Arlen Specter, circa 1964

All Parkland physicians who submitted written reports regarding the treatment of President Kennedy were called to testify before representatives of the Warren Commission. Drs. Fouad A. Bashour, Charles R. Baxter, C. James Carrico, William Kemp Clark, Adolf H. Giesecke, M.T. "Pepper" Jenkins, Ronald C. Jones, Robert N. McClelland, and Malcolm O. Perry were all questioned at Parkland by Specter. In speaking with these doctors, Specter apparently became aware of several other witnesses who were present in Trauma Room One, who were not been previously known to the Commission. Drs. Don T. Curtis, Richard B. Dulany, Jackie H. Hunt, Paul C. Peters, Kenneth E. Salyer, and Martin G. White, none of whom submitted written reports, were also called to testify. Oddly, four additional physicians known to Specter were not called, and only one of the four was interviewed by government agents.

In his appearance before Commission representatives, Charles R. Baxter, M.D. was asked to name medical personnel he recalled as being present while the President was being treated. Dr. Baxter replied that "Dr. Carrico and Dr. Jones and Dr. Jenkins --- several nurses" were present. Later in his testimony, Dr. Baxter said, "I'm not sure whether the others came before or after I did. There was Crenshaw, Peters, and Kemp Clark, Dr. Bashour finally came. I believe Jackie Hunt --- yes --- she was, I believe she was the anesthesiologist who came" (6WCH 40).

Robert N. McClelland, M.D. told Specter that word of the assassination was brought to him by Dr. Crenshaw. When Specter inquired as to who was present during the treatment of the President, he named "Dr. Malcolm Perry, Dr. Charles Baxter, Dr. Charles Crenshaw, Dr. James Carrico, Dr. Paul Peters...[i]n addition, the ones that arrived afterwards, were Dr. Kenneth Salyer...Dr. Fouad Bashour...Dr. Donald Seldin...[and] Dr. Jenkins..." (6WCH 32).

Don T. Curtis, D.D.S. did not submit a report, but was called as a witness by the Commission. Dr. Curtis named Dr. Carrico, Dr. Perry, Dr. Baxter, Dr. Jenkins, Dr. Seldin, and Dr. Crenshaw as being in Trauma Room One. It should be noted that Specter failed to question Dr. Curtis on any specific points regarding the President's head wound (6WCH 59-60).

Like Dr. Curtis, Martin G. White, M.D. did not submit a written account, but was called as a witness, yet not asked about any specific details regarding the head wound. Dr. White told Specter that he recalled Dr. Carrico, Dr. Baxter, Dr. Perry, and Dr. Zedelitz as being present:

Mr. Specter: Doctor who --- what is his first name?
Dr. White: William Zedelitz.
Mr. Specter: To what extent did he participate?
Dr. White: I don't believe that he had any --- I don't know what he did other than the fact that when I was doing the cutdown he assisted me by just putting some tape over the catheters we used to do this with.
Mr. Specter: Is he an intern as you are?
Dr. White: He is a surgical resident here at this hospital (6WCH 83).

Dr. Salyer: I might mention also, I think just right after I came in the room Dr. Clark and Dr. Grossman also arrived.
Mr. Specter: Doctor who?
Dr. Salyer: Dr. Grossman, just briefly. He's a neurosurgeon also.
Mr. Specter: What is his name?
Dr. Salyer: Dr. Grossman --- Bob Grossman. He was just there, I think, briefly.
Mr. Specter: How long was he there?
Dr. Salyer: I couldn't say --- I'm not sure he came in the room. I know they were together---I cannot say that for sure.
Mr. Specter: To what extent did Dr. Crenshaw participate?
Dr. Salyer: Dr. Crenshaw participated about the extent that I did. We were occupied in making sure an I.V. was going and hanging up a bottle of blood.
Mr. Specter: Is the---is Dr. Crenshaw a resident?
Dr. Salyer: Yes, he is third-year resident. That's the reason I remember him specifically because we were sort of working there together on that (6WCH 80-81).

In questioning these witnesses, one of whom was ordered to appear with only a day's notice, Specter was told of the presence of four physicians who were in Trauma Room One while the President was being treated. Dr. Charles Crenshaw, Dr. Robert Grossman, Dr. Donald Seldin, and Dr. William Zedelitz were all named, yet none were called to testify. When Nurse Henchliffe could be called without having the standard three days notification, why were these four doctors not ordered to appear?

