Subject: Belated Response To Jerry Re: MC Station
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2000 15:43:31 GMT
From: bishopm@my-deja.com
Organization: Deja.com - Before you buy.
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy.jfk

Jerry:

First, allow me to express my thanks and compliments for the civility
your displayed in your last reply to me.  I will attempt to respond in
kind.

When I previously wrote:

>Again, Jerry, I am NOT arguing that there was something odd about the
> October 1 intercept being red-flagged, for it should have been. But
> this was no less true of the September 27 intercept.

you asked for more information:

“So just tell me how you would have handled it if you'd been in
charge.”

And yet when I provided same:

> If my CoS had asked the perfectly legitimate question "Possible to
> identify?" I would have made an attempt to do so. I am NOT suggesting
> that it should necessarily have been completed successfully, but SOME
> attempt, ANY attempt, would have demonstrated a sincere effort.
> Instead, the issue was "reviewed and filed." You suggest that a good
> faith effort to do so was not undertaken because MC station was
>swamped with work and couldn't properly assess the data as it arrived.
>This in itself is an admission that the station was NOT "smoothly
>functioning" per your prior posts.

you apparently grew fatigued:

“Right, let's move on. I'm becoming bored with this topic.”

I fail to understand what compels one to demand more information, then
refuse to deal with it when provided.  In the very next instance,
rather than simply plead boredom, you switched instead to a lack of
awareness:

>You also failed to answer the question about the importance of Ms.
>Duran to the station. She had already been identified as Lechuga's sex
>partner, and had already been considered for recruitment/cooption, by
>placing a US national between her sheets. ANY phone call from her
>regarding an "American" should have piqued interest for that fact
>alone.

“Sylvia Duran had recently begun her job - I think it some 4-5 weeks
previously. I don't know when she was "identified as [Carlos] Lechuga's
sex partner" - perhaps you could tell me. I don't know when she
was "considered for recruitment" - maybe you could tell me.”

Jerry, you’ve read the Win Scott manuscript, and the Phillips HSCA
testimony in this regard, so why do you plead ignorance?   A redacted
portion of Scott’s manuscript [Lechuga’s name was excised ] alluded to
using Duran for MC station’s purposes, no doubt exploiting her
relationship with Lechuga as the necessary leverage.  When read the
pertinent portion, Phillips expressed surprise and told the HSCA: ”No
one let me in on this operation.”

It seemed as though Phillips acknowledged whatever was contained in
Scott’s manuscript must be true, before switching gears and expressing
doubts that Duran had ever been pitched, “because the station could not
identify her weaknesses.”  At this point, Phillips was read what the
Lopez Report called “reporting on file” [precise document undisclosed,
though it must have originated prior to Oswald’s visit in order to make
any sense], and was forced to relent.  Phillips ended up admitting, in
the words of the Lopez Report, “…it did indeed sound as if the Station
had targeted Ms. Duran for recruitment, that the Station’s interest had
been substantial, and that the weaknesses and means had been
identified.”

Phillips’ odd denial of awareness then is mirrored by your own odd
denial of awareness now.

Moreover, whatever you think the station didn’t know about Duran prior
to Oswald’s visit was apparently soon thereafter rectified.  On
11/23/63, in asking for Duran’s arrest, detention and interrogation, MC
station provided the Mexicans with Duran’s home and work address, her
home and work phone numbers, her automobile licence plate number, along
with the addresses of both Duran’s mother and brother.  When taken
alongside the foregoing “reporting on file,” this seems to be a fairly
detailed synopsis of critical data, if you’re arguing that MC station
had no compelling reason to interest itself in Duran, her sex partners,
her potential weaknesses, etc.

I’m also intrigued by your professed ignorance of Duran’s longevity at
the Cuban consulate.  No, Jerry; Duran HADN’T “…recently begun her job -
 I think it some 4-5 weeks previously.”  In point of fact, she
commenced work there in 1959 and left in 1964.  For a man so intimately
acquainted with the inner workings of MC station, its protocols and
targets of interest, your lack of data on Duran smacks of you being
disingenuous, but I will accept that your ignorance is genuine.

