Reflections on why it took so long
It required logic rather than deep knowledge of NAA
How ironic it is that the key to understanding the NAA
data was not detailed, specialized knowledge about NAA, but rather basic
reasoning, i.e., grasping the idea that the tight groupings of fragments and the
membership of the two groups were incompatible with chance ordering of fragments
with heterogeneities as large as those found in quarters of bullets. One needs
to know nothing about NAA in order to see the problem here.
Similarly, one needs to know nothing about NAA, and probably
little about analytical chemistry in general, to appreciate the importance of
the FBI's analysis of replicates of fragments, if not to grasp the significance
of the contrast between their near-identical results and the variabilities at
larger scales of sampling. That is logic pure and simple. JFK researchers who do
not know NAA are not absolved from missing this answer.
These two observations strongly emphasize the role of
critical-thinking skills, which unfortunately have to be learned by painful
practice over many months or years. The observations also put a heavy responsibility
on every one of us for not having arrived at the answer many years earlier. This
painful episode points out just how far all of us still have to go in developing
these skills. May we learn from it.
Why didn't people grasp the true significance of the NAA data?
This is a question with unpleasant answers all around.
One does not need to be a specialist in NAA to grasp the great significance of
its data to the JFK assassination—one need only
plug away at it. Plenty of information was there; it just had to be
arranged properly. I can only conclude that not enough people were interested,
especially from among the scientific and technical disciplines that would feel
most comfortable with numbers. All it took was a sense that here was important
stuff that was not yet fully interpreted.
Where were the academics?
Academics are conspicuously absent from
"research" into the JFK assassination. Instead, the vast majority of
participants are "citizen investigators," as they have been called,
ordinary people from all walks of life. Where are all those academics? Their
absence has surely been one of the most important factors in lowering the
overall level of study.
Although it is not easy to get a solid answer, a few factors
suggest themselves. Perhaps the most general is that JFK research is tainted by
association—the greater academic community sees
the army of untrained, opinionated, emotional, and backbiting investigators and
runs the other way, wary of being associated with them and thereby
becoming tainted in the eyes of their peers. Academia views JFK research as the
next thing to UFOs, spontaneous human combustion, and body snatching, and maybe
rightly so. An academic must be strong indeed to swim against this tide.
Another major factor keeping academics away is that studying
JFK does not bring money to an institution. Even people who produce books do it
nearly always on their own. (Conspicuous exceptions are George Michael Evica and
Michael Kurtz, whose books were at least published by university presses.) In these days when sponsored research is the name of the game at
so many universities, JFK research is not a winner.
I expect that academics are also turned off by the bickering
and petty battles among JFK researchers. It is interesting and saddening to note
the near-absence of academics from the newsgroups and the "research"
conferences.
Another possible reason keeping academics away from JFK
studies is that they sense, rightly or wrongly, that few genuine academic
questions are involved. I suspect there are quite a number, though, but often
buried a layer or two beneath the surface.
Why did J. Edgar Hoover hide the OES data?
This question is fairly straightforward to answer.
Hoover hid the OES data because he realized that they showed nothing and would
thereby reflect badly on his organization in the eyes of the majority of the
populace who didn't understand the legitimate limitations of OES. Hindsight has
proved him right. The one person who tried to work with the data, George Michael
Evica, totally misinterpreted them. His book, And We Are All Mortal,
suffers to the extent that he based it on these data.
Why did Hoover hide the NAA data?
Hoover's actions with respect to the NAA data are harder
to understand, and I don't pretend to. At one level, he was just doing the same
as for the OES data, keeping secret something he wasn't sure would make his FBI
look stellar. But something else is going on here, for the FBI had essentially
cracked the mystery of the NAA data—in spite of
what Guinn said, they knew of the two groups of fragments and must have realized
what they probably meant. It is possible, however, that they felt insecure about
the interpretation because they didn't have enough background bullets to be able
to put the proper error bounds on the concentrations of antimony. This is
another way of saying that they would not have been able to back up their
interpretation to the extent necessary in dealing with the crime of the century.
They can hardly be faulted for feeling insecure, but they can be faulted for
hiding the very facts of the NAA tests.
But something else may still be going on at a deeper level.
We must not forget that the NAA data, with their two-bullet sense, work against
the FBI's official finding of three bullets—one each to Kennedy's back,
Connally's back, and Kennedy's head. (This official finding has never been
withdrawn, and so presumably remains FBI policy.) Hoover may have been hiding
the FBI's full understanding of the NAA data because they would have conflicted
with his earlier report to the Warren Commission, and Hoover could not have
stood such a public embarrassment. Whatever the reason for hiding the fact of
the FBI's NAA, American societ was extremely ill-served by it.
The societal cost of hiding the FBI's full understanding
Hoover's act of hiding the FBI's full understanding of
the NAA data effectively delayed the resolution of the assassination by 40
years. It created unnecessary confusion, with side effects that live on and
poison the whole atmosphere surrounding the assassination, perhaps forever. This
created a huge societal cost, one that is nearly impossible to fully evaluate.
Imagine how different the mood in America would have been over the last 40 years
if we had been able to view the assassination simply as the act of one deranged
loner and misfit who acted on the spur of the moment and got off three poor
shots, one that missed completely, one that hit Kennedy's back instead of his
head, and one that came within an inch or so of missing the head altogether.
Seen in this light, the assassination was a chancy feat indeed. No wonder the
assassin paused for a moment to review his "handiwork"—he,
of all people, realized to the fullest how he had snatched victory from failure
at the very last second. He knew his life had just changed forever, but also
that it almost didn't.
How different the last 40 years would have been if we had
been able to see the assassination the way Oswald saw it. We would have, if
Hoover had released the FBI's NAA data. But he denied us that chance, and
created 40 years of unnecessary doubt, confusion, and suspicion that
eventually became self-sustaining as it tapped into people's natural doubts and
suspicions. Hoover's self-centered act postponed
the day of reconciliation about the assassination by nearly half a century.
This was a villainous act, pure and simple.
Is this the real cover-up of the assassination?
It seems self-evident that keeping from the public
evidence as powerful as the NAA is a major cover-up. A strong case can
be now made that it was the biggest cover-up in the entire assassination and
aftermath. J. Edgar Hoover's reputation will be held accountable for this.
Ahead to Time to Let Go
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