Although the researcher seemed eager to learn more, one of his queries gave Katie considerable pause.

“Now, Mrs. Donahue, can you tell me who manufactures the Pristine bullets?” Conzelman asked matter-of-factly.

“Well...ah,” Katie hesitated. “There isn’t really a bullet with the brand name Pristine. That’s just a term, a derogatory term, really, that the Warren Commission critics have used top describe the bullet found at Parkland Hospital because of its undamaged condition, which of course the critics don’t believe would have been possible given the wounds the bullet caused to Kennedy and Connally. They also call it the ‘magic bullet.’ It’s the same thing, really.”

“Ah yes. Of course. I see,” Conzelman said quickly. He thanked Katie for her time and assured her the committee would be in contact as the investigation progressed.

“Well, it is funny,” Katie said, “but I just hope it’s not an indication of the knowledge level we’re dealing with down there.”

“Yeah,” Howard replied, “but don’t forget: Moriarty is a former homicide detective. He know exactly what I’m talking about. Conzelman no doubt means well, but he’s just a puppy. It doesn’t matter how knowledgeable he is.”

Flagged by Reppert, the Baltimore Sun’s Washington correspondent reported Donahue’s meeting with the congressional investigators in a twelve-inch story on page A-5 the next day. The article noted that Donahue had urged the committee to obtain the neutron activation tests and quoted him as saying it was now up to the committee to find the facts.

Page 164: At the committee’s ballistics hearings—the proceedings Donahue had tried so mightily to be a part of—additional information surfaced that, to Donahue, again fit a pattern of elimination or obfuscation of any evidence that pointed to the actual origin of the bullet.

The testimony by various experts focused primarily on the single bullet theory. This shopworn controversy was seemingly put to rest thanks to the neutron activation work of Vincent Guinn, a University of California professor of radiochemistry. Guinn reported that neutron activation tests showed the lead fragments removed from Connally’s wrist were indeed pieces of the “pristine bullet” recovered at Parkland Hospital, although Guinn never explained how this conclusion could have been reached with any degree of certainty through the analysis of lead, since lead is nonhomogeneous and hence subject to wide variances in composition from sample to sample.[71]

Turning to the head wound, Guinn said tests of the lead fragments removed from Kennedy’s brain showed they too were probably from a Carcano bullet.[72] But he quickly added a curious qualifier. According to the professor, the fragments tested—represented by the National Archives as having come from Kennedy’s brain—were not the same brain fragments the FBI tested when the agency did its own neutron activation analysis back in 1964.

Guinn explained to reporters that a small container represented by the National Archives as holding all the metal recovered from the President’s brain contained only two fragments, one weighing 41.9 milligrams and the other 5.4 milligrams. Yet FBI records from the original testing in 1964 showed a total of four samples were removed from the President’s brain, and none had weights corresponding with the pieces at the National Archives.

“The pieces brought out by the archives did not include any of the specific pieces the FBI analyzed,” Guinn said. “Where [the originals] are, I have no idea.”

This revelation received scant notice in the press and only passing mention in the committee’s final report. But again, to Donahue, it was easy to surmise what might have taken place if someone knew the original metal fragments from the brain were verifiably from the AR-15. It was likely, he thought, that the original brain fragments were simply switched with pieces from Oswald’s ricocheted bullet, a number of which he believed had ended up on the floor of the President’s limo. This swap allowed the “brain fragments” stored at the National Archives to be traced to Oswald’s rifle, and at the same time, covered the disappearance of the four genuine fragments taken from Kennedy’s brain. If, for example, among those original pieces were shards of zincless copper jacket, the Carcano could be eliminated as the source of the bullet and suspicion would turn to the AR-15.[73]

Significantly, the documentation released in support of Guinn’s testimony showed he did not test any pieces of copper jacket material and instead analyzed only the lead from the bullet core.[74]

As for the long-sought-after results of the FBI’s own neutron activation testing, Guinn said that he had access to this data during testing[75] and that “I initially could not make any sense of it,” but that, after completing his work, he reviewed the FBI data and found the numbers fit substantially with his findings.[76] Once again, however, no mention was made as to whether copper from the bullet’s jacket was tested and if so, what the conclusion were.[77] Nor were the FBI’s original test results released by the committee.[78]

Page 227: As for the neutron activation testing done by the House Committee, Dr. Vincent Guinn disputed Donahue’s contention that testing of lead may sometimes be less than definitive due to the presence of random pockets of impurities in the metal.

Yet Guinn had himself reported in a technical paper in 1978 (ref. to ANS Meeting, 1978) that, at least in the case of the 6.5mm Carcano round, comparative tests showed the bullet’s lead to be “remarkably heterogeneous” with vastly differing amounts of assorted elements found throughout the test group.

In any event, Guinn went on to say that in his work for the House Select Committee, he did not test any copper jacket material from the bullet fragments allegedly recovered from Kennedy’s brain, nor was he aware that the FBI had. Donahue had long believed tests of the jacket pieces could quickly prove his thesis right or wrong, since the copper Carcano jacket contained a significant percentage of zinc, while the AR-15 jacket did not.

According to Guinn, the tests were not conducted because the activation process is ineffective with copper.

“The copper jacket is pretty hard to do by activation analysis because the copper and zinc—of which those are made—get so highly radioactive that it obscures any little bit of other activity that would be there,” he said. “I tried it years ago, and every time I had so much copper and zinc radioactivity that you couldn’t see anything else.”

However, Guinn’s assertion that copper can’t be effectively tested was disputed by another neutron activation expert, Dr. Frank Dyer of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. It was Dyer and a colleague, Dr. Juel Emery, who did the original activation testing on the assassination bullet fragments for the FBI back in 1964.