When you suggested it was unreasonable to expect MC station personnel
to attempt to locate the “telegram to Washington” about which - the
October 1 intercept revealed - “Oswald” inquired in the phone call, I
replied:

> It is NOT a case of dropping "important work and focus on activating
> agents" yadda yadda yadda. This is PART of the work, a natural
> portion of the station's function, NOT undertaken by it, but by its
>proxies at DFS. Just how much effort would it require to notify DFS
>about the existence of the purported cable, and ask for a copy? Was
>THAT too hard, Jerry? Too demanding a task? It was pro forma, part of
>the job.

You responded:

"I don't know what the Station's full response to the 9/27 intercepts
consisted of. Win Scott may have had plans very similar to what you
have suggested. I agree with you that it would be of interest. But, I
don't know what he planned or did - or didn't plan or do. Do you?"

Jerry, we need not indulge in retroactive telepathic exercises.  Again,
Win Scott’s own manuscript disclosed:  that the “Oswald” affair was far
from routine [“…Oswald became a person of great interest to us during
this 27 September  to 2 October period.”]; that the station’s interest
was instant [“…Oswald, having just arrived in Mexico City, made his
first contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico…”]; and that
appropriate measures WERE taken [“…we at first thought that Lee Harvey
Oswald might be a dangerous potential defector from the USA to the
Soviet Union… so we kept a special watch on him and his activities.”]

Your admiration for Win Scott has been restated here many times.  Why
are you so reluctant to accept HIS version of events?  Is it solely
because Scott’s own memoirs are so much at odds with the later reports
written by those who WEREN’T there in the pertinent period?   If so,
you owe Scott greater respect.  If not, just why, pray tell, do you
disbelieve the man who RAN the station?  In either event, what an ODD
way to treat one’s heroes.

You continued:

"But, that would be routine Station business as opposed to actions
taken specifically in regard the Oswald case. From that limited point
of view, we do know that the calls were not associated with Oswald
until after the assassination -- can we at least agree that that was
the case?"

We can, Jerry, but only by ignoring further statements from other
credible MC station personnel.  How about this HSCA testimony from
translator/transcriber Mr. T., which echoes PRECISELY the protocols
Scott himself had previously posited, but which were no doubt unknown
to him since he hadn’t read a copy of the manuscript:

“We got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of
this person because sometimes we had a so-called “defector” from the
United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on
them.  Not I – the Station.  Consequently, they were very hot about the
whole thing.”

Again, this suggests that merely taking note of a name and forwarding a
single cable to Langley was substantially LESS than the minimal
requirements, and WASN'T what happened at all.  Mr. T.’s recollection
reflects a fervent contemporaneous interest in Oswald.  Why display so
avid an interest, only to make NO attempt to locate the “dangerous
potential defector” who so concerned Scott himself?  The anomaly is
self-evident.

You also stated:

"I'll say this, that some of the actions you've listed would be
appropriate if SAY it was a suspected international terrorist that
was being talked about, rather than poor gun-waggling Lee Oswald, a
wretch just happened to go on to assassinate JFK."

To which I replied:

>PRECISELY the point, Jerry. MC station had no way of discerning
>whether "the American" WAS merely a wretch [gun-waggling or otherwise]
>or WAS an international terrorist, perhaps posing as "the American."
>ANY effort, even if unsuccessful, to divine which was true would have
>demonstrated the integrity of the staff.

Leading to your response:

"I don't know whether Win Scott considered this or not, and, if so - or
if not - what his directions were based on. Do you?"

All of the above gives us a pretty good clue, doesn’t it, Jerry?  But
you seem highly reluctant to accept Scott's manuscript as a true
version of what DID happen.