Dr. Charles Crenshaw, if called, would have told Specter that, in his opinion, the President "had been shot at least twice." He "identified a small opening about the diameter of a pencil at the midline of his throat to be an entry bullet hole" (CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE page 79). In addition, Dr. Crenshaw would have told Specter that "there was no doubt in my mind that the bullet had entered his head through the front, and as it surgically passed through his cranium, the missile obliterated part of the temporal and all of the parietal and occital lobes before it lacerated the cerebellum" (page 86).

Dr. Robert Grossman, a neurosurgeon, would have observed the wounds in greater detail than most physicians in the trauma room. If called, Dr. Grossman would have told Specter of the two large skull defects he observed. Like every other witness at Parkland, Dr. Grossman noted a large wound in occiput (High Treason, page 51). He later spoke of the second wound, saying, "[i]t was clear to me...that the right parietal bone had been lifted up by a bullet which had exited" (page 53). This wound, if closed with the remaining skull fragments and scalp by Mrs. Kennedy while en route to Parkland, could have been easily been concealed by matted and bloody hair, and would not have been readily visible to emergency room personnel.

Dr. William Zedelitz, who assisted Dr. White in a cutdown, was not called, and this author is unaware of any evidence to suggest that he was interviewed by investigators. It appears as though any chance to obtain comments from him were lost in Specter's failure to inquire as to what the doctor knew about the President's death.

Dr. Don Seldin, Parkland's Chief of Internal Medicine, was mentioned in Dr. Bashour's handwritten statement of November 22. Although present only briefly, he was interviewed by government agents whom he believes to have been from the F.B.I. Dr. Seldin stated in 1993 that he believes he was not called by the Commission because he had nothing of value to add to the investigation (Seldin January 14, 1993). If Dr. Seldin, who admittedly had little to do with the treatment of the President, was interviewed by government agents, why were Dr. Crenshaw, Dr. Grossman, or Dr. Zedelitz not contacted by the government?

As Dr. Seldin's comments were taken by F.B.I. agents, Specter may have known that he had nothing to contribute to his investigation. However, Dr. Crenshaw and Dr. Zedelitz would have been as important witnesses as Dr. Curtis, Dr. Salyer, and Dr. White, as each contributed equally to the effort to revive the President. Dr. Grossman, one of only two neurosurgeons to examine the wounds, was a potentially invaluable witness to the medical evidence.

Why were these remaining three physicians not called to testify, when fifteen others who were present in the trauma room were ordered to appear for questioning? Is it possible that Specter knew what Dr. Crenshaw and Dr. Grossman would say, and that their observations and opinions could not be explained away in what is quite possibly history's most hypothetical question (see Rush to Judgement, pp 403-404)? When this author put this question to Dr. Crenshaw, he replied that it is most unlikely. According to Dr. Crenshaw, the Secret Service's briefing of the Dallas doctors as to the official autopsy findings on November 29 ended virtually all talk among the medical staff regarding the assassination (Crenshaw April 19, 1995).

In a letter dated October 27, 1994 from this author to Senator Specter, he was asked why these potentially valuable witnesses were not called to testify. Not surprisingly, no reply has been recieved as of this writing.

As it is is unlikely that Specter knew of what these trained physicians would say under oath, one can only attribute his failure to question these witnesses as just another example of the Commission's incomplete and incompetent investigative procedures.

Whether or not the testimony of Dr. Crenshaw, Dr. Grossman, or Dr. Zedelitz would have impacted the outcome of the Commission's findings is doubtful. In following its preconcieved agenda, the Commission would have ignored their testimony, as it did in so many previously documented instances. While some may say that the descriptions of the wounds as detailed by Dr. Crenshaw and Dr. Grossman may not be in total agreement, their testimony should have been taken for later evaluation. In the end, the Commission's star witnesses would still have been the autopsy pathologists, but the accounts of these witnesses would have been in the official record.

Crenshaw, Charles A., M.D., Author's telephone consultation with, April 19, 1995.

Groden, Robert J., and Livingstone, Harrison E., High Treason, New York, Berkley Books, 1989.

Lane, Mark, Rush to Judgement, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966.

Parker, Brad J., Letter to Senator Arlen Specter, October 27, 1994.

The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

Seldin, Donald W., M.D., Author's telephone interview, January 14, 1993.

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