“It gets highly radioactive in that you can’t measure anything until that copper itself decays,” Dyer said. “But you could do it. Undoubtedly you could measure silver, zinc, gold, and other impurities. You wait for three or four days and you could measure it. We do that all the time. It’s a common thing. We radiate things that become fairly radioactive and then we wait until we can see traces of other things.”[79]

Dyer confirmed that he had not tested any copper jacket material for the FBI in 1964. Asked why not, Dyer said: :”Well, Juel and I just did what the FBI wanted us to do, you know.”[80]

Jim Moore’s references to NAA are brief, because he accepts its implications for the SBT. He consistently overstates the strength of the results, however, when he uses “proved” and “matched.”

Page 169: It’s important to remember that there’s virtually no doubt that all of Connally’s bullet wounds were caused by a single missile. All three of the Governor’s surgeons agreed on that point. Later, their consensus was confirmed by neutron activation analysis.[81]

Page 171 (footnote): Neutron Activation Analysis has proven that the metal recovered from Connally’s wrist came from bullet 399.[82] The critics have responded by questioning the chain of possession of the metal fragments.[83] The implication is that someone switched fragments to ensure “favorable” NAA test results. Again, when you give the critics an answer, they either ask another question or make another supposition.

Page 181: Neutron activation analysis proved that a fragment lodged near the President’s right eye matched the fragments recovered from the limousine floor.[84]

This short passage contains five major errors. About the only thing Smith got right in his whole discussion of Guinn’s NAA was the definition of the “Magic Bullet.”

Page 145: In other areas of investigation the [House Select] Committee found itself accepting evidence which was highly questionable. Dr. Vincent Guinn had submitted to them the results of a neutron activation analysis carried out on Warren Commission Exhibit 399, the ‘Magic Bullet’ purported to have traversed the bodies of the President and Governor Connally, passed again through the Governor’s wrist and into his thigh, and on fragments of bullet recovered from the President’s head and Connally’s wrist. On the face of it the results proved that the fragments matched to the one bullet,[85] and since the ‘Magic Bullet’ matched to Oswald’s Mannlicher-Carcano, there was total support for the single bullet theory.[86] On closer examination of the results used in reaching these conclusions, Guinn’s data was found to be riddled with deficiencies[87] and none of the fragments actually matched.[88]

Considering that Sprinkle and Butman are paraphrasing David Belin rather than expressing their own thoughts, their two major errors in two sentences (confusing weight of fragments with number of fragments; completely misunderstanding the purpose of the NAA) are almost too much to comprehend.

Page 80 (paraphrasing David W. Belin’s Final Disclosure): The amount of bullet fragments found in Connally’s body was consistent with the total weight of the bullet found on his stretcher.[89] This was ascertained through the use of neutron-activation analysis performed on the fragments taken from Connally and the nearly whole bullet.[90]

This book contains the documented screenplay of Stone’s famous film JFK. The book also includes 340 “research notes” and 97 reactions to the film and commentaries on it. This section deals only with comments on NAA in the screenplay and the research notes. Remarks contained in the 97 articles are discussed under the individual authors.

Page 153 (trial scene; Garrison character describing the single-bullet theory): Yet the government says it can prove this [seven wounds created by one undamaged bullet] with some fancy physics in a nuclear laboratory. Of course they can. Theoretical physics[91] can prove an elephant can hang from a cliff with its tail tied to a daisy, but use your eyes—your common sense[92]—(he holds the bullet) seven wounds, skin, bone. This single bullet explanation is the foundation of the Warren Commission’s claim of a lone assassin. And once you conclude that the magic bullet could not create all seven of those wounds, you have to conclude there was a fourth shot and a second rifleman.

Page 154 (research note): Supporters of the Warren Commission and the HSCA’s confirmation of the single bullet theory like to assert that the government panels proved via neutron activation analysis (usually abbreviated NAA and regarded as a highly precise method of identifying metal fragments) that the bullet fragments removed from Governor Connally’s wrist came from CE 399. However, this is a false claim.

The Warren Commission did not acknowledge having done any NAA tests in their volumes.[93] In 1973, a declassified memo to the Commission from J. Edgar Hoover dated July 8, 1964, stated that the bullet fragments had undergone NAA. Hoover’s convoluted wording does its best to obscure the important non-conclusion reached by these tests. He admits that there were “minor variations in composition” that prevented “positively determining” which bullet the fragment came from. In other words, the tests did not prove that the wrist fragments matched CE 399. Subsequent FOIA suits for the actual test data were unsuccessful[94]—this information is important because NAA does not tolerate much in the way of “minor variations”: it measures the concentration of elements to less than a billionth of a gram [Anson, They’ve Killed the President!, p. 91–92; Dr. Cyril Wecht, “J.F.K. Assassination: A Prolonged and Willful Coverup,”[95] Modern Medicine, October 28, 1974].[96]

The HSCA performed NAA tests on the wrist fragments and reached a verdict of “highly likely,” not “definite,” for a good reason: the HSCA had no proof that the fragments tested actually came from Connally’s wrist.[97] The Committee retained Dr. Vincent P. Guinn who had performed the tests for the Warren Commission.[98] Dr. Guinn noted in his report to the Committee that the fragments the FBI had given him for testing were definitely not the same fragments he tested in 1964 (they differed in weight).[99] The National Archives assured Guinn and the FBI that these were the only fragments they had—they had no ideas what happened to the original set [HSCA I. p. 562][100].

On the way out of the hearing room, Dr. Guinn told a researcher a hypothetical scenario for the origin of the fragments:

“Possibly (the FBI) would take a bullet, take out a few little pieces and say, ‘This is what came out of Connally’s wrist.’ And naturally, if you compare it with CE 399, it will look alike…I have no control over these things” [taped interview with David Lifton, September 9, 1978, cited by Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 83].[101]

Most recently, former HSCA Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey told New York Newsday reporter Robert Greene that the “bullet and slivers checked by his experts are identical to those examined by the Warren Commission” and that researcher’s [sic] claims to the contrary are “nonsense” [Newsday, March 29, 1992]. Clearly, as evidenced above, this is not true, at least according to the HSCA’s own published material.[102]

To sum up, the HSCA’S NAA tests did not settle any doubts about CE 399 but instead raised new ones about the honesty of the fbi, the credibility of G. Robert Blakey and the safekeeping abilities of the National Archives.[103] Twenty-eight years after the assassination, there is still no evidence that CE 399 hit either Connally or Kennedy.[104] The bullet was never tracked through Kennedy’s back or throat (see testimony of Dr. Pierre Finck, p. 158) and therefore, no bullet fragments were removed.[105] Nor was any blood or tissue from either man found on the bullet. [WC 3H p. 428–429].