When I suggested that SA Hosty knowing Oswald had met with Kostikov was
virtually useless without SA Hosty also knowing about Kostikov’s
purported role as a Department 13 specialist, you replied:

"He knew that Oswald had said that he'd previously been to the Sovemb
and had spoken with V.V. Kostikov, yes.  As far as the "Department 13
operator" -- I don't know if anybody knows that even to this day.  Any
information or suspicions about Kostikov before the assassination were
limited to his being a probable KGB officer. Agreed?"

Yes, but MY GOD, that changed with tremendous speed, didn’t it?  Are
you not the SLIGHTEST bit interested in how this fact was SO
conspicuous by its absence from the documentary record PRIOR to
11/22/63, yet materialized as if by immaculate conception on 11/23/63,
at CIA’s own instigation?  The sudden emergence of this little nugget
put a WHOLE OTHER spin on previously innocuous events, Jerry.  While
this detail in and of itself does NOT prove CIA conspiracy to murder
the President, conspirators could have done NO BETTER than to float
this “fact” so soon after the President’s murder.

The subsequent emergence of other such details spells out an even more
diabolical attempt to tie Oswald to Department 13.  Recall, if you
will, the November 9 letter from Oswald to the SovEmb in DC, in which
Oswald ‘mistakes’ Kostikov for ‘Comrade Kostin.’  Soon after the
assassination, CIA likewise magically discerned that ‘Kostin’ was
Kostikov’s Department 13 code name.  Now, I ask you Jerry, how does a
lone nut gunman know more about the code names used by enemy
assassination specialists than the Agency itself did?  The clear
implication, the intended conclusion, is that Oswald was a ‘Kostin’
operative, for this was the ONLY way Oswald would have been privy to
such a detail before the Agency was.

This was compounded even further by the subsequent disclosure that
Department 13 gave its operatives a two year training.  In MINSK!
Another one of those magically-timed details of which the Agency was
wholly ignorant until the revelation could only assume the most
incendiary implications.

When you pointed out that it was the Bureau which dropped the ball when
Oswald was again Stateside, I agreed, and disagreed:

> Merely citing the deficiencies of the data's end user [no argument
>from ME that SA Hosty should have done more] does not absolve the
>parallel deficiencies of those who provided the data.

Yet having claimed SA Hosty was something less than vigorous in his
pursuit of Oswald, you seem to accept at face value his subsequent self-
serving attempts to dodge responsibility:

"SA Hosty tells me that in fact he could do no more. He had an open
file on Oswald as a potential security risk. He was far more concerned
about Marina Oswald as a possible sleeper agent sent by the Soviets.
Hosty has patiently explained to me that under the guidelines, he could
not even approach Lee Oswald. He could keep tabs on where he lived,
where he worked, etc.  He could not perform more than passive
surveillance unless Oswald did something that was against the law --
such as make a threat against the President's life."

Jerry, would that same prohibition have been binding upon SA Hosty’s
actions if he KNEW Oswald had consorted with the purported Department
13 Western Hemisphere chief?  Again, the timing of the Agency’s
knowledge regarding Kostikov’s ostensible “true” role is made suspect
by the ginger fashion in which it was handled by CIA, and the timing of
its ultimate disclosure.

I suggested that you consult with Annie Goodpasture regarding
prevailing protocols, which you apparently did:.

"Here is Ms Goodpasture's reply: "I would not be inclined to wade into
that quagmire. It would not be prudent. The reason is that I believe
the necessary facts were in the Warren Commission Report. Subsequent
revelations become extraneous additions to the circus of distortion
created by the press and media." "

Unfortunately, Ms. Goodpasture was sucked into that vortex –
the “circus of distortion” – when asked to reconcile the differences
between the contents of Win Scott’s manuscript - with which she
strongly disagreed, as you know - and the “official version” posited by
the Warren Commission which she claims is THE compleat history of the
event.  I don’t blame her for wishing to say nothing further on this
matter – even though she was, I assume, asked only about the protocols
in place for dealing with an “Oswald”-type character – because she
cannot do so without either further defaming the memory of her old
boss, or calling into question the integrity of the Commission Report
she defends.  Something of a Hobson’s choice, isn’t it?

