History Of The NAA In The JFK Case
Claim: The FBI's early use of NAA on the fragments was an "honest
mistake."
Response: False. It was honest, but not a mistake. Its results were
confirmed by Guinn, and have yet to be refuted by anyone.
Claim: The FBI's resulting data were inconclusive.
Response: False. The data were of very high quality, except for the
systematic error that Guinn later found and allowed for. The FBI's
reproducibility studies have proven to be key in interpreting the overall set of
data.
Claim: Dr. Guinn saw what he wanted to see in the NAA data.
Response: False. Guinn interpreted his data in a careful, realistic way,
but without statistics. His conclusions remain untouched.
Claim: Guinn was not critical enough of his limited set of data.
Response: False. Guinn did not need to be more critical than he was, for
his data have been proven to be sufficient for the task.
Claim: Guinn's data is better than the FBI's earlier data.
Response: False. A careful look shows that the FBI's data were actually
taken more carefully and more thoroughly than Guinn's, save for the unfortunate
systematic error. The FBI had unlimited time, whereas Guinn had only three days.
Claim: Guinn's idea about matching WCC/MC fragments began a
long-standing myth.
Response: False. It is reality, not any sort of myth. RG's paper does
nothing to disprove it.
Claim: The FBI had not used NAA before they tested the JFK fragments
in 1963.
Response: True.
Claim: Dr. Guinn was willing to overstate the significance of his
results and the NAA results of others to try to advance the technique and his
career.
Response: False. Although he was surely interesting in promoting the new
NAA at that time, he did not overstate his results.
Claim: The FBI notes on the NAA were a mess.
Response: Irrelevant and subjective.
Claim: Articles after the mid-sixties began to back off on the claims
for the future of NAA.
Response: Perhaps, but irrelevant to its application to the JFK case.
Claim: NAA has virtually disappeared from the landscape, and has been
replaced by ICP and MS.
Response: True, but again irrelevant to JFK. This discussion is about how
the NAA was applied in 1964 and 1978, and even more about elemental analysis of
bullet leads in general.
Claim: People were willing to draw conclusions from a pathetic amount
of data.
Response: False. The best analysis to date shows that the amount of data,
while small, is enough to get a completely justified answer.
Claim: The historical interpretation of the NAA is based on many false
assumptions about lead, bullet manufacturing, and metallurgy.
Response: False. None of those things are needed to get the right answer.
Claim: The CABL "debacle" carries over to the JFK case.
Response: False. (1) It wasn't a debacle, since the NRC panel gave the
go-ahead to continue with it. (2) The FBI's version of CABL doesn't carry over to the JFK case because
the circumstances are so different.
Claim: The NAS study was a watershed for the [JFK] case.
Response: False. That study had no implications for the JFK case because
the circumstances are so different.
Claim: CABL has been put to bed.
Response: False. The NRC panel gave the go-ahead for the FBI to continue
to use it, but with tightened procedures.
Claim: CE 399 might not be the real thing.
Response: Groundless claim when all the ballistic and chemical evidence
are considered together.