Oliver Stone—JFK is not irresponsible—Choosing to ignore the evidence is.
(Article in Los Angeles Times, 6 January 1992; reproduced in Stone/Sklar’s JFK: The Book of the Film, 1992)

This article responds to Richard Mosk’s article of 30 December 1991 in the same newspaper. The NAA part of Stone’s response is a curious mix of fact, error, and apparent stealth recantation.

Neutron activation analysis and other tests do not confirm the single-bullet theory.[106] The NAA tests performed on the magic bullet and the fragments found in Connally’s wrist for the Warren Commission were “inconclusive.”[107] The tests could only prove that the bullet passed through Connally’s wrist—merely one of the seven wounds allegedly caused by the bullet.[108]

No scientific evidence has even proved that the bullet passed through Kennedy’s body[109] and there is convincing evidence that it did not.[110] In addition to the aforementioned FBI reports, recently Gov. Connally once again reiterated he does not believe he was shot by the same bullet that hit Kennedy.[111]

[1]Brown puts his own slant on these individuals’ testimony. According to Exhibit 2011, “Tomlinson stated it appears to be the same one he found on a hospital carriage at Parkland Hospital on November 22, 1963, but he cannot positively identify the bullet he found and showed to Mr. O.P. Wright.” Mr. O.P. Wright, Personnel Officer of the hospital “…advised Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum that Exhibit C1, a rifle slug, shown to him at the time of the interview, looks like the slug found at Parkland Hospital on November 22, 1963, which he gave to Richard Johnsen, Special Agent of the Secret Service.” Special Agent Richard E. Johnsen “…advised he could not identify this bullet as the one he obtained from O.P. Wright, Parkland Hospital…” James Rowley, Chief, United States Secret Service, “…advised he could not identify this bullet as the one he received from Special Agent Richard E. Johnsen…” Thus while none of the four men could positively identify the bullet, two of the four were less negative than Brown portrays. Hospital personnel would not be expected to know about strict chain-of-possession rules. In any event, Brown’s point about chain of possession is nullified by both NAA analyses, which make it highly probable that the bullet matched the fragments in Connally’s wrist and therefore was exactly what it was claimed to be all along.

[2]The NAA essentially identifies the bullet.

[3]Brown offers no grounds for thinking that Dr. Guinn would have been bewildered or shaken by this mythical exchange.

[4]This contrived stereotype of an out-of-touch scientist does not fit the real Guinn, who had testified 50 times previous to the HSCA hearings, and who used completely understandable language there.

[5]Brown is demeaning the character of fictional prosecutor without offering justification for it.

[6]False designation. CE 843 represented two small metallic fragments recovered from President Kennedy’s head. Brown used the wrong number—he is clearly discussing CE 567 and CE 569, the two larger fragments found in the front of the limousine. For proof of Brown’s intention, read farther in his text.

[7]Brown forgets that both large fragments had been identified ballistically as having been fired from Lee Harvey Oswald’s Mannlicher-Carcano, to the exclusion of all other rifles.

[8]This trial is set during January 1965. Dr. Guinn analyzed the bullet fragments in September 1977. Guinn is thus reporting his results twelve years and nine months before the fact, and thirteen years and nine months before he testified to the HSCA. Guinn never appeared before the Warren Commission. Brown has confused Vincent Guinn with the two Oak Ridge nuclear chemists who originally analyzed the fragments for the FBI under the supervision of John A. Gallagher (who did appear before the Warren Commission).

[9]Brown is wrong again. Dr. Guinn only tested one of the large fragments—the other was a copper jacket with no lead core. Furthermore, Guinn never said it was highly probable that the fragments represented two bullets, nor did anyone else. The Commission’s ballistic expert said merely that they could have come from one bullet or two, because one was a base and the other a tip. This sentence sounds very much like Guinn’s statement categorizing all five fragments that he analyzed.

[10]False statement. Guinn consulted for the HSCA, not the FBI or the Warren Commission. He had nothing to do with the unspecified “FBI report.” In fact, no FBI report on NAA was ever written. A general paragraph on NAA was included in a July 1964 letter by J. Edgar Hoover that was not released until 1973. The FBI’s NAA data were not released until 1975, and then as raw data, not in a report. But Walt Brown is not writing fiction, he assures us.

[11]False statement. Guinn never claimed that NAA measurements are without uncertainty, for they are not. To believe otherwise indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of measurement and science. In fact, Guinn went one step further—he stressed that the total uncertainty of measured elemental concentrations for a bullet depended not only on the direct NAA measurements (whose uncertainties he carefully pointed out in his tables) but also on variations within a bullet. The total uncertainties were about six times as large as the direct NAA uncertainties (from simple counting statistics). In testimony to the HSCA, he gave the example of antimony in the stretcher bullet (CE 399) vs the fragments from Connally’s wrist (CE 842). The former measured 833 ppm; the latter, 797 ppm. On the face of it, 833 would seem to be different from 797, but when the total uncertainties are in cluded, 833±50 ppm overlaps 797±50 ppm. Thus the bullets and fragments gave different concentrations but could not be considered statistically different.

[12]Again grossly wrong—see previous footnote.