I also suggested:

> > > Why not ask her why MC station assets inside the Cuban consulate
> > were NOT asked to determine the identity of "the American?"

To which you replied:

"Do you know for a fact that they were not asked?"

Jerry, given the immense pressure placed upon the Agency by SSCIA and
HSCA to explain the apparent anomalies prevalent in the MC affair, are
you suggesting the Agency would have foregone an opportunity to
DEMONSTRATE it had pursued every possible asset in an attempt to locate
the “dangerous potential defector?”

You also suggested that an attempt to speak with MC station’s own
assets inside the Cuban consulate was an onerous task for a station
already overburdened with other tasks.  I disagreed:

>It is the function of station personnel to maintain regular
> contact with assets, irrespective of any "special" tasks that may
> emerge. No "special meets" were required. What's more, in the course
> of such a regular contact, it SHOULD have come to MC station's
> attention that a particular Yanqui made quite a stink in the
>consulate, for it was the talk of the Cuban personnel, this ignorant,
>abusive, demanding Yanqui who expected standard bureaucratic protocols
>to be waived for him. For MC station's inside assets, it was a part of
>their function - a requirement, in fact - that they pay particular
>attention for persons such as "the American," a US national of
>undetermined allegiance who claimed a FPCC leadership role.

You felt this wasn’t quite so well known after all:

"I don't doubt what you say. I do recall Azcue's testimony that when
Oswald was there, only he and Mirabel and Duran were present in the
Consulate, which was quite small - have you seen the floorplan?"

Yes, Jerry.  And the fact that the consulate WAS so small made it
highly unlikely that the dispute was heard ONLY by the consular staff
you referred to above.  What’s more, one of Duran’s closer colleagues
inside the consulate was Luis Alberu, a man who passed MUCH data on to
MC station.  Being a regular recipient of such data presupposes regular
contact with the supplier of same, a contention made verifiable by the
volume of data he provided in the pertinent period, and subsequently,
after a lengthy absence when Alberu was posted elsewhere.  Of course,
CIA has done its level best to preclude us knowing anything about
Alberu, by sanitizing all documents of his name.  However, surely one
who has studied the case as much as you have obviously done has found
the tell-tale signs of Alberu’s data in numerous reports.

I asked about Phillips' apparent ignorance of this:

>You remember FPCC, don't you, Jerry? The group whose neutralization
>had been entrusted to MC station's covert eminence gris, DA Phillips?

To which you replied:

"When was he so "entrusted"? I recall that in Mexico City he had been
promoted from Chief of Covert Action to Chief of the Cuban Section. Was
he heavily involved with FPCC in Mexico City? I don't think he mentions
that in _Nightwatch_."

Well, Jerry, given the deliberate gaps and vacuums inside the Agency’s
documentary trail, we cannot say with certainty the precise date on
which Phillips was thusly entrusted with the task of countering FPCC
influence.  What we CAN say from the available documents is that this
transpired no later than February 1, 1961.  Subsequent promotions were
in addition to extant taskings, not a substitution for them.  And,
please, I’ll refrain from demolishing ‘Nightwatch’ as self-serving
eyewash, if you’ll likewise refrain from citing it as anything remotely
resembling a credible source.  Deal?

When I stated my hope that we could find ANY sign of interest:

>Again, Jerry, I am not asking MC station to have identified "the
> American" and determined he was a lunatic planning an assassination.
>I ask only what was pro forma for the situation at hand, which was an
> ATTEMPT - ANY ATTEMPT - to do so.

