©1995,
1999 by George Michael Evica
©1995,
1999 by George Michael Evica
The first executive session of the Warren
Commission was quickly followed by (at least) two later sessions concerned with
a threatening "dirty rumor": that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a paid
asset, an "informer," for the FBI. Afterward, having been once-burned
dealing with this topic, the Commission (or at least its chair Chief Justice
Earl Warren) apparently intended to avoid any future backdraft as the Commission
faced four months of testimony often touching on that same "dirty
rumor."
The fifth volume (5 H) of the Warren
Commission's 26 volumes of material is central to the topic of Oswald's possible
participation in U.S. intelligence activities. In Washington, Dallas, and
elsewhere, from May 6th, 1964, through September 6th, 1964, the Commission
listened to representatives of the FBI, including J. Edgar Hoover; the U.S. Army
(on wound ballistics); the CIA, including its Director and its Deputy Director
for Plans; Texas law enforcement officers on the state, county, and city levels;
the U.S. State Department, including the Secretary of State; the Secret Service,
including its Chief, James J. Rowley; and the Treasury Department, including
Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. The Commission also took testimony from
Mark Lane, asked by Oswald's mother to represent the accused assassin; from the
President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson and his wife; and from
several prominent residents of Dallas, including Marina Oswald and Jack Ruby.
First on this distinguished list of witnesses
was Alan Belmont, Assistant Director of the FBI, who testified in Washington on
May 6th, 1964. (5 H 1-32)
After some preliminary questions and comments,
Commission member Allan Dulles began the more serious inquiry, asking Belmont
about teletype operations connecting FBI offices; Dulles' specific example was,
appropriately for an Oswald focus, the link between the New Orleans and Dallas
FBI offices. (5 H 3)
Commission member John J. McCloy, also
adopting an Oswald focus, asked about U.S. "defections: to the Soviet
Union. (5 H 4) Both McCloy and Dulles questioned whether the so-called Oswald
FBI file had been "closed" or "open." (5 H-6) Within a
half-hour of Alan Belmont being sworn in, two Commission members (for whatever
their reasons) had begun to explore important issues in the Oswald "dirty
rumor" story.
Samuel A. Stern, Warren Commission staff
assistant counsel, referred to an April 6th, 1964, FBI letter prepared and
reviewed by Belmont (signed by FBI Director Hoover) and sent to J. Lee Rankin,
Chief Counsel of the Warren Commission. (5 H 6) Though its contents were not
given at that moment in Belmont's testimony, the letter did indeed summarize
(according to the Bureau) the FBI's relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald. (5 H
11) The letter, dated May 4th, 1964, reportedly answered "...a number of
questions which the Commission posed to the FBI." (5 h 6). The letter, a
response to a meeting on May 4th, 1964, between Warren Commission staff members
and Belmont, briefly described 69 items contained in the FBI's Oswald file. (17
H [CE 834] 804-813). Earlier, the Warren Commission had written a letter to the
FBI (dated March 26th, 1964) inquiring about the FBI's knowledge of Lee Harvey
Oswald before November 22nd, 1963; the Bureau's replies to the Commission's
thirty questions posed by its staff were delivered in an FBI letter (dated April
6th, 1964) with a separate cover letter signed by Director Hoover; many of the
Warren Commission's questions asked for information bearing directly on the
Oswald-as-agent question. (17 H [CE 833] 787-803)
Earlier in the session, Commission Staff
Assistant Counsel Stern had established the Commission's primary focus: Lee
Harvey Oswald. Belmont had commented: "As the individual in charge of all
investigative operations, [I am responsible for] the Lee Harvey Oswald
investigation..., the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau."
(5 H 4)
Stern soon arrived at the hearing's crucial
point: Belmont's "...examination of the investigation...of the nature of
the FBI interest in Oswald." (5 H 6) Clearly, Stern wished to examine
through Belmont the key issue of Oswald's rumored intelligence links. But Warren
interrupted Stern twice (5 H 6, 7), attempting to shut off Stern early in the
session. (5 H 7) In this exchange (and later exchanges involving Rankin),
apparently the Warren Commission counsel (Rankin and Stern) and Earl Warren
demonstrated quite different agendas relative to Lee Harvey Oswald and U.S.
intelligence.