[13]Wrong. The problem here is extremely important to understand, and Brown doesn’t. It has to do with underlying reality vs our imperfect attempts to measure it. For example, a bullet has a real average concentration of antimony, but because of inherent uncertainties in measurement, and variations within the bullet, any measurement only approximates the true value—it will only come within a certain range of it. We express this range as the uncertainty of measurement. The best we can say about the true value (the true mean) is that it lies somewhere between the upper and lower bounds of our measurement. Now, if we measure antimony in the sample again, we will generally get a different number, but the range of that number will usually over lap the range of the first number. We then say that the two numbers are not “statistically different,” for we really do not know that they are different. Again, note that we can say only that the true value of something lies within our band of uncertainty. Now, if we measure antimony in two pieces of bullet lead, we get two estimates of true concentrations. We can only say the true concentrations are significantly different if our two ranges of estimate for them do not overlap. If the ranges overlap, the two numbers are not “statistically different,” that is, we cannot say that the two true numbers are different. Part of the problem in understanding significant differences is caused by our terminology. It is very confusing to cite numbers that are different, and then immediately state that they are not “statistically different.” It would be more understandable to stress that that the true means they represent are not statistically different, for the numbers them selves are obviously different. Always remember the differences between our measurements and the true means they are trying to quantify.

[14]False—see previous footnote.

[15]It’s far more than just wordplay, but writer Brown doesn’t understand it.

[16]False paragraph. Guinn found three samples unsuitable for testing, but only one actually absent—CE 841, tiny particles scraped from the inside of the limousine’s windshield. The other two samples were present in their boxes, but one was a sample of curb that didn’t have enough sample pre sent, and the other was a copper jacket of a bullet—no lead. Thus, Brown’s “two, perhaps three containers holding nothing but air” is simply wrong.

[17]Misleading statement. Guinn could tell, to a high probability, that all fragments came from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.

[18]False statement. “No significant differences” means no detectable differences. And if differences cannot be detected, they cannot be said to exist.

[19]This all-too-obvious picture of the young, dashing defense lawyer making mincemeat of the hapless older, paunchy prosecutor is too pat and obvious. The implication that the prosecution had no case wears thin in a hurry. The obvious mocking of the prosecution by writer Brown would perhaps carry more weight if Brown were factually accurate.

The object lesson of the milk and the cows is presumably intended to illustrate that two samples (cartons of milk) can appear similar but because of minor differences actually have originated with different sources (cows). This would reinforce Brown’s textual point that “statistically insignificant” differences in fragments actually meant different bullets. But the way the example is presented, it could just as well mean that identical samples (milk; fragments) do not necessarily come from a single source (cow; bullet). Because Brown does not state whether the milk samples are identical, his object lesson remains ambiguous.

[20]Here DiEugenio refers to his Note 148.

[21](a) Here, “tracing” refers only to reconstructing trajectories of bullets. (b) Citing “most experts” hardly refutes Blake’s claim.

[22]It is a pity that DiEugenio limited his remarks to various experts siting the wound in different places rather than exploring the reasons they did so.

[23]Is DiEugenio trying to impugn Dr. Guinn because he allegedly worked for the Warren Commission? Sounds like guilt by association. No proof offered, just a rumor of someone else’s documents.

[24](a) Here DiEugenio refers to his Chapter 15. (b) “Suggesting” switching of fragments hardly proves it. Other explanations such as consumption of mass by previous analyses were not mentioned here.

[25]False statement. Guinn had informally advised the FBI on NAA, but testified to the HSCA that he did nothing for the Warren Commission (HSCA Vol. 1, pp. 490 ff.). The inaccurate rumor originated in a story by Robert Sam Anson in New Times of 18 April 1975.

[26]False statement. Guinn examined fragments from only one of the wounds created by the Parkland bullet, in Governor Connally’s wrist. No fragments were available from the other wounds, or from the clothing of the Governor or the President.

[27]False statement. Guinn’s findings were only valid to a high probability. In Guinn’s own words, they were “consistent with” the magic-bullet theory but didn’t prove it.

[28]False statement. The HSCA asked Guinn to redo analyses first done by the FBI in 1964; they did not ask Guinn to reexamine his own analyses. Duffy and Ricci apparently think that Guinn analyzed the fragments twice!

[29]Misleading statement. The smallest fragments could not be subdivided for NAA, and so when they were discarded by Oak Ridge as radioactive waste, they were gone forever. A regrettable but perfectly logical explanation.

[30]This sentence falsely implies that Dr. Guinn’s “advanced” neutron activation also improved his ability to link fragments with bullets. The improved linkage was presented as coming from Guinn’s background studies on impurities in bullets, but in fact had nothing to do with it.

[31]Antimony, silver, and copper are not the only elements. There are about 80 more stable elements.

[32]False statement that confuses accuracy with detection limits. The detection limit of some elements under some circumstances can be one-billionth gram (one nanogram), but in most circumstances NAA’s accuracy of measurement will be far worse than this. Most elements are not detectable to anywhere near one nanogram with NAA.

[33]Dr. Guinn found that most batches of most ammunition have similar compositions, not different compositions.

[34]The goal of the neutron-activation analyses was to associate fragments, not to compare batches of ammunition.

[35]This sentence is doubly wrong. (a) The fragments were compared less to the unfired bullet than to each other, because the main point of the test was to determine how many bullets were fired into the limousine. (b) The unfired bullet was found not to match any fragments recovered from the limousine, its occupants, or the hospital. But the compositions of all fragments and the unfired bullet were in the general range of WCC/MC ammunition.

[36]False. This analysis of the fragments found evidence for only two bullets, although additional bullets of indistinguishable compositions could not be ruled out.

[37]Nonsensical conclusion. If the test had shown that two bullets had been fired, then two different compositions would have been found, and both could not match exactly the unfired bullet.

[38] It was strongly disfigured at its base, to the extent that viselike forces must have been required.

[39] This statement refers to the hospital bullet and the Mannlicher-Carcano base and tip found in the front seat of the limousine. Depending on whether the base and tip came from one bullet or two, these large fragments could represent two bullets or three. In providing strong evidence for only two bullets, the chemical evidence essentially settled this question.

[40] The NAA tests were run in September 1977; 1978 was the year that Dr. Guinn testified to the HSCA about his results.

[41] The universal name is “neutron-activation analysis,” not “neutron analysis.”

[42] False statement. No fragments from Kennedy’s neck were analyzed because none were found there. Fragments from his brain were analyzed.