You wrote:

"I don't really know what attempts were contemplated or made - or not
comtemplated or made. My POV is strictly that of the Oswald case and I
do know that these calls were not associated with *him* until after the
assassination. Do you agree?"

Jerry, I don’t see how someone professing a perspective “…strictly
[limited to] that of the Oswald case” can simultaneously claim to know
what standard protocols prevailed in relation to such a situation.  How
can you conclude the “Oswald” case was not anomalous without knowing
ANYTHING about how other such cases were handled?

You apparently felt the need to defend MC station's CoS:

"Don't you think Win Scott knew how to run a Station? When he jotted on
the routing slip - I forget the date - "Possible to identify?" - he was
aware of the full range of options and made informed decisions.  Do you
doubt that?"

No, Jerry, you’re making my point for me, thanks.  What we’ve been
asked to accept to date ISN’T what happened under Scott.  On the
contrary, I take your point ENTIRELY, and ask you to accept that the
portions of the Scott memoir cited above are FAR closer to the truth
than you dare acknowledge.  If Scott was miffed that the Warren
Commission’s Report falsely characterized what was and wasn’t done by
MC station, I would be FAR more inclined to side with Scott than the
Commission.  But that’s not REALLY what you want to hear, is it,
Jerry?

Regarding the spurious 9/28 phone call, I suggested that if this caller
was a bogus "Oswald," then Mr. T.'s identification of the caller as
identical to the 10/1 caller made it certain BOTH calls were placed by
a bogus "Oswald."  Your replied:

"And tell me all about it, this "imposture. And don't leave out the
part about Boris Tarasoff commenting that the voice on the 10/1 tape
was the same voice who'd called on the 28th."

To which I replied:

> A FINE piece of work, that. It is commendable that Mr. T showed that
> degree of initiative, identifying a caller as synonymous with one four
> days earlier. Why, then, the failure to identify the woman on 9/28 as
> being synonymous with the same voice on 9/27, only one day earlier?

You countered:

"In fact, he did so identify Sylvia Duran as the caller. I believe
there was some delay in doing so. Perhaps you have the details at hand
and can share them with me."

Sorry, Jerry.  While it IS true that SOMEBODY later ID’ed the female
caller as Duran, it WASN’T done by Mr. T.  Nor have we been told who
made the ID, or when; only that it transpired at an undetermined
“later.”  But then, it couldn't have been TOO much later, for the tapes
were soon thereafter routinely recycled, weren't they?

> What's more, this opens up a HUGE can of worms for you, doesn't it,
> Jerry? If the 9/28 phone call was a demonstrable fraud, then
> presumably the same holds true for the 10/1 phone call too, doesn't
it?

"Yes, I agree. The question is: can you prove that the calls were
"demonstrable fraud[s]"?"

Yes, Jerry, but not without re-covering old ground at the risk of
you “becoming bored with this topic.”

The 9/28 intercept disclosed an “Oswald” who didn’t know his address,
but had managed to retrieve it from the Cubans.  Even if one accepts
that Oswald was not a uniquely gifted person, just how stupid must one
be to not know one’s own address, to count upon the Cubans to give it
to him?  How would the Cubans have known his address, if not from
Oswald himself?

Assuming Mr. T. was correct in his characterization of the caller’s
linguistic skills on 9/28, Oswald spoke in horrible, barely
decipherable Russian.    This was the polar opposite of what the
Commission itself was told by all the Russian speaking witnesses who
had encountered the ‘real’ Oswald.  In contrast to the 9/28 Oswald, the
10/1 Oswald presumably spoke much better Russian, since there was no
reference to his “…terrible, hardly recognizable Russian” on that
transcript.  This discrepancy alone virtually demands the use of a
second (or even third) “Oswald.”  Of course, a far more tenable and
less fanciful rationale is that the two SovEmb callers WEREN'T
identical, but that's not something you'll entertain, is it?