But despite Warren's objections, Stern
persisted in exploring the Oswald-as-agent theme, querying Belmont about both
the FBI's domestic intelligence and identification divisions (on defection, on
Oswald's Marine fingerprints, on Oswald's correspondence, and on the Albert
Schweitzer College puzzle: (5 H 7). Though neither Stern nor any Commission
member (nor later, any Commission counsel) reportedly pursued the topic, Stern
elicited from Belmont that the FBI had "set up" certain
"connections with the State Department passport file" on Oswald's
(undefined) "activities" and on Oswald's "...dealing with the
[U.S.] Embassy in Moscow." (5 H 7)
Belmont further asserted that the FBI had no
interest in Oswald when he returned from the Soviet Union (5 H 8) and that
Oswald was "not known" to be connected to FBI "sources" in
New Orleans (5 H 9)
Despite Warren's interruptions and objections,
Stern (on behalf of Rankin and his Commission counsel and staff) had been able
to begin exploring hints of Oswald's possible intelligence connections.
Stern now introduced the Belmont summary of
the "HQ" FBI file on Oswald, its cover letter to Rankin dated May 4th,
1964, and entered into the Commission's evidence as CE 834 (17 H 804-813). Stern
established that Belmont at that moment was in possession of the actual FBI
file. (5 H 11)
Stern asked Belmont about "...materials
in that [Oswald] file...for security reasons you would prefer not to
disclose...." (5 H 11) Belmont responded by defining the file's
"security" materials: "The file contains the identity of some of
our informants in subversive movements." (5 H 11) Commissioners Warren,
McCloy, and Dulls and Commission Counsels Stern and Rankin (at least) must have
understood that the FBI's "informants in subversive movements" in the
so-called Oswald file had to include New Orleans and possibly Dallas informants
who had operated in side pro-Castro organizations and whose identities might
have led directly to evidence establishing Oswald as a U.S. intelligence asset.
Stern cautioned Belmont: "I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on
that." (5 H 11)
But is was not "enough" for
Commissioner McCloy (5 H 11), whose query of Belmont elicited a response from
Warren attempting to cut off any further questioning of Belmont on security
"matters" in the FBI's Oswald file. (5 H 11) Though he complimented
Warren on his security-conscious behavior, Belmont indicated that his chief J.
Edgar Hoover had insisted that Belmont be of "utmost help" to the
Commission. (5 H 11)
Belmont's testimony strongly suggested that 1.
the FBI (through Belmont) and Chief Justice Earl Warren had earlier scripted the
FBI's offer of the so-called Oswald file to the Warren Commission so that Warren
could reject it on "security" grounds but that 2. Commission counsel
Stern and Rankin (unaware of this probable FBI-Warren accommodation) were
working against Warren in order to accept the FBI's seeming offer of the file.
After Stern elicited from Belmont that the FBI
file was "...available to the Commission..." (5 H 11), Warren
countered by establishing the "...security matter" involving
identified FBI informers was contained in that allegedly complete file. (5 H 11)
Belmont verified that fact: "This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau
with all information in it." (5 H 11) Justice Warren responded: "With
all information in it?" (5 H 11: italics added) Belmont answered: "Yes
sir; this [the file apparently in Belmont's hands or on the table in front of
him] is the actual file." (5 H 11: italics added) Warren commented: "I
see." (5 H 11)
Now Chief Counsel Rankin intervened, asking
Belmont if he would indeed leave that actual file in the Commission's possession
so that"...any of the Commissioners [could]...examine it
personally..." (5 H 11) Obviously, Rankin intended to secure the purported
entire FBI Oswald file for his Commission staff. Belmont agreed to leave the
file. (5 H 11)
But Warren immediately interrupted with a
confused statement about non-existent "conditions" and not wanting
"...information that involves our security..." (5 H 11) How the
identity of FBI informers in New Orleans or Dallas might compromise the security
of the United States ("our security") was never made clear.
Warren then pushed his argument further,
rejecting the possession (and therefore the assumed use) of any sensitive
intelligence documents (5 H 11), opting for only Belmont's testimony. This
rejecting of a reportedly full intelligence file (on the accused assassin) and
relying solely on the sworn statements of an intelligence officer helped to
establish the Warren Commission's antipathy toward any documentation of Oswald's
suspected intelligence links.