[43] False statement. The NAA test did not confirm that the same bullet had struck both men, only that the fragments from Connally’s wrist were indistinguishable from the bullet found at Parkland Hospital, CE 399. Since the fragments from Kennedy’s brain differed from the CE 399/wrist fragments and were indistinguishable from the four fragments from the floor of the limousine that could be analyzed, there are no fragments from Kennedy that can be tied chemically to the Connally and the hospital bullet.

[44]False statement. Although Z313 is blurred, certain important things could be seen. For example, the center of the pinkish cloud of fragments is clearly ahead of the center of JFK’s head, and two large fragments can be seen flying forward and upward away from the front of the head. At the same time, JFK’s head is snapping forward from its position in Z312.

[45]Livingstone is correct that no whole bullet was found in the limousine. But two large fragments, a top and a bottom of a bullet, both fired from Oswald’s rifle, were found in the front of the car. Together, the fragments weighed 66 grains, or 40% of a WCC/MC bullet. The simplest assumption is that these fragments came from a single WCC/MC bullet.

[46]False assertion. Fragments that are large enough and not excessively deformed can frequently be linked to a given rifle by their remaining markings. This is basic ballistics.

[47]Time’s statement is false, but for a different reason that Livingstone states. The NAA showed it highly probable that the fragments in Connally’s wrist came from the Parkland bullet, not the two large fragments found in the car.

[48]Although the NAA tests were not conclusive, they did provide a much higher probability than Livingstone’s statement implies. I estimate a 99% probability that the wrist fragments came from the hospital bullet, which is hardly “not conclusive.”

[49]Livingstone cites only one side of the evidence. A nurse claims that the wrist fragments contained more mass than was missing from the bullet, whereas one of the autopsy doctors says that they were light enough to have come from the bullet with room to spare.

[50]Other than the word “proved,” the shows were not far off the mark on linking fragments to Oswald’s rifle. (a) If the “bullet found in the car” refers to the two large fragments found in the front, the NAA testing wasn’t even needed—both fragments were linked ballistically to Oswald’s rifle to the exclusion of all other rifles. If that “bullet” referred to the three tiny fragments found on the rear floorboard of the car, NAA provided strong evidence that they were linked to the front fragments, which was matched ballistically to Oswald’s rifle. (b) If the “bullet” found in Connally’s leg refers to the hospital bullet that the Warren Commission concluded somehow came out of his leg in Parkland Hospital, that bullet was also matched to Oswald’s rifle by markings. If the “bullet” refers to the fragment(s) that remained in the Governor’s leg, then the shows were wrong, for that material was obviously never tested.

[51]The Warren Commission admitted it could not prove that the Parkland bullet originated on Connally’s stretcher, but after reviewing all available evidence, “concluded” that it came from that stretcher.

[52]Dr. John K. Lattimer (1980) and others have recorded photographically that bullets fired at the proper angle into human skulls cause the skull to shoot fragments upward and forward, while recoiling backward and to the left, just as Kennedy’s head did. This is scientific proof. However, these authors do not claim that this “jet effect” explains all Kennedy’s motions.

[53]Several lines of reasoning prove that the “magic bullet” could have struck Kennedy and Connally, (Livingstone’s expression) but none of these tests prove that it did strike them. There is a crucial difference, and that’s why NAA is so important, for it shows what did happen. Incidentally, Livingstone’s phrase “could have struck both men at the same time” is careless writing—the bullet obviously didn’t strike the two men at the same time. Livingstone should have simply written “could have struck both men,” or “could have struck both men in one pass.” In another example of careless writing and editing, the trajectory didn’t strike both men, the bullet did.

[54]Neutron activation is not “so-called” atomic testing, it is actual atomic testing.

[55](a) Unproven assertion that the NAA results were held up because they did not support the single-bullet theory. Other explanations are just as plausible and should be considered. (b) False statement that the Warren Commission held up the results. They never received them from the FBI. The results were held up by the FBI.

[56]False statement. J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI claimed only that the NAA results showed all fragments to be similar in composition, but Dr. Guinn later showed that their data revealed two clear groups of fragments, as did Guinn’s own NAA tests.

[57]False statement. Ignores Guinn’s major finding that individual WCC/MC bullets have distinct compositions, even when from the same production run.

[58]False conclusion about frame-up. Don’t forget that the chemical composition of the fragment from Connally’s wrist was also indistinguishable from that of the hospital bullet. Thus if the hospital bullet had been planted there, the conspirators would have to known in advance which bullet would hit Connally’s wrist, have measured its composition by NAA, have measured the composition of enough other WCC/MC bullets to find one that was indistinguishable from the bullet to be fired, then fired the just-found bullet in such a way as to keep in “pristine,” and then planted it in Parkland Hospital. Super-conspirators indeed! Of course, they would have to have analyzed that string of bullets in a research reactor without of the scientists around happening to notice…

[59]The bullet was not “perfect”—its base was deformed to an extent requiring viselike forces, and lead was forced out of it.

[60]Irradiating the materials with neutrons.

[61]Misleading phrase. “Exact composition” and “down to parts per billion” are easily misinterpreted to make NAA seem more powerful that it is. NAA does not determine “exact compositions”—it measures concentrations of elements to uncertainties of typically a few percent. This is not to be confused with NAA’s detection limits, which can be as low as ppm (of total mass) for the most-sensitive elements. Some elements it doesn’t detect at all.

[62]When using terms like “nuclear fingerprinting” one must always remember that NAA’s analytical uncertainties are a few percent. NAA does not discriminate among similar materials as well as fingerprinting discriminates individuals.

[63]Donahue is right that bullet lead can be of heterogeneous composition when waste lead is used. His invocation of “random pockets” of impurities to explain these heterogeneities seems a bit forced, however, and conjures up pictures of lead that is mostly homogeneous but with occasional big deviations from the mean. If waste lead starts out this way, Donahue may be right. But he offers no evidence that impurities in waste lead exist as “pockets.” Lacking such data, one may only speak of heterogeneities in lead in general terms.