If one accepts the rendition of events posited by Nechiporenko – a MOST
dangerous proposition – Oswald left SovEmb @ 10:15 to 10:30 AM on
11/28, presumably to go retrieve his address from the Cubans, for
reasons never specified by anyone.  Yet the Cuban consulate was right
around the corner, and Oswald’s purported call from there didn’t
transpire until 11:51 AM.  Did it take Oswald 90 minutes to complete a
five-minute walk?  Did it take him 90 minutes to bang on the door until
somebody opened it?  And just who inside the consulate allowed him
entry, if not Duran, Azcue or Mirabal, all of whom denied doing so?
The consulate was closed on Saturdays, a point on which all consular
staff agreed.

According to Nechiporenko’s account, Oswald was repeatedly informed of
the bureaucratic reasons for his not being granted an expedited visa.
He didn’t even fill out an application.  So what was the necessity for
retrieving an address, from the Cubans or anyone else?  Even if he DID
provide an address, he would still face a 3-4 month wait for approval,
so what was the rush in providing the address on that day?

There is only ONE thing supporting the notion that this 9/28 caller was
genuine, and that is Mr. T.’s contention the voice was the same one
later captured on the 10/1 intercept, a contention made impossible to
verify by the alleged destruction of the tape.  One cannot compare the
timbre or verbal tics of two transcripts.

Compare and contrast that ONE tenuous strand of evidence with the self-
contradictory nature of the call itself, the caller’s apparent lack of
fluency in Russian, the pointlessness of providing the Soviets with an
address in support of an application that was never signed nor
submitted.  Does your common sense REALLY tell you that Oswald made
this call?  [I won’t even pick the scab of whether or not Dallas FBI,
Coleman and Slawson heard a tape.]

What’s more, it’s quite apparent that Mr. and Mrs. T. had divergent
views about another related point, the existence of a “missing”
transcript, which Mrs. T. described as lengthy.  In this intercept,
Oswald provided his name and alluded in some fashion to wanting
financial assistance from the Soviets.  She said she had transcribed
the intercept herself, a fact made simple by an anomalous fact: Oswald
spoke entirely in English.  On this point, the contrary recollection of
Mr. T. has been used to impeach the version told by his wife.

Yet Mrs. T.’s testimony could instead be used with equal facility to
impeach her husband’s version.  If she had transcribed this “lengthy”
intercept herself, how could Mr. T. be so certain, so long after the
fact, that a document HE hadn’t generated never existed?  Mrs. T’s
version received confirmation from an unimpeachable source (in your
view), Jerry; no less than David Atlee Phillips.  As you well know,
Jerry, just prior to his own HSCA testimony Phillips told journalist
Ron Kessler that Oswald told the Soviets: “I have information you would
be interested in, and I know you can pay my way.”  Since no extant
intercept shows Oswald alluding to any financial topic, let alone
cutting a deal for indeterminate “information,” Mrs. T. and Phillips
were presumably referring to the same phone call, the same intercept,
which is, technically, “missing.”

The “lengthy” transcript may have received partial confirmation from
Win Scott as well, for his manuscript revealed what must have been a
relatively long conversation, in order for Oswald to have imparted all
the details which Scott attributed to him.  Among other topics, Oswald
reputedly “…further told this Soviet that he should know that Oswald,
his wife and child wanted to go to the Crimea….”  There is no extant
intercept including anything like that.

Scott’s manuscript provides additional cause for concern.  Oswald “…was
observed on all his visits to each of the two communist embassies; and
his conversations with personnel of these embassies were studied in
detail, so far as we knew them.”  Studied in detail?  Such phraseology
suggests there was more being studied than the extant intercepts (even
granting the 9/28 intercept is genuine), for they offer precious little
TO be "studied in detail."  Again, we have the suggestion of  something
outside the known record.  A more likely subject for being “studied in
detail” would be the tapes themselves.