Warren concluded his argument with a muddled
statement in favor of "open" discussion as opposed to reading and
talking about sensitive documents "in privacy." (5 H 12)
Rankin was now apparently willing to give up
almost all of his ground if only to be allowed to examine the FBI file; he
promised that "...the [Commission] staff will not examine it..." (5 H
12), a statement obviously directed at Warren rather than Belmont. But Warren
countered that reading the FBI file was "one thing" (whatever that
meant), but for him, asking Belmont questions about his summary of the Oswald
FBI was enough. (5 H 12) Finally, Warren defined his bottom-line position:
"...I really would prefer not to have a secret file...a file that contains
[security] matters of that kind in our possession." (5 H 12)
Rankin now had little leverage except to air
the vexing "dirty rumor," which he strongly hinted at in his final
major argument for accepting FBI's offer of the "HQ" Oswald file.
Though his impromptu statement was garbled, Rankin obviously wanted the FBI
Oswald file available so that the Warren Commission could, as he said,
"...be satisfied that nothing was withheld from it [the Commission] in
regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the inquiry."
(5 H 12) Rankin's two phrases, "this particular question" and
"the purpose of the inquiry," clearly pointed to the Commission's
continuing problem: the " dirty rumor" of Oswald's FBI link.
Allan Dulles accepted Warren's lead, but
McCloy, apparently now looking at a copy of the actual FBI file, interfered,
indicating Belmont's "summary" was disturbingly not "a complete
description" of the file's contents as McCloy examined it. (5 H 12)
Warren again tried to head off objections (5 H
12), but Rankin counterattacked, articulating the Warren Commission's strongest
argument for independent analysis of intelligence files, concluding: "...we
did want the [Warren Commission] record in such condition that the Commission
could say in its report, `We have seen everything that they have.' I think [this
file]... is important to the case." (5 H 13)
Further, Commissioner McCloy remained dubious,
suggesting that the Commission might miss "...the full impact of all the
narrative..." in the file's FBI reports on Oswald. (5 H 13) Both Belmont
and Warren then argued with McCloy, telling him that the Commission already had
possession of the particular FBI records to which he referred. (5 H 13)
Clearly, Warren was blocking any curious
Commissioner from reading through actual files and actual documents, whether
those materials were in the possession of the staff or not. For Warren, the
question seemed to be: Where would it all end?
Rankin persisted, trying to emphasize his (and
Stern's) argument: the Warren Commission would be in possession of
"...everything...the FBI had [on Oswald]...[;] this is their total
file...so that...nothing [is] withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned.
That is...what we [the staff counsel] are trying to develop this morning..."
(5 H 13: italics added)
Dulles again supported Warren, speaking to a
separate issue involving the staff, allowing Warren to close with his argument
against sharing files with non-government investigators: "...the same
people who would demand that we see everything of this kind would also demand
that they be entitled to see it, and if it is security matters[,] we can't let
them see it. It has to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny." (5 H 13:
italics added)
But Commissioner McCloy persisted in opposing
Warren, apparently looking at Belmont's file summary on telegrams from "the
Embassy" and "Mexico," key issues that later would be relevant to
both the so-called Second Oswald story and CIA manipulation of the
"Oswald" in Mexico story. (t H 14) Warren, however, triumphed, and
Stern and Warren moved to admit only the Belmont file "summary" (CE
834) into the record. (5 H 14) One last time, Warren emphasized his point:
"There are no security matter [detailed] in this [summary]?" (5 H 14)
Belmont then continued his testimony,
asserting that Oswald was neither an agent nor an informant for the FBI (5 H
14-16 and 29), speaking at length but to no productive purpose about the FBI,
the Secret Service, cooperation, and presidential security; about Ruby and
Communism; and, at least for the FBI, about some minor matters (5 H 16-32).
On behalf of the Warren Commission, its
chairperson Chief Justice Earl Warren had successfully refused to accept the FBI
HQ file on Lee Harvey Oswald, ultimately relying on the unsupported statements
of U. S. intelligence officers that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent (or
asset) of the U.S. intelligence community. Later, circumstantial evidence and
some of the CIA's Oswald files would be made available to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, strongly supporting the argument that Oswald may
either have thought he was a U.S. intelligence agent or was, indeed, an agent or
asset of--and provocateur for--any of several U.S. intelligence services,
including the FBI, CIA, NO, ATF, and at least one Senate subcommittee
investigating weapons traffic in the United States.
(From Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Volume 1, Summer 1995)