[64]Donahue’s reasoning about the inconclusiveness of analyzing bullet lead was only theoretical, and should have been checked before he accepted it. While his basic conclusion is correct, he failed to mention three important points that would add positive perspective. He seems unaware of Dr. Guinn’s background study of impurities in various brands of bullets. First, the analytical uncertainties of NAA reduce its power to discriminate among bullets—it’s not just heterogeneities in the lead itself. Second, Guinn found that only certain types of bullets—WCC/MC in particular—showed such great heterogeneities between bullets but not between productions runs. Most brands of bullets he tested varied somewhat between runs, but only very little within a box or a run. This means that Donahue’s proposed mechanism for creating heterogeneities in bullets is the exception rather than the rule. Most bullets behave oppositely from what he expected. And third, if the inconclusive results are accompanied by the proper background studies on compositions of bullets, probabilities can be attached to the findings. For example, a probability of 99% that two fragments are indistinguishable is a very strong result, even though it is technically “inconclusive.” Thus the mere fact of inconclusively should not be used to dismiss results altogether.

[65]Donahue’s argument for analyzing jackets is much weaker than it seems, because his scenario for why analyses of bullet lead are inconclusive is overly pessimistic. (See previous footnote.) Thus, Donahue turned prematurely to analyzing jackets. This rest of his discussion of jackets should be read with the understanding that it is unnecessary.

[66]False conclusion. The impurities could still have contained zinc, but because it was less than 1 percent, it wouldn’t automatically have been reported.

[67]Basing a proof on the absence of information (no other high-powered rifles know to be at the scene besides Hickey’s) is not only risky, but logically flawed. This line of reasoning must be rejected, because Donahue cannot know that no other high-powered rifles were present.

[68]This second “proof” is doubly wrong: (a) It suffers form the same logical flaw of proof by absence of data that the first “proof” did (previous footnote); (b) It requires any fragments of jacket to be the full thickness of the jacket itself, which cannot be assumed.

[69]Once again, Donahue tries to conclude something from the absence of something else. This is logically impossible. Specifically, the government might have had another reason for holding back the NAA data, such as inconclusive results.

[70]Again Donahue is trying to conclude something from the absence of something else, and committing a logical fallacy. This disappearance of the brain may well have been completely unrelated to the fragments it contained. Without further evidence, Donahue may conclude nothing.

[71]False statement. (a) While Guinn never calculated probabilities that various fragments matched, he discuss heterogeneities within bullets at length, and showed how they affected the overall uncertainties of his results. His report to the Committee included actual analyses of fourteen reference WCC/MC bullets. In other words, he did everything but calculate probabilities. (b) Donahue’s use of “showed” is unfortunate, because it overstates the strength of Guinn’s conclusions, and contradicts Donahue’s subsequent phrase “with any degree of certainty,” which is a self-contradictory phrase.

[72]Guinn did much more than just show that the fragments from Kennedy’s brain were highly probably from a WCC/MC bullet. He also showed that they strongly resembled large and small fragments found in the car, and that they probably did not match fragments from the Parkland bullet and Connally’s wrist.

[73]Donahue is jumping to conclusions again. While his fragment-swapping scenario is theoretically possible, it is purely conjectural and supported by no evidence. Much simpler explanations exist with evidence to back them up, and so much be chosen first. Among these simpler explanations is that Oak Ridge National Laboratory simply discarded the fragments, as radioactive waste, after their analyses. This was standard procedure then, and is backed up by the memory of one of the employees who analyzed the fragments.

[74]Why “significantly”? Guinn did not test the copper jacket because he never did—experience had shown him that lead was a far better medium to analyze than copper. Donahue again jumps to a conclusion without considering alternative explanations first.

[75]Misleading statement. Guinn only had access to the FBI’s NAA data because he and others had fought to obtain it under a FOIA suit.

[76]Misleading statement. When Guinn reviewed the FBI’s data after completing his own tests, he found a new way to group the data that revealed the same patterns as in his own. The FBI’s numbers didn’t change, only how they were displayed. The problem was with multiple analyses of fragments not agreeing. Guinn found that the four replicate analyses of antimony in the fragments were all shifted up or down in absolute value, but their patterns remained parallel and matched his own two groups of fragments. Neither he nor the FBI had noticed these systematic errors previously.

[77]Not true. Guinn specifically said that he did not analyze the copper jackets, and explained why. The FBI also listed exactly those fragments that they had analyzed earlier.

[78]The results didn’t belong to the Committee—they belonged to the FBI. Committee didn’t have t he FBI’s results, Guinn did. He published his recalculations of them in his April 1979 article in Analytical Chemistry, after which they were ignored by almost everybody.

[79]Both opinions are correct, for different reasons. Guinn was justified in stressing the interference from the short-lived radionuclides of copper and zinc, because he used short analytical schemes where these interferences would matter. Dyer and Emery were also correct that these activities could be allowed to die away, and the longer-lived antimony and silver measured after a few days. But that’s not how Guinn wanted to (or had to ) do it. In particular, the constraints placed on Guinn’s analysis by the National Archives—only three working days available, and samples returned each night—precluded any long analyses, and actually compromised the quality of Guinn’s data severely.

[80]The FBI’s choice of fragments to analyzed was probably guided by their experience with emission spectrography. I have the impression that they didn’t measure impurities in the copper jackets, either.

[81]A bit too strong about NAA.

[82]“Proven” is too strong. Guinn’s characterization of his conclusions was “highly probable.”

[83]The critics are right about the chain of possession of the fragments, but maybe a bit strict with their expectations, considering the confused circumstances and the untrained personnel at Parkland Hospital.

[84]This sentence overstates results of NAA. They didn’t “prove” anything, but were consistent with WC’s scenario. In the words of V. Guinn (Anal. Chem. article): “The new results cannot prove the Warren Commission’s theory that the stretcher bullet is the one that caused the President’s back wound and all of the Governor’s wounds, but the results are indeed consistent with this theory.”