But how many "embassy visits" did MC station observe?  In describing
the SovEmb visitations, Scott used the plural [“…contacted the Soviet
Embassy on at least four occasions…”]  Strangely, Scott specifically
used the singular in reference to the Cuban consulate [“…and ONCE went
directly from the office of Sra. Sylvia Tirado de Duran…to his friends,
the Soviets.”]  Surely if the 9/28 intercept, the prelude to a second
visit to SovEmb that same day, had legitimately transpired, Scott’s
language would have said “…and TWICE went directly…..”  [CAPS are my
emphasis.]  Clearly, Scott himself discounted ONE of the two calls
announcing Oswald’s pending arrival at SovEmb.  Faced with a similar
choice, which intercept would YOU discount, Jerry?

Scott depicted a circumstance in which MC station was instantly aware
of Oswald’s first telephone overture to SovEmb, which transpired BEFORE
he visited the Cuban consulate; acknowledged the possible importance of
Oswald by keeping “a special watch on him;” his conversations
were “studied in detail;” and “Soon after his arrival and first talk
with the Soviets, we received a brief sketch on Lee Harvey Oswald from
headquarters, in answer to our request for information on him.”

Jerry, THIS is the way Scott ran his station.  MC station KNEW about
Oswald’s presence while he was there; KNEW about his contacts with the
Cubans, which was thereafter denied; KNEW that Oswald's contacts
involved requests for at least one travel visa; DID contemporaneously
contact Langley for background materials, and DID receive precisely
that, contemporaneously.

Scott himself wrote, and I think we should heed it:  “These visits and
conversations are not hearsay; for persons watching these embassies
photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the
time he spent on each visit.  The conversations are also known to have
taken place....."

Scott's certainty can only be discounted by impeaching Scott himself,
which I'm NOT prepared to do, your own misinference of my point of view
notwithstanding.  I take Scott at his word, for this is PRECISELY the
kind of mettle that EARNED Scott his retirement medal.

What’s more, there’s no reason to believe that this was the first or
last time somebody kept “a special watch on him and his activities:”

NYT – 11/25/63, page 8 – headed OSWALD MADE A VISIT IN SEPTEMBER TO
MEXICO, the article includes: “William M. Kline, assistant United
States Customs agent in charge of the bureau’s investigative service
here [Laredo, Tx], said Oswald crossed the border Sept. 26 bound for
Mexico City and returned Oct. 3...  He said Oswald’s movements were
watched at the request of “a Federal agency in Washington,” but
declined to give any further details.  “I’m not at liberty to say,” he
said.”

NYT – 11/26/63, page 14 – headed OSWALD VISITED MEXICO SEEKING VISAS,
the article includes: “A Mexican government source said today that Lee
H. Oswald, the slain suspect in the assassination of President Kennedy,
was in Mexico from Sept. 26 until Oct. 3 attempting without success to
get visas to Cuba and the Soviet Union.  There were reports here also
that his movements were followed in Mexico by an unidentified United
States agency.  The United States Embassy here declined to confirm or
deny any knowledge of the visit...  Apparently Mexico secret police had
observed the American from time to time, but the Government official
said it had not been determined where he lived during his stay in
Mexico City.  It has been established , he said, that he did not meet
with any of the known established leftist groups here...”

All of the contemporaneous evidence suggests that MC station's handling
of the "Oswald" affair was substantially more than routine.  All of the
subsequent rationales offered for a contrary "routine" handling were
offered because it was the minimal requirement for explaining
the "routine" destruction of the tapes, the otherwise inexplicable lack
of activity displayed in the surviving paper record, and CIA's failure
to stress the possible importance of the "dangerous potential defector"
Oswald to other agencies.

In closing, some highly perceptive words from Win Scott, albeit offered
in a radically different context: “A great deal was written by people
who knew a smattering and tried to divine, from what little they knew,
a story in which they hoped that what they said would eventually be
taken as fact.”

Precisely, Jerry.

Precisely.

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Before you buy.