[85](a) Confusing statement. It is not clear how genuine proof can ever be accepted with just a quick look. (b) “Proved” overstates the strength of the NAA results, because matching composition proves only the possibility of common origin. (c) The head fragments did not “match” the Parkland bullet; only the wrist fragments did. (d) Guinn himself testified about the restricted nature of his conclusions: “These results only show that the CE 399 “pristine” bullet, or so-called stretcher bullet, matches the fragments in [Governor Connally’s] wrist. They give you no information whatsoever about whether that bullet first went through President Kennedy’s body, since it left no track of fragments and, for that matter, it doesn’t even say that it went through Governor Connally—through his back, that is—because it left no track of fragments there.” So Smith’s assertion that NAA provided “total support” for the single-bullet theory is false, and shows that he didn’t study the subject before writing about it.

[86]False conclusion follows from false initial premise (of previous footnote).

[87]Undocumented assertion. Smith claims that Guinn’s data were “riddled with deficiencies” but doesn’t state any of them.

[88]False statement. Smith’s assertion that none of the fragments matched any other fragments is based on the false premises that neutron activation has zero analytical error, and that individual bullets are completely homogenous. The first of these has been discussed at length earlier in this compendium, and the second goes directly against the heterogeneities that Guinn showed to be a unique feature of WCC/MC bullets. It is hard to see how Smith could have read Guinn’s report or testimony and then written this sentence.

[89]False statement. The total weight (not amount) of fragments found in Connally’s wrist was consistent with the weight of the Parkland bullet.

[90]False statement. Neutron activation was not used to determine the number of fragments recovered from Connally’s wrist (as Sprinkle and Butman write in their uncorrected first sentence), or to determine the weight of the fragments (from the corrected first sentence). Rather, NAA was used to try to determine the number of bullets that hit the two men, and whether the Parkland bullet passed through either or both men.

[91] The NAA tests referred to by the Garrison character involved nothing theoretical—they were practical analytical procedures.

[92] The Garrison character’s appeal to visual observation and “common sense” is an extremely shallow, almost antiintellectual tactic designed to mock sophisticated and reputable science of a type accepted in courtrooms for many years.

[93] No, because they did them in the laboratory! Actually, the FBI did the tests on their own initiative.

[94] False. Dr. John Nichols obtained the 70 pages of the FBI’s original NAA data and calculations in April 1975 via a FOIA suit and immediately flew them to Dr. Guinn in California. Guinn completely recalculated all the data and carefully reinterpreted them. Guinn recounts the story in his 1979 Analytical Chemistry feature article “JFK Assassination: Bullet Analyses” (Anal. Chem. Vol. 51, No. 4, April 1979, pp. 484A–493A).

[95] There are ten errors in copying this title from the original, which is “JFK assassination: ‘a prolonged and willful cover-up’”.

[96] Stone and Sklar have misquoted both Anson and Wecht comments on the sensitivity of neutron activation. Anson wrote (in his 1975 book) without attribution: “…NAA, a neutron activation analysis, a highly sophisticated technique that measures differences in material that has been bombarded with radiation down to parts per billion and even less.” Anson appears to have copied this passage from Wecht’s 1974 article, which stated: “Trace elements can be detected and measured down to parts per billion or even less in somes [sic] cases.” At least Wecht cited his source: Chapter 1 of a book entitled “Trace Analysis: Physical Methods,” edited by G.H. Morrison and published by Interscience Publishers, John Wiley & Sons, New York City, 1965. But the point is that both Anson and Wecht wrote “parts per billion,” meaning parts per billion of whatever mass of material was being analyzed, while Stone and Sklar erroneously changed it to “less than a billionth of a gram.” A part per billion equals a billionth of a gram only when the mass of sample is exactly one gram. The two versions differ in a second way: Stone and Sklar’s “less than…” means something different from Wecht’s “parts per billion or even less.”

Note that Anson in his haste recast his quote from Wecht in a way that made it very difficult to understand: The phrase “differences in material that has been bombarded with radiation down to parts per billion and even less” must be understood as “differences [in material that has been bombarded with radiation] down to parts per billion and even less,” not “differences in material that has been bombarded with [radiation down to parts per billion and even less]” as it appears at first glance. The differences are measured to parts per billion or less—there is no such thing as “radiation down to parts per billion and even less.” I daresay that few people who have read this passage ever understood it.

Thus Anson copied Wecht wrongly and Stone/Sklar copied them both wrongly. But there’s more. Wecht copied Morrison wrongly, because NAA does not measure all elements down to ppb or less, only some elements. In fact, some elements NAA doesn’t measure at all! Thus all three writers (counting Stone/Sklar as one) copied their sources wrongly. With such sloppy practices as this, it is no wonder that such confusion about NAA reigns among students of the JFK assassination.

[97] False reason. The real reason that the HSCA could not conclude that the wrist fragments “definitely” came from CE 399 was that comparison tests can never prove origin, just disorigin. Even if two fragments have indistinguishable compositions, a third fragment of indistinguishable composition might have been the real source of one of them. An alternate source like this can be ruled out only when every other possible source has been analyzed and found different from the two fragments in question, which in the real world is impractical.

[98] False assertion. Guinn did no test the fragments in 1964; John F. Gallagher of the FBI laboratory did the work at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory under the supervision of two Oak Ridge employees. I have no idea where Stone and Sklar got this idea from, because to the best of my knowledge, the only association of Guinn with the Warren Commission that has been claimed is that he analyzed or helped them analyze Oswald’s paraffin casts. The record is very clear that Gallagher did the FBI’s NAA tests.

[99] The statement is false in two ways. First, the alleged remark by Guinn was not made in his report to the Committee, but rather in his testimony to it. Second, he did not say that the “fragments” given him were definitely not those tested by the FBI in 1964, but rather that the “pieces” brought to California by the National Archives did not include any of the “specific little pieces” analyzed by the FBI. Although Guinn did not define his terms, a careful reading of his testimony shows that he was using “pieces” to mean “original fragments” and “specific little pieces” to mean aliquots taken from them for analysis. His relevant sentence was: “The particular little pieces that they [FBI] analyzed, I could just as well have analyzed over again, but the pieces that were brought out from the Archives—which reportedly, according to Mr. Gear [who brought them], were the only bullet-lead fragments from this case still present in the Archives—did not include any of the specific little pieces that the FBI had analyzed.” Thus, Guinn was not saying that he was given something other than the original fragments, but rather that he was not given the smaller subfragments taken from them by the FBI to analyze.

[100] Stone and Sklar’s closing remark, “they had no ideas what happened to the original set,” is a fabrication that reinforces the false notion that Guinn tested a set of fragments different from the original set. The National Archives said no such thing on page 562 of HSCA Volume I or anywhere else that I am aware of. Their only remark concerning the fragments is that reported in the previous footnote: “but the pieces that were brought out from the Archives—which reportedly, according to Mr. Gear, were the only bullet-lead fragments from this case still present in the Archives,” says nothing about any “original set” or what might happened to it. Stone and Sklar are putting words in to mouths of the National Archives to buttress a false point.

[101] Inaccurate quote from Hurt’s Reasonable Doubt. Here is Stone and Sklar’s version of the quote, but with their errors crossed out and the correct version shown in boldface immediately after it: “Possibly (the FBI) would take a bullet, take out a few little pieces and put it in the container, and say, ‘This is what came out of Connally’s wrist.’ And naturally, if you compare it with CE [CE] 399, it will look alike…I have no control over these things”. These changes are mild, however, compared to what Hurt did to the passage when “quoting” Lifton’s original: “Possibly they ~~would~~ could take a bullet, take out a few little pieces and put it in the containers, and say, ‘This is what came out of Connally’s wrist.’ And naturally, if you compare it that with [CE] 399, ~~it will~~ they’ll look alike.~~...~~I have no control over these things. I have to believe that these are honest people.” Neglecting for the moment the implications of such general sloppiness in transcribing as shown here by both Hurt and Stone/Sklar, the force of Guinn’s remarks has been twisted by leaving out his crucial closing sentence “I have to believe that these are honest people.” Guinn was not putting forth a hypothetical scenario to explain how the fragments might really have been switched, as Hurt and Stone/Sklar are implying (and as many other writers have also suggested); rather, he was putting forth a hypothetical scenario and then stating immediately that he didn’t believe it—he accepted that he had the original fragments. While I suspect that Stone and Sklar were genuinely misled by Hurt’s incomplete quote, Hurt either left out the critical last sentence deliberately or couldn’t tell the difference—either way he comes out looking very bad. Episodes like this destroy one’s trust in assassination writers very quickly.

[102] This sentence is false. Stone and Sklar jumped to a wrong conclusion by not thinking carefully enough. If we assume that by “bullet and slivers” Blakey quite logically was referring to a full bullet (399) and the next-smaller units (i.e., fragments), he was saying only that the bullet and the fragments given to Guinn were the same as analyzed previously by the FBI. He was not commenting one way or the other on the smaller subfragments actually irradiated and counted by the FBI. Blakey is thus correct. It is a pity that so much confusion has been created by lack of a standard terminology for bullets, fragments, and subfragments. But one need not rely on Blakey’s word, Guinn’s word, or the National Archives’ word that the fragments were the same. One need only compare Guinn’s results with those of the FBI 13 years earlier to see that they are virtually identical once systematic errors in the FBI’s results are recognized. Guinn explains all of this and shows the FBI’s data in his Analytical Chemistry article of April 1979 (pp. 484A–493A). To avoid their error, all Stone and Sklar needed to do was read the literature.

[103] This sentence is a perfect example of the kind of sweeping statement that sounds wonderful but is in fact totally false, all because its authors failed to read and think. The JFK case is full of similar pronouncement on all sorts of topics.

[104] Another sweeping statement, the Connally part of which is fully refuted by NAA data from both Guinn and the FBI on Q1 and Q9. The Kennedy part is refuted by abundant indirect evidence (but not proof).

[105] Removing no fragments from the back or throat was based on not finding them on X-rays, not on inability to track the path during the autopsy.

[106] True.

[107] It would have been nice for Stone to tell us whom he was quoting. “Inconclusive” is often used in reference to J. Edgar Hoover’s characterization of the FBI’s original NAA analyses, although he himself did not use the word there. In his 8 July 1964 letter to the Warren Commission, he wrote that “…the minor variations in composition…were not considered sufficient” to differentiate the fragments and tell which bullet each came from. The first use of “insufficient” I could find in the assassination literature was by Robert Sam Anson in both his 1975 New Times article (The greatest cover-up of all) and in his book of the same year (They’ve Killed the President!). Stone probably took “insufficient” from Anson’s book because he used it as a major source for other NAA information and cited it in his annotated screenplay of 1992. Unfortunately, both of Anson’s uses of “insufficient” referred to the spectroscopic analyses, not the NAA. Right word, wrong technique.

[108] This sentence makes me wonder if even Stone knows what he himself believes, because on page 154 of the Stone/Sklar screenplay of 1992, one of their research notes states bluntly that: (a) the Warren Commission’s claim that their NAA proved that the wrist fragments came from CE 399 was false; (b) that Guinn’s NAA for the HSCA could not prove the same thing because he could not be sure that the fragments actually came from Connally’s wrist; and (c) that 28 years after the assassination there is no evidence (let alone proof) that CE 399 hit either Connally or Kennedy. Now here, in early 1992, Stone seems to be relenting on the Connally part and accepting that NAA proves that CE 399 hit Connally after all. To follow the first, exceedingly strong pronouncement with such a weak agreement and no further explanation leaves me very uncertain about Stone.

[109] Correct.

[110] “Convincing evidence” is by no means conclusive. It is still in the realm of belief rather than proof.

[111] Governor Connally’s hunting experience notwithstanding, eyewitness testimony in stressed situations is highly unreliable and cannot meaningfully corroborate any